Law as justice? Rawlsian foundations of non-positivism




John Rawls, non-positivism, jurisprudence


Background: This paper offers an interpretation of John Rawls’s philosophy as applied to jurisprudence.

Research purpose: The purpose is to interpret the ideal of the original position as a device of non-positivist jurisprudence, which help us to better understand the theoretical bond between justice and law, as well as make a case for non-positivism.

Methods: Analytical jurisprudence, conceptual analysis, reflective equilibrium

Conclusions: The paper argues that Rawlsian original position can be applied in constructing a non-positivist conception of law, and that within the Rawlsian scheme moral considerations are indispensable when determining legal validity.


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How to Cite

Rupniewski, M. (2021). Law as justice? Rawlsian foundations of non-positivism. Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne, 119, 91–106.