Government officials as a quasi-body of Polish state-owned companies




corporate governance, supervision, State-Owned Companies (SOCs), government officials, supervisory boards, management boards, Treasury, Ministry of the Treasury, Ministry of State Assets


Background: State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), like other joint-stock companies, are determined by external and internal corporate governance mechanisms. In SOEs additionally operate a mechanism that is absent in private companies, i.e., supervision by government officials. The article analyses the impact that such supervision has on SOEs.

Research purpose: The article’s purpose is to demonstrate government officials’ impact on State- Owned Companies (SOCs) and identify its formal and informal determinants.

Methods: The research is multidisciplinary, comprising an analysis of legal regulations and a survey carried out among members of SOCs’ management and supervisory boards and officials of the Ministry of the Treasury who supervise those companies. The research sample encompassed the entire population, i.e., all Polish SOCs where the rights derived from shares are exercised by the Minister of the Treasury and all officials that supervise those companies.

Conclusions: The government officials are a quasi-body of SOCs and a unique corporate governance mechanism that not only supervises companies directly but also influences other corporate governance mechanisms. The administrative nature and political influence on government officials are an obstacle to ensuring the business efficiency of companies that are supposed to respond timely and adequately to specific market situations.


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How to Cite

Postuła, I., & Wieczorek, A. (2021). Government officials as a quasi-body of Polish state-owned companies. Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne, 119, 333–353.