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FROM THE EDITORS

After the European Union great enlargement on May 1, 2004 and the following accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the number of the European population covered by various EU policies including the Common Agricultural Policy increased in a significant way. It resulted in two major processes forming the starting point of considerations encapsulated in the presented volume. The first one has been focused on the structure of European societies that underwent major transformations and consequently diversification of the social positions, types of the political involvement in public life as well as increasing diversities in value systems. At the same time the role of the rural population as a potential political force influencing EU social and political life has also increased. Simultaneously one of the priority objectives of the – if we might put it in this way – EU development project has been focused on the protection of natural as well as cultural resources located mainly in rural areas. Therefore the current LIX volume of the 'Sociological Review' has been devoted to the problems of rural areas of contemporary Europe in order to show the complexity and the richness of the issues mentioned above.

Articles published in the presented volume have been collected as an attempt to challenge, at least partially, the issues briefly described in the previous part of the note. However, they were gathered in different ways. Some of them were presented at the European Society for Rural Sociology (ESRS) congress held in Vaasa, Finland in August 2009. I turn, some of them were prepared as a reaction to the exclusive invitation by the editors of the volume. As a result the volume contains seven articles prepared by sociologists from France, Greece, Czech Republic and Poland. They cover the issues of sustainable development, international mobility, rural family as well as decollectivisation of agriculture, civic participation, class diversification among peasantry and marketization of rural resources. All of them address more general issues (sustainable development, decollectivization, international mobility, civic participation, class diversification as well as marketization of rural resources) but at the same time are rooted in particular social and cultural national contexts, namely: Poland, Greece, Czech Republic or, more general, in European ones.

The volume has been opened by Mark Barbier's article in which the author outlines a new platform for debate for representatives of rural studies within the Actor – Network Approach. His analysis has been focused on particular relationships between society, science and technology. Maria Halamska and Marie Claude Maurel analyse comparatively determinants and consequences of the systemic transformation at the turn of the 80s and 90s in XXth century, in rural areas and agriculture of Central European countries (Czech, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary). Charalambos Kasimis discusses one of the hot issues in Europe, namely: the subject of international mobility into rural areas in conditions of socio-demographic imbalance of resources in European countries, particularly in Greece. Pawel Starosta, using extensively some data from the European Social Survey, attempts to explain the level, modes and associations of civic participation of rural population across Europe. Krzysztof Gorlach and Marta Klekotko, basing on a series of survey studies, focus on transformations of the Polish peasantry in the years 1994–2007.

In turn, Hanna Podedworna analyzes the process of marketization of rural resources in Poland. Finally, the last chapter of the volume has been prepared by Vera Majerova who considers major tendencies in the transformation of rural families in the Czech Republic. Last but not least the volume has been supplemented with the review prepared by Katarzyna Zajda who discusses the book on "Rural Sustainable Development in the Knowledge Society" edited by Karl Bruckmeier and Hilary Tovey, published in 2008 by Ashgate Publishing Company that covers extensively various issues of rural development in the countries of Western as well as East-Central Europe.

Moreover the editors of the volume would like to express their gratitude to Lynda Walters for her contribution to editorial correction.

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MARC BARBIER
INRA, Paris
barbier@grignon.inra.fr

THE ECOLOGIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE TREADMILL OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. A CRITIQUE IN A STATE OF TRANSITION*

Abstract

This communication tries to shape and to ground the idea that Rural Studies and Rural Sociology have a particularly promising job to do in re-assembling the Social, the Natural and the Technical within the treadmill of sustainable development. It is argued that the cross-fertilization of the ecological modernization movement and Social Studies of Science and Technology (particularly Actor-Network-Theory) is giving the opportunity to establish a perspective that might enlighten and accompany the processes of making agricultural sciences and technology more ecological. But this requires specific conditions and ways of doing social studies in situations that include those processes.

Key words: Sustainable development, Actor-Network-Theory, modernization, biopolitics.

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INTRODUCTION

Following the important account of the ecologization of agricultural policy in Europe developed recently by Deverre and de Sainte Marie (2008)[1], we would like to develop some ideas about the parallel life of Science and Technological Studies (STS) and Rural Studies (RS) during the 90's. Doing so, we would like to underline the fact that there are already some existing or promising relationships in the multiple senses and narratives about ecological modernization, either in its early alternative agri-food system foundations, or in the booming eco--governmentalization of agriculture and rural space.

We would like to propose the idea that Rural Studies and Rural Sociology have a particularly promising job to do in re-assembling the Social, the Natural and the Technical within what critically thinking might be called today "the treadmill of sustainable development".

More specifically, it is argued that the cross-fertilization of the ecological modernization movement and Actor-Network-Theory is giving the opportunity to establish a perspective that might enlighten and accompany the effective ecologization processes of modernized agricultures under certain requisite deliberative conditions.

1. THE TREND TOWARDS AN ECOLOGICAL MODERNITY

1.1. The ToP

The theory of the "Treadmill of Production" developed in the late 1970's by the Schnaiberg's group represents the pillar of a critique of the effects of capitalism on the environment as delineated by Catton and Dunlap (1978). Capitalism was compared to a treadmill in which accumulation processes generate a demand for consumption while at the same time industrial production leads to consumption of natural resources along with the addition of wastes to the environment – according to Max Weber, until the last ton of coal. This vision assumed an equivalence of the exploitation and rejection of labour forces on one side and the addition and subtraction of natural resources on the other.

[1] We want to thank Christian Deverre for some - and too short- moments of discussion about some ideas developed here. Our thanks also go to the members of the team of INRA Sciences in Societies, who help me through permanent debates to frame some of the ideas that are developed in this communication (special thank to M.Cerf; P.B.Joly O.Thiery and T.Tari).

As Buttel (2004) had shown: the relative decline of this theory during the turn of century does not necessarily mean that there is a complete denial of its potentiality. Nevertheless, the debate that took place during 2004 in *Organization Environment* indicates that many issues are still difficult to integrate. Wright (2004) notably pointed out two questions to be addressed to the "Treadmill of Production"; they seem perhaps even more relevant today than when proposed:

– in light of the rise of direct consumption practices or green consumerism involvement, the predominance of entering in the treadmill through the temporality of production and not consumption is an important bias;

– in light of the eco-service economy and the deployment of eco-government processes and apparatus, the idea that the environment is only to be mined for natural resources or to be used as a trash dump, does not account for the economy of recycling or industrial ecology.

It would certainly be possible to justify the critique and the idea of a new treadmill of sustainable development. The sustainable development framework is born with international convention on natural resource use and protection, and it has promoted a conceptual framework and a grounded legitimacy for a new kind of individual or collective rights in relation to environmental justice. All these new rights are closely related to the material or immaterial realities of science and technology either depreciating or healing the environment. However, the use of S&T in a sustainable perspective requires a new political space (Latour, 1993) and a re-engagement of the social consequences (Redclift, 2005) to clarify the fact that a market governance of sustainability would mean addition and subtraction of environmental justice according to a non deliberated distribution of risk (Beck, 1992).

But let's go back in the 90's. While delivering a review of the sociology of environment, Buttel (1996) had already established a continuity between the quite pessimistic environmental sociology movement and the forthcoming positive considerations of the «*ecological modernization school of environmental sociological thought in Northern Europe*», as he named it. Quoting the early work of Spaargaren and Mol (1992) (Buttel, 1996: 70) , he was pointing out that «*the development of environmental knowledge and social pressures were creating a basis for deflecting the course of modernity in the direction of ecological modernization*». At the same time, Schmidt (1993) was also using the notion of "ecologization" to point out the fact that environmental policies should pay attention to the social conditions that may be favourable or an impediment to an ecologization of the economy, such an economization being considered as a new phase of the civilizing process.

The quiet conflagration of those two contrasted positions about ecologization, reflects particularly well how the Rio Conference in 1992 might have shaped, at that time, the agenda of the new political-economic regime of post-industrialised countries while internalizing, in purpose, what the environmental and neo-Marxist critiques were starting to consider as a new frontier for intellectual fights and social movements.

Concomitantly to the treadmill of production framework, the premises of the ecological modernisation were thus about to be shaped in Berlin, Netherlands and the UK during the end of the 1980's (Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000), and this inspiration was also found within rural sociology as a theory of non-centralised and unplanned change of social order because of environmental damages (Mol, 1992; Mol and Spaargaren, 1992). Many others also contributed to this theoretical emergence in Wageningen and Cardif (namely J.D. Van der Ploeg, H. Renting J. Murdoch, P. Milbourne and T. Marsden). Those colleagues took the establishment of environmental issues as a turning point and a set of concerns to frame a research program. It did so in relation to the definition of alternative solutions to the post-industrial agri-food system described by Allaire (1996) and the decline of the national food system linked to a national agriculture (Friedmann and Mc Michel, 1989).

The inevitability of the ecological modernisation process was then leading to a comprehensive and propositional agenda of social research with the explicit aim to develop a quest for ecological modernisation, which certainly did not mean, at that time, to take part to the greening of agro-chain strategies or agricultural policies (see notably Marsden, 2004).

Nevertheless, the early foundation of this research has possibly underpinned the role of farming techniques, of farmers' reflexive account of ecological modernisation and what all the organisation of production means in relation to agro-chain management (see Deverre and de Sainte Marie, forthcoming). The reduction of ecological modernization to a type of alternative (local organic farming and local consumption) might have represented, for a while, an efficient framework but perhaps a counterintuitive position because what we called the treadmill of sustainable development was starting to improve its efficiency. But, it is also to be noticed that the general orientation of the ecological modernization model also contained a pragmatic promise: a constructive resistance to industrial agri-food system was also an alternative and a positive model associating very directly farm and rural development with innovative modes of food consumption, a "*new rural development paradigm in Western Europe»* as labelled by Goodman (2004). This is certainly why the «ecological modernization» theorizing has

somehow to be considered as continuous with the foundations of the critique of capitalism opened by the environmental sociology with the Treadmill of Production.

This "*new rural development paradigm"* had thus much to say and propose about how to socially engineer new paths of development with claims for more organic farming; claims for new social practices and institutional reframing involving more NGOs in governance structure and claims for the empowerment of local political élites (Mol, 2000). More recently, mobilizing the idea of a metabolic relation, some works brought evidence that alternative systems linking producers and consumers on a local scale not only represented a, so to say, political alternative but also an alternative that solved problems with the newness of the food system either because of food scares (Stassart and Whatmore, 2003) or because of market uncertainty related to globalization of the agro-chain (Lamine, 2008). The potential for exploration of the multiple benefits of an ecologized agrifood system has certainly not come to an end.

1.2. The competing narratives of ecological modernization

If, during the 90's, the ecological modernization theory of rural sociologists has proposed a consistent theoretical framework, one could also say that it did not improve the comprehensive account of the ecological modernisation that was starting to take place within so-called conventional agriculture under local agri-environmental experiments and under the resources from the greening of agricultural policy. Ecological modernization started to include a variety of possibilities in terms of institutional arrangement of sustainable development (conventional, standards, labelling) and space (regions and nations). One has also to look at ecological modernisation as a manifestation of this profusion, and following York (2004: 355) to note that: *what appears to be improving environmental performance as part of the modernization process may not be due to a general trend toward sustainability associated with modernization but rather, due to a trend toward increased variability of environmental performance in institutions in late modernity*. In this perspective, the variability makes it difficult to grasp what is really happening but the profusion represents primarily *extreme cases that appear to be ecologically modernizing*. This argument has to be seriously challenged because it considers ecology of knowledge and practices, which might echo our sensibility.

There are recent proposals to indicate a broad approach of the diverse rural worlds and a systematic account of pathways towards sustainability through

agriculture while also paying attention to the distributional consequences of dynamic changes in agriculture (Thompson and Scoones, 2009). In this kind of platform, the issue of ecologization is less oriented to alternative food system orientation; instead, it explores the various master frames and narratives that shape the political agenda of sustainability. Ecological modernization could mean, among other things, a rationalization process until the last acre is turned into "biofuel cropping". The proliferation of narratives and public concerns about agriculture and rural life is certainly something to bear in mind. Lockie (2006) has acknowledged in newspapers the central role of narratives about organic food plays the double role of giving concrete answers and attesting to all types of controversial food-related issues.

Moreover, it is to be noticed in this short genealogy that over the past decade the achievement of sustainable agriculture has been a central narrative in the work of many organisations (governmental and intermediary bodies, NGOs, professional organisations and research institutions). Various political, technological or research programmes declare future targets and objectives to improve sustainability in various subsectors of agriculture (animal production, arable farming, glasshouse horticulture, etc.). Whether to develop organic farming or to develop an Integrated Production scheme, the relations between agronomic sciences, agricultural technologies and public or private expectations are at stake. This has led to claims for "slow innovation" concerning the purposes and ways of designing new technologies or new relations to old techniques. In fact, these claims indicate a need for a shift in the governance of research and innovation to achieve a sustainable future of the agrosystem for the 4 Fs: food, feed, fuel and fibres.

The competition of narratives thus does not concern only food production and the system of provision, but also includes increasing numbers of narratives concerning agriculture as a multifunctional and technological sector. The narratives also include objectives addressed to agronomic sciences in order to develop the regime of evidences that could ground the measurement of sustainable agriculture according to multifunctional objectives and globalized governance of carbon emission and storage. There is new promise in the paths for an ecologically intensive agriculture. This new promise presents itself as very technical and modernist, similar to how the green revolution had also been justified (Griffon, 2006). Brooks (2005) has suggested a stimulating comparison between the green revolution and the agri-biotechnology regime that will certainly have to be enlarged to this new narrative of ecologically intensive agriculture, possibly with GM organisms. The idea of a third Green Revolution has also been proposed to promote ecosystemic engineering based on ecological principles (Hastings et al.,

2008), and, thus, it is challenging agricultural research practices and objectives. This is not necessarily the type of challenge addressed by agroecology (Altieri, 1989); nevertheless, there are more paradigmatic and common approaches of farming practices there than with the type of Science and technology policy that has been promoted under the European Knowledge Based Bio-Economy (KBBE) for the last 5 years at least. But also, there are multiple meanings of KBBE (Coombs, 2007).

There is an asymmetric competition between different paradigms, as Vanloqueren and Baret (2009) have recently claimed, and certainly a biotech paradigm that has comfortably flourished under the CAP and consequently has locked-out agroecological innovation. One could easily feel that it could get even stronger under the new KBBE, based on innovation in molecular biology, in the use of biocatalysts and in crop breeding and management systems within sustainable objectives. It should be noticed that agroecology does not rely on the same type of scientific practices, regime of data collection or on the same type of sociotechnical arrangement to develop an innovative system, even when fibres or agrofuel are concerned. Thus as Vanloqueren and Baret (2009: 981) have announced, *This means not only a more balanced allocation of resources in agricultural research, but attention to the larger Framework that influences S&T choices*. Advances in Sciences studies and Science Policy Studies about the management of knowledge and transition in agricultural research is announced here.

With the development of a new green technology the notion of ecologization also addresses technico-industrial progress and innovation as well as political messages for governance and economic incentives for innovation in agriculture (Higgins, 2006). Looking forward, it seems then that there are different views and theoretical foundations of the ecological modernization promise. Also the debates about this notion and the competing knowledge systems that are exploring what sustainable development is are certainly providing new ways to redefine agriculture and rural development. Debates about the nature of science and technology are clearly crossing many boundaries.

2. SCIENCE STUDIES, ACTOR-NETWORK-THEORY AND RURAL & AGRICULTURAL STUDIES

2.1. ANT in the Rural

The purpose of the previous section was not to establish a full genealogy and academic review of ecological modernization. It was simply to clarify the debates about the dichotomy between Nature and Society that explicitly ground the "treadmill of production" framework and to explain "ecological modernisation" perspective had proposed to heal with alternative means. This is a limited account of technological and knowledge systems, and not much about how farmers, advisors, technical knowledge and even life sciences scientists are locking-in or even deconstructing the "treadmill" and rebuilding alternative farming practices. The opposition between the Natural and the Societal, which grounds the modernist agricultural project, appears to be criticized. But this critique does not address many Knowledge and Technical aspects despite the fact that it has brought human agency back into matters concerning environment and sustainability of agriculture.

A critique of the Nature/Society divide within the ecological modernization project has been straightforwardly addressed to rural sociologists by Goodman (1999) and also by Human geographers (Murdoch, 1997). After some scholars had started to introduce ANT methodological considerations (Arce and Marsden, 1993; Bush and Juska, 1997; Whatmore and Thorne, 1997), Goodman (1999: 17) radically introduced the ANT points of view: *agrofood studies are weakened by their methodological foundations staying in the modernist ontology*" and he proposed to "*renounce the methodological erasure of nature and expose its foundations in the reductionist ontology of modernity* (op. cit., 1999: 18). To frame this critique, the notion of corporeality was developed and was to be understood as a metabolic relation, which is networking in practices, settings and intermediary-objects, the "on the land" production of food and the "in the plate" consumption of food. It is also metaphoric in the sense it covers what is performed in between. Thus, corporeality also signifies *organic, eco-social processes that are intrinsic to agriculture, to food, to agro food network and the hybrid constitution of the practices in the social worlds* (op. cit., 1999: 18). However, in order to make the concept adequate to the study of agro-foods networks, the notion of "second nature" is also introduced to reify agriculture and agrosystem and to define the nature of agriculture as being *produced in interaction with social labour, and*

the corporeal metabolism that describes the nexus of food and human bodies of production and reproduction (op. cit., 1999: 18).

As Higgins (2006) has also claimed more recently, more space has to be devoted to the centrality of the non-human in agri-food studies. Also the idea that there are modes of ordering (Law, 1994) that enable us to depict strategy and to move between actors and contexts; this framework has been mobilised by Lockie and Kitto (2000) to introduce ANT methodology in agro-food studies. Following the idea that we should go beyond the open-up and closing-down of controversies about the nodes of power relations within agro-chain, we should enter a more systematic programme of identifying and analysing the resources and contingencies of modes of ordering that are building agrofood networks in relation to science and to environmental management.

2.2. Issue of the agency of non-human objects

This defence for the reintroduction of the agency of non-human object and the issues of the politics of networks corresponds to an internal evolution of debates in the STS. We would like, at this point, to make a quick jump within the debates that have surged in the STS community about the methodological problems that contains or raised the ANT perspective.

Laboratory studies (Latour and Woolgar, 1978; Knorr-Cetina, 1982) and David Bloor's strong programme are well known for having set the place of sociology of science and technology within a symmetry principle (that could even be applied to sociology itself for D.Bloor). The SCOT model of Bijker, Hughes and Pinch (1987) has developed a very clear methodological foundation to study the expressed, voiced and vested interest of social groups in problem definition and problem solving processes that take place in innovation processes. The perspective opened by this attempt contrasts with the emphasis put by localism and integrationist studies of scientific work and laboratory life represented by Star (1995). ANT was born in the attempt made by social studies of science to bridge the human and technical agency of laboratory life and the human and technical agency of technological innovation processes in society. The concepts of translation, intermediary object, obligatory point of passage, and immutable mobiles have been used by many to give an account of the co-construction of techniques used among all players in the script of simple technical objects or complex technical systems.

ANT scholars had received strong critiques about the consequence of the equivalence principle between human and non-human in the alignment of actor-

networks. To accept that non-humans could have agency and master human action (and have been designed for that purpose) was signifying that social interests, morale issues, and all democratic discussions about science and technology would be denied or pushed outside the boundaries of actors in networks if not translated into it. For many STS scholars this "tour de force" was reinforcing the modernist forces of techno-science; it did not Bruno Latour paint the scientist as a capitalist entrepreneur of efficient theory. But, early on, Law (1992) had anticipated the possibility of this critique. Nevertheless it is true that translations that are clarified, after a long process of negotiation with multiple sophisticated arrangements, are easier to study simply because they are more "visible" and sometimes they more "noisy" when socio-technical controversies had to be closed.

Anyway, thinking that ANT means the biopolitics of the "lonesome innovator" is missleading. The semiotic of the agrochain is, first of all, a methodological framework for the de-construction and understanding of power-relations, heterogeneous human and non-human agency, functional materiality and knowledge that are illuminatedin networks. For example, Law and Mol (2008) described the collapse of the technique of boiling pigswill because of the FMD epidemic in the UK. Because the technique failed on a single farm, recycling feedstuff coming from any place in the world where FMD is possibly endemic has stopped; it has triggered a large epidemic and while the debates were taking place about the origin and the management of the early stages, the metabolic economy of recycling was not considered to be very important – for much and as in the BSE case *the boundaries were taken to be far more important than sharing food a bit more equally*. What we mean here with this case study is that ANT is enabling more than a flat description of innovation and allows discussion about human affairs.

When one leaves the language of technoscientific networks, there is a need to explain how networks fit or not, and under what kind of local, historical determination or contingencies to the area of practice or organisational setting the actor-network is relating. Akera (2009) recently made a very stimulating methodological proposal based on a metaphoric extension of an ecological view of knowledge in order to uphold the distinction between different scales of analysis while following actors of networks at *different representational scales, corresponding to historical events, social institutions, occupations and disciplines, organizations technical knowledge, skilled practices, material artefacts, and human actors*, (Akera, 2009: 418).

2.3. Biopolitics of actor-networks in the Bios

After this short attempt to justify – if needed – the desirability of the ANT perspective, what is more important to notice in STS is that many recent intellectual discussions are about innovation that presumably either directly or indirectly affects the human bios itself. These innovations may be in scientific practices (biomedical innovation, stem cells, cloning techniques) or human practices that affect and are self-transforming bodies (or ideas of natural bodies); the idea of what is natural and what is not is being reinvented (the Cyborg of Harraway, 1991). When STS scholars take biomedicine and biotechnology as a matter of inquiry (either into resistance to biopower or into the pathways of innovation), what life sciences researchers or clinicians do to the human *bios* is frequently questioned in terms of social control, surveillance, knowledge and ethics. This also raises questions about the status of gender in debates that are partly ontological and partly political in STS[2]. Moreover, and it is a particularly important point, the question arose regarding how STS work and knowledge could be or should mobilized in those public and political debates about governing societies with technoscience affecting the bios (the Paris 4S/EASST was clearly very much concerned by this issue).

The scientific and public issues of food scares, of GMO controversies, of animal welfare in husbandry, and lately about biosecurity and climate change indicate that the Science-Technique/ Society divide was hiding the fact that the politics of Nature were also at stake within the technoscientific project. We could even say a "second nature," to go back to Goodman's (1999) "second agriculture": a first Nature, for example, with locally selected seeds and with GMO as techno-scientific artifacts extended from the laboratory to the farm; and a second Nature of organic products or GMO as being metabolised in the environment or in human corpus. This second nature has been at stake and a matter of controversy and regulation in the EU, whereby the US regulation had consecrated the nonexistence of it because of the principle of substantive equivalence.

Within an ANT framework we could say that domesticated animals or plants for the food supply have at least three political voices: one as represented in the human work to breed them and put them into a metabolic relation (from farm

[2] The ontological debate about the naturality of the human being is clearly addressed. Gender issues have also been flourishing in STS, with a charge of feminist STS against mainstream STS ignoring their work although the sciences war had presented STS as a unified front, but also with a claim that the insights of feminist scholarship can help to improve understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge, culture, and practice (Whelan, 2001).

to plate); another as represented in the human work to select or transform their genetic characteristics and the human agency that results from being able to engineer changes by techno-scientific and/or breeding practices; and finally the fact that their ways of being in rural spaces are increasingly a matter of monitoring for sanitary and environmental advantages and, why not soon, according to their efficient contribution to global warming and CO2 storage.

What we see here is the development of three political layers to discuss and/or contest the performance of the politics of natures: farming, technoscientific and monitoring practices and expertise of the Rural.

3. THE JUNCTION OF THE DIVIDES AND AFTER

3.1. Parallel lives of 2 Divides

At this point of my reasoning I would like to sketch the idea that Rural Studies and Rural sociology on one side, and Science and Technological Studies on the other have been evolving quite separately: The divide between Science or Technique and Society has only recently confronted the issues of the politics of Nature[3] for STS; and the divide between Nature and Society has hidden the politics of Technology in the ecological modernisation project as I discussed in the first section on Rural Studies. The existence of those parallel divides is, I guess, why *ANT has been slow to find its way into agrofood studies* (Goodman, 1999: 26). As Murdoch (1997) had already proposed, a non-dualistic and symmetrical perspective on nature and society has to be grounded with the ANT early observations. As far as those divides are recognised and also identified as sources of questions, problems and new scientific issues, we think that there are two directions for social studies involved in the matters of cultivating, engineering, transforming, managing, and governing "Nature".

One direction is to consider that there are disciplinary ontologies to be maintained despite the divide. For instance, after a review of the literature of the Nature/Society debate, Goldman and Schurman (2000) confessed that they recognise the usefulness of considering nature-culture hybrids in order to understand the new political identities, tools and strategies of new biotechnologies; but they concluded that «*sociology remains at its best when it tries to understand*

[3] This is not the case of Latour (1993) and certainly many other works about environmental controversies in STS, my views might looks like a caricature, but I find that the "bio political turn" is recent and perhaps also very European. This should be clarified and challenged.

how new and enduring structures, institutions, and practices exploit and dominate people and nature, as well as reveal new strategies for emancipatory politics. We believe that once scholars begin to rethink the framework of the society-nature divide, other cherished but flawed ideas will also reveal their weaknesses. We hope that from this process, a new sociological imagination will spring» (*op.cit.* 2000: 578). ANT would thus only be an exotic trip or something like the night diary of Bronislaw Malinowski, and then Bruno Latour would be happy to say that the Moderns definitely speak for forked tongues.

Another direction is to consider that there will always be enough scholars to take care of the disciplinary pillars of academic knowledge- important because some elements of traditions are necessary to shape meaningful points of view. There is thus no intention to fight with academic knowledge. More urgent in this second direction is to take the risk of recognising the divisions that ground our modernity (Latour, 1993), and thus our position towards: (a) people who are not thought to be modernized enough and (b) our responsibility for the tremendous effects of modernity on climate and biodiversity, as the ToP might have explained it in its own way.

The ”primitives of our modernity” are not defined anymore by colonial and post-colonial science. Thinking about agricultural development in terms of divides has always been raising unproductive questions. Who has to take the blame of under-development? The peasant as the technocentric and modern narrative is always doing when technology are not adopted (Handy, 2009). Who is the patient when environmental and sanitary damages are advocated as public problems that directly question the type of technological package engineered by agronomists: The farmer or the agronomist engineer? There is here a possible turn in defining what is normal and pathological for society (Mol, 1998), and there are scientific claims made by STS colleagues that agricultural science and technology is locked in a technological paradigm that tends to exclude other approaches: ecological modernization has also become a matter of the ecologization of agriculture science and technology.

But it would be too easy to trigger a science-war-game with Sokal-like hoaxes, playing one good sustainable science against another. It seems that the dynamic of S&T in agriculture could quickly find different pathways that promote the need of ecosystem engineering (Hastings et al., 2008), conservation techniques (Goulet, 2008) and financial assets based on biodiversity conservation, while at the same time supporting organic food and slow innovation. Clearly we do not

know what is going to happen though we know the many skills of entrepreneurs that lead them to take advantage of the possibility of scarcity.

At least, we are sure that ecological modernisation is having its "second nature" since the accelerating proliferation of eco-govermentality and ecosystem services in the past 5 years call for much more work on the treadmill of sustainable production. Moreover, the concrete sustainability schemes are frequently require participatory mechanisms in order to design more robust technology. The contestability of the promises of techno-science as well as the contestability of technologies deployed in society both call for new ways of governing the process of innovation in societies, especially when there is collective risk. The development of studies about participation and participatory design in the field of STS clearly indicates this trend (Lengwiler, 2008), either in the macro biopolitics of expertise (climate change, biodiversity notably) or in the micro biopolitics of innovative design. For social or biotechnical research in and on the rural and agriculture, participation is of course a matter of getting into biopolitics with the treadmill of sustainable development, but it is also a matter of professional attachment to the situation, place and social worlds where – through participatory programmes, scheme, project, etc.- scientists are going to get close to the materialisation of biopolitics in *dispositif* (Barbier, 2008).

3.2. Conditions for a junction of the Divides

So what to do with the two divides we have presented? I guess two things.

1. First of all to recognise the idea that there is a co-production of technology, nature and society; and that a ANT-like methodological approach in this co-production provides a unique flat vision of socio-technical hybrid constructs, which are controlling society in particular ways, and are grounding this controlling separate 'natural' characteristics (Jasanoff, 2004: 21). Pestre (2003) suggested that during the past thirty years this coproduction has corresponded to changes in the forms of regulation of knowledge production, particularly with the decline of the national states regulation system and with the intensification of infra or supra state regulation in the form of standards that operate at the international level and with the existence of international civic epistemologies.

New regimes of power-relations are then appearing within the legitimacy that the protection and value of environments had gained in discourses. It comes to the point that the notion of biopower itself has to be re-problematized (Lazzarato, 2000) since the co-production of science, nature, technologies and social order seems to have reached new frontiers with issues of global change

and sustainability. It is not only the integration of biological life into politics that matters; beyond that, the contestations and moreover the disputability (either legitimized or in civil disobedience) of this integration has produced a public problem to design policies and to participate in politics regarding bio-risks, threats, diseases, etc. This integration may define the governance of science and technology in a much more hands-on conception of biopolitics, where practitioners, regulators, stakeholders and activists do not conceal the fact that they are making history in a state of vulnerability and that irreversibility follows from decisions or non-decisions. Governmentality is certainly also starting to be driven as much by pastoral power as by what could have been labelled pastoral surrenders during the 70's.

2. Bearing in mind this type of current post-Foucaldian and govermentality studies (Lemke, 2001; Dean, 2006), a pragmatic approach of the "use of our knowledge" in this turn is an obligation that we cannot escape. We shall not only produce ontology and methodology to get the Social Sciences right, we also must perform the re-assembling of the social, the technical and the natural. This is perhaps the condition that we have to address in disciplinary points of view such as Goldman and Schurman (2000) have delivered. And this, we cannot do from our desk.

But, there are conditions of possibility for this re-assembling in the light of our exploration of STS and RS. I mean that it seems difficult not to be present, as social scientists in the "field", whatever the intensity of this attachment. It also seems difficult not to "invite" those who create knowledge and technologies on one hand and not pay attention to those who have concerns, ideas or oppositions on the other. Thus, the systematic treatment of the dynamics of coproduction and the re-assembling of the social, the technical and the natural is something that can take place in specific conditions and *kairos*.

This means a pragmatic and pluridisciplinary oriented programme, which many scholars of rural studies, rural sociology but also certainly many STS scholars have in mind, which consists in taking part into participatory research or projects with interdisciplinary challenges and scientific objectives, as well as political surface and stake-holders (see an example of mobilizing Interactive Technology Assessment in the case of biotechnology in Marris et al., 2008).

It also means that the re-assembling of the Social, the Technical, the Natural can only happen in defined circumstances of entering collective experiments where matters of concern and matters of facts (Latour, 2004) are simultaneously at work in specific *dispositif* or promising organizational arrangement, which might have certain properties (see Barbier et al. 2004):

– to involve situations and practices of cooperative design between scientists, engineers and practitioners;

– to involve a certain level of worrying without tolerance about the re-framing of occupations and identities in systems of practices (farmers, land managers, R&D engineers, scientists, etc.)

– to involve a certain level of hybridity and openness in order for claims and concerns about producing "Natural" goods (first of second agriculture) to be translated.

What we mean here is that the re-assembling of the social, the technical and the natural is requesting a dense milieu of heterogeneous practices, a collective exploration of the potentiality of innovative design and of course to cross many of the organisational and institutional layers that new arising networks will cross (Joly, 2005).

In this perspective, Grin (2007) brought back the notion of reflexive modernisation from Beck (1992) and the structuration theory of Giddens to consider the re-structuration as the interrelated transformation of structure and action through structuration processes guided by the deliberated re-orientation of modernization. A reflexive modernisation in this way is not to be considered as "re-modernisation". Bos and Grin (2008) applied this framework to a pig husbandry research project dealing with the side effects of first modernisation and trying to get out of a narrative about a successful project, to establish the idea that participatory research is possible crossing reflexive design methodology to supply the instrumental and describes the necessary institutional conditions to facilitate re-orientation of modernization. I think we could easily replace this kind of pig husbandry with any ecological experiential setting in organic farming or integrated production.

Indeed, a variety of new sociotechnical "system innovations" are coming to match – and even create – the sustainability challenges in various agrofood systems; and we know that the promotion of narrative about green technical change will not be enough to answer the challenges of civic epistemologies or sustainable consumerism. But, one must also not forget the willingness to change towards sustainable solution that is growing in agricultural R&D organizations and technical centres (Barbier et al., 2005).

The enormous challenges of sustainability (and precisely because it is an oxymoron) will also require new regulations, changes and transition management, and necessarily institutional "hybridity" (Allaire et Wolf, 2004) and reflexive governance (Voss et al., 2006; Elzen et al., 2004). Such changes and transitions are taking place at the level of systems of production, distribution and consumption and are related to societal tensions, political purposes, economic expectations

that can take place within a given sector or in the interplay between different sectors. There is an enormous amount of work in the treadmill of sustainable development.

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MARIA HALAMSKA,
University of Warsaw, Warsaw
m.halamska@uw.edu.pl
MARIE-CLAUDE MAUREL
Higher School of Social Sciences, Paris
maurel@ehess.fr

DECOLLECTIVISATION OF AGRICULTURE AND RESHAPING OF AGRARIAN STRUCTURE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

Abstract

This article is about the decollectivisation of agriculture which took place in Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia and Poland in the first half of the nineteen-nineties as well as about changes in the agrarian structure which were to be observed during the next decade. We argue that significant structural transformations have affected the agricultural domain and altered the way it is used for production. As a result of the transfer of property rights, agricultural land and part of the forests have changed hands. The process of decentralisation of the methods of farming the land which has affected the area of agricultural production is occurring with varying intensity depending on the country and the region. Re-established as the result of decollectivisation, private ownership of the land has been dispersed among a large number of landowners, sometimes without any direct link with agriculture and the rural milieu. More than a decade after the privatisation of the land, the land market is slow to re-establish itself and to play its role fully. Furthermore, farming structures have not become more stable. In a certain number of cases, capital restructuring is taking place within enterprises that have taken over from the former collective farms. Weakened by the impact of greater competition, the less efficient farms have been gradually eliminated. The decrease in the size of the workforce needed for agricultural land continues. The restructuring of the agricultural sector remains incomplete. Far from being fixed, the picture we have

painted should be regarded as a snapshot rather than as the culmination of the transformation that has been launched.

Key words: Decollectivisation of agriculture, agrarian structure, central Europe.

INTRODUCTION

This essay is about the decollectivisation of agriculture which took place in Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia and Poland in the first half of the nineteen-nineties as well as about changes in the agrarian structure which were to be observed during the next decade. For the third time in the 20th century, the Central European countryside corrected the trajectory of its agrarian evolution. It did so for the first time at the beginning of the 20th century when, through many albeit unsystematic agrarian reforms, the newly emerging states in the region made an effort to solve their "agrarian issues". These agrarian reforms, interrupted by World War II, were completed in the nineteen-forties by new communist governments or governments which remained under communist pressure. The new legislation (decrees and acts of parliament) of 1944–1945 lay down the rules of obligatory division of land among the peasants without compensation, which were implemented by 1948. Enforced in different years in different countries, as communist rule consolidated, they finalised the peasantisation of agriculture. This peasantisation was incomplete, because another radical process began in the late nineteen-forties, i.e. collectivisation.

The history of this process in Europe is still incomplete and its definitions have changed over the years. Collectivisation usually means liquidation of peasant farming by means of the creation, under political, economic and administrative pressure (as well as terror), of large co-operative farms. A french geographer defines the process slightly differently, taking as his point of departure the Soviet model of agriculture (organisation of production based on two types of large, non-private farms: the kolkhoz and the sovkhoz) and understands collectivisation as the popularisation of this model and its institutions throughout the world[1] (Sivignon,1992–1993).

The prospect of agrarian decollectivisation suggests yet another distribution of accents in our attempt to define collectivisation. Here we shall define

[1] Collectivisation in this sense took place in the nineteen-seventies. It made its last, ephemeral conquest in Portugal (in Alentejo and Ribatejo) after 1974.

collectivisation more broadly, as the process whereby organisational, production and social structures and specific mechanisms for their functioning are developed in agriculture. This is the specific process of absorption of the peasant farm by the so-called socialist economy, based on central planning. This process took place in two stages. The purpose of the first stage (1949–1962) was to lay the foundations for collective farming. In order to do this it was necessary to deprive the peasants of their economic autonomy, take control of their property and clamp them down within the collectivist organisational system. The second major stage of collectivisation – the nineteen-sixties and seventies – witnessed the implementation of collectivist agrarian order. This stage involved, above all, the development of agrarian structures in the broad sense, of a dual, welfare-and-production logic of their functioning and of the "new farm man", i.e., decomposition of the farming occupation by introducing narrow professional specialities.

We will start with an assessment of the transition processes in the agrarian sector; the ways they have been carried out have turned out to differ considerably, and the extent to which their initial objectives have been achieved has likewise varied. Regardless of the results achieved, the moves away from collectivism demonstrate the influence of the agrarian legacy on the strategic choices and the routes taken by the restructuring process. In the second part, we will analyse the specific features of the way restructuring has been carried out in different countries and the diversity of structural forms resulting from this. Finally, we will consider the different processes of agrarian restructuring that took place on the eve of integration into the EU, and the part played in them by various categories of farming entities.

DECOLLECTIVISATION AND CHANGING PROPERTY STRUCTURES

Collectivist farming is farming based on large, complicated, hierarchic production structures which are rooted in collectivist property (i.e. property owned by either a group or the state) and which function according to a dual, welfare-productive rationale. "Decollectivisation is a process of elimination of collectivist farming in its two varieties: cooperative and state. Decollectivisation, therefore, must mean changes in ownership relations, changes in the ways production structures are organised and changes in functional rationale. Changes in the economic sphere (particularly in the property structure and organisational hierarchies) lead to changes in the social structure of the countryside. These

changes lead in turn to changes in attitudes and values. Decollectivisation of agriculture is a significant part of the process of transformation in agrarian segments of post-communist societies" (Halamska 2008 p.8).

Decollectivisation thus conceived is a process which began in Central-European farming in the early nineteen-nineties. The concept itself, however, emerged in the nineteen-fifties and had a different connotation. Originally, decollectivisation meant the spontaneous process of dissolution of farming production cooperatives during the post-Stalinist thaw. Decollectivisation as it was then understood had a narrower meaning than it does today. There is also another difference between the two decollectivisations. Decollectivisation in the `fifties meant the return to pre-collectivist *status quo ante.* Decollectivisation in the `nineties did not lead to the reinstatement of any pre-collectivist *status quo ante* because of the different countries' different socio-economic structures, their different locations on the modernisation scale and the advancement of world-wide globalisation processes.

The essence of decollectivisation is the change in the way property is conceptualized. Socialism – as Jadwiga Staniszkis demonstrates in her *Ontology of Socialism* – had its own systemic identity, largely determined by the specific form of ownership called collectivist ownership, a kind of collective ownership which cannot be divided into parts and which cannot change hands (Staniszkis 1989). And although, chronologically speaking, decollectivisation began with the destruction of collectivist logic, the socalled socialist farm (co-operative or state-owned), the nexus of the decollectivisation process had to be the change in the relationship of individuals to property and to each others involved in agriculture. Various types of agrarian assets, belonging to – often unidentified – collectives (the co-operative, the state), had to find concrete owners. Hence the appropriation process, the reverse of expropriation in the broad sense which was the framework for agrarian collectivisation, was initiated.

This multifaceted appropriation process has its own dynamic. We can distinguish three phases: a) the preliminary, euphoric, stage during which the legal foundations for appropriation are laid down, b) the optimistic, primary appropriation stage during which nominal owners are ascribed to property and c) the ongoing state of secondary, realistic appropriation leading to factual ownership. Secondary appropriation also involves transformation of the property structure which was developed in the previous stage. Concentration is a particularly interesting aspect of secondary appropriation.

Although liberalism has no structural foundations in any of the analysed countries and no historical tradition, except perhaps in Czechia, the vision of individual freedom, rule of law, respect for property rights and rooting of the economy in private ownership and the free market was ubiquitous in this part of Europe in the late nineteen-eighties. Liberal ideology emerged "first as a kind of communism rebours, and therefore largely as a set of principles which opposed the official ideology and were basically its reversal" (Szacki 1996, p. 91). Post-communist society did not have a civil base for liberalism, a so-called middle class, and private property was practically non-existent. What did exist, however, were the liberal reformers and it was they who began to declare capitalism as a model, an ideological project.

The idea that privatisation of agriculture is the logical consequence of the liberal option of transformation of post-communist societies. On the other hand, it has a logic of its own, rooted in the post-peasant (in the actual and/or ideological sense) nature of Central European societies[2] populated by peasants, formerly collectivised peasants or their legal descendants. This is why the privatisation of agriculture is so politically important and the legal framework for this privatisation was usually developed prior to the first free elections in Central Europe. Therefore, legislation concerning privatisation also has an agrarian stigma. Through the choice of dates which are the reference points when determining property rights[3], through the use of a specific vocabulary, particularly the open use of the term `agrarian reform, through the principles inspiring certain solutions (area restrictions of the value of compensation[4], recognition of the `moral right' of those who work the land to own the land[5]), through the allocation of plots to workers or `landless' village people, through the accompanying concern about proper use of space (rational plot division), these acts of redistribution are acquiring the meaning of agrarian reform. All this reflects the complex ambiguity of the assumptions underlying this social restoration (Maurel, 1997).

Legislation concerning agrarian privatisation has its national specificity and is part of the more general transformation rationale in each country.

[2] By the actual post-peasant nature of these societies we mean the share of farming populations in these countries' social structures in the late nineteen-thirties and the symbolically post-peasant popularity of agrarian ideology at that time, exemplified by the then powerful peasant parties.

[3] In all cases, those dates included effects of communist agricultural reforms, conducted until 1948.

[4] Limits in Hungary, Slovakia.

[5] In Hungary.

Most liberal of all is the philosophy of change adopted by the Czechoslovakian reformers who acted on the assumption that the most important element of economic transformation was the emergence of owners because it was they, as responsible economic actors, who would find the best way to use their property and stimulate economic restructuring. The key words of the Czechoslovakian philosophy of agrarian transformation are: property rights sanctioning possession and unrestricted use of property, restitution, i.e., regaining nationalised property, privatisation meaning the transfer of state property to private hands, and transformation, meaning conversion of collective farms into other social forms of organisation of production. Acting on these assumptions, Czechoslovakia developed the most liberal, consistent and complex legislation including rehabilitation, privatisation, restitution and transformation laws. From 1990 on we have a series of legal acts regulating the restitution of property confiscated in various periods, crowned by the restitution act of 21St May 1991. Estates nationalised between 15.02.1948 and 01.01.1990 were to undergo restitution in kind. Their owners or heirs could apply for restitution in kind and, that not being feasible, they were to receive compensation, part of which was to be paid in cash and part in Restitution Investment Fund bonds. This major act of parliament continued to be obligatory in the two republics which resulted from the division of Czechoslovakia: the Czech Republic (Czechia) and the Slovakian Republic (Slovakia). It was supplemented in Slovakia by an additional act of parliament on the restitution of ecclesiastic and monastic property. The original act was amended in 1996 when the provision was added that satisfaction of demands for restitution is the obligation of the new owner or the Slovakian Land Fund (founded in 1991). Up to 150 ha of arable land and 150 ha of forests were to be returned. These limits were lifted in the Czech Republic. The framework for the transformation of agrarian production co-operatives were laid by a separate act of parliament passed in 1992. This act defined eligibility for participation in the division of co-operative property and the procedures for such division and it also gave the deadline for completion of the legal reorganisation of the farms (1993).

The Hungarian solutions followed a different philosophy, although here too, the key words were: property rights, private property, transformation, privatisation, compensation and restitution. In contrast with Czech philosophy, the Hungarian philosophy of transformation is not based on mass privatisation because "Hungary adopted a different strategy, i.e., one of seeking and encouraging owners/users who had initiative and were willing to take the risk associated with maximally effective asset management. The Hungarian

authorities believed that mass privatisation, limited to modification of the property structure only, would not stimulate restructuring without which there could be no guarantee of effectiveness. (OCDE 1993, p. 54). The Hungarians wanted to achieve two mutually incompatible goals: to transform property rights and at the same time to ensure continuity of functioning in agriculture (Maurel 1997) – hardly surprising if we consider the place which agriculture occupies in the Hungarian economy. In this case, agrarian decollectivisation involved privatisation of state-owned enterprises and farms on the one hand and transformation of farming co-operatives on the other. This process was regulated by three groups of legal acts which reflected both the specificity of collectivisation in Hungarian agriculture and the considerable saturation of the as yet socialist Hungarian economy with market mechanisms. The legal framework for decollectivisation was provided by a number of acts of parliament: four compensation acts (1991), two acts regulating transformation of agricultural production co-operatives and several acts dealing with privatisation but not limited to agriculture alone. All in all, these acts rendered the process of decollectivisation in Hungary quite complicated and ambiguous, not only for the external observer. The procedure for compensation for nationalised land which was to be partial, regressive gradual decrease OR a lowering of tax rates for sums below a specifit amount? and step-by-step was the most complicated of all.

Polish legislation is quite humble vis-a-vis the legislation presented above. This is justified to a certain extent by the size and specific nature of the collectivisation of agriculture in Poland[6]. The legislation is based on the same values which determined the specific rationale of the "Balcerowicz reform", the values of functional economic liberalism which highlight such functions as effectiveness and efficiency and clearly neglect or underestimate other aspects of property rights. The legislation said nothing about reprivatisation, a situation which has persisted to this day with numerous economic, political and psychological consequences. The few existing acts of parliament dealing with decollectivisation in Poland fit into this philosophy very well. Only state-owned farms were to be obligatorily privatised in accordance with the act of 19 October 1991 which defined the forms and methods of their privatisation. Co-operative farms could be transformed but their transformation was not obligatory. After 1989 agricultural production co-operatives continued to operate on the basis of the co-operative law passed in 1982. A 1990 act decreeing obligatory liquidation

[6] Sector of collective farming occupied approximately 20% of land.

of all co-operative unions gave farms complete independence but the possibility of property transformation was limited until autumn 1994 due to the still existing principle of indivisibility of co-operative assets. Certain possibilities of change of the internal structure are provided by the share valorisation act of August 1991 and the change in the organisation and operation of co-operatives and share revalorisation act of October 1992. These acts make it possible to privatise part of the co-operative assets (mainly houses) and to take the road of several stages to transformation of co-operatives into companies. But it was not until the cooperative law was amended in 1994 that property transformation became fully possible. This amended act states that the entire co-operative assets belong to the members cum natural persons and can be divided among them if the co-operative is liquidated.

The legal foundations for decollectivisation are reviewed in Table 1. The legal solutions pertaining to decollectivisation can be divided into several groups: a) legislation pertaining to restoration of full property rights to owners whose rights were limited by collectivisation (the peasant right to ownership of land in production cooperatives); b) legislation pertaining to restitution of, or compensation for, property which was confiscated or nationalised in a way recognised as illegal; c) free distribution of property according to a combination of "reparative justice" (according to input) and "re-distributive justice" (according to work effort); d) sales in various forms and e) handing over. A review of these categories leads to several conclusions. The legal solutions pertaining to privatisation of agriculture are not intrinsic, isolated or irrational. On the contrary, they are consistent with the global philosophy of transformation adopted by each of the analysed societies. This inchoate pattern will only emerge fully during the stage of economic and secondary appropriation. The legal solutions relating to privatisation of agriculture have their liberal and agrarian roots. These two ideological trends mingle in the discourse preceding the legislative procedure, the moment the project for social change emerges. However, even the first approximation in the form of new legal frameworks suggests withdrawal from liberalism and bowing to collectivism. Although the new decollectivisation law dissociates itself from collectivist ideology it adopts and legitimises a number of collectivist solutions[7].

[7] This conclusion follows from the analysis of the new law from the perspective of: a) the attitude towards the post-war agrarian reforms, b) the adopted scale and character of restitution, c) the principles of distribution of indivisible co-operative property and d) the restrictions concerning owners' purchase and sale of received property.

TABLE 1. A review of the legal foundations for privatisation of farms

	Czechia/Slovakia	Hungary	Poland
Transformation of co-operative farms			
	obligatory transformation by 31 December 1992	obligatory transformation by 31 December 1992	no obligation to alter the legal status
Procedures for privatisation of collectivised land			
opinion of withdrawing land contribution and farming it individually available (factual) appropriation)	yes, since May 1990	yes, since November 1989	yes, since 1956
restitution and/or compensation	complete/ conditional restitution'	partial, degressive compensation	no
allocation of land	none	members and employees[b]	no
Procedures for privatisation of the capital of co-operative farms			
	sales of 25% to eligible people distribution according to reparation logic	distribution of max. 10% among employees distribution according to redistribution logic	increased proportion of share fund possibility of buying housing and coope rative land with - this fund
Procedure for privatisation of state-owned farms			
	restitution, sale leasing, Coupon privatization	commercialisation and then sale or leasing	sales and leasing by tender, corn-mercialisation

'Restitution first of up to 150 ha of arable land in Slovakia, no limit in Czechia.

[b] For co-operative members who have no land contribution – 30 gold crowns, for co-operative employees – 20 gold crowns.

THE PATHS TAKEN BY POST-COLLECTIVIST RESTRUCTURING

The second, social phase of the decollectivisation is broadly understood as an appropriation process composed of the legal and economic appropriation. Within the framework of property rights this is the process of defining the

conceptualization of property. Rather than regulating "people-object relations" property rights regulate "people-people relations relating to the use of objects. Thanks to property rights, individuals can foresee beforehand what they can rationally expect in their relations with other members of the community" (Demsetz, 1967 in Brosi, 1993). Here, we adopt a wider perspective on the process of legal appropriation and view it as the general process whereby property rights in agriculture are organised and owners are designated. Two overlapping processes would be involved in this more general process: "designation" of a nominal owner to property or its parts and the purchase of ownership rights by individuals or groups.

The first of these component processes, i.e., owner designation, is an indispensable phase of privatisation but must not be equated with privatisation. First and foremost, it involves the procedures of structure transformation, valuation and division of previously indivisible, collectivist property and designation of each part's rightful owner. When real estate is divided, the institution of central mortgage register must be restored. Parts of the property may be in kind (i.e., consist of tangible goods) or they may be symbolic (when they are parts of values, stocks or shares). The process does not always end in the legal designation of a private owner because it often involves taking over property by the state treasury. The property may later be privatised by means of other methods.

The second component process, i.e., acquisition of legal property rights, is both more complex and more interesting. Whatever the country, decollectivist legislation has two elements, both of which are extremely important for the further course of the process. First, change of ownership structure is not voluntary, it is compulsory and must proceed according to a predetermined rhythm. The legal acts precisely state the date of obligatory completion of the transformation of the property-structure of farming production co-operatives and the structural-functional transformation of state-owned farms (See Table 1, line "Transformation of co-operative farms"). Several goals seem to have informed this obligatory speed of transformation. The reformers wanted to gain the majority's political approval and take advantage of the social enthusiasm. At the same time they did not want to leave the collectivist *nomenklatura* too much time to counterattack. The speed was probably also motivated by the need to change the agrarian production structure as soon as possible in order to avoid a drastic drop in agricultural production. Ownership rights are not acquired automatically and the future owner must demonstrate much determination and activity from the very start. The future potential owner, and often the former

owner, must apply for restitution or purchase within a specific deadline even if the property was misappropriated illegally. The time legally given to apply for restitution or allocation of property is very short.

The legislation concerning reprivatisation and decollectivist privatisation, as formerly defined, indicated who could acquire property rights in agriculture. However, not everybody who was eligible applied for restitution or the right to acquire land. In the analysed countries (except Poland) this technically complicated an economically complex stage resulted in the development of a large, spatially dispersed and heterogeneous group of owners of farm land and production capital. Everywhere the main new owners of the means of agrarian production were not people who actually worked in farming but people who were not currently working on farms [?], i.e., former owners or heirs who now lived in towns and cities. This led to the development of a new albeit temporary situation in agrarian relations: fragmented ownership of means of production was separated from work.

From the formal/legal point of view the decollectivisation process was complete once property was distributed and each part was attributed to an individual, a nominal owner. Despite the formal, legal status of owners, new owners were confronted with many economic, social and psychological barriers that limited their freedom of the use of their property. The main economic barrier was the lack of a market for agrarian property. The main social barriers were rooted in owner characteristics: their "externality" with respect to farming, i.e., their "urbanity", old age, other sources of sustenance, physical distance or lack of elementary farming and capital management competence. To this we must add psychological barriers. Although the vast majority of present owners have full legal right to their property they are vicarious owners by a caprice of history.

The stage of legal appropriation produced a large and very heterogeneous category of owners. After this initial phase of systemic transformation Central-Eastern European agriculture (except in Poland) became an agriculture of producers-cum-leaseholders rather than producers-cum-proprietors. In this situation, economic appropriation assumed two basically different forms: classical economic appropriation where the owner is the appropriating agent (proprietor appropriation) and factual appropriation where the manager is the appropriating agent (managerial appropriation). These are the two forms of economic appropriation which Françoise Simon identified in her analysis of the privatisation of Czech agriculture (Simon 1995) but this model apparently has a much wider meaning and can be applied to agrarian privatisation in entire Central Europe.

The following strategies can be identified within *the proprietor appropriation model*:

a) the subsistence-oriented strategy, i.e., the regaining or gaining of property which is usually not worth very much and using it for sustenance purposes; b) the capital-securing strategy ("grab what's yours and run"), i.e., taking over property (land, buildings, machinery) from the collectivist farm with the purpose or hope of later selling it; c) the collective-solidarity strategy, applied by employee co-proprietors of neocollective forms of organisation of production. Because owners-cum-employees have not discovered any other way of making use of their property than the neocollective farm, they are determined to keep the farm running and at this stage they treat it as a certain number of jobs; d) the patrimony reconstruction strategy is very emotionally tinged and centres around regaining collectivised or nationalised land and reconstructing the farm which existed before collectivization; e) the enterprise strategy differs from the previous strategies in that it is fuelled by a widely understood project for a future farming enterprise rather than by memory of the past. This strategy has many varieties just as there are many types of agricultural enterprises and entrepreneurs.

When analysing all these real, economic appropriation strategies we must remember that the majority of new agrarian owners have remained passive. This passivity "is not a strategy deliberately chosen by the owners. First and foremost, their passivity expresses their lack of real means of realising their ownership rights. Lack of information, competence and behaviour patterns, and the lack of or the embryo state of financial markets and land markets explain why most owners were unable to utilise their ownership rights effectively" (Simon 1995, p. 265). This in turn gave way to *the second type of economic appropriation, i.e. ,managerial appropriation.* The managerial, non-proprietor type of appropriation had several variations anchored by two extreme strategies. *The classic strategy* is based on dispersed ownership. This enables the manager to control the owners' doings. We find this classic managerial appropriation strategy in many new production co-operatives but also in joint-stock or employee-owned companies. The managers behave like active owners, i.e., they manage the property, but they do so on behalf of the owners who have delegated their rights to them. This classic, managerial type of appropriation often degenerates and this degeneration is facilitated by `soft' ownership rights: the managers are used to governing shared property (that is nobody's and therefore mine) and the owners are not yet in the habit of executing their rights. Here, appropriation was very seldom overt and direct. It was usually

based on various networks, mutual ownership, buying up stock with the help of various funds, e.g., social benefit funds. If, in the previous, classic version we had control of property through delegation (delegation property control), then here we have a different strategy: *network property control.* Is this, we wonder, just property control or is it a novel, post-collective type of ownership which we may call *manageriate?*

Because of the absence of any reference model, the interplay of the balance of power, and conflicts of interest, strategies for abandoning the old collectivist system have turned out to vary considerably.

The path of appropriation and control benefiting "managers" in the Czech Republic

In the Czech Republic, transformation was based on the restitution of property confiscated by the communist powers after February 1948, the restructuring of the cooperatives, and the privatisation of the state farms. Set in motion by the application of a complex legislative system, restructuring has left many questions unanswered and given rise to conflicts of interest between the different categories of social actors involved in the transformation process, particularly in relation to the control of the capital of the farms that have been privatised.

The Czech agricultural sector has experienced a limited restructuring of the family farm. In the early 1990s, the restitution of the land to its former owners might have favoured the establishment of independent farmers. To start with, this was encouraged by a policy of support for investment, but after 1994 the process slowed down. There are a number of reasons why family market farming did not become the dominant model. The social sector likely to become involved in such a project was relatively limited. The workers on the collective farms (discriminated against by the criteria for allocating shares in the capital) were hardly interested. The new farmers were recruited from among the descendants of the former owners and the group of specialists (agricultural engineers, agronomists, and so on). In the second half of the 1990s, the neo-cooperatives underwent a second wave of transformations, consisting in changing the legal status so as to be able to go ahead with a restructuring of capital. The number of cooperatives has continued to decrease in favour of corporate forms.

The privatisation of the former state forms has mostly given rise to corporate enterprises, or more rarely to farms run by individuals as sole traders. In the beginning, the land and assets were leased out by the state Land Fund. Since

1999, the state has started to privatise the lands that it retains (about 500 000 ha) but the process of selling them is a slow one.

In broad outline, three different categories of structure can be distinguished, depending on the origin of the property: farms originating in the transformation of the former cooperatives, the size of which has diminished; farms formed on the basis of restitution (about 50 000 farms run by sole traders have been established, covering about one fifth of the agricultural area); and farms originating in the privatisation of the former state farms. The structures that were established immediately after the transformation of the cooperatives and the privatisation of the state farms have changed relatively little.

Although the decollectivisation of Czech agriculture has been achieved, problems persist. Czech farmers have tried to adjust to the conditions of prices imposed by the market and have improved their productivity, but their economic efficiency still needs to make further progress. The development of the land market has proved to be insufficient, in spite of the sale of land by the state and measures providing loans for buying land. More than 90% of cultivated land is leased from a large number of private owners who live in the towns. This situation may eventually be a factor leading to vulnerability. Penetration by foreign capital will increase competition among farmers, especially as regards the leasing of land.

A neo-collectivist path in Slovakia

After the separation from the Czech Republic in 1992, Slovakia embarked on a different course, opting for a policy that was more conservative and more interventionist. Adopting a rhetoric calling for security of food supplies, economic stability, the maintenance of sufficient agricultural revenues, the preservation of agricultural activity in mountainous regions, and the protection of farmland, the government of Vladimir Mečiar implemented a policy of support for the agricultural sector. Accompanied as it was by measures discriminating against small farmers, this policy had the effect of directing the path taken by agricultural development in Slovakia towards a structural concentration of land and agricultural capital in the hands of interest groups with their origins in the former controlling elite. In order to preserve the level of organisation of the agricultural sector, a new law on the transformation of the cooperatives, adopted in 1995, aimed

at stabilising capital in the transformed cooperatives, thus effectively favouring their survival[8]. In their new statutory situation, the cooperatives have survived, their managements having hindered the application of the law. Slightly later, the privatisation of the state farms was launched in 1996–1997, and the sale of the assets occurred in a way that favoured the former controlling elite. The arrival in power of a centre-right coalition in 1998 did not fundamentally alter the direction of these trends.

Deprived of political support, family farming has made little progress[9]. The extreme division of the land into smaller units, the delay in identifying who had the titles to the land and in renewing the land registers, and the lack of starting capital, all impeded the establishment of this type of agriculture. Certain experts have pointed out that farming by middle-class farmers has never existed in Slovakia, and thus it could not serve as a reference model (Blaas, 2001). The limited development of the family farming model remains a specific characteristic of Slovak agriculture. Large-scale farms with a corporate status, with their origins in the transformation of the former collective structures, remain the dominant model.

The decline of the cooperative sector in Hungary

The path followed in Hungary is distinguished from the two previous ones by a more pronounced dualism and by an accelerated decline of the cooperative form in favour of farming structures with a corporate status. As in the neighbouring countries, decollectivisation was carried out without defining any clear and coherent agricultural policy. While some political parties (such as the Party of Small Holders) proclaimed the merits of small and medium farms, others, by contrast, defended the collectivist structures and did not want to dismantle them so as to preserve their production potential. The restitution of the land to the former owners from whom they had been taken took place in an original way by means of compensation (with vouchers being issued to a value corresponding to that of the confiscated property). Part of the land of the former collective

[8] This law establishes, in place of the transformation participation shares of beneficiaries who were not members of the cooperatives, share certificates in the cooperatives which are trust securities (registered or bearer securities). The law obliges the cooperatives to issue these securities to the amount of the capital held by beneficiaries who are not members. Those who are members of the cooperatives may also ask for their participation shares to be converted into securities. The cooperatives have been very slow in regularising their situation by issuing these securities.

[9] In spite of the steps taken in 1991 by Čarnogursky‘s government (the adoption of laws favouring restitution and the re-establishment of private property rights to the land).

farms was auctioned off and acquired by holders of the compensation vouchers. A significant proportion of the land also remained the property of members of the cooperatives, who were able to withdraw them from the collective structures in order to cultivate them or lease them out. Finally, in an attempt at social equity, plots of land were distributed to employees of the collective farms who did not have any land themselves. At the conclusion of the process of transformation of the former cooperatives, the capital other than the land was supposed to be divided up, in the form of a proportion of the property, to those who were eligible (active members, former members and their heirs, employees). Relatively egalitarian in its intentions, this privatisation process has benefited those who were capable of implementing active appropriation strategies and of developing these assets. The decollectivisation process has ended in the widespread fragmentation of the land among a large number of owners and in a separation between the ownership of the land and its exploitation. Half a million people received more then two million hectares in a little less than five years. The reallocation of property rights created conditions for the transformation of farming structures, giving rise to new social forms of production. Transformed into cooperatives of landowners, the former agricultural collectives have set about adjusting to the new rules of the market economy by reducing their production costs (cutting back on investments, shedding surplus workers, etc.). At the beginning of the 2000s, the process of capital restructuring accelerated, with cooperatives being converted into companies with various types of legal status. The number and surface area of the cooperatives has continued to decline. In 2002, less than one tenth of the utilised agricultural area was farmed by cooperatives.

A limited decollectivisation in Poland

In 1989, Poland was virtually an exception within the Eastern bloc. The state sector (18.5% of the utilised agricultural area) and the cooperative sector (3.7% of the utilised agricultural area) were only of minor importance in Poland compared to a private sector that consisted of small individual farms covering 76.2% of the agricultural area. Although Poland did not have to carry out a large-scale decollectivisation, changes did take place in terms of the ownership and the use of the land. During the years 1992–1995, the state farms were abolished and the land transferred to an Agency for Agricultural Property of the Public Finance Department, which was in charge of administering this national land stock. The Agency has tended to favour corporate entities when allocating land for lease or for sale. The former split between the socialised sector (state farms and agricultural production cooperatives) and the individual sector has been replaced by a division

between agriculture carried out by private entities with a corporate status, mostly consisting of large-scale farms and agricultural production cooperatives (covering 2% of the area), and small – or medium – sized family farms.

Polish agriculture has undergone a rapid transformation. The break dates from 1989, from the moment when the transition to a market economy allowed the introduction of reforms and a radical change of direction in agricultural policy (with the abolition of state assistance for the agricultural sector and the dismantling of the network of "cooperative" services that formed the framework for agriculture). Over the period 1989–2004, growing distinctions can be noted between different types of farm, depending on their market position (farms working principally to satisfy their own needs and farms producing goods to meet the needs of the market), and also an increasing polarisation between large and small farms, with the decline of medium-sized farms and the concentration of land benefiting the large farms. Polish agriculture now consists of production units with very different characteristics, rules and goals for the way they are run.

The appropriation strategies described above throw light on the origin of the social forms of production[10] that can be seen in the post-collectivist agricultural structures, and also on the mechanisms of reproduction and adaptation. The paths followed by the transition from one social form to another have been the subject of monographs (Maurel, 1994, 2005). Attempts to put forward general conclusions have been made (Laschewski, 1998). This is the case if we are dealing with the transition from the large estate to the state farm and its subsequent conversion into a corporate enterprise, or again with the journey leading from the agricultural production cooperative to the neo-cooperative. The small subsistence farm is generally considered to be the continuation of individual plots of land from the socialist era. However, the paths taken by the transition from collective forms (state or cooperative) to post-collective ones are not as straightforward as is often assumed. Each social form of production is defined by a specific way of linking up the three basic production factors in agriculture: land, labour, and capital. What position do the post-collectivist social forms occupy in relation to the previous ones, in what ways do they testify to a kind of continuity or, by contrast, to a break with the previous social forms?

[10] It is preferable to think in terms of social forms of production, supported by social actors with differing aptitudes, interests, and ways of acting.

The new cooperatives of owners

Under the legal form of cooperatives of owners (in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary), the former collective farms have carried out a conversion of a neo-collectivist type. With a reduction in their size and their material and human resources, they have taken over from the former structures. They are characterised by the hybrid and composite nature of ownership. The ways in which the land and the other assets have been divided up (in the form of shares in the cooperative) have led to the land and capital being divided up among a large number of owners and shareholders, and to an effective separation between the ownership of the land and its use. The connections between the production factors (land, labour and capital) bring into contact with one another (and sometimes into competition) social groups with varying interests (external owners, pensioners, employees, managers, etc.). As a consequence of these farming structures going into debt, and in order to try to achieve financial stability, capital restructuring is taking place on the initiative of the group of managers capable of implementing appropriation control strategies. These hybrid and transitory structures have been progressively converted into various legal forms (corporate farms).

The large business companies

These have their origin in the privatisation of the state farms on the one hand, and the conversion of the cooperatives of owners, on the other. In the case of the former state farms, the land is leased to institutions that have been established in an ad hoc way by the state (Agencies, Land Funds, etc.). They have often been privatised on the initiative of and to the benefit of the former senior managers (the group of specialists). Functioning in a corporate form (joint-stock companies, limited liability companies), they have employees (though fewer than the cooperatives) and produce exclusively for the market. Their principal objective is to make a profit, which means paying back the capital invested, paying their workers' wages, and paying the ground rent regularly. Up until now the amount of the ground rent paid to the small landowners or the institutions managing the land that has remained state property has been quite low. The slowness of the procedures for restitution or the registration of rights, and the weak negotiating position of the hundreds of thousands of small landowners have held back the creation of a land market. Things will change after the end of a transitional period ranging from seven to twelve years after joining the EU, when citizens of other European countries will be able to buy the land. The competitiveness of this

type of enterprise depends partly on the development of the land market and the reduction of labour costs (related to the types of production system).

The state-owned companies

They have been directly inherited from the former state farms over which the state has retained control, either in order to preserve a controlling interest in a particular branch of production (such as seed production or genetic selection in the case of the former agro-industrial units), or for lack of other alternatives. Placed under the control or the administration of Agencies for State Property (as in Poland and Hungary), they employ a paid workforce (labourers and managers) and attempt to function in the market context. Their number is tending to decrease.

The reappearance in many forms of family agriculture

This assumes various forms, differing in their size, the rationale behind the way they function, and the extent to which production is market-oriented. The smallest farms can be compared to the supplementary plots of land formerly allocated to farm workers for their own use. Land reform policies made it possible to increase the size of these plots (particularly in Hungary). Withdrawing a small plot of land from a large agricultural complex can be part of a strategy of preserving a family inheritance or of attempting to acquire a supplementary source of income (in Slovakia or Hungary). Small-scale family farming consists of subsistence or semi-subsistence units which survive in precarious conditions thanks to income from social benefit payments, notably in Poland (Halamska 2004, 2008 a).

Larger farms try either to revive a family approach, based on a close connection between capital, labour, and the family, or else to opt for a business rationale. Only a small number of these independent farms seem to be in the process of acquiring more land, investing, and modernising. Many of them experience difficulties in gaining access to credit, benefiting from appropriate technical assistance, and selling their produce on the market.

The conditions of reproduction of the various social forms of post-collectivist production (access to credit, professional training, technical supervision networks, forms of market integration, etc.), their way of organising professionally (associations, agricultural trade unions), and their political representation (agrarian parties) appear to be extremely varied. Depending on the country, these social forms are present in varying proportions, and their relative importance is constantly changing. Whereas the agrarian landscape (regrouping of small plots of land, extensive buildings, sometimes in a state of ruin) retains the imprint of

the collectivist system, the rationales underlying the production structures have developed substantially due to their integration into the market economy (with the exception of the subsistence farms). Under various forms and to differing extents, post-collectivist agriculture continues to be characterised by a strong duality of structures, a constant feature of the agrarian history of Central Europe, which is currently assuming new forms.

STRUCTURAL PROFILES ON THE EVE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The changes in the appropriation methods resulting from the re-establishment of property rights, the transformation of the former collective structures into new legal forms (cooperatives, companies, small individual farms), and the restructuring that has followed, mean that old categories no longer serve a very useful purpose. The official legal status does not explain properly the structure of capital nor the way in which the farms are managed. The definitions used by the statistical agencies vary from one country to another (the status of the farming entity, the fiscal system, social contributions, pension rights, etc.). The registration of production units is not very reliable, especially as regards the small individual farms (plots of land), which are not taken into account systematically. But these small farms affect a large number of households and occupy a considerable portion of the utilised agricultural area. Their importance has been recognised by European agricultural policy, which uses appropriate measures to support semi-subsistence agriculture[11].

The structural diversity is the result of a reduction in the agricultural workforce and the move away from structural concentration of the farms. In describing the structural profiles, we have based our comparison on the homogenous statistics collected by Eurostat. Immediately before joining the EU, Czech and Slovak agricultures were characterised by concentrated structures, with more than nine-tenths of the utilised agricultural area being used by large farms of more than 50 ha. However, Slovakia retained a significant number of small individual farms. Hungary was characterised by a lower concentration of the land, whereas Polish agriculture differed from the others in having a polymorphous profile,

[11] In the new member states, many "semi-subsistence farms" are to be found, which, while still producing for their own consumption, commercialise the majority of their production. During the course of the transition period, the European Union is aiding these farms by a specific measure to help them to become viable units from the commercial point of view.

with the utilised agricultural area being divided up between small, medium, and large farming units.

TABLE 2 – Farms in 2005: the principal characteristics

	Czech Republic		Slovakia		Hungary		Poland		EU-25	
Farms										
Farm size (in ha)	% of farms	% of UAA	% of farms	% of UAA	% of farms	% of UAA	% of farms	% of UAA	% of farms	% of UAA
0-5	53.0	0.9	90.0	2.3	89.7	8.4	70.7	17.6	61.6	6.0
5-10	11.2	0.9	2.8	0.7	4.1	4.6	14.9	17.9	13.3	5.8
10-20	10.3	1.7	1.7	0.9	2.7	6.1	9.6	22.1	9.9	8.7
20-50	10.3	3.9	1.6	1.9	2.0	9.8	3.9	18.9	8.3	16.4
> 50	15.2	92.6	3.8	94.2	1.6	71.0	0.8	23.5	6.9	63.0
Farms larger than 1 ESU										
	Czech Republic		Slovakia		Hungary		Poland		EU-27	
Number of farms (in 1000s)	26		12		155		1082		7815	
Permanent workforce (1000s of AWUs)	142		66		229		1727		9782	
Permanent workforce per farm (AWUs)	5.4		5.2		1.5		1.6		X	
Family workforce (%)	20.0		15.6		59.9		93.1		X	
UAA (1000s of ha)	3520		1840		4045		13132		161105	
UAA per farm (ha)	133.4		142.7		26.0		12.1		20.6	
Total livestock (1000s of LSUs)	2047		739		2104		2047		133492	

UAA – Utilised Agricultural Area
ESU – European Size Unit
AWU – Annual Work Unit
LSU – Large Stock Unit

Source : //ec.europa.eu/agriculture/agrista/rurdev2008/RD_Report_2008_Chapter3.pdf, Eurostat, Agriculture, Main Statistics, 2005–2006, 2007.

The continuing high concentration of land in the Czech Republic

The structure of farm sizes has a dual character. A large number of small enterprises own small areas (64% cultivate less than 2% of the total area), whereas farms that are larger than 50 ha, representing 15.2% of the total, cover the largest part (92.6%) of the total Utilised Agricultural Area (UAA). According to the statistical survey on farm structures carried out in 2005 by the Czech Statistical Office, there are 39 419 units held by "natural persons" (individuals – 93.3% of the total) and 2833 held by "legal entities", three quarters of which are corporate farms (70.7% of the UAA). The first category includes farms run by sole traders some of whom are officially registered, but the majority are not. Altogether, they cultivate 1 million hectares, or 29.3% of the UAA, which means an average size of around 26 ha. More than half of them have an area of less than ten hectares, but they cultivate less than 2% of the UAA. The largest of these farms are run by sole traders who lease the land (63.6% of the UAA under cultivation is leased). The second category is made up of agricultural enterprises with various types of status. The enterprises of a corporate type number 2154 and cultivate 45.9% of the area; the cooperatives number 584 and exploit less than a quarter of the UAA. In both cases, they are large farms covering several hundred hectares, the majority of which is leased. 136 enterprises (62 companies and 52 cooperatives) are bigger than 3000 ha. The profile of the agrarian structures varies depending on the region and the ways in which the farms are developed. Large-scale agricultural production, based in the centre of Bohemia, contrasts with agricultural areas with a large number of small farms, especially in Moravia where restructuring is progressing more slowly.

Large and small farms in Slovakia

In Slovakia, agriculture presents a level of concentration of the land just as pronounced as in the Czech Republic. The 2600 farms with more than 50 ha (3.8% of the total) cover more than 94.2% of the UAA. The great majority of them are production units with the status of legal entities, resulting from the conversion of the former cooperatives. In the agriculture census taken in 2001, 1522 registered farms were counted with the status of legal entities, cultivating 89.8% of the total area. They included 715 cooperatives. After having increased until 1996 (due to the impact of internal divisions), the number of cooperatives then started to decrease because some of them went into liquidation, but most were converted into various corporate forms. In 1994 70% of the cultivated area was concentrated in the hands of the cooperatives, but ten years later they

cultivated just under half of it. Until the early 2000s, these farms functioned under a system of weak budgetary constraints, enabling them to avoid bankruptcy and liquidation in spite of high debt levels. The restructuring of their capital in the hands of managers and the introduction of management methods comparable to those of the private agricultural companies has helped move the cooperatives that are still active closer to the other corporate structures. Although a tendency can be seen towards a reduction in their average size, still more then two-fifths of corporate farms cultivate areas in excess of a thousand hectares. Alongside these large corporate farms, the growth of a new category of individual farms can be observed (Blaas, 2003). The proportion of the total area of agricultural land cultivated by individual farmers quadrupled during the 1990s. Four-fifths of these farms (not registered) come under the heading of semi-subsistence agriculture which provides a supplementary source of income (in the form of self-consumption) to households of pensioners or those who farm in addition to another job. A slow and incomplete restructuring process and the continued high degree of concentration of land and capital that benefit large, inefficient farming units are responsible for the lack of competitiveness in Slovakian agriculture (Csaki, Lerman, Nucifora, Blaas, 2003).

A new relationship between large and small farms in Hungary

Because of its agrarian dualism, Hungary presents a very interesting scenario. The restructuring phase resulted in a reversal of the previous proportions of the land farmed by the small individual farmers and the large enterprises (cooperatives and companies). The former overwhelming domination by the cooperative sector (which held 62% of the land in 1989) and the state sector (26%) has given way to a more equal distribution between the private farms (which utilised 49% of the area in 2000), the corporate farms (30%), and the cooperatives (15%). These categories cover a great variety of forms in terms of size, status of the workforce, and the aim of the productive activity. Around 20 000 farms form the core of a family-merchant agriculture. The number of corporate farms has increased. In this sector, a process of concentration of production can be observed, benefiting a small number of large enterprises that may have originated in the conversion of former cooperatives and state farms, or may have been created *ex nihilo* on the initiative of entrepreneurs. The dual structure conceals a double process of concentration, benefiting a small number of family farms on the one hand and large corporate farms on the other (Ieda, 2003). Taking all types of farms together, 71% of the UAA is concentrated in the hands of production units with more than 50 ha; those larger than 100 ha hold 62%. In comparison with neighbouring countries,

Hungarian agriculture appears structurally more diversified, both in terms of social forms and of size. Although the bipolarisation remains largely present, it does not prevent the emergence of medium-sized structures in the form of family farms or specialised corporate enterprises (such as livestock farming of an industrial type or horticulture). Farms with company or partnership status cultivate 26.1% of the UAA. Overall, the corporate sector utilises 59.5% of the area.

Small farms of less than 5 ha cultivate 17.6% of the UAA. Not all of them are officially registered. Semi-subsistence agriculture accounts for 78% of this category. The proportion of small merchant farmers remains low. Because of a lack of capital and difficulty in gaining access to credit from banks, they are unable to become competitive.

The structural diversity of Polish agriculture

There are around 2 700 000 farms in Poland. More than 250 000 are "statistical farms", appearing in the registers without achieving any sort of agricultural production. Roughly 1 million farms have an area of less than one hectare, whereas approximately 1 750 000 farms have an area greater than this. Family agriculture, has become largely the majority form, but it does not constitute a homogenous whole. A new form of structural duality runs through it. A model of commercial agriculture that is similar to the family enterprise model, is involved in strategies of land accumulation, and constitutes the modernist tendency. The great majority of these farmers are trying to increase their holding of land, but can only achieve this with difficulty. The lack of fluidity in the land market is one obstacle to their development. The consolidation of this professional agriculture would require a capacity for accumulation that the low profitability of agricultural production does not allow, and it would call for a more active policy of investment aid. The modernist transformation based on a market model is thus a highly selective process.

Semi-subsistence farming, increasingly marginal from the point of view of the economy, forms the core of family agriculture (69% of individual farms and 46% of the agricultural workforce). These are farms of a rural type covering a small area, in the hands of farmers who are often old. Withdrawn from the market, these farm owners live like small farmers or "virtually small farmers" (Halamska, 2004), but in reality derive most of their income from other sources than agricultural activity. Having reduced their level of production, simplified their system of cultivation, and abandoned animal production, are they still really farmers? While some of them have started to reduce their holding of land by leasing or selling some plots, others keep their lands, thus preventing other farmers

from expanding. This relative structural inertia is one of the factors behind the blockage of the land market. The implementation of a family commercial model is restricted by the survival, largely assisted, of a majority of small subsistence farms. Playing the role of a "safety net", a farm with a social function keeps an excessive workforce on the land and postpones the anticipated restructuring. Considered in its various structural, social and cultural dimensions, the reduction in the number of small subsistence farmers appears to be the central theme in the post-communist transformation in rural Poland (Maurel, Halamska, Lamarche, 2003). The structural bipolarisation, the unequal opening up to the market, and the composition of the income of farming households are all indicators that give family agriculture a dual image. This is coupled with a geographical duality that can be seen in the distribution by area of the different types of family farms. The product of agrarian inheritances of longstanding, this differentiation has a double effect on the structure of rural agriculture (size of farms and size of workforce). The division of farms into small units in the southern part of the country contrasts with the more concentrated structures in the north and west, whereas medium-sized farms are representative of the western regions and to a lesser extent of the centre of the country. The predominance of small farms and the strong influence of rural farming go hand in hand. The purpose of agricultural production, directed either principally towards self-consumption or principally towards the market, introduces an additional geographical divide.

CONCLUSION

Significant structural transformations have affected the agricultural domain and altered the way it is used for production. As a result of the transfer of property rights, agricultural land and part of the forests have changed hands. The framework of land appropriation and the framework of the agricultural area have to a large extent been separated from each other, with the exception of rural Poland, where the method of farming by the owner continues to hold sway. The process of decentralisation of the methods of farming the land which has affected the area of agricultural production is occurring with varying intensity depending on the country and the region. Re-established as the result of decollectivisation, private ownership of the land has been dispersed among a large number of landowners, sometimes without any direct link with agriculture and the rural milieu. More than a decade after the privatisation of the land, the land market is slow to re-establish itself and to play its role fully. Furthermore, farming structures have not

become more stable. In a certain number of cases, capital restructuring is taking place within enterprises that have taken over from the former collective farms. Weakened by the impact of greater competition, the less efficient farms have been gradually eliminated. The decrease in the size of the workforce needed for agricultural land continues. This transformation, which is key for modernisation and growth in productivity, has advanced to very different degrees depending on the country and the region. The restructuring of the agricultural sector remains incomplete. Far from being fixed, the picture we have painted should be regarded as a snapshot rather than as the culmination of the transformation that has been launched.

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CHARALAMBOS KASIMIS
Agricultural University of Athens, Athens
kasimis@aua.gr

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC IMBALANCES IN RURAL EUROPE AND INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY TO RURAL AREAS: THE CASE OF GREECE[1]

Abstract

This paper discusses the expanding phenomenon of international mobility to the rural areas of Europe. First it extends the theoretical discussion of international mobility to rural regions and presents comparatively the 'northern' and 'southern' European models of migration as well as the implications of these migration flows upon the rural areas of Europe. The paper moves to the case of Greece presenting research results related to the implications of the migratory phenomenon upon the rural economy and society and to the issues of migrant mobility and integration. Finally, the paper projects the implications of the present economic crisis upon the migrant populations and their countries of origin and raises issues of policy to counter depopulation trends and to support rural sustainability.

Key words: mobility, migration, depopulation, rural sustainability.

INTRODUCTION

Human mobility is an increasingly central dimension of globalisation. Policy makers and citizens look with growing interest upon the connection between this emerging mobility and the economic and social outcomes on the migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries.

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[1] This paper draws largely from a presentation of the author in the Thematic Symposium "Mobilities and Stabilities in Rural Space" organised by the European Society of Rural Sociology in the context of the XXIII ESRS Congress held in Vaasa, Finland in August 2009.

As Europe undergoes a rapid demographic change migrant workers are going to become more and more important.

The EU Commission, being fully aware of these developments, issued a Green Paper in 2005, in which it is clearly stated that the EU will need 20 million migrants between 2010 and 2030 to cover the decline of its economically active population. However, the designation and implementation of a Policy Plan for legal migration in 2005 does not seem to have been success story (Commission of the European Communities 2005). The EU has still not resolved the contradiction of the acknowledged labour needs and the adoption of restrictive migration policies. Nevertheless, net migration into Europe is still increasing and is now the largest component of population change.

Structural rigidities in European labour markets imply that shortages of both skilled and unskilled labour in most countries are likely to coexist not only with large pools of unemployed and/or inactive people, both nationals and migrants, but also with continuous inflows of new migrants.

The segmentation of EU labour markets, in conjunction with differences in economic, social, and institutional characteristics, has given rise to two distinct 'migration regimes' in northern and southern European countries.

These 'migration regimes' are distinguished with respect to migrant and host country characteristics, labour market and policy content and effectiveness.

More specifically, Southern Europe constitutes a 'special case' of European capitalism characterised by late industrialisation, large agricultural and tourist sectors, speculative urban development and an extensive family-based informal economy. These characteristics make up the framework for the construction of the so-called 'Southern European model of migration'. What differentiates this model from the 'Northern European model' of legal migration for work in the 'fordist' industrial sectors of post WW II countries like Germany, UK, France, Sweden etc., are: its wide 'illegality', due to migration controls and restrictive policies; the multiplicity and heterogeneity of nationalities migrating towards Southern Europe; the asymmetry of their gender composition (being overwhelmingly male); the differentiation of the geographic, social and cultural origin of migrants; and finally the coexistence of migration with high unemployment and underemployment in the receiver countries (King 2000).

The recent economic crisis has raised new concerns about migration. Concerns are related to the size and implications of it in the host countries and there are concerns for the expected implications of the crisis upon the sending countries. Such issues are discussed later in the paper.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN RURAL EUROPE

In the greatest part of the twentieth century, the regional pattern of population change in most European countries was characterised by a 'rural exodus' and an increasing urbanisation.

However, from the 1970s onwards 'counter urbanisation' became a common trend in the 'well developed' parts of the world. Together with a parallel process of 'de-agriculturalisation' of rural households and an increasing development of non-agricultural activities in rural areas, these processes contributed largely to the formation of a 'new rurality' characterising more and more the rural regions of Europe.

Ageing of the population has been an important issue in the rural regions of some Member States, notably Spain, Greece, Portugal and France, where the rural populations contain a higher proportion of people over 65. The same countries show a relatively low ratio of children (0–15) to pensioners (>65), a low ratio of young adults (15–24) to pensioners, and a high overall dependency ratio (total population/ages 15–64). Thus, it comes as no surprise that the ageing of the rural and farm population and the need to accommodate or reduce the flow of young people out of the countryside has been a serious challenge to the generational renewal and the sustainability of the European rural regions. This development reveals the complexity of the rural labour markets and the social mismatch of the demand and supply of employment.

In terms of gender, the most important pattern is the 'masculinisation' of the more sparsely populated Nordic rural regions and the out-migration of younger women from the less developed rural regions of Southern Europe and the New Member States This development too influences fertility rates and the sustainability of rural regions (Study on Employment in Rural Areas (SERA) 2006).

Statistics show that almost 17% of the rural population in the EU is over retirement age. In the rural regions of France, Greece, Spain and Portugal, in particular, the proportion of retired people is above the EU average and between 18-22% while the dependency ratios are higher.

In EU-25 only 10% of farm holders are younger than 35 years old (European Commission 2006). On the other hand, the continued restructuring and modernisation of Europe's agriculture is expected to place a heavy burden on many rural areas. According to a Communication from the Commission (COM 2006 857 final), on the basis of current trends, it is to be expected that in the EU-15 some 2 million full-time workers will leave the sector by 2014. In addition,

1–2 million full-time workers may potentially leave the sector within the ten New Member States, and 1–2 million workers in Bulgaria and Romania (European Commission 2007).

Particularly those rural areas that are most remote, depopulated or dependent on agriculture face strong challenges regarding growth, jobs and sustainability in the coming years.

MIGRANTS IN THE RURAL REGIONS OF EUROPE

Some of these demographic imbalances have been halted so far by two independent developments: 'counter urbanisation', mentioned earlier, and "international migration". Thispaper concentrates on the latter because migration is considered more crucial for both the demographic and the economic revitalisation of rural regions.

Strong migration flows to rural regions are a relatively new phenomenon in the European context and they have had a significant and growing impact on peripheral and rural areas.

A number of factors can explain that.

On the one hand, the restructuring of agriculture has created significant demands for labour that could not be satisfied because of the unfavourable demographic changes in rural areas related to rural exodus and ageing of the population; on the other hand, the indigenous labour rarely has the necessary motivation and mobility for such work and is unwilling to work for low wages and under poor working conditions. Furthermore, the European countryside has, over the past few years, become an arena for the development of non-agricultural activities – manufacturing, tourism, housing expansion, and new consumption patterns, connected to leisure and recreation that have increased demand for labour.

In such an environment migrants come and fill the gaps left in the rural labour markets by the national population. These gaps are socially defined and regulated rather than strictly economically prescribed. Employees end up in different segments of the labour markets on the basis of their ethnicity, gender and class. For migrants, these sectors consist mainly of agriculture, construction, family handicraft, hospitality/tourism, and domestic services in which they provide their labour for the marginal, least secure, highly exploitative, under-paid and non-insured jobs (Kasimis 2008; Hoggart & Mendoza 1999).

SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

A number of interdependent factors like globalisation, EU enlargement and the particular socio-economic developments in Southern European countries (e.g., improvement of living standards and education, women's integration into the labour market, expansion of the tertiary sector and finally the extended informal economy) have transformed these countries from senders to receivers of migration flows (King 2000).

Evidence shows a rapid increase in migrant employment in agriculture and rural regions that expanded in late 1980s and early 1990s. This is connected to agriculture's particular weight in the economies and societies of all Southern European countries. In fact, half of the agriculturally employed population and two-thirds of the farm holdings of the EU – 15 were concentrated in the European South before the enlargement (European Commission 2004).

In Italy, migrants are over-represented in agricultural employment in comparison with the economically active population of the country (13.1 percent as against 5.3 percent). They make up 60 percent of the total seasonal labour force in agriculture, even though the majority of them are irregular and mostly seasonally employed in the crop seasons. Two thirds of those employed originate from Eastern Euroean countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Romania (De Zulueta 2003; Calavita 2006).

Spain's 2001 Census showed that 17 percent of all migrants are settled in rural areas. According to evidence provided by the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs for year 2005, the agricultural sector concentrates 9,4% of all insured migrants, a percentage well above the 5,3% of the indigenous labour employed in the sector. Moroccans represent 40,7% Equadorians 15,3% and Romanians 11,5%. Recent evidence shows that Romanians and Bulgarians have recently started replacing the once-dominant African migrants (Cánovas Pedreño, 2005; Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs, 2005; Mendoza, 2001; Hoggart and Mendoza, 1999). Even Portugal's large-scale agriculture now reportedly relies heavily on inexpensive migrant labour. In rural areas, migrants are employed in construction and the agricultural sector (especially in the Alentejo, Ribatejo, and Oeste regions) (Baganha and Fonseca 2004; Malheiros 2002).

In Greece the percentage of migrants employed in agriculture is over 17% of their total population. They provide nearly one fifth of the total labour days expended in the agricultural sector having become the exclusive contributors of wage labour (Kasimis 2008).

Arriving from the Balkans, African and Asian migrants have fuelled these often labour-intensive regional economies, working in economically restructured rural areas and increasingly specialising seasonal agriculture.

The latter point involves continually hiring new agricultural labourers from the lowest segments of the job market, assigning them the least skilled jobs and/or hiring them on a casual and irregular basis to work in both entrepreneurial and family farms. However, migrants are not restricted to agriculture. They often play a multifunctional role in rural regions alternating between agriculture, tourism and construction. They are also engaged in the provision of an overall support of aged populations, especially in marginal or mountainous rural areas.

Migrants and women (migrant and indigenous) make up the wage labour for the intensive crops where gender and ethnicity define the terms and conditions of employment. In the South, irregular migrants are employed to ensure flexible labour relations in a time of continuous efforts for the deregulation of labour markets. For that purpose often the bureaucratic treatment of migrants reflects the requirements of a social organisation of agriculture in which those involved in production are often deprived of citizen's rights (Pedone 2005; Mendoza 2001).

Migrant labour in the rural regions of Southern Europe constitutes a 'new rural class' the presence of which has often caused social tensions connected directly with their way of life, work conditions and their management of residences. On the other hand the contining arrival of irregular migrants serves to maintain a model of agricultural production that inhibits the process of labour and social integration of migrants in these rural regions.

NORTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

In some northern European countries, such as Ireland, Scotland, England, Germany and the Scandinavian countries (particularly Norway), rural areas have particularly benefited from the 2004 EU enlargement. Increasing evidence suggests that the majority of migrant workers from the 2004 accession states have found employment in rural areas rather than in the traditional migration centres.

More than one in three agricultural workers in the UK (England and Scotland) are estimated to be migrants almost exclusively arriving from Accession 8 countries representing approximately ¼ of the total number of the Workers Registration Scheme (WRS) registrations (Jentch 2007).

One in three dairy farms in many rural areas are employing Polish workers whereas nearly 300,000 Poles and a few thousand Czechs or Romanians flood to Germany each year during the six-week asparagus harvesting season (The Christian Science Monitor 2006).

The agricultural sector is among the top receiving branches of migrant workers in the Norwegian economy, especially in the summer season. Since 1990, when the Norwegian authorities established a seasonal migration quota programme directed towards meeting the demand for labour in the sector, the number of migrant workers employed in agriculture has been rising to reach an estimated number of 22,000 in 2005 (Andrzejewska 2007).

An initial analysis of migration patterns to Northern European rural regions shows that:

– The arrival pattern of migrant workers in rural areas was intensified after the EU enlargement, is more seasonal than in urban areas and is organised legally.

– Rural migrant workers are geographically concentrated in specific areas.

– This geographical concentration is related to the greater concentration in specific sectors: agriculture and the food industry, hospitality, manufacturing, distribution.

– Migrants provide wage labour in a predominantly entrepreneurial agriculture.

– In these rural areas migrant workers are a significant proportion of the overall workforce.

But migrants working in the rural areas of Northern Europe are not always regular and European. Reports related to the fish and the cockles industries make reference to extensive employment of irregular Chinese labourers. Irregular employment, deteriorating working conditions and low remunerations are reportedly expanding. Just before the crisis, increasing shortages in labour and the demands for an urgent increase in the seasonal agricultural workers were reported.

In agriculture (dairy farming, fruit and vegetable), fish farming and processing and hospitality, migrant labour has become a structural characteristic of the industries according to the statements of the employers themselves.

At a geographical level, once we examine the phenomenon of migration comparatively, it becomes clear that the European countries under consideration do not constitute a homogeneous frame of reference. Thus, the theoretical construct of a 'Southern' and a 'Northern' European model of migration could be challenged. First, Southern European countries are not a 'unified' geographical

entity and within each of them – especially Italy and Spain – regional differences are substantial. Second, more emphasis should be placed upon the differences observed between the Southern European countries, mostly in relation to the composition of the migrant population and the relations between the recipient country and the countries of origin.

The changes observed in the past few years – mostly in the demographic composition of migrant population – could lead to a revision of a number of characteristics of the Southern European model of migration. For example, in relation to gender issues of migration and the observed asymmetry of proportions of men and women migrants, recent evidence shows that the proportions are becoming increasingly equal (Bell 2002; ISMU 2005).

Hence, the theoretical models of Northern and Southern migration discussed cannot be treated as confirmed models given the development of the phenomenon and the changes a number of other developments can bring to most countries. The question posed, therefore, is whether in the next few years it will still be possible to talk about the particularity of the Southern European model of migration or whether the changes in the socio-economics and the demographics of migration, as well as the discussion on integration and diversity in the European South, will lead to a convergence of the characteristics of the Southern and the Northern models of migration.

MIGRANTS IN THE RURAL REGIONS OF GREECE

Migrants in Greece arrived en masse after the collapse of Central Eastern European Countries communist regimes in 1989. Easily crossed borders with the Balkan neighbours Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and extensive coastlines turned the country quickly into a migrant receiver. As a result, although Greece was at that time still one of the less-developed EU states, in the 1990s it received the highest percentage of immigrants in relation to the size of its labour force. Today migrants are unoficcially estimated to amount to 1.2 million (just over 10% of the country's population). Nearly 2/3 of them originate from neighbouring Albania (Zografakis, Kontis, Mitrakos 2009; Kasimis and Kassimi 2004).

In rural Greece demographic factors, connected with the massive rural exodus of the 1960s**,** as well as the restructuring of agriculture and the expansion of other, non-agricultural activities, have caused labour shortages that have not been filled by the indigenous population.

Such labour deficiencies are explained not only by demographic and structural factors but also by social factors, especially the rejection of low-status, unskilled and badly-paid jobs in rural areas by the younger generation. Improvements in the level of education and the standard of living as well as the spread of urban consumption patterns in the past 25 years, have led to the creation of high expectations by the younger generation, who have been looking for jobs outside agriculture and away from rural areas. Moreover, the integration of women into the labour market, the accompanying changes in family structures and the lack of adequate social infrastructures have resulted in increased demands for domestic support work.

Labour deficiencies have undoubtedly had substantial negative implications for the cost of production and the competitiveness of Greek agriculture.

The arrival of migrants, seen in retrospect, has offered solutions to these pressing problems generating, at the same time, new demands for labour and new job positions in agriculture and the countryside in general (Kasimis 2008; Kasimis and Papadopoulos 2005).

A SHORT ACCOUNT OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

The implications of the settlement and employment of migrant labour upon the rural households and rural areas have been studied by our team in various research projects carried out in rural regions of the country over the past 8 years (Kasimis, Nitsiakos, Zacopoulou, Papadopoulos 2002; Kasimis and Papadopoulos 2006; Kasimis, Papadopoulos, Pappas 2008). In these studies a multi-method approach combining both qualitative and quantitative methods of both indigenous and migrant populations in paradigmatic/exemplar rural regions of Greece has been adopted.

These paradigmatic regions were: marginal/mountainous, dynamic lowland regions of intensive agriculture and multifunctional/pluriactive island regions combining both agricultural and non-agricultural activities (Map 1).

The main hypothesis of these studies has been that migrant workers addressed four structural developments in rural Greece: first, the longstanding shortages of labour that had resulted from the restructuring of its agricultural sector and rural economy; second, the demographic crisis experienced by the rural population as a result of the rural exodus connected with emigration in the 1950s and 1960s; third, the social rejection by the younger generation of life and labour in rural areas; and last, the increased opportunities of the rural population for off-farm employment.

SURVIVAL AND EXPANSION

In our studies it was confirmed that despite the overall declining agricultural employment and the expanding 'multifunctionality' of the Greek countryside, agriculture still remains a central feature of the social and economic life of the rural population.

Two-thirds of farm holdings and more than half of rural households employed migrant labour.

The arrival of migrants played a crucial role in the restructuring of labour relations in rural regions. Wage labour in Greek agriculture almost doubled its size in the years following their arrival contributing ¼ of total labour expended in the farms. This non-family wage labour is almost exclusively migrant labour today.

The contribution of migrant labour varied in degree in accordance with the weight and role of the agricultural sector in the different rural regions.

In the vibrant lowland agricultural regions, the contribution of migrants was higher and primarily found in agricultural production and processing and secondarily in construction. In regions combining agricultural and non-agricultural activities their contribution was still high but was diffused to all sectors. In the 'marginal' and mountain areas it was lower but migrants combined the roles of both worker and caretaker of aged people. More particularly, on the one hand they worked in the reconstruction and revival of the traditional housing environment with the use of traditional materials, contributing to the conservation of the rural landscape, and on the other, they provided aged households with the labour necessary to preserve the traditional way of living. Without the migrant labour, many aging people would likely have lost their traditional way of life. In other words, in the absence of a satisfactory social infrastructure system in these areas, migrants undertook the support role hitherto played by members of the wider family. The importance of that for the social cohesion of those areas and for the integration of women in the labour market, in a family-centric rural society, is high.

On the other hand, migrants supported both the survival and the expansion of farms. However, the use of migrant labour was, in economic terms, more significant for the larger, 'entrepreneurial' farms. More analytically:

In the dynamic regions of intensive agriculture in particular, the average non-family wage labour days per farm more than doubled after the arrival of migrants and the process of socio-economic differentiation in the countryside was accentuated despite their employment by the larger strata of the rural population which serviced different needs for different purposes.

Similar to other Southern European countries, migrants in Greece have replaced and expanded pre-existing models of seasonal wage employment which were part of cyclical movements of internal migration. That labour was provided by ethnic groups who travelled seasonally to meet the labour demands (Rom,

Pomac Muslims from northern Greece) and/or by poor land workers from other rural regions. However, improved living standards and better education halted such internal migration in the 1980s.

Thus, the employment of migrant labour did not act as a substitute for indigenous wage labour. It acted rather complementarily to family labour by filling seasonal deficits and meeting increasing demands in both agriculture and rural regions as a whole.

Additionally, it resulted in a new family division of labour on and off the farm. It facilitated the partial withdrawal of family labour and the adoption of new family employment strategies. Farm operators reduced their workload and devoted more time to farm organisation and management; spouses either reduced their work or returned exclusively to housework whereasother members of the family sought employment outside of agriculture.

Two interconnected processes illustrate the implications of migrant labour upon gender employment in family farms. On the one hand, migrant labour favoured the expansion of larger farm holdings located in plain rural areas, allowing them to compete in the market, expand, modernise their cultivation and increase their production. The result of it has been the 'masculinisation' of the larger farms, which has provided additional pressure towards the domestication and/or off-farm employment orientation of female family members.

On the other hand, migrant labour had an indirect influence on the gender identity of women farmers in smaller farm holdings, and especially those located in the less favourableareas of the country, by providing non-family labour to substitute for a sufficient quantity of family, male labour. The availability of migrant labour offered an alternative to the labour of males who sought full-time, off-farm employment. Migrant labour in the smaller farms has, therefore, facilitated their 'feminisation' giving women the opportunity to take over the management of the farm and obtain a professional farmer identity.

Migrants have contributed positively to the demography of rural areas. Rural stock farmers, in particular, welcomed both the increased availability of labour and the infusion of eligible women. Mixed marriages increased seriously in both the 'multifunctional/pluriactive' and the 'marginal'/mountainous areas. Of even greater significance for the demography of the rural regions was the presence of the migrants' children in all types of primary and secondary education schools. In a number of rural communities schools re-opened for the first time in years to receive the children of migrants.

MOBILITY AND INTEGRATION

Over the past few years older migrants have started moving out of wage labour in agriculture in search of job stability and improved school education for their children. Albanians show higher professional and social mobility when compared to other nationalities. They are becoming increasingly stable, moving away from seasonal and opportunistic jobs and seeking more regular and permanent employment in construction or in setting up their own businesses in trade, tourism or agriculture either through renting land or sharecropping. Such behaviour tends to depend on the length of residence in the region and the requirements in the life cycle of the migrant family.

In agriculture Albanians have been replaced by irregular Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Indians, Bulgarians and Romanians, who have taken over the hard, low-paid, unhealthy jobs living in appalling conditions.

These new arrivals provide the cheap unauthorised labour that keeps the cost of production low securing a more aggressive position for Greek products on the national and international markets.

To date, the integration of older – Albanian mostly - migrants appears to have resulted largely from the individual/family strategies of the migrants themselves, rather than from the provisions of an institutional framework. Albanians show faster individual and family strategies of integration compared to other nationalities.

This research indicated that migrant workers were relatively more accepted and integrated in the less-developed rural regions than in the developed ones. This was related to the proportion of migrants in the total population of each region, their family status, and their job characteristics. Migrants and the local population had largely overlapping opinions about the prospects for integration. Both populations believed that the prospects for integration were much better for migrants who lived in the countryside with their families, as opposed to seasonal/irregular labourers travelling without families.

The former adopted strategies that were immediately related to the future of their children.

THE EXPECTED IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

The present economic crisis has highlighted even more the contradictions of Europe’s migration policies and the dangers of loosing an import factor

thatcontributes to rural sustainability; that factor is the possibility of a gradual withdrawal of migrants from the rural labour markets (Papademetriou and Terrazas 2009).

The crisis is expected to affect migration on 4 levels: employment, return migration, remittances and social integration. However, it is too early to reach clear conclusions with regards to the outcomes (Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty 2009).

The impact of the crisis on migrants' employment will likely depend on how severely it affects sectors in which migrants work and how long the crisis lasts.

Research has shown that low-skilled migrant workers are more vulnerable in a recession. Despite all this the majority of migrants seem to decide to stay on and are expected to show high levels of flexibility, mobility and willingness to adjust. That explains why, despite the concern of national governments and policy makers about natives' jobs and employment opportunities and the introduction of subsidised return programmes, most of these policies failed (Spain introduced a programme of paid return with no success so far – only 1400 out of 100.000 joined it).

However, migrants from Accession 8[2] countries are more recession responsive. They have a low cost of return and no barriers to re-entry when conditions allow it. Additionally, improving conditions back home following EU support have reduced unemployment while at the same time conditions deteriorate in other advanced EU countries. All these mean that the decision to return is easier for them.

Figures released by the Office for National Statistics in May 2009 showed the number of people from Eastern Europe leaving Britain more than doubled between September 2007 and September 2008. In the 12 months before September, 56,000 people from the A8 countries left Britain, compared with 25,000 in the year before September 2007. However, the net number of migrants from the countries still rose, although the figure was far lower than at the same point in the previous year. Immigration from non-EU states is expected to slow as the government's new points-based system, which allows entry only to workers with professional skills needed in the UK, starts to take effect (The Financial Times 2009).

In agriculture and the food sector, international trade pressures along with the reform of the CAP and the consequent reduction of subsidies and crop changes, followed by the recent economic crisis, have led to increasing pressures to either reduce the size of migrant employment and/or re-engage more family members in

[2] Accession 8 countries are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia

order to cut down labour costs. This development implies a redefinition of labour relations and of family division of labour on and off the farm in particular, and may have consequences for the future of migrants in rural regions.

The crisis has also brought changes to the attitudes of the indigenous population towards agricultural work. There are indications that Britons were "now applying for some of the more seasonal, agricultural-type jobs" they might have rejected before (The Financial Times 2009).

The situation is rather different for the non-EU migrants. Despite the close distance with receiving countries like Greece and Italy, no mass returns are found for Albanians for example. The family structure and long duration of their stay along with the weak economic prospects in their home country make the decision to return more difficult.

In other cases, the cost of returnning, the weak human capital they carry and their family conditions make return a difficult decision.

In the midst of an economic crisis, the direction of development and the size of threats to the sustainability of the rural regions of both receiving and sending countries are still difficult to foresee. It all depends on the depth and duration of the crisis and on the structural characteristics of the labour markets and of the migrants themselves.

It may be that the most important thing for migrant sending countries is the size of remittances.

There has been some discussion that the economic downturn will be a blow to migrant remittances, which have been identified as a key source of external capital for developing countries in the past decade. In the case of Albanian migrants, for example, we know that their remittances contribute more than 1/3 of the total monthly household income back home.It is even higher for rural households that get more than 50% of total remittances. For the World Bank that percentage goes up to 67%. It becomes evident that migration makes a positive contribution to the sustainability of the rural regions not only of the receiving countries but of the sending too. A possible reduction of remittances therefore is expected to affect sharply the living conditions in rural regions where poverty is higher than in the urban regions (World Bank 2009).

Economic and social integration will be affected by job losses and a limitation of access to social welfare benefits. On the other hand, unemployment may cause tensions between native and migrant populations. Sensitivities about migration have sharpened in UK and other European countries (Spain, Greece), with strikes over the hiring of migrant labour. With unemployment rising, politicians fear the political reactions and the exploitation of this issue by far-right political parties/

groups (UK, Greece, France, Italy). Migrants who remain abroad are expected to be in an increasingly precarious position with fewer opportunities for formal employment and the possibility of greater stigmatisation, the result of which may be abuse and discrimination.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

Migrants have been employed in many tasks, with differing skills, and significant geographic mobility over the seasons. In short, they have provided a highly flexible labour force. They have not supplanted native wage labourers; rather, they have improved the organisation and management of farm enterprises, relieving family members of manual tasks. Hired to do arduous, health-threatening, and low-paid jobs, they have greatly served rural areas and have been very important for the agricultural and wider economic development of them.

In regions where agriculture holds a significant position in the local economy, the positive consequences of migrant labour have ranged from farm preservation to farm expansion and modernisation. The most appreciated economic effects have been on large-scale farms and businesses that depend heavily on the availability of migrant labour. Migrants have played a significant role in the expansion ofthese farms, agricultural intensification, and modernisation. For smaller and pluriactive farms, they have offered the opportunity to preserve the farm while the farm operator and/or family members hold off-farm jobs. In this process, they have contributed to the 'feminisation' of small farms and the 'masculinisation' of large farms.

In marginal areas, migrants have provided rural households with the labour necessary for the maintenance of their traditional/cultural life. This last contribution is key to understanding the social and demographic implications of migrants' presence in the rural regions of Southern Europe in particular.

Migrants have offered great services in other forms of rural economic activities such as construction, hospitality/tourism, and personal/domestic services providing necessary labour at a low cost. They have also improved the demographics in many rural regions. In some regions lacking women willing to get married and to stay in rural areas, migrant women offered 'solutions' as spouses, improving fertility rates and keeping young farmers on the land.

The Greek experience is a valuable frame of reference for policymakers in most Southern European countries – and indeed, some in Northern Europe – as they grapple with the challenges and opportunities of migration. Policymakers

must cope with Southern Europe's persistent demographic, structural problems, the informality of rural labour markets and the continued rejection of agricultural work by the younger generation. If not tackled, these issues are expected to have a negative effect on the future of rural areas at a time of severe worldwide pressures connected with the World Trade Organisation negotiations, CAP reforms and the recent EU enlargement.

Despite a widespread acknowledgement of the migrants' positive contribution by the rural populations of the receiving countries, insecurity is still expressed, negative stereotypes have been maintained and a form of 'resistance' to the acceptance of the cultural differences which their presence implies is still apparent; thus, setting up serious obstacles to the integration of migrants..

This is mostly important in times of economic crisis and rising insecurity of a native population and is possibly one of the factors that makes Europe maintain a restrictive migration policy.

It is interesting that while the work of migrants is becoming increasingly important most Member States have few policies designed to attract, admit, and benefit systematically from the work of migrants. On the contrary member States design unsuccessful programmes for the repatriation of migrants when the persisting problems of Europe's agricultural sector and rural regions require policies that will regulate and monitor their employment and integration. These policies need to adhere to principles of social justice, and should resolve the problems of regularisation, of equal pay for jobs of equal value and of social rights. They should promote economic efficiency through job training and education. Such an approach must also support the restructuring of the agricultural sector and the development of the countryside.

We must recognise that rural areas also need to deal with the new EU policies of rural environmental protection, the production of quality agricultural goods, and the requirements for multifunctional agriculture, which in addition to producing food and fibre, will preserve the landscape and create rural employment.

Today the plethora of more or less restrictive national policies and bilateral agreements on migrant entry, quotas, etc., highlight the need to:

– Improve the implementation of the regularisation programmes as a precondition for the integration of migrants in rural economies and societies.

– Design operational plans at a national level and adopt differentiated and flexible policies, on the basis of varying regional characteristics, for the management of regional/seasonal or permanent demands for labour.

– Expand EU agricultural training programmes to include migrants in a way that improves their professional capabilities and understanding of new farming practices within the framework of new EU agricultural policies.

– Instigate and support local government initiatives for the reception and integration of migrants in rural regions providing the required services and facilities that would maintain them and their families in the countryside.

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PAWEŁ STAROSTA
University of Lodz, Lodz
starosta@uni lodz.pl

CIVIC PARTICIPATION IN RURAL EUROPE

Abstract

The main goal of this article is to make an attempt at answering three main problem questions:

1) What is the general level of civic participation of Europe's rural population in the end of the first decade of the 21st century and what is the scale of differentiation of the participation in different European countries? 2) What patterns of civic participation dominate in Europe's rural population? And 3) Which of the below listed models explaining the differentiation of civic participation (Socio Economic Status Model; Social Capital Model or Attachment Model) is best fitted to explain the changeability of European rural population's participation?

In the article, civic participation is understood in terms of behavioural approach as activity executed by the actions of citizens in the public, political and associative spheres. The data for empirical analysis comes from the fourth round of the European Social Survey conducted in 21 European countries in 2008. This article employs only the data referring to the sample of 14 509 respondents who declared themselves as living in rural areas. The sample under research is not to be identified with farmers.

The results of the study highlight four general conclusions. First, the level of civic participation of the rural inhabitants of Europe is lower than we assumed hypothetically. The mean value on the scale of 0 to 913 points is merely 1.17 points. Almost 17% of the rural inhabitants of Europe did not participate in any of the act of participation covered by the study, whereas 38% participated only in one of them. Second, our analyses revealed a high level of differentiation of civic participation in countries studied. In general, the former Eastern-bloc countries, Portugal, and Spain form a cluster of countries with the lowest level of

civic participation. Therefore, these are the countries where authoritarian rules, irrelevant of their orientation, lasted longest in the 20th century Europe. Italy, Cyprus and Switzerland are the intermediary cluster between the former group and the old democracies: Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France and UK. The highest level of civic participation was identified in the Scandinavian countries. Third, as a result of the empirical analyses conducted, four major patterns of civic participation have been distinguished: campaign participation, party participation, voluntaristic participation, and voting participation. Among them voting and campaign participation forms would be the most common modes of civic involvement in the rural part of Europe. Finally, our analyses revealed that among the three verified models explaining diversification of civic participation, it was the model of social capital that had the greatest prediction power, and not the model of socio-economic status, as was expected.

Key words: Civic Participation, Rural Society, Europe, European Social Survey 2008

1. INTRODUCTION

The process of global transformation goes hand in hand with various consequences within the economic, political and social spheres of contemporary societies. One of the globalists' fundamental theses assumes that alongside the free flow of goods, ideas and people, the potential possibilities of citizens to subjectively participate in shaping political and social structures increase in turn. In other words, a greater range of freedom and reduced pressure from state structures put the previously blocked individual potential in motion and contribute to the increase of common good and democracy. Widely known is an opinion by S. Huntington (2004) that the main direction of political transformations in the world is towards strengthening and extending democratic systems. Huntington claims that the era of globalisation is the third wave of democratisation in the history of contemporary world. The thesis is formulated both in reference to the advanced democracies and those in transition. As far as the latter are concerned, it has been known by the phrase 'hidden potential'.

On the other hand, the proponents of conservative-oriented ideologies point to the fact that the processes of globalisation, mainly the declining role of the national state and the growing role taken by the freedom of individuals unprepared for taking civic advantage of it, leads to quite opposite results. The normative system undergoes differentiation and relativisation, social life becomes

increasingly privatised and, consequently, the public sphere collapses. According to D. Marquand (2004), industrial society, with its strong social structures, repressed to a large extent the emotional and volitional sphere of an individual, imposing on them the rules of conduct that obliged them to act within clearly-defined legal limits. The public sphere was thus a sphere of normative coercion and was beyond the scope of spontaneous and emotional behaviour of an individual. Privacy, to use A. Etzioni's words, was of 'mandated' character and referred "to legal requirement that person's thoughts, emotions, and, above all behaviour be kept out of the sight and earshot of others" (Etzioni 2004;31). Consequently, participation in the civic sphere was strictly regulated and stimulated by social sanctions and the mechanism of internalisation of norms.

In the times of globalisation supported by the liberal doctrine of freedom and rights of an individual, privacy takes on, according to Etzioni, the character of 'expository' privacy. In other words, it is founded not on the right 'from' but on the right 'to', exposing individual separateness, manifesting individual attitudes and beliefs. However, the right 'to', as Bauman (2001), Etzioni (2004) and others notice, is not rooted in the formalised systems of enacted laws, but on more generalised norms referring to moral doctrines of individual freedom. Expository privacy thus stresses not an obligation and submission but freedom of choice and spontaneity of action according to individual predispositions. Understood this way, common wisdom, moods and subjective feelings of an individual or a group and not the enacted law become the basis for legitimisation of behaviour.

Consequently, the civic sphere becomes a domain of private choices, dependent, to a large extent, on the subject's changing emotional attitudes. According to conservatives, alongside the privatisation of public life, civic participation breaks down instead of becoming stronger. Individuals concentrate on their own problems instead of focusing on the idea of the public good. Many researchers provide empirical examples confirming a decrease in the interest in the political sphere and engagement of the representatives of democratic authorities in supporting authoritarian governments (Tam 1998). The famous publication by R. Putnam (2001) illustrates this process in reference to the United Stares' society both on national and local levels. According to the quoted author, public activity was much higher in the 1960s and 1970s than it was in the second half of the 1990s. This idea is also partially confirmed by comparative analysis of political participation in the 1960s and 1980s conducted by S. Verba et al. (1995). The complexity of assessment of the level of political involvement is pointed to by B. Rothstein (2002), who analysed the situation in Swedish society, and P. Hall (2002), who studied British society. According to Rothstein "Several surveys

show an increasing interest in politics. On the other hand, people are turning away from traditional channels of Political participation, such as political parties and interest organization, and are turning toward temporary and single – issue organizations mobilizing citizens for particular causes".

In Sweden in the years 1984-1994, the percentage of people between 24 and 44 years of age belonging to various political parties decreased from 13% to 6%. In Great Britain, according to P. Hall, the level of electoral participation has remained on a similar level since the 1950s. Approximately three quarters of British electorate participate in various elections quite regularly. What is more, "the number of British citizens engaged in extra-electoral forms of civic participation has significantly increased since the 1970s" (Hall 2002; 50); this refers mostly to participating in various kinds of boycotts or, e.g., signing protest petitions. Also Li, Savage and Pickles' analyses (2002) point to the general decrease in the level of participation in voluntary associations in England and Wales in the years 1972–1999.

In Poland and many other Central-Eastern European countries, after the period of intense activism at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, a lower level of participation in elections and, simultaneously, a decrease in the declared interest in politics can be observed. The results of national surveys (Bartkowski, 2003) show a small percentage of people belonging to or involved in working for political parties and trade unions, which played the role of quasi-parties in Polish political conditions until 2002.

Comparative analyses show that the level of electoral activeness is higher in European democracies than it is in the USA and Poland, and that the level of non-electoral forms of participation is usually higher in the USA than in the old European democracies or the new ones of Central-Eastern Europe (Verba, Scholzman, Brady, 1995). However, it is worth emphasising that the higher level of electoral participation in some European countries is the result of obligatory participation in elections.

Taking the research concerning local communities, particularly those of villages and small towns, into consideration, it needs to be noted that a higher level of civic participation exists in the countries of established democratic tradition than in developing democracies Starosta, Stanek (2002)**.** What is more, the analyses conducted by Starosta and Stanek (2002) and by Alberg and Sanberg (2003) show small differences in the levels of political participation among the formerly socialist countries.

It needs to be stressed, however, that the analyses of civic participation conducted to date have most frequently compared the situations in different

countries or different urban settings (Fung 2006). Less attention has been devoted to the transformations taking place in rural environments of different countries. Rural sociologists are interested more in the issues of the rural communities' participation in development programmes than they are in routine political behaviours. They frequently use case studies instead of survey databases. For Western political sociologists, in turn, rural parts of their societies are usually a less interesting subject of research due to their smaller significance as a national political force.

The European Union enlargement that took place in the beginning of the 21st century with former Eastern-bloc countries entering the EU structures, changed the internal constitution of social and political structure in the New Europe. The accession of countries with large rural populations increased the significance of this part of the European structure in electing the ruling elites and for the priorities of European society.

It is then becoming more and more important to monitor the level of civic participation of these environments that, on the one hand, constitute Europe's crucial human potential and that have received significant financial support from EU, and on the other hand, simultaneously manifest the most conservative attitudes towards the processes of cultural and political changes in Europe.

2. PROBLEM FORMULATION, HYPOTHESIS AND DATA BASE

The objective of this article is to make an attempt at answering three main problem questions:

1) What is the general level of civic participation of Europe's rural population in the end of the first decade of the 21st century and what is the scale of differentiation of the participation in different European countries?

2) What patterns of civic participation dominate in Europe's rural population? and

3) Which of the below listed models explaining the differentiation of civic participation (Socio Economic Status Model; Social Capital Model or Attachment Model) is best fited to explaining the changeability of the European rural population's participation?

Three hypotheses have been formulated respectively to the questions.

H1. In the first hypothesis it has been assumed that the level of civic participation will be close to the middle position on the designed scale and the level of differentiation will oscillate around one standard deviation. This will

consequently indicate a rather average heterogeneity of the levels of participation in particular countries in the rural part of Europe. It is expected that the highest levels of participation will be noted in the countries of the longest democratic traditions such as Great Britain, Switzerland or France, while the lowest levels will be noted in the countries of the shortest democratic tradition such as Estonia or Russia.

H2. In accordance with the results obtained from previous studies (Verba, Scholzman, Brady 1995; Pattie, Sayed, Whiteley 2003), we suppose that the dominating patterns of participation will be voting and campaign participation. The former will be mostly limited to participating in parliamentary or local elections, while the latter will indicate the participation of individuals in various collective social actions, not only electoral ones.

H3. We suppose that from among the three models taken under consideration (the SES, SC and AT Models), the Socio-Economic Status model is best suited to explaining the changeability of civic participation of the studied inhabitants of the rural part of Europe, from the statistical point of view.

The verification of the hypotheses was initiated based on a database containing information from the fourth round of the European Social Survey conducted in 21 European countries in 2008. This article uses only the data referring to people who declared themselves as living in rural areas. The sample under research is not to be identified with farmers exclusively. The analysis covered 14,509 respondents from such countries as Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Holland, Spain, Germany, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Sweden, Hungary, Italy and Great Britain. As it can be seen in the data contained in Table 1 and Table 4, the largest part of the studied group were the rural populations of Spain (1158 respondents, constituting 8% of the studied group), Belgium (957 respondents, constituting 7% of the studied group) and Germany (935 respondents – 6% of the studied group), while the smallest parts of the studied group comprised the rural populations of Italy (426 respondents – 3% of the studied group), Cyprus (432 respondents – 3% of the studied group), Estonia (437 respondents – 3% of the studied group), Denmark (485 respondents – 3% of the population under survey) and Russia (488 respondents – 3% of the studied group). The collection of data was thus not limited solely to the representatives of the Member States of the EU. It needs to be added that the research was conducted on independent random samples,

separate for particular countries[1]. The author of this text has not participated in the preparation nor execution of the empirical research.

3. CONCEPT, COMPONENTS AND MEASUREMENT OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION

The dependent variable of this article is civic participation. It is a well-known term in social and political Sciences. It has been borrowed from colloquial language and has played an important role not only in Science but also in political journalism and ideology. There is no question that it is a sub-category of a wider term of social participation (Misztal 1977) which denotes participation of various subjects in social processes and structures (Starosta,1983). In the tradition of political and social Sciences, the varied understanding of civic participation is connected with varied perception of the issue of social development (Hickey & Mohan; 2004) and citizenship (Delanty 2000). Nevertheless, it always refers to subjects' participation in the spheres of life that constitute civic space, i.e. to the political, associative and public spheres (Edwards, 2009).

According to the literature on the subject, three dominant ways of understanding civic participation can be distinguished.

The first defines participation as related to belonging to a group or being a part of a social whole. In this case, participation is merely a social fact of membership or the right to use resources of a social group based on membership privileges. The essence of the relation of participating, according to this way of understanding it, is an individual having specific social rights, constituted by tradition, religion or social contract norms at his/her disposal. Here, social activism is the consequence of the formal-legal status that an individual has within a group, community or social situation.

According to the second tradition, civic participation is defined as one or a series of behavioural acts based on which a given group or another social category grants a given subject access to resources at its disposal. Here, the definitive criterion of participation is an individual's activism. To participate is the same as to act for the benefit of a group or of a social whole. The above understanding only makes sense when all citizens are guaranteed equal rights in the sphere of civic activities, i.e. when the civic sphere is potentially accessible to everyone. Within this definition, there is no interest in the psychical motivation

[1] I received permission to use the ESS data from prof. Pawel Sztabinski of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of Polish Academy of Sciences, the Polish Research Coordinator.

of an individual's participation taken up within the public sphere. In other words, motivation and attitudes are less important here than the activities and their results for the community and for other individuals.

The proponents of the third interpretation perceive civic participation more broadly, including in its scope not only activities but also attitudes and psychical predispositions of the acting individuals towards groups, communities and social situations. Such an understanding of participation has its source in traditional citizen republicanism and more contemporary communitarian conceptions. The roots of this tradition go back to J. J Rousseau and A. De Toqueville's inspirations. As Sartori (1994:148) notes, "participation understood properly and reasonably is about personal participation, joining in actively and eagerly. Participation is thus not a prosaic 'being a part of something'... Participation is a spontaneous movement, an exact opposite of being included... i.e. The opposite of being mobilised". Rothstein (2002;294) perceives this issue in a similar way when he emphasises that, "a vital aspect of any working democracy is willingness of its people to spend time and energy in established forms of political activity". In this sense, participation is a process of subjective activity of an individual in various social situations. Such a conception of participation is also contained in the work of S. Verba, K. Scholzman and H. Brady (1995; 3), who claim that, "our conception of the participatory process rests upon two factors: the motivation and the capacity to take part in political life". The presented approach is rooted in the general voluntaristic tradition of organisation of social life. Apart from the undoubted advantage of perceiving civic participation not only in behavioural but also in mental dimension, its weak point is an insignificant possibility of empirical differentiation between a fully subjective action, resulting from the thoroughly conscious psychical disposition of an individual and an activity forced onto an individual by a social structure or situation. I therefore propose, in reference to the third approach, to apply the term "civic engagement" rather than "civic participation".

In the article, civic participation is understood similarly to behavioural approach as an activity that is executed by the actions of citizens in the public, political and associative spheres. **S**uch a view suspends the meaning of an individual's mental states in reference to the sphere of civic society and its reception, as demonstrated in an interest in political, public and associative matters. What is more, it excludes the necessity of respecting a moral and institutional obligation to take part in various public events. Our view is thus a narrow understanding of civic participation as civic behaviours (Pattie, Seid, Whiteley, 2003).

Activities within the civic sphere differ from one another depending on the amount of resources they engage and the skills individuals are required to have in order to execute them. Based on this, certain forms of activities that may be considered as basic components of participation can be distinguished.

The first of these forms is focused on electoral behaviour i.e. voting. It is the simplest form of participation, which does not require an individual to have any special resources or skills. It does, however, play the main role in both the process of legitimisation of political power and creation of an established socio-political order. It determines the selection of citizens to hold elite positions at both local and central level. " Voting is the most widespread an regularized political activity, and in terms of overall impact of the citizenry on governmental performance it may be the single most important act" (Verba Nie 1972; 46)

The second component requires significantly greater resources and skills and indirectly influences the shape of political structures in society. This element is called, following Verba et al. (1995), a 'campaign element' as it assumes that an individual will make use of significantly more extended resources and more skills, but it has no direct influence on legitimisation of authority neither local nor central. Its essence is reduced not only to activities on behalf of candidates or parties running for elite positions but it also includes collective activities as a part of social movements that are a kind of an alternative for institutionalised political behaviours.

The third, "net" component covers connections of an individual with people engaged in activities in the public sphere. It is a form of participation frequently included in the sphere of social capital and community life (Steinberger 1981). Taking into consideration the strict isolation of the political sphere from the social solidarity sphere, it was included in the pool of civic participation characterised by direct influence on legitimisation of authority, particularly in the area of social communication.

The fourth component refers to the activities of an individual in the associations-related sphere (Grabb, Curtis 1992). An expression of civic participation in this case is membership in voluntary organisations, working to their benefit or doing socially useful unpaid work.

The fifth component refers to party involvement. It thus includes party membership and active engagement in activities within the party beyond the periods of electoral mobilisation. Apart from the electoral aspect, this is the classical example of political involvement and it is connected with the classical conception of a democratic state representing the interest of legitimate citizens.

Having the questionnaire of the fourth round of ESS at our disposal, 11 questions regarding different acts of civic participation were selected. Those were the questions regarding political party membership, trade union membership, voting in the last parliamentary elections, doing voluntary and unpaid work during the previous month and participating such events as contacting a politician, working for a political party, working for an association, taking part in a public demonstration, signing a petition, wearing a badge during a campaign or boycotting a certain product in the previous 12 months' period.

The selected set of 11 questions thus fulfils two basic conditions formulated in this text referring to the notion of civic participation. Firstly, all questions are connected with the behavioural sphere, and secondly, the information they contain can be referred to all afore-enumerated components of civic participation. It needs to be added that the questions that characterise civic participation in the ESS study are also applied by many authors. The unquestionable disadvantage of the selected set of questions is the fact that consecutive components of civic participation are represented in varied degrees. Clearly underrepresented are the acts of voting participation or contacts with representatives of public sphere. Compared to other studies, in the fourth round of ESS, such issues as taking part in local elections, membership in voluntary associations or contact with media were nor recorded. In general, the number of questions in the ESS study that can be taken into consideration when characterising civic participation is four or five items smaller than the number that other authors usually include in their studies. Despite this outlined disadvantage, the ESS data collection seems to be sufficiently complete that an attempt at a comparative analysis of the studied phenomenon can be made. What is more, the ESS database provides a researcher with a rare opportunity to compare the situation between so many countries. The answers to the 11 selected indicatory questions were coded in a 0,1 system, where zero denoted lack of participation and 1 denoted participation in a given act.

Table 1 contains frequency and percentage display of positive declarations referring to particular acts of civic participation in the rural populations of European countries.

TABLE 1. Items of Civic Participation by Country in Rural EUROPE (%)

Country	Participation in last parliamentaryelection	Contacted politician last 12 months	Worked in political party or action group last 12 months	Worked in another association last 12 months	Displayed campaign badge last 12 months	Signed petition last 12 months	Taken part in public demonstration last 12 months	Boycotted certain products last 12 months	Membership of political party	Membership of trade union	Unpaid voluntary work in last month	Total	
												%	N
Belgium	83,9	15,0	4,1	24,7	7,3	24,7	6,7	9,9	4,9	33,6	19,2	100,0	957
Bulgaria	75,5	6,6	4,5	,7	2,0	2,0	,8	,9	7,4	2,1	5,1	100,0	759
Switzerland	53,0	13,2	5,8	11,9	5,3	35,8	5,8	24,0	7,1	9,4	13,6	100,0	973
Cyprus	86,6	19,4	9,5	6,9	7,9	5,3	2,5	4,6	14,6	18,5	1,4	100,0	432
Germany	77,8	22,6	4,7	30,4	4,0	27,6	5,1	28,4	3,4	12,3	23,0	100,0	935
Denmark	87,2	21,6	3,7	24,1	6,6	30,3	6,4	16,5	9,7	62,1	30,3	100,0	485
Estonia	65,9	13,5	2,1	4,8	7,1	7,6	,7	4,6	5,5	6,2	8,9	100,0	437
Spain	71,8	11,1	3,0	8,9	3,8	15,0	11,4	6,1	1,4	6,0	4,5	100,0	1158
Finland	73,6	22,7	5,6	32,3	13,5	27,1	2,0	26,6	9,5	45,9	15,5	100,0	882
France	73,4	17,5	1,6	11,9	7,2	28,7	11,7	24,5	1,2	6,4	21,3	100,0	738
United Kingdom	73,8	20,8	2,8	8,5	7,1	42,3	3,6	32,1	4,6	12,7	18,7	100,0	504
Norway	76,4	25,4	8,8	29,1	24,9	36,9	6,3	18,1	11,0	45,2	31,9	100,0	602
Poland	60,6	6,0	1,7	4,0	2,3	4,8	,7	2,2	1,2	4,0	3,7	100,0	601
Portugal	68,5	4,0	1,1	1,4	1,9	2,5	2,6	1,9	1,9	2,6	2,3	100,0	734
Russian Federation	71,9	7,0	3,3	3,1	2,5	4,9	4,3	3,5	4,5	12,3	3,3	100,0	488
Sweden	82,0	16,9	5,5	28,5	15,4	50,3	5,1	35,3	8,0	50,7	24,5	100,0	527
Slovenia	67,6	11,4	3,5	1,6	3,0	6,1	,7	4,3	6,1	16,9	18,6	100,0	694
Slovakia	77,2	12,2	2,5	6,9	2,7	15,1	,7	5,5	3,0	5,7	10,2	100,0	813
Netherland	84,4	14,4	3,3	27,0	4,1	21,1	2,4	8,7	6,6	16,6	36,7	100,0	755
Italy	75,8	14,1	6,8	5,2	7,3	9,2	7,3	5,2	6,6	12,4	8,9	100,0	426
Hungary	72,2	10,3	,7	5,4	,5	5,3	1,5	3,8	,7	3,8	4,8	100,0	609
Mean	74,3	14,6	4,0	13,2	6,5	19,2	4,2	12,7	5,7	18,3	14,6		
Median	73,4	14,1	3,5	8,5	5,3	15,0	3,6	6,1	5,5	12,3	10,2		

Even a quick glance at table 1 highlights the fact that the most common act of participation of the rural population of Europe is voting in parliamentary elections (73% of the studied rural population of Europe). The second place is taken by signing petitions (21%), the third, by trade union membership (18%). It is worth emphasising that a large, more than threefold, distance exists between voting in parliamentary elections and the second form of participation i.e. signing petitions among the rural population of Europe. The least popular act of civic participation among the studied group is working for a political party (4%), taking part in a demonstration (4.7%) and membership in a political patty (5.4%).

The highest percentage of those participating in parliamentary elections was recorded in Denmark (87.2%), the lowest, which is a significant surprise, was recorded in Switzerland (53.0%). The most frequent contacts with politicians were these of the inhabitants of rural areas in Norway (25.4%), and the least frequent – those of Portugal (4%). Taking part in work for a political party was most frequently declared on Cyprus (9.5%), and least frequently – in Hungary (0.7%). Working for an association was most frequently declared by the respondents from Finland (32.3%), and least frequently by the respondents from Bulgaria (0.7%). wearing a campaign badge was most popular in Norway (24.9%), and least popular in Hungary. The inhabitants of rural areas in Sweden were most engaged in signing petitions, while the ones in Bulgaria were least engaged (2%). Participating in demonstrations was most frequently declared by the inhabitants of French rural areas (11.7%), and least frequently by those of Slovenian, Slovak, Polish and Estonian rural areas (0.7% each). Boycotting a product was most frequently declared in Sweden (35.3%), and least frequently in Bulgaria (0.9%). Party membership was most frequently declared by the inhabitants of Cypriot rural areas, and least frequently in Hungary (0.7%). Trade union membership was most popular among the respondents from Denmark (62.1%), and least popular among the inhabitants of Bulgaria (2.1%). Finally, doing voluntary unpaid work during the previous month was most frequently declared by the inhabitants of Holland (36.7%), and least frequently by the respondents from of Cyprus (1.4%).

In general, significant statistical differences were recorded between the frequency of occurrence of the studied forms of civic participation among the whole population of rural areas in Europe and among countries within a given form or a given act of participation.

In order to construct one synthetic variable describing the level of civic participation within the whole of the European population and in particular countries, it has been decided to sum up the positive responses to the 11 previously selected questions. In this way a 12-degree summary initial scale was constructed

with the minimum of 0 points, in the case of lack of participation in any act, and the maximum of 11 points, in the case of participation in all acts. The conducted correlative analysis between particular binary items revealed a high level of statistical importance in all 55 pairs of partial correlations of the each-to-each item type. (TABLE 2)

The calculated level of reliability of the initial scale measured by the score of Cronbach's alpha coefficient (0.660) was, prior to weighting the items. As there were significant differences in the empirical occurrence of particular acts of participation, before constructing the final version of the scale, it was decided to weight particular items, i.e. to avoid treating them as equivalents. The basis for setting the weight for a specific item on the scale was the fraction of the difference between the theoretically possible, maximum percentage of occurrence of a given act of civic participation and the empirical frequency of its occurrence, to the theoretically possible percentage of occurrence of a given act. This can be expressed as (100 – Cea) /100, where 100 is the maximum possible frequency of occurrence of a given participation act and Cea is the empirical frequency referred to the whole of rural population in the study of the fourth round of the ESS.

The summary scale of civic participation (CP) for each respondent, having weighted particular items, was then as follows: CP = (0.27 x vote)+(0.85 x contplt)+ (0.96 x wrkprty)+(0.86 x wrkorg)+ (0.93 x badge)+(0.79 x sgnptt)+(0.95 x pbldmn)+(0.86 x bctprd)+(0.95 x mmbprty)+(0.82 x mbtru)+(0.86 x pvolwrk)[2].

As a result of weighing particular items, a higher rank was given to participation acts demanding commitment of greater resources, while the rank of those simplest acts of participation, often performed out of a certain routine, was lowered. First of all, the importance of participation in parliamentary elections was reduced in the general scale of civic participation, since in some European countries voting in parliamentary elections is a legal obligation. In consequence, the scale of civil participation was flattened, its minimum being 0 and the maximum value 9.13. Cronbach's alpha coefficient, after weighting, equaled 0.681.

[2] Mnemonics are quoted from *Wykaz zmiennych w zbiorze skumulowanym ESS runda 1-3 oraz zbiorze ESS runda 4*. W-wa IFIS PAN 2010.

TABLE 2. Matrix of r Pearson's correlations coefficient between items of Civic Participation

Items	Participation in last parliamentary election	Contacted politician last 12 months	Worked in political party or action group last 12 months	Worked in another association last 12 months	Displayed campaign badge last 12 months	Signed petition last 12 months	Taken part in public demonstration last 12 months	Boycotted certain products last 12 months	Membership of political party	Membership of trade union
Contacted politician last 12 months	,137									
Worked in political party or action group last 12 months	,085	,310								
Worked in another association last 12 months	,115	,313	,255							
Displayed campaign badge last 12 months	,041	,200	,285	,271						
Signed petition last 12 months	,081	,229	,153	,274	,263					
Taken part in public demonstration last 12 months	,032	,135	,172	,161	,256	,258				
Boycotted certain products last 12 months	,062	,187	,091	,194	,190	,321	,175			
Membership of political party	,111	,188	,444	,165	,195	,086	,057	,040		
Membership of trade union	,133	,114	,078	,182	,127	,154	,082	,113	,075	
p. = ,000										

TABLE 3. Scale of Civic Participation in Rural EUROPE (before weighting)

Number acts of participation	F	%
,00	2425	16,7
1,00	5542	38,2
2,00	2731	18,8
3,00	1581	10,9
4,00	978	6,7
5,00	595	4,1
6,00	354	2,4
7,00	146	1,0
8,00	87	,6
9,00	37	,3
10,00	27	,2
11,0	6	,0
Total	14509	100,0

Cronbach's alpha = 0,660 before weighting 11 items
Cronbach's apha = 0,681 after weighting 11 items

4. THEORIES EXPLAINING CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Several theories can be identified in sociological literature, which makes a relatively thorough attempt to explain the changeability of civic participation of a country, region or community population, in the form of simplified explanatory models. Several explanatory patterns are most often mentioned: rational choice theory, socio-economic status theory, civic voluntarism theory, social capital theory, theory of attachment and theory of socialization. We are aware that in each of these cases we deal with a theoretical concept or rather pattern or explanatory model than a theory as such, characterised by independent ontological, epistemological and methodological foundations.

Within each of the above mentioned explanatory models, the focus is on the collection of certain factors which, according to authors of particular concepts, explain civic activism quite precisely.

The theory of rational choice (Downs 1957, Olson 1974, Hechter 1987, Coleman 1994) assumes that both individual and collective actions can be explained in terms of expenditures (costs) carried and advantages (benefits) achieved. Civic activity comes into view when the costs of civic participation are lower than advantages that the individual receives as a result of actions undertaken. Rationality, in the earlier versions of this theory, was associated with advantages

understood in economic terms as individual profits. A distinction between private versus public goods as well as individual versus collective advantages was introduced in later versions of the theory (Hechter1987, Coleman 1994). The notion of rationality was therefore broadened by socio-cultural requirements assuring the possibility of survival and self-development of an individual in conditions of close relationship with a given social group or cultural circle. This was a reference to cultural rationality as described by Chayanov within the context of traditional peasant economy (Kerblay 1971).

The concept of socio-economic status is taken directly from structural functionalism. Its core assumption is that every social system rewards those individuals who, by undertaking social actions, contribute to the *duration* and development of the social system as well as those who possess certain rare skills important for fulfilling the functional requirements of the system (Davies K., Moore W., 1975) Therefore, every structure consists of diverse social statuses indicated by such resources-values as education, power, wealth, age or gender. Civic activism appears on the one hand as an activity through which one desires to alter one's position in the social structure, and on the other, as a kind of the return payment that one makes for the social system in exchange for a high position occupied within it and related privileges (Verba, Nie 1972).

The concept of civic volunatarism is an attempt to broaden the theory of socio-economic status by ideas borrowed from the theory of resources. It was popularised by Verba, Szolzman and Brady (1995). The central assumption states that civic activism is not only a consequence of social status occupied by the individual which is defined by such variables as power, education, or wealth, but also by other values–resources that are not included in the classical understanding of status, but are necessary for successful activity in the public sphere. According to Verba and others, these are primarily the time that individuals may give to some activity, and civic skills not equivalent to formal education. 'Voluntary organizations' was a new category of resource added by J. M., McPherson (1988). Civic structures constitute an offer and a form of encouragement for undertaking civic activity within certain populations.

The concept of social capital is currently one of the most trendy theoretical approaches in Sociology. Popularised by Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1994), Lin (2001), Putnam (2001), and Halpern (2005), it is used for explaining numerous social phenomena, particularly economic development, development of democracy in various countries and local communities, public security and quality of life. Since the most common components of social capital are trust, network of social contacts that the individual has and, less frequently, shared

norms of cooperation, thus civic activism is treated here as a result of a certain level of trust that the individual displays for people and institutional structures, as a result of being embedded in a network of social contacts. In other words, the concept of social capital assumes that a high level of social activism accompanies the high level of trust occurring in a group or society as well as broad network of social contacts. However, there are distinct differences among the social capital researchers over the function that the social capital fulfils. While the majority perceives it as a cause or basis for the development in various spheres of social life, others argue that it is rather a result of certain developmental processes.

The concept of attachment was designed by psychologists (Bowlby 1997) and sociologists (Kasarda, Janowitz 1974; Goudy 1998) as a theory of an individual's dependence from another individual or social group. In other words, the individual's activity, including civic activity, is a result of the emotional ties of an individual with a given social group and functional bonds that exist between the individual and the group (the one within which civic activity is possible).

The concept of socialisation is well known in Sociology. Its basic assumption is that the individual's activity is primarily a function of a particular system of norms and values transferred to them by their typical social environment(Tillman, 1996). In other words, the individual internalises certain norms and values which operate in their close environment, through the process of upbringing, and subsequently follows patterns of behaviour consistent with these norms, irrespectable of the advantages and disadvantages this brings. Civic activity appears, therefore, where it is highly valued by a social setting and where its importance is transferred from generation to generation or from groups of reference and role models within the same generation.

It should be underlined that the explanatory models described above are not mutually exclusive concepts. Some elements of the status concept e.g. wealth and education are also included in the concept of civic voluntarism, whereas the concept of attachment in the aspect of functional dependencies is clearly close to the concept of rational choice in its later version, accentuating the importance of public goods. Many themes in the concepts mentioned above moreover refer to the theory of exchange. Therefore, it is difficult to recommend the models described as alternative ways of interpretation of a given social phenomenon. Inability to acknowledge all the presented models in our empirical analyses results not only from overlapping of the scopes of notions of the studied phenomena but also from shortage of information from databases of the 4th round of ESS. Due to these two reasons, only the models of socio-economic status, social capital, and attachment will be employed for further analyses.

The socio-economic status model consists of the following variables: gender, age, and education – measured by the number of completed years of education, income – measured by yearly net income from all sources in a household and by holding position of a supervisor of other people's work. Variables in our model are therefore typical SES variables frequently used in other studies. Let us add that variables such as 'sex' and 'supervising other people's work' were expressed in binary categories where 0 – represented females and individuals not supervising the work of others; whereas 1 – stood for males and, respectively, individuals supervising the work of others. The remaining variables were expressed on the interval scale.

The social capital model consists of such variables as generalised trust, trust for institutions, frequency of using the Internet, frequency of meeting friends or colleagues and frequency of participation in social events and parties. Quite evidently, in our study, social capital is represented mainly by the variables of trust and variables of network. Generalised trust was expressed by the total sum of positions taken by respondents on three 10-point scales. The first rated the respondent's reaction to the statement"Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful?" The next rated a reaction to the statement "Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair". Finally, the third one measured reactions to the statement "Most people try to be helpful to others or mostly looking out for themselves". Each respondent was asked to describe his/her reaction to the above statements by marking the relevant number on a scale where 0 stood for the most negative attitude and 10 for the most positive one. The scale of trust towards institutions consisted of the total sum of points indicating reactions to questions about trust towards parliament, legal system, police, and political parties. Similarly as in the case of generalised trust, 0 on each of the four partial scales stood for the lack of trust in a given institution, and 10 for the most positive trust in an institution. The remaining variables were expressed on ordinal scales.

The attachment model consists of such variables as sense of being discriminated in the country of residence, having nationality of the country of residence, being born in the country of residence, belonging to an ethnic minority in the country of residence, sense of security in the place of living, as well as having a permanent work contract. In this case, the first and the fifth variable was expressed on the ordinal scale, while the remaining ones on the binary scale – where 1 indicated the positive situation and 0 – the negative one.

6. DIFFERENTIATION OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION LEVEL

The data in tables 3 and 4 indicates that the general level of civic participation among the inhabitants of rural Europe is very low. On the participation scale from 0 to 9.13 points, the average for the whole continent was merely that of 1.17. It needs to be added, however, that this situation is typical not only of the rural population but also of the inhabitants of large cities, in whose case the arithmetic mean was 1.15, and of medium and small cities' inhabitants, in whose case the average was 1.18 points. These differences are statistically unimportant.

TABLE 4. MEANS of Civic Participation by Country in Rural EUROPE (after weighting).

Country	Mean	N	%	Standard deviation	Min	Max
Portugal	,374	734	5	,660	0,0	9,13
Poland	,421	601	4	,709	0,0	9,13
Bulgaria	,484	759	5	,740	0,0	9,13
Hungary	,503	609	4	,706	0,0	9,13
Russian Federation	,612	488	3	,914	0,0	9,13
Estonia	,702	437	3	,947	0,0	9,13
Slovakia	,753	813	6	,985	0,0	9,13
Slovenia	,798	694	5	,975	0,0	9,13
Spain	,809	1158	8	1,222	0,0	9,13
Italy	,926	426	3	1,527	0,0	9,13
Cyprus	1,028	432	3	1,490	0,0	9,13
Switzerland	1,271	973	7	1,388	0,0	9,13
France	1,328	738	5	1,416	0,0	9,13
Netherland	1,428	755	5	1,391	0,0	9,13
United Kingdom	1,499	504	3	1,359	0,0	9,13
Belgium	1,505	957	7	1,440	0,0	9,13
Germany	1,589	935	6	1,501	0,0	9,13
Finland	1,915	882	6	1,544	0,0	9,13
Denmark	2,029	485	3	1,473	0,0	9,13
Norway	2,249	602	4	1,783	0,0	9,13
Sweden	2,263	527	4	1,621	0,0	9,13
Total	1,168	14509	100	1,394	0,0	9,13

The average level of engagement is, hence, lower than the medium measurement on the scale. The low average level is on the one hand the result of the significant size of the population of people who display no civic activity whatsoever (17%) and the percentage (38%) of the respondents who declared their

participation in only one act of civic participation, i.e. taking part in parliamentary elections, as well as a very small percentage of the population taking part in five or more acts of participation (8.6%) on the other.

The highest levels of participation were recorded in Sweden ($\bar{x} = 2.26$), Norway ($\bar{x} = 2.25$) and Denmark ($\bar{x} = 2.03$), while the lowest – in Portugal ($\bar{x} = 0.370$), Poland ($\bar{x} = 0.42$) and Bulgaria ($\bar{x} = 0.48$). The most surprising result was the very low level of participation in the Polish rural areas, where several years ago, certain interest groups deomstrated noticeably increased activity and where numerous campaigns and protests were organised. Even in the mid –1990s, a significantly higher level of civic participation existed in orural and small-town local communities in Poland than in Bulgaria or Russia (Starosta, Stanek 2002). It would seem that the tradition of civic engagement in Poland has a stronger correlation to the general level of participation than in for example, the other countries of the former socialist bloc. However, it seems that the low level of civic participation in the Polish rural areas is predominantly the result of the low participation in parliamentary elections. It is then possible that the more disciplined electoral behaviours, shaped by the respect for state institutions, resulted also in the higher level of electoral participation in the post-transformation period in the former socialist countries.

The generally low level of participation is accompanied by a highly significant differentiation of activity both among and within particular countries. The highest level of differentiation, which is understandable, was recorded in the countries with the highest level of participation, i.e. in Norway and Sweden, while the lowest level of differentiation was recorded in the countries with the lowest level of participation, i.e. in Portugal, Hungary and Poland. The difference in the levels of participation between the most active inhabitants of Sweden and the most passive inhabitants of Poland is more than six-fold (TABLE 5).

The results of Scheffe's test, presented in the table, allow us to remark that at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, five sub-sets of countries with a similar levels of civic participation can be distinguished. The first one, with the lowest level of participation, includes only Portugal. The inhabitants of Portuguese rural areas declared a very low level of participation in many of the analysed acts. The difference between Portugal as a negative leader and the following sub-set of countries is not large but it is significant. The second category with a low level of participation includes the former Eastern bloc countries such as Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Russia. The third sub-set of countries with a medium level of participation consists, in part, of former socialist countries such as Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia and in part, of southern countries such as Spain, Italy

and Cyprus. The category with a higher level of civic participation includes the countries of the old European democracy: Switzerland, France, Holland, Great Britain, Belgium and Germany. Finally, the category with the highest level of civic participation includes only the Scandinavian countries: Finland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

TABLE 5. Heterogeneity and Homogeneity of Civic Participation in Rural EUROPE - ANOVA ANALYSIS

		df	F	p.
Between groups	4683,394	20	144,233	,000
Within groups	23522,033	14488		

Sub-sets of Homogeneous Countries (Scheffe's test) for alpha = 0,05

Country	1	2	3	4	5	6
Portugal	,3736					
Poland		,4213				
Bulgaria		,4840				
Hungary		,5026				
Russian Federation		,6121				
Estonia		,7020	,7020			
Slovakia		,7534	,7534			
Slovenia		,7978	,7978			
Spain		,8090	,8090			
Italy			,9263	,9263		
Cyprus			1,0281	1,0281		
Switzerland				1,2711	1,2711	
France					1,3285	
Netherland					1,4277	
United Kingdom					1,4991	
Belgium					1,5050	
Germany					1,5886	
Finland						1,9151
Denmark						2,0292
Norway						2,2488
Sweden						2,2633
p.	1,000	,081	,410	,277	,476	,256

The obtained result is partially surprising. We assumed that young democracies will be characterised by a generally low level of participation, but we did not foresee that the highest level of participation will occur in Scandinavian countries. We were more inclined to assume that the leadership will be that of the rural populations in France, Germany and Great Britain. However, when looking

closely at the system-political differences, at cultural and social tradition it is easier to understand the advantage of the Scandinavian countries over the other European states in the area of civic activity.

It needs to be emphasized that all of these countries have had a clear peasant majority within their population since the 1940s. Some of them, for example,. Finland, was described as a peasant state (Grandberg, Nikula 1995). Secondly, all these countries have a perfectly developed system of service for the inhabitants of rural areas and of agriculture as well as an extensive network of voluntary associations in rural communities. Thirdly, these countries did not participate intensively in the first stage of industrialisation, as it was in case of France, Germany or Great Britain. Fourthly. In the longer term, these countries' politics were not influenced by dictatorship or neo-liberal doctrines. What is more, these are the countries where the value of Ginni's coefficient, which characterises the differences in the levels of redistribution of material goods, is the lowest in the world.

7. *MODES* OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION

One of the main problem questions of this article concerned the dominant types of civic participation taken part in by the inhabitants of rural areas in Europe. This problem has been analysed among others by Verba, Nie (1972), Novak et al. (1982), Gliński, Palska (1995), Verba Scholzman, Brady (1995) with reference to different social contexts.

In order to answer this question, as with the other researchers, we have applied a factor analysis, which is based on the reduction of the initial 11 acts of participation to a few factors or patterns within which the initial items, statistically speaking, are significantly and strongly associated with one another (TABLE 6).

The data presented in table 6 highlights the fact that four dominating types/ patterns of civic participation can be distinguished among the inhabitants of rural areas in Europe.

The first one, that of the largest load, explains the variances of the whole scale of civic participation; we called it the campaign participation type. The type consists of acts of participation in such activities and acts as taking part in demonstrations, signing petitions, boycotting a product or displaying a campaign badge. These are acts of participation in weakly institutionalised activities. They confirm the participation in social movements rather than in formalised

structures. What is more, they do not have to be, and most probably are not, strictly connected with the political or associative sphere. Key to this argument is the lack of items related to political sphere or associative activities within this factor. The greatest frequency of occurrence of this type of participation was recorded in Sweden. Norway and Great Britain, while the lowest – in Bulgaria, Hungary and Portugal.

TABLE 6. Types of civic participation in Rural EUROPE - FACTOR ANALYSIS

Items	Campaign	Party	Associational	Voting
Taken part in public demonstration last 12 months	,708			
Signed petition last 12 months	,649			
Boycotted certain products last 12 months	,594			
Displayed campaign badge last 12 months	,543			
Worked in political party or action group last 12 months		,806		
Membership of political party		,798		
Unpaid voluntary work in favour other people			,835	
Worked in another association last 12 months			,670	
Contacted politician last 12 months			,439	
Participation in last parliamentary election				,795
Membership of trade union				,671
% of variance	15,785	15,090	13,843	10,545
cumulative %	15,785	30,874	44,718	55,263
Test KMO	,774			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Rotation Method: Varimax

The second type includes strictly political participation and contains only two items: party membership and working for a party or a political activity group. This pattern of participation occurs least frequently in the studied population, its significance, however, for explaining the variances of the general scale of participation is very important. It occurs most frequently in Cyprus, Norway and Italy and least frequently in Poland, Portugal and the Netherlands.

The third pattern was called associational participation, but it could as well be called voluntaristic, as it is characterised by taking up voluntary unpaid work for an association or for other people. The third feature of this type of participation are contacts with politicians. The context of the latter item implies that it is not the social contact, but a contact that results in an attempt to solve certain problems

of the community. This type of participation occurred most frequently in the Netherlands, Norway and Germany, and least frequently – in Portugal, Russia and Cyprus.

The last pattern was called voting-type participation. It includes not only participation in elections but also trade union membership. These two acts fall under the same type because of very strong statistical associations between taking part in elections and being a member of a trade union. This can be a signal that trade unions associated with the inhabitants of rural areas within the study function as a structure that mobilises its members for electoral behaviours, rather than as a party or form of voluntary activity. This is the type that most frequently occurs among the studied group of European rural inhabitants but its explanatory power of the participation scale variances is the least important. The fourth type of participation was most numerously represented in Denmark, Sweden and Finland and it occurred least frequently in Poland and Portugal.

Specific items comprising the enumerated types of social participation were also present in other studies. They also constituted similar arrangements but these were not sets identical to the one outlined in this article. For instance, in the research by Verba and others (1995), voting and campaign types are included, but the former type only covered the variables of participation in parliamentary and local elections, and the latter referred to political rather than social campaigning as it is the case here. What is more, that which is called "campaign-type" in our study, occurs under the name "collective activity type" in the studies by Patti and others (2003).

In general, the crucial difference between our typology and other typologies can be reduced to the fact that the types distinguished by us characterise certain spheres of participation, while the typologies by Patti and others (2003) or Verba et.al. (1995) diversify civic participation in reference to forms of activities.

8. TESTING OF THE THREE MODELS

The models explaining the changeability of levels of civic participation in reference to both its whole and its specific types were verified by means of a regression equation, the *ordinary least squares* method (OLS). The relative coefficient in each of the three analysed cases was the standardised civic participation scale and the particular factors of the participation types, which was the result of the previous factor analysis. The variables assigned to each explanatory model were the explanatory predictors.

TABLE 7. OLS Regression – Socio Economic Status Model

Predictors	General civic participation		Campaign participation		Party participation		Associational participation		Voting participation	
	Beta	p.	Beta	p.	Beta	p.	Beta	p.	Beta	p.
Gender	,026	,001	-,041	,000	,050	,000	,037	,000	,015	,057
Age	,097	,000	-,074	,000	,082	,000	,057	,000	,262	,000
Years of full time education completed	,263	,000	,144	,000	,031	,001	,170	,000	,197	,000
Household's total net income	,135	,000	,073	,000	-,003	,743	,076	,000	,139	,000
Supervising other employees	,111	,000	,040	,000	,040	,000	,096	,000	,043	,000
R^2	,135		,053		,012		,062		,105	
F	452,539		162,449		34,265		192,798		341,721	
p.	,000[a]		,000[a]		,000[a]		,000[a]		,000[a]	

a/ dependent variable: x_1 General civic participation; x_2 Campaign participation; x_3 Party participation; x_4 Associational participation; x_5 Voting participation

TABLE 8. OLS Regression – Social Capital Model

Predictors	General civic participation		Campaign participation		Party participation		Associational participation		Voting participation	
	Beta	p.	Beta	p.	Beta	p.	Beta	p.	Beta	p.
Generalized trust	,089	,000	,051	,000	-,031	,001	,068	,000	,089	,000
Institutional trust	,093	,000	,001	,884	,079	,000	,057	,000	,076	,000
Frequence of internet use	,217	,000	,202	,000	-,037	,000	,159	,000	,021	,017
Frequence of meetings with friends or colleagues	,174	,000	,057	,000	,101	,000	,160	,000	,027	,001
Frequence of taking part in social meetings	,022	,006	,020	,018	-,005	,575	,009	,274	,025	,003
R^2	,144		,059		,015		,086		,025	
F	487,336		181,011		44,145		273,184		75,258	
p.	,000[a]		,000[a]		,000[a]		,000[a]		,000[a]	

a/ dependent variable: x_1 General civic participation; x_2 Campaign participation; x_3 Party participation; x_4 Associational participation; x_5 Voting participation

TABLE 9. OLS Regression – Attachment Model

Predictors	General civic participation		Campaign participation		Party participation		Associational participation		Voting participation	
	Beta	p.	Beta	p.	Beta	p.	Beta	p.	Beta	p.
Feeling of discrimination in country of residence	,093	,000	,071	,000	,009	,321	,056	,000	-,013	,112
Citizenship in country of residence	,051	,000	-,021	,042	,030	,004	,012	,228	,179	,000
Born in country of residence	,039	,000	-,015	,154	,016	,116	,016	,121	,023	,019
Member of ethnic minority	,048	,000	,056	,000	,026	,003	,044	,000	-,019	,024
Feeling of safety in place of residence	-,137	,000	-,082	,000	-,018	,030	-,081	,000	,061	,000
Permanent work contract	,095	,000	,041	,000	-,024	,004	,047	,000	,209	,000
Satisfied with present state of economy in country	,127	,000	,019	,029	,040	,000	,112	,000	,091	,000
R^2	,064		,017		,004		,029		,096	
F	387,603		34,904		9,091		59,631		213,419	
p.	,000[a]		,000[a]		,000[a]		,000[a]		,000[a]	

a/ dependent variable: x_1 General civic participation; x_2 Campaign participation; x_3 Party participation; x_4 Associational participation; x_5 Voting participation

All three models explain the changeability of the level of civic participation in a statistically significant way. In each case the significance level was 0.000. In other words, there is almost certainty of rejecting the zero hypothesis that states that there is no connection between the variables included in the models an the level of civic participation. However, the R^2 scores are not high and they are for the social capital model – 0.144, for the socio-economic status model – 0.135, and for the attachment model – a mere 0.064. This means that the variables placed in the social capital model can be used to explain 14.4% of civic participation changeability, the variables placed in the socio-economic model – 13.5%, and the variables of the attachment model – a mere 6.4%. In other words, in the case of the first model, 85.6% of the changeability of differentiation of civic participation is explained any means of variables that are located outside of the model, in case of the second model – 86.5%, and in case of the third model – 93.7%.

There is, thus, no doubt that the models presented here have little power as predictors and it would not cause much interest in the case of econometric analysis, where a different type of data is used. In case of sociological analysis, however, the obtained results do not diverge much from the results of other similar analyses. For instance, in the analyses by Patti et.al (2003), the prediction power of the three models analysed (rational choice, social capital, and civic voluntarism) was within the range 16 to 20% but, in the models proposed by the authors, beside the variables proper for each model each time the variables of socio-economic status were added. It can therefore be noticed that the prediction results achieved by us in reference to particular models are slightly lower, but their net explanatory power is significantly higher that of the British authors'.

The analysis of the data presented in tables 7,8 and 9 proves that the variables of social capital slightly more adequately explain the differentiation of civic participation than the included variables of socio-economic status and attachment.

The remarks on explaining the general scale of civic participation are not completely identical to the prediction of the distinguished types of participation. It appears that the social capital model best explains the changeabilities of campaign, party and voluntaristic participation but it barely explains the changeability of voting participation. Taking part in elections is thus better explained by means of attachment variables than by means of social capital variables.

Moving to the level of variables within particular models it is easy to notice, based on the value of the beta coefficient, that in the social capital model the variables "frequency of Internet use" and "frequency of meeting with friends or colleagues" have the highest prediction power, and the variables of "trust" and "frequency of taking part in social parties" have lower power. It is thus an

argument that confirms a certain explanatory advantage of the network capital (Lin 2001) over the trust capital (Sztompka 2007) in reference to explaining civic participation.

Within the socio-economic status, the variables of education, income and power have the highest, while the lowest prediction power refers to gender, indicating that the differences in the level and types of civic participation in Europe are not statistically important when referred to men and women. Certain divergence from the above-outlined model can be found in the case of voting and party participation. It appears that in these cases, it is the age of the respondents, rather than their level of education, income or the scope of supervision over other employees, that is the variable which best explains participation. The value of the beta coefficient in the relationship between age and voting participation is the highest of all partial coefficients in our study.

In the attachment model, the variables of non-belonging to an ethnic minority or an unlimited work contract have the highest prediction power, while the citizenship of the country of residence has the lowest prediction power for the inhabitants of rural areas. In conclusion, it has to be said that it is not the socio-economic status model (as we assumed) but rather the social capital model that is best fitted to explain the levels and types of civic participation in rural Europe. This confirms the importance of the social capital model for interpreting civic participation recorded in other studies (Pattie et al., 2003; Helpren 2005, Starosta Frykowski 2008; Rossteutscher 2008).

9. CONCLUSIONS

The presented results of analyses point to four general conclusions.

First, the level of civic participation of the rural inhabitants of Europe is rather low, in fact lower than we assumed hypothetically. The mean value on the scale of 0 to 9.13 points is merely 1.17 points. Almost 17% of the rural inhabitants of Europe did not participate in any act of participation covered by the study, whereas 38% participated only in one of them. The most common was participation in parliamentary elections (73%), while the rarest (4%) was work for a political party or a political interest group. The results of the study refer to the weakly developed civic sphere of the rural part of Europe. However, not only is the level of participation of the rural population only slightly higher than that of large city inhabitants, but also the differences between the levels of participation of those two environments are not statistically significant. Thus, low

civic participation is a problem for the whole of Europe, not only its rural part. The results of our studies also point to the existence of the socio-political system in which certain elite groups rule the relatively passive social masses rather than co-rule together with the politically-aware citizens. Citizenship mainly takes the pattern of participation limited to election of elites, leaving public matters in the hands of elected ruling representatives.

Second, our analyses revealed a high level of differentiation of civic participation in countries within the study. In general, the former Eastern-bloc countries, Portugal, and Spain are the groups with lowest level of civic participation. Therefore, these are the countries where authoritarian rules, irrelevant of their orientation, lasted longest in 20th century Europe. Italy, Cyprus and Switzerland are the intermediaries between the former group and the old democracies of Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France and the UK. The highest level of civic participation was identified in the Scandinavian countries, where the level of voluntary work for associations and the frequency of contacts with politicians was higher than in other countries.

It is not out of the question that one of the fundamental reasons (on the macro level) for the Scandinavian countries' supremacy over other European countries in terms of civic sphere function is the different style of civil service execution by the civil servants. While the civil service in the countries of strong authoritarian rule traditions is characterised by distance and a clientelist attitude towards the citizen, in Scandinavian countries it is more based on partnership and mutual openness. In brief, the level of participation in Scandinavian countries is on average five times higher than in countries with a tradition of authoritarian rule. Hence, our anticipation that the highest level of civic participation would be in the countries with the longest democratic tradition i.e. in UK, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Germany was not confirmed.

Third, as a result of the empirical analyses conducted, four major patterns of civic participation have been distinguished: campaign participation, party participation, voluntaristic participation, and voting participation. Among them, voting and campaign participation forms would be the most common modes of civic involvement in the rural part of Europe.

Finally, our analyses revealed that among the three verified models explaining the diversification of civic participation, it was the model of social capital that had the greatest prediction power, and not the model of socio-economic status, as was expected. Still, all three models explained the changeability of both the general scale of civic participation and the distinguished modes of participation only to a small degree.

It is therefore worth taking into account such methods of civic participation analysis which would allow verification of other explanatory models mentioned in the literature as well as introducing the new ones referring not only to the micro sphere but also the macro sphere. Moreover, it would be necessary to include variables characterising the personality and psychological disposition of the studied population in these models.

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KRZYSZTOF GORLACH & MARTA KLEKOTKO
Jagiellonian University, Cracow
kgorlach@interia.pl
marta.klekotko@uj.edu.pl

TOGETHER BUT SEPARATELY: AN ATTEMPT AT THE PROCESS OF CLASS DIVERSIFICATION AMONG POLISH PEASANTRY[1]

Abstract

The authors try to examine the class diversification hypothesis in the context of recent social and economic changes occurring in the community of family farm owners/operators in Poland. Basing on three consecutive national research conducted respectively in 1994, 1999 and 2007 the processes of diversification have been analyzed. They are observed on the level of changing market positions of farms as well as on the level of class consciousness of the owners/operators, and on the level of strategies preferred by them to defend their interests. The analysis of research results leads to the conclusion that the discrepancy between the group of business-type farms with visible elements of "capitalist consciousness" and the group of rather marginalized ones with lack of "capitalist consciousness" might be observed.

Key words: peasantry, family farms, market position, class consciousness, diversification

[1] The paper has been based on the data collected within research project conducted by Krzysztof Gorlach in 1994, 1999 and 2007. The project has been financed by Ministry of Science (grants: 1 1628 92 03, H02E 007 15, N 116 003 31/0267). We would like to thank Tadeusz Sozanski, PhD and Zbigniew Drąg, PhD from the Institute of Sociology at the Jagiellonian University for their help with research and statistical analysis.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

As a point of departure, let us point to a tendency that may be observed in current Polish sociological literature on changes in the stratification system. It might be illustrated by recent work published by the leading team of Polish sociologists (see: Domański 2008). Farmers are treated as a homogenous category, a homogenous element of the stratification system. In this conception of social classes, patterned after the international EGP model, farmers are treated as a single social category. Some other stratification models differentiate two categories of peasantry: farmers (considered as owners) and agricultural workers (considered as hired workers). From this perspective though, references to the Marxist division into owners and hired workers are taken into consideration.

What's interesting, even referring to the problem of class interests, which seems to be a perspective favoring the perception of farmers as a diverse category, presenting different cases of class location (which might be contradictory) does not lead to this kind of study. It is worth mentioning that one of the articles included in the aforementioned work, devoted to class consciousness of political interests, treated farmers as a single professional category, opposed en bloc to other elements of social structure, like upper class or workers (Dubrow 2008: 271–292).

This does not mean that we are unaware of the problem of diversification of farmers. They seem to be conscious of that fact, which can be confirmed by the following quotation in which characteristics of different classes of contemporary Polish society are synthesized: "Considering qualifications and wealth [farmers] are a diverse category, but what they have in common is possession of lands and farming. In the socialism era they constituted peasantry class dependent on state in the scope of purchase of equipement and other means of production as well as entering the contracts for food production. The post-communist transformation and international competition forced professionalization of Polish farms so significant part of them represent today a farmer type" (Słomczyński & Tomescu-Dubrow 2008: 95). However, analyses of social mobility have been carried out based on a widely regarded stratification model, in which farmers are treated as a single, homogenous category.

Because of use of this model, an extremely interesting field for analysis of the inner dynamics of of the transformation of the peasantry is being omitted. In particular, it makes verification of statements abour peasantry polarization impossible. This article attempts at analyzing this aspect of social structure.

FAMILY FARMS IN THE MARKET SOCIETY

When studying the problem of location of peasantry in the social structure, one has a wide range of concepts and theoretical models to choose. Not without reason Theodor Shanin has called peasantry an "awkward" class (Shanin 1972). Positioning peasantry in a social structure or their class location is always determined by the social-economic context. Attempts at searching for universal characteristics of the social situation of peasantry draws attention to two issues: their underdog position in postmodern societies and their specific cultural character. However, even these issues turn out to be problematic when taking into consideration social and economic diversification of peasantry.

Contradictory to predictions formulated by Marx and some of his followers (e.g. Buttel and Newby 1980), neither modernization process nor transition to modern society or market economy has lead to such a polarization of peasantry that would have resulted in the presence of, on the one hand, a relatively small group of owners of large and modern farms, and on the other hand, a much largergroup of hired agricultural workers. The situation is complicated by multiple connections between farms (including peasant ones) and markets as well as by the diversity of their various assets. Although one may find many classifications and typologies of these complications, four general situations might be identified (for a more detailed analysis see: Gorlach 2004: 86–90). In the first, the farm takes the form of a large capitalist enterprise, where the owner of the farm employs an appropriate number of employees. Second, a kind of mutation of this situation is the farm on which the owner feels pressure and must employ illegal workers. This kind of situation can be found not only in Latin America or some African and Asian countries, but also in the European Union and the United States where illegal immigrants from African countries, Mexico, or even from European countries that are either new members of the EU or stay outside its structures. Workers on these farms are exploited with low wages and poor living conditions. The third situation occurs when the owner–worker relationship is in the form of a lease. In this case, the owner can dominate over small leaseholders or the workers can gain economic and structural advantage over the owners by accumulating land leased from smaller owners. Finally, there are small family farms that rarely employ seasonal workers and are run by family members.

This last situation is not meant to suggest that there is only one type of family farm. On the contrary, considering the range and level of integration of capitalist relations characteristic in a market economy, one may identify many types of family farms. The position of the owner of a family farm is determined by the

following factors: lease on lands, farm debts, employment of family members who live on the farm or outside the farm, employing nonfamily workers, andthe use of contract production. Taking into consideration various combinations of these factors, as well as different effects of interactions between them, many types of family farms can be identified: typical capitalist farms, family farms employing hired workers, typical petty-commodity farms, leased farms, indebted farms, etc (see: Mooney 1988). One may also refer to other factors related to the position of a farm in a market economy. It might be, for example, a level of familization (as we decided to call this process) of the farms. The following factors are relevant to level of familization: connections between the owner and actual user of the land, blood relationships and family connections between members of the team operating in the farm, sources of capital, extent of the family working force, making the farm over within the family and dwelling in the farm house. Depending on various combinations of these characteristics, the farms might be considered more or less family enterprises (see: Errington & Gasson 1993). Another factor differentiating situations of family farms is the style of management, for example, "economic" farmers, "intensive" ones, "farmers-machine or "big farmers" (see: van der Ploeg, 2003).

Aforementioned theoretical proposals – which have been presented here in a very selective and superficial way – may only exemplify the great diversity of situations of family farms as well as the locations of their owners in the class structure. They reflect the multidimensional character of class polarization processes that affect farmers functioning in market economy conditions. Polish farms, dominated by the small family farm type are not free of this process. Therefore, the main hypothesis of this article is that there is an intensifying polarization of the peasantry in Poland.

DIVERSIFICATION PROCESSES AMONG PEASANTRY IN POLAND IN 1994–2007

Empirical analysis of the polarization process should be started with identification of the class location of owners of family farms. According to the assumption accepted here after Weberian classical concepts, the class position of the owner reflects the location or market position of the farm. On the other hand, the market position of a farm is a consequence of economic and cultural capitals which are at the owner's disposal. Because this is a short article, the procedure of construction of "farm's market position" variable (that is class position of the

owner) will not be described. The following table presents only the results of this procedure, indicating the existence of three types of farms and three types of class positions of owners.

TABLE 1. Market positions of the farms.

Farms` market position	Number of farms in 1994 (w %)	Number of farms in 1999 (w %)	Number of farms in 2007 (w %)
Negatively privileged	47,9	48,1	36,2
Middle position	34,5	30,7	35,5
Positively privileged	17,6	21,2	28,3
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0

Source: the authors` own research

In one of the studies that dealt with the changes observed from 1994 to 1999, which are presented in the above table, the following conclusion was presented: "Analysis shows that the process of farms' polarization definitely takes place, which can be indicative of disintegration of the peasant class in both extreme communities, meaning farms that have very limited opportunities to adapt themselves to the market situation [negatively privileged market position – K.G. and M.K.] and farms that have great opportunities to adapt themselves to the market situation [positively privileged market position – K.G. and M.K.]

In both these categories we can see an increase in the number of farms, while the number of farms that fell between these two extreme categories was decreasing. This tendency can be treated as a manifestation of the process widely described in the literature as the disappearing middle (taking into consideration a complex profile of farms, not just their sizes) (Gorlach 2001).

Once again it is worth remembering that this generalization was made based on values in the second and third columns of the table above. What changed between 1999–2007? The answer can be found in the fourth column. The obvious change in trends is visible there. The disappearing middle is no longer the case, as can be seen intwo tendencies. First, the number of farms that had a negatively privileged market position was reduced. In 1999 these farms made up 48% of the researched community, eight years later, 38 % of them remained. Second, farms occupying a middle market position, which in 1999 made up 31 % of our sample, in 2007 made up 35%, which is comparable to the situation that was observed in the first research edition in 1994. So, what we are dealing with it is not a "disappearing middle" but more likely a "increasing middle", that appears to be the result of a decrease in negatively privileged farms but no decrease in positively priveleged

farms. This statement can be additionally supported by tendency observed in the category of farms that are in a positively privileged market position. Their number grew and the growth is more visible now than it was in the previous time period. The thesis should then be formed in the following manner. The results of the newest research show that processes of restructuring farms has lead to polarization not in the form of structure with two extremely different types of family farms but (at least for now) in the form of concentration of capital of the farms that have the best opportunities to adjust to the market economy. Stating this, it should also be remembered that, due to the applied panel method, all the processes were observed within a shrinking community in which farms with the strongest chance of survival – which has been well documented – are thosewith larger capital at their disposal. It is not surprising then that the ones with at least average privileged market position are the most visible.

Studies on class structure and its dynamics are not limited to presenting objective dimensions of social position. Equally important is the question of whether objective parameters of a position are somehow related to types of identity, value systems, or beliefs and attitudes of people occupying that position. Only then one can talk existing social classes in the sociological sense of this term.

Therefore, another part of the main hypothesis was tested. It addressed the issue of how farm owners think and how they define their role as farm owners, including the opinions they have on various aspects of the relationships between employers and workers, which is treated as an indicator of a type of class identity (Gorlach 2001: 245).

The first important characteristic is how individuals identified their roles. It can be described in some way as a type of social identity that was present in the communities we studied. In analyses of class identity, social identity is considered fundamental (Giddens 1973). The way individuals think about their social-economic role is a basis on which to build various contents of their identities to create successive levels of class identity.

We found that the ways in which individuals understood the situation of the family farm owner fell into three categories: “owner”, “producer” and “marginalized”. The type of identity described as “owner” was related to the fact of owning agricultural land, which is often associated with the peasant tradition; there is certain pride derived from the fact of land ownership. In the type of identity described as “entrepreneur”, respondents made references to a modern way of viewing ownership based on additional activities and creating new values. Finally, the third type of identity described as “marginalized” referred feelings

of powerlessness, treating farm ownership as a burden rather than a chance for active participation in the society and improving their life situation. In some way, this can be considered a peasant tradition, but its emphasis is on injustice and wrongdoings experienced by peasants.

The analysis of the values presented in Table 2 reveals the relation between the type of identity and the class position of respondents. It can be seen that in each case these relations are statistically important, although the data from 2007 are definitely weaker than in the two previous editions of the research.

Table 2. Ways of perceiving the role of farm owner in relation to the class position of studied farmers in 1994, 1999, 2007 (values expressed in %).

Way o defining one's role	Negatively privileged position	Position of average privilege	Positively privileged position
Owner	42.4 36.3 38.3	27.9 30.4 29.5	21.2 21.8 35.8
Entrepreneur	24.7 17.0 45.7	46.4 31.7 57.2	67.4 43.5 58.4
Marginalized	32.9 46.6 16.0	25.7 37.9 13.3	11.6 34.7 5.8

Note: In each field of the table numbers of the left mean values for 1994 ($p<0.001$); numbers in the middle for year 1999 ($p<0.001$); and numbers on the right for year 2007 ($p<0.05$).

Source: the authors` own research

The frequency of various types of identity in the three research categories are worth looking at. I would like to start with a few thoughts on the "owner" type of identity. Among those who were negatively privileged, the percentage of respondents presenting this kind of identity decreased slightly over the period of the investigation, from 42,4% in 1994 to 38,3% in 2007. In the case of farms occupying the middle position, one may observe some stabilization (27,9% in 1994 and 29,5% in 2007). In the category of positively privileged farmers – in contradiction to the tendency observed amongthe negatively privileged – one may observe growth in the percentage of respondents presenting the "owner" type of identity. The percentage of this type of answers was 21,1% in 1994 and remained stable for next five years (that is until 1999) but the data collected in 2007 shows significant growth – the percentage increased to 35,8% of respondents. What's interesting, is that the percentage of respondents who claimed an "owner" type of identity was significantly different for two extreme groups, that is positively and negatively privileged, in 1994 (in a ratio 42,4% to 21,2%) and turned out to be similar in 2007 (38,3% to 35,8%). It might be interpreted as similar ways of thinking – at least considering presented problem – in these two categories.

Now have a look at the "entrepreneur" identity, which – as we have assumed – reflects modern way of thinking of farmers who are subjected to modernization processes and who run their farms following the rules of a modern company. The situation here seems to be as interesting as it is paradoxical. It turns out that the percentage of respondents presenting this kind of identity has grown significantly among farmers occupying a negatively privileged or a middle position. Among those who were negatively privileged,it grew from 24,7% in 1994 to 45,7% in 2007;among those in the middleposition it grew from 46,4% to 57,2%. It might be the result of a selection bias in the sample – particularly the negatively privileged farms. Recall thatthe percentage of negatively privileged farms decreased significantly, especially in the period 1999–2007. Owners of the farms that held out despite relatively adverse situations, also considered their farms as small businesses facing difficulties that were characteristic for the market economy. It is probably the same for farms occupying middle position.

The opposite situation might be observed among positively privileged farmers. The percentage of farmers presenting "owner" type of identity is smaller in 2007 (58,4%) than thirteen years earlier (67,4%). However, notice that the smallest percentage wasobserved in 1999 (43,5%). Taking these changes into consideration, one may conclude that among those positively privileged farmers growth in "modern" identities took place in the second part of the period investigated 1999–2007).

It is worth emphasizing that in all categories of owners, the smallest percentages of respondents reporting an "owner" identity were observed in 1999. It might be yet another argument indicating that the 90s were the most traumatic period for Polish farmers, which resulted in their abandoning the businessman identity. The fact, that the percentage of respondents reporting a "marginalized" farmer's identity was highest in 1999 also supports this thesis.

We hypothesized an interdependence of positively privileged positions of farms and an enterprising identity of their owners. Confirming the hypothesis, in all three rounds of the survey, the largest percentage of respondents reporting an enterprising identity was observed among farmers occupying a positively privileged position (although in 2007 the difference was not so visible). However, even though the percentage of respondents presenting a "businessman" type of identity fell in this category (in comparison to 1994) at the same time there was growth in the percentage of positively privileged owners reporting an "owner" type of identity. Therefore, one may hazard a guess (as additional deepened research would be required in order to answer to this kind of question) that some part of

farms occupying a positively privileged market position refer to at least some elements of the peasant tradition when defining their identity.

Another issue related to the process of reconstruction of class consciousness is the problem of sense of identity toward others. According to the aforementioned Giddens's concept, it is another layer of class consciousness and it is created on the basis of identity. An assumption has been accepted that modernization processes result in the transformation of farms (including family ones) into enterprises. Therefore, a question should be raised regarding whether this is reflected in farmers' consciousness, that is if they identify with a wider category of owners of different companies or enterprises or at least perceive their situations as similar to a business. An answer to this question would allow us to formulate more general statements on farmers' class consciousness in a modern society. Certainly, the strong peasant tradition underlying the collective memory of farmers – particularly in societies like the Polish one – may constitute factor preventing thecreation of this kind of identity.

TABLE 3. Perception of resemblances between farmers and owners or other enrepreneurs in relation to the class position of studied farmers in 1994, 1999, 2007 (values expressed in %).

Perception of resembances	Negatively privileged position	Middle position	Positively privileged position
No resemblance	65,4 72,6 47,4	51,4 57,1 41,6	36,8 50,0 29,2
There is resemblance	34,6 27,4 52,6	48,6 42,9 58,4	63,2 50,0 70,8

Note: In each field of the table numbers of the left mean values for 1994 ($p<0.001$); numbers in the middle for year 1999 ($p<0.001$); and numbers on the right for year 2007 ($p<0.01$).

Source: the authors` own research

The argument that the perception of resemblance instead of difference between the situations of farmers and other entrepreneurs is connected with the modernization process (that is the transition to a family company oriented to profits) is confirmed in this analysis of the perceptions of farmers in different market positions. This phenomenon is illustrated in Table 3. It turns out that percentages of respondents pointing at resemblances between farmers and other entrepreneurs reaches the highest level in the category of owners of positively privileged farms, regardless of the period investigated. Simultaneously, the percentages of respondents who perceived no such resemblance was also the lowest in this category. Negatively privileged farmers reported opposite perceptions.

These data also lead to another conclusion. Changes in the perceptions in both categories of respondents are different in both periods. The percentage of

owners of both positively privileged farms and negatively privileged farms fell in the second period in their perceived similarity to business (1994–1999) and then reported more similarities in the third period (1999–2007). We believe that this is yet another argument supporting our thesis of the particularly difficult character of experiences of Polish farmers in 1990s, which resulted in perceptions that their situations were unique and incomparable to other categories of owners.

TABLE 4. Perception of differences between farmers and owners or other enrepreneurs in relation to the class position of studied farmers in 1994, 1999, 2007 (values expressed in %).

Perception of differences	Negatively provileged position			Middle position			Positively privileged position		
No differences	12,1	6,3	14,9	11,7	6,8	13,9	8,4	2,4	14,6
Specificity of farming	36,0	21,4	41,1	39,1	21,8	47,4	41,0	36,2	50,4
Sense of inferiority	48,5	70,8	41,1	44,1	70,2	37,0	47,3	58,9	31,4
Sense of superiority	3,5	1,3	2,9	5,0	1,2	1,7	3,2	2,4	3,6

Note: In each field of the table numbers of the left mean values for 1994 ($p<0.05$); numbers in the middle for year 1999 ($p<0.05$); and numbers on the right for year 2007.

Source: the authors` own research

More can be learnedfrom the way farmers perceive the differences between their positions and positions of owners of other enterprises (see Table 4). It should be noted that correlations between answers to this question and class position are statistically significant only in 1994 and 1999. It might indicate that way of thinking of these farmers becomes similar despite their class position. Is this a fact? It's worth paying attention to other types of answers. The answer "lack of differences" is almost the same frequency in all three categories in 2007. In previous years (1994 and 1999), the percentages were different. It might confirm our conjecture. However, other answers do not support this line of thought. In all rounds of this survey (1994, 1999, 2007), respondents who were characterized as a positively privileged class were more likely to perceive their situation as a specific one. On the other hand, such regularity cannot be observed when considering answers to questions regarding a "sense of inferiority". In 1994, the percentages of this answer were similar in all three categories. The differences appeared five years later when the percentage of a "sense of inferiority" increased in all the categories (which was probably an effect of the "hard" '90s), but not to the same extent. The same was in 2007. Again, the lowest percentage of this answer was observed among respondents who were positively privileged. It must be emphasized that in all categories the fewest farmers responded positively to

a “sense of inferiority” in 1999. Moreover, the decrease was much lower in the categories of negatively and medium privileged than in category of positively privileged. It resulted in relatively small differences in 1999. It suggests – although not statistically significant – that the way of thinking in different categories of farmers is becoming more similar. The last type of answer, named a “sense of superiority” was reported by a small number of respondents (never more than 5%) in all three categories in all rounds of the survey, so it neither supports nor undermines our thesis.

The perception of conflict related to social-economic positions in different social categories constitutes another element of reconstruction of class consciousness among these farmers. The basic question refers to the location of a specific group which is an object of thisstudy. Anthony Giddens – to whom we have already referred in this article – considers awareness of conflict as another layer of class consciousness distinguishing definite social classes. Following his ideas and trying to operationalize them, we used the concept of Erik O. Wright, which treats class consciousness as a bundle of opinions and beliefs referring to different aspects of relationships between owners and hired workers (Wright 1997). This relationship constitutes the essence of the social structure in a capitalist society.

In order to study this problem, we decided to focus on three issues: the remuneration of owners and their workers, the influence ofworkers on the company strategies, andthe eligibility of owners to hire new workers in the case of strike of their employees. Farmers were requested to take a position on these issues.

In our analysis we focused on the opinions that had been measured using arithmetic means and correlations between class positions of respondents instead of giving frequencies of definite types of answers. The typology of class positions – in order to emphasize problem we were investigating – has been limited to two categories: positively and negatively privileged.

Table 5 shows opinions expressed in arithmetic means. It must be emphasized that the most pro-owners opinions (namely those who consent to large differences in remunerations, who employ strike-breakers, and who do not accept influence from workers regarding company strategy of action) have been given mark 1, while the most anti-owners ones – mark 5.

TABLE 5. General opinions of two opposite class categories.

Class category	Arithmetic mean in 1994 (standard deviation)	Arithmetic mean in 1999 (standard deviation)**	Arithmetic mean in 2007 (standard deviation)***
Negatively privileged	2,78 (0,732)	2,91 (0,772)	2,69 (0,664)
Positively privileged	2,62 (0,849)	2,70 (0,764)	2,38 (0,653)

Source: the authors` own research; ** p<0,01; *** p<0,001

It's worth paying attention to types of class consciousness represented by two opposite categories. The data are presented in Table 5. First, one must emphasize that after some increase in percentage of respondents declaring "anti-owners" opinions in 1999 (compared to 1994), entering UE resulted in an increase in the number of "pro-owners" opinions of Polish farmers. Second, the process is more visible – both in the past and in the most recent survey – among respondents occupying the positively privileged class position. Finally, in both categories there was a tendency for opinions to become more homogenous. However, the process of homogenization of opinions within categories is only among positively privileged farmers, whereas among farmers occupying a negatively privileged position opinions remain heterogeneous. Generally speaking, farmers who are positively privileged are more "pro-owners-oriented" and more homogenous considering the type of class consciousness. Consider the differences between means in these two categories. In 1994 the difference amounted to only 0,14, whereas in 1999 – to 0,21 (becoming statistically significant) and in 2007 to 0,31 (being even more statistically significant). One may conclude that polarization of class consciousness among farmers is more visible when it is observed along with class location.

Finally, the last dimension of class consciousness – following Giddens's concept – is the level of revolutionary orientation. Revolutionary character has been understood *sensu largo* and operationalised in terms of identification with specific organizations struggling for the interests of farmers. Moreover, it has been focused on following the life of two main organizations which – as farmers believe – defend their interests, namely: *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* and *Samoobrona.*

TABLE 6. Percentages of respondents pointing at organizations defending farmers' interests.

Category of answer	1994	1999	2007
Pointing at minimum one organization	13,6	41,1	17,5
Pointing at PSL	7,4	9,1	4,5
Pointing at Samoobrona	0,6	27,0	2,7

Source: the authors` own research

The data presented in Table 6 illustrate the dynamic of answers of farmers to the question about the organization defending farmer's interests. Comparison of the numbers in the table leads to the following conclusions. First, they reflect the tumultuous '90s. Intense processes of restructuring of farms, as well as years of farmers protests, are reflected by 40% of respondents indicating at least one organization struggling for farmers' interests. This fact is particularly worth emphasizing, as five years earlier only 14% of farmers in this study could indicate at least one such an organization. It is particularly visible in case of Samoobrona. Less than 1% of respondents pointed to this organization in 1994, five years later it was pointed out by every fourth respondent. In 1999, Samoobrona was considered an organization struggling for farmers' interests by three times more respondents than was PSL.

The comparison of these two categories of answers is equally interesting. First of all, one may observe that PSL supporters constitute a more stable group, although it is never more than 10% of respondents. Currently (that is in 2007) there are even more supporters than in the first round of the survey (1994). The highest percentage was observed in 1999. The popularity of Samoobrona – an organization run by a very distinctive leader, involved in conflicts and protests - among farmers was short-lived. It was popular only during periods conflicts and protests. Starting from political oblivion (0,6%) in 1994, it reached the height of its popularity (27%) in 1999, and lost farmers' support again (2,7%) in 2007. Finally, notice that although both PSL and Samoobrona are currently less frequently perceived by farmers as organizations struggling for their interests, the total percentage of respondents indicating at least one organization is larger in 2007 than in 1994. It might indicate the processes of fragmentation of family farm owners and reflect a diversification of their interests.

The same problem is illustrated in Table 7, but – this time – it is analyzed in connection with the class position of respondents and refers only to years 1999 and 2007. One must warn that correlations presented in the table are not statistically significant.

TABLE 7. Pointing to organizations defending farmer's interests in relation to the class position of studied farmers in 1999 and 2007 (expressed in %).

Category	Negatively privileged	Middle position	Positively privileged
Pointing to a minimum one organization	33,6 12,5	42,4 19,7	56,3 22,5
Pointing to PSL	7,3 5,1	8,1 4,6	14,5 3,6
Pointing toSamoobrona	22,1 2,8	30,0 1,7	33,8 3,6

Source: the authors` own research.

Taking into consideration answers to the question about which organizations defend farmers' interests, one may observe that respondents in a positively privileged position are more likely to indicate such an organization. The same regularity can be observed both on the general level (indicating at least one organization) and in case of PSL and Samoobrona. In both cases one may also observe fundamental differences between frequencies of definite answers in the periods compared. Once again, the tumultuous situation of the '90s is reflected in the data. A specific sense of loneliness in the face of a hard situation is more visible in farms that cannot manage the changing conditions (negatively privileged farmers). On the other hand, positively privileged farmers who are more involved in phenomena and processes that occur in the market and – as such – are more aware of them, are more interested in institutional guaranties that secure their interests.

One may ask whether these differences reflect the general preferences of farmers for specific definite methods of struggle in their interests. This problem is presented in the Table 8.

TABLE 8. Preferences for different forms of struggle for farmers' interests in relation to the class position of studied farmers in 1999 and 2007 (values expressed in %).

Category (in total)	Negatively privileged		Middle position		Positively privileged	
Demonstrations, blocks 16,0 7,2	15,2	5,7	12,9	8,7	22,1	7,3
Political lobbying 16,9 15,1	16,1	14,2	20,3	14,5	13,8	16,8
Self-organization of farmers 35,2 48,0	30,0	46,0	35,6	48,3	46,2	50,4
There's no sense to take any action 38,7 29,7	38,7	34,1	31,2	28,5	17,9	25,5

Source: the authors` own research.

Interpreting the data in this table, one may draw two general conclusions. First, the growth tendency is observed only in one category of answers: the one indicating self-organization of farmers as a method of struggle. It was preferred by a bit more than 1/3 of respondents in 1999, and almost half in 2007. Preference for protest (demonstrations, blocks) and political (lobbying) methods of struggle on the one hand and sense of helplessness and alienation ("there is no sense to take any actions") on the other are becoming less popular among farmers. Self-organization is particularly preferred by positively privileged farmers and less by the ones occupying middle and negatively privileged positions, although – it must be stressed – it was more visible in 1999 (respectively: 46,2% to 35,6% and 30,0%) than in 2007 (respectively: 50,4% to 48,3% and 46,0%). It is possible that negatively privileged farmers and those occupying the middle position are becoming convinced that self-organization is the best method for safeguarding their interests.

Analysis of other three categories of answers leads to interesting generalizations as well. Preferences for confrontation methods are slightly stronger among farmers occupying positively privileged and middle market positions than they are among negatively privileged ones. However, the situation was different in 1999 when respondents presenting preferences for this kind of methods were much more numerous among positively privileged farmers than among the other two categories. It turns out that those farmers who were most involved in the market economy system became much more disappointed in confrontation methods of struggle than any other. It is just the opposite in the case of methods we call "political" ones. We observe an increase in the percentage of preferences for these methods among the positively privileged as comparedthe other two categories. Does it mean that this method is viewed more effective by the owners because more of them are economically and politically involved? Finally, total – as it seems to be – surprise. Positively privileged farmers are the unique category in which one may observe an increase in percentage of respondents who declared experiencing a sense of helplessness, that is those who declare that "there is no sense to take any action". Is it because the problems experienced in this group are more serious than the disappointments characteristic of farmers in the other two groups? However, it must be stressed that the percentage of helpless respondents is still smaller among positively privileged farmers than among farmers occupying the middle and negatively privileged positions. Does it mean that one may observe a process of unifying of the way of thinking in this population, which might be – among other things – a result of the elimination of weak farms? The

lack of regularity might also be – we believe - a result of individual experiences of farmers that are unrelated to their class position.

CONCLUSION

The title of this article reflects our interest in conveying the essence of changes experienced by family farms and their owners that are a result of the transformation process in Poland after 1989. Polish farmers have gone through this period of difficult experiences together. Every farm and every farmer has been subjected to them. However, the effects of these experiences are different, they follow different paths, differentiating the positions of the farms as well as the way of thinking of their users.

The general argument which guided these analyses concerned the polarization process of farms as well as farmers' ways of thinking and acting. We aimed at answering the question of whether the processes of polarization, the disappearing middle and the elimination of the middle farms can be observed; on the other hand, we wanted to answer the question of whether new, different peasant classes are emerging - in terms of farmers' identities, their attitudes as well as preferences for strategies of struggle for their interests.

What kind of view do these data and our interpretations bring, though? First of all, the analysis of market positions of thesefarms does not confirm the thesis of the disappearing middle, which is widely presented in the literature. This process can be observed only in the first of the investigated periods. The data collected in second period shows concentration of farms in the middle and in the positively privileged market positions. Two factors might explain this finding. First, supporters of the thesis on the disappearing middle refer in their analysis to the amount of land as an indicator of the market position of a farm. In our research, multifaceted types of economic and cultural capitals were taken into consideration when constructing an indicator of market position. Moreover, panel method, which does not allow to select new farms in consecutive rounds of survey, is the strongest way to examine the effect of dropping out (and thus of our research) of the farms occupying relatively weak market positions.

However, when considering identity, attitudes and strategies of struggle, our data confirm the hypothesis of class polarization of peasantry. The differences in perceptions of the role of owner are statistically significantly different in all three rounds of the survey. The "businessman" identity is more common among owners of positively privileged farms, whereas negatively privileged farmers

present a more "marginalized" identity. Similarly, those with "businessman" identity are more likely to perceive their situation as similar to that of owners of other types of enterprises. Apparently, they consider themselves entrepreneurs to a larger extent than other categories of farmers do. They also present more "pro-owner" beliefs than the others. Moreover, the difference between them is becoming more and more significant. Finally, it's worth stressing that the owners of the farms occupying the bestmarket positions are more interested in organization struggling for their interests more than are other categories of farmers, and they are more likely to organize themselves in order to struggle for their interests. Therefore, the latter findings lead to general conclusion that after 20 years of social transformation one may observe strong and class diversification of the peasantry.

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HANNA PODEDWORNA
Warsaw Agricultural University, Warsaw
hpodedworna@interia.pl

MARKETIZATION OF RURAL RESOURCES IN POLAND[1]

Abstract

The collapse of the communist system and the process of transformation process changed macro-social and institutional environment of rural communities in Poland. Market economy and democracy opened new prospects for rural communities and farmers. Sociological research proofs that farmers tend to be victims of the changes rather than winners. Rural transformation in Poland could be perceived in terms of the process of marketization of local resources and desagrarisation of rural space. Multifunctional agriculture produces market products and public goods which could be also commodified.

Factors of rural space desagrarisation and development of its new functions are discussed. Rural space is becoming a space of consumption, which enables transforming its material and cultural heritage into market products. Factors supporting marketization of rural resources in Poland include: CAP reform, rural and agriculture development policy, governance in production and consumption of food. Differentiation of rural economy enables capitalization of local social and cultural resources and using them in diverse local development strategies.

Key words: marketization of rural resources, multifunctional agriculture, post-productive countryside, rural sustainable development, desagrarisation of rural space.

[1] The term *marketization* is used by M. Buravoy, see Refrences p. 123.

INTRODUCTION

In the analyses of the transformation process in Poland made so far, the researchers' attention was focused on identification of barriers hampering the development of civic society and limiting social participation. Smaller interest rates both resulted from and promoted a market economy and market mechanisms. It was concluded, in fact, that Poles accepted market rules more quickly than the rules of democracy (Rychard 2006, 2004), but little is known about how that almost enthusiastic acceptance of market rules is affecting the adaptation strategies of various social actors and what will be the consequences of the market expansion in rural areas. That problem was made a subject of interest and empirical research by K. Gorlach (2009; 2001; 1995) several times, while he was documenting the impact of market mechanisms on family farms and analyzing the defense strategies adopted by them. The research results help to create a certain picture of the restructuring of Polish agriculture. In the opinion of the quoted author, it consists of "a more and more visible presence of medium and high capitalized farms, of which the number regularly grows in the analyzed period" (Gorlach 2009: 107). This conclusion can also be interpreted as a manifestation of concentration of resources in the most effective farms which have managed to defend their market positions.

Descriptions of the transformation process in Poland usually present farmers as the great losers in the process of changes (Domański 1997) and a social class which lost rather than gained in the process of transformation, and they have even been mentioned as an example of communities affected by the transformation change trauma (Sztompka 2000; Kocik 2001). Such views are supported by numerous statistical data that show the distance dividing rural households from urban households in both the economic situation and the level of income, or incomes of farmers versus the incomes of other social-professional categories. The social and economic situation of farmers in fact improved after accession of Poland to the EU, but the rural areas still lag behind and gain less from the results of the development processes. This causes fears that the disproportionate social development between urban and rural areas (Halamska 2009; *Raport Polska 2000*) will hamper modernization processes and will put social cohesion in jeopardy.

MULTIFUNCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TURNING OF THE RURAL AREAS INTO NON-AGRICULTURAL AREAS

In the global economy, the significance of agriculture in economic life changes both in the villages and in the whole society. As noticed in many works (such as Ward 1993, Wilson 2001, Wilkin 2005, Van Huylenbroeck 2006), agriculture in developed societies and globalized economies enters another developmental phase, defined as post-productive. The result is its diminishing role in the generation of GDP and the creation of jobs along with the fall of incomes of people employed in that sector and, as a consequence, a shrinking of the number of inhabitants in rural areas. Post-productive agriculture (Wilkin 2005) is not only oriented to an increase in productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness, it is concentrated on fulfillment of high quality criteria and on a production process that is less burdensome for the natural environment, i.e., with respect to the rules of sustainable development. Also the rural economy is differentiated, as its development depends on local resources, not just material ones, and possibilities of their capitalization.

The multifunctional model of agriculture constitutes the third proposal compared to the dependent model and the competitive model of agriculture, both regulated by market mechanisms only (Van Huylenbroeck 2006). It assumes that agriculture produces not only marketable goods, but also other values that are not priced by the market. It is expected that the policy of rural development will also support farmers ability to produce non-market goods and services that are consumed by other users of the rural area, which can also bring income to farmers (Van Huylenbroeck 2006). Some goods can be supplied to public markets where the main buyer is the state and other representatives of the public sector. This would require a change in rural area development policy, which has been oriented toward development of the local economy oriented to strengthening local capital rather than be focused on the development of agriculture (Refsgaard 2009). Achievement of those objectives requires the creation of new social networks that embrace representatives of both private and public sectors and would enable distribution of such local public goods. A multifunctional agriculture thus enables a transformation of the local non-marketable goods into local resources that, by becoming marketable, gain economic value and stimulate the local economy.

A multifunctional process of development of rural areas leads to their integration and deep restructuring. Just like every process of change, it is territorially differentiated, and particular places within a geographical area

lose their agricultural character at different rates and develop non-agricultural functions. That depends on many factors, such as:

– situation in the geographical space, where the distance to the city and to main roads is of importance,
– density of population,
– character of the local economy, degree of its dependence on agriculture, which is decisive with regard to availability of non-agricultural jobs,
– character of the local labour resources and social capital,
– character of the value systems of the inhabitants of villages, how the abandonment of agricultural activity is perceived, and the place in the system that is occupied by traditional peasant values.

The multi-functional model of development is the reason why development opportunities in rural societies depend not only on the condition of agriculture, but, more and more, on the ability to initiate and exploit the less mobile local resources (e.g., economic, social and cultural capital) and on the synergy between mobile and immobile resources (Bryden and others 2008: 4).

Concluding that the economic activity and behaviour of social actors are rooted in the natural environment and in the social system, it is assumed that the relations shaped between them are of a dynamic and complex character. As a result of empirical research, six interrelated structural factors have been identified, which determine local development in rural areas. They include:

– The transformation of local culture and society towards market regulations;
– Development in the geographic periphery and the level of development of technical infrastructure;
– Governance, character of the public institutions, and size of investments;
– Development of entrepreneurship;
– Character of economic structures and active organizations;
– Human resources and relationships (Bryden i in., 2008: 5).

These factors determine the character and course of the economic activities that have been undertaken, through which the natural and cultural resources are commercialized and economic capital is created. Their activity also allows for an explanation of the observed differences in levels of local development and living conditions of inhabitants of particular places.

The multifunctional model of rural development, the observed structural changes and differentiation of Polish rural space create its new image and require a new conceptualization. So far, rural space has been defined in substantive categories according to what was grown, which was created and reproduced

mainly as a result of farmers' co-operation with nature, by way of carrying out specific production practices. Such a definition of rural space narrowed its meaning to agricultural space.

Integration brings about development of new functions to rural space; new functions require that the different types of activity and practices carried out there are taken into account to a greater extent. The types of activities and practices mentioned above may have only loose connections with agricultural activity or have no connection with it at all. An example of such practices can be the marketing of tourist services, natural environment protection programmes, realization of the goals of EU Common Agricultural Policy, or the life style of the urban *service class*, which highly values rural dwelling space and willingly consumes it.

MARKETIZATION OF RURAL RESOURCES

Rural areas subjected to restructuring become predominantly a consumer's space with residential, recreational and leisure time functions. Development of those new functions requires that the rural resources be get marketized. While being commercialized, rural areas and their natural and cultural heritage are transformed into market goods that become part of the global turnover. Goods need a buyer, a consumer who will pay and provide profit for the one who offers them. Commercialization of the resources of a rural area is also supported by the development of a service economy, which entails a change in the nature of work. Commercialization also results in growth in the demand for dwelling spaces free from the burdens of the big-city environment and a life-style which highly values the so called "green consumerism" or "green life-style". That idea embraces a wide variety of phenomena such as vegetarianism, care of animals, shops offering healthy food, open-air festivals, bicycles, demonstrations, marches and other activities which need a lot of free space that rural areas have in abundance.

The observed desagrarisation of rural areas and the multi-functional character of its development give a new meaning to the country and its resources, including material, natural, social and cultural ones. They can be, and more and more often are, treated as unique resources which the market helps capitalize. Hence, marketization of rural resources will mean creation and expansion of the scope of activity of market mechanisms and ownership rights, which decide about allocation of those resources. It also means that there will be competition for

access to various goods and services and a need for external development funds by local country communities.

Regulation through the market mechanism eventually leads to reduction in the number of participants and increasing density in their inter-relationships (Aldridge 2006). Hence, the country resources may be analyzed along a new dimension which is their marketization. Here, I refer to the concept of goods and social relationships (Ziółkowski 2005: 185), according to which "marketization" […] is a process of turning into goods, getting a price and entering the market". Such a process embraces not only the natural rural resources, such as land, water, free space, but also social and cultural resources, such as local traditions or cultural heritage. Preparation of a complete list of elements which may be subject of marketization is not really possible, so I will just paraphrase the four different categories selected by Perkins (2006: 245):

– Agricultural and gardener's products and activities, well known, with a well established market position, which increase their market shares by way of popularization, e.g. Lisiecka sausage in Poland;

– New products and activities which become popular as a result of changes in the life-style, fashion, popularization of good nutrition, such as ecological food, cheeses or smoked products made with the use of traditional methods, or horse riding;

– Old, abandoned village households and farming facilities used by inhabitants of cities as second homes, hobby farms;

– Elements of country space and country traditions used for recreational purposes, or traditional regional cuisine or traditional activities enjoyed by a city dweller who spends his holidays at his vacation farm can participate.

Commercialization of these resources, which in part are public goods, leads to a deep restructuring of rural areas. When the historical significance of an area is lost, some people begin to ignore the local context and start functioning outside of it. This turns some things into market products that are subject of market transactions. These products may be offered to anyone including visitors from far-away places who live in a different cultural context. As a result of commercialization, the "countryside" and "rurality" loose their spatial and social-cultural characteristics that have so far reflected a set of measurable indicators, such as density of population, share of agriculture in the local economy, size of the village (town). The terms "village" and "rurality" start to function as cognitive structures, as social representations (Halfacree 1993; Halfacree 2006), or as a "rustical style" (Macnaghten, Urry 2005: 231). The change of categories "countryside" and "rurality" causes various social consequences, such as:

– aesthetization of rural areas and idealization of the countryside landscape,
– idolization of country space which begins to be treated as something particularly valuable, the access to which can be limited and from which economic profits can be gained by way of collecting of charges,
– conversion of elements of the local culture into goods attractive to buyers,
– calling for protection of the landscape and cultural and natural heritage of the countryside, deemed to be valued treasures which should be preserved for future generations.

Rural space is starting to be perceived as a "lost paradise", an idyllic place as opposed to the inhumane conditions prevailing in an industrial city (Macnaghten and Urry 2005: 235). In a long-term perspective, that may mean a rationing of access to those commonly desired values by charging for access to rural landscape, air, and open space.

The process of commercializing rural resources can be the cost modernization that rural residents, governed by different rules in the pre-industrial societies, bear when included into wider social systems.

Commercializing of rural resources significantly changes their character. By functioning as commodities, those resources loose their authentic character, their connection with the local place and culture. They can be multiplied without limitations become more like a social design that is subordinated to the requirements of the global market. The countryside, its unique natural resources, elements of the landscape, and local culture become just a brand that sells well. Branding of a product with the adjective "rural", such as "rural ham" or "rural cheese" is considered a guarantee of its authenticity, taste and health values, etc. Commercializing rural resources in the way described above removes them of stigmatizing meanings and makes it possible to present the rural world as attractive to *outsiders* who become its consumers.

The countryside ceases to function as a real social world, becoming a picture from an advertisement, a presented, created world. It changes into a visual phenomenon created for the needs of the market which values its otherness and allows for sale of products branded as "rural". Attractiveness can also be and is created as a result of deliberate decisions of specialists in the field of marketing of goods and services. The following advertising leaflet is an example:

Mountaineer's Pizza

The commercialization of rural areas and the development of an artificial identity, e.g., "rustic" has an impact on rural areas, causing various social consequences. They include:

– conversion of rural spaces into spectacles, articles ready for sale, which means development with a pre-devised plan,

– loss of the local unique character and detachment from the social and historical context, orientation towards the tastes and needs of *outsiders*, "new consumers" rather than the local inhabitants,

– potential conflicts between the existing users of the rural areas (farmers) and their new users (tourists, residents, etc)

As was mentioned earlier, both modern agriculture and rural space in European societies has become multifunctional (Barthelemy and Vidal 2006, Wilkin 2005). In developed countries, it is no longer possible to identify rural areas with just one economic function. Once agriculture lost its traditional function as the central economic factor of the rural economy, it became mostly a service provided to consumers from outside of rural areas; the functions of agriculture were reduced to the delivery of public goods (Wilkin 2005: 25). Here, one has in mind those effects of a farmer's work, that are not sold on the market, such as maintenance of the

natural environment in an appropriate condition, preservation of the countryside cultural heritage, maintenance of bio-diversity, prevention of depopulation of rural areas all of which economists call positive external effects. Those "positive external effects", having partly a character of "public goods" become a subject of consumption of the whole society, not only the inhabitants of the country, and which haven't been valuated by the market, so far.

Development of division of work requires an expansion of the market which, according to A. Smith, develops significantly slower in rural areas than in urban areas. Expansion of the market in the sphere of agriculture entails a number of limitations, which are a result of both the nature of market mechanisms and the character of agriculture. Contemporary societies expect agriculture to fulfill many functions going beyond the traditionally understood production of foods and raw materials. Relations between agricultural and non-agricultural functions of rural areas are complex. According to research results (Van Huylenbroeck 2006) the presence of an open agricultural space in the vicinity is advantageous for the residential function, because it makes the residential properties situated nearby more attractive. It is to the contrary in the case of big animal farms, the proximity of which diminishes the attractiveness of residential properties.

The changes that have been discussed regarding Polish rural areas can be illustrated, at least partly, with the use of available statistical data. Undoubtedly, one of the manifestations of the desagrarisation of rural space is the structure of income of rural households, which is presented below:

Structure of income of rural households in Poland (1995–2008)



Source: D. Milczarek-Andrzejewska, P. Strawiński, *Zmiana struktury dochodów na wsi,* 2009 in: Raport Polska 2030.

The structure of income of rural households shows a diminishing share of income obtained from the farm, which has been replaced by income from employment and provision of social services.

Three facts document the development of the residential function. One is the almost tripled growth of the number of new residential buildings erected in rural areas – from 14959 in 2000 to 42 675 in 2007 (Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture and Rural Areas 2008), which is presented by the chart below:

Number of newly built houses in the countryside



Source: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture and Rural Areas 2008.

Similar conclusions result from NSP data showing the growth of the number of rural households in the period of 1988–2002 in the most urbanized voivodship, i.e. Silesian voivodship (by 11%) and Małopolskie voivodship (by 16%) (Gorlach, Drąg, Nowak 2004: 33), which constitute the second confirmation of desagrarisation of the rural space. The third one is the share of rural households with no user of the farm, which is documented by NSP 2002 data situated on the map below:

Percentage of landless rural households in Poland



Source: Census Data 2002, GUS

In the light of Census Data 2002 data presented on the map, in 6 voivodships situated in rural areas there prevail households connected with the use of a farm. Those are Podlaskie, Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Małopolskie, Świętokrzyskie and Łódzkie voivodships. In the Mazovian voivodship there exists an equilibrium between landless households and those connected with a farm. In the rural areas of other voivodships there dominate landless households.

Commercialization of rural space requires other conceptual approaches and new theoretical categories to analyze it. At present, one source of such categories is, *inter alia*, the concept of sustainable rural development, which invests the rural area with special properties and calls for the necessity to protect it and to take actions aimed at preserving it for future generations. The concept of sustainable development addresses rural areas in an integrative way, accentuating the importance of equilibrium of three dimensions – natural, economic and social, as the most important principle of development. Realization of this principle requires a participation model of rural development. The proposed rural development policy makes it possible to preserve it for future generations and allows for protecting it against degradation, depopulation, and marginalization, which principally changes its social perception. Rural space begins to be perceived as an asylum, a resort for all people tired of urban civilization, who want to use it as a result of a deliberate choice of their preferred lifestyle, "consume" its advantages, and enjoy its aesthetic character (Howe 2005: 42). The background of a sustainable development conceptual approach is the desire to maintain its present properties rather than to introduce changes.

The conceptual approach to rural space, which assumes that it is treated as a national and even all-human resource, makes that space an oasis of unique values of the natural environment, authentic and vivid interpersonal relationships, a rich symbolic sphere and almost an ideal community. This new image is very distant from the one which has prevailed so far, the one in which rural areas are the subject of modernization efforts, realization of development policies, or an area in which many social problems are concentrated, such as unemployment, poverty, aging of the inhabitants and depopulation, the solution of which assumed activities aimed at introduction of changes rather than maintaining the *status quo*.

What pictures of the rural space have been formulated so far? Let me refer to three described by Macnaghten and Urry (2005: 247). The first, which has been defined as "seeing, landscape", presents a countryside with a healthy environment, diversified, accessible and full of beauty, "a countryside of dreams". This vision has two aspects – deepening of the picture and access to it. Intensive agriculture and other forms of intensive economic activity threaten this vision of the countryside. Farmers are rather out of place here. They are hidden away from tourists or act as an addition to a romantic landscape. It is recommended that the landscape be passively consumed and its charms admired, rather than transformed. The second picture, defined as "management", is built by governmental agencies and organizers of leisure time, in which effective management is perceived as a tool allowing for overcoming the conflicts of interests arising in rural areas.

One should be aware that answers to the question: "why should the countryside be managed?" can be and are very different. As formulated by Macnaghten and Urry (2005: 250), "should the countryside be managed in order to pursue its economic revival or to maintain it in its present shape?" It is difficult to answer the question, for example, whose interests should be defended and what conflicts should be avoided? The third picture, defined as a "consumer choice", includes commercialization of rural areas and treatment of the rural environment as a positive aspects of a category of valuable resources. That means the development of an economic potential regarding the use of those resources and promotion of new activities in the rural space, such as hunting, war games, mountain cycling, fishing or golf. That also assumes a commercialization of access to rural areas by introducing parking charges, camping charges, climatic charges, etc. Social consequences of such a commercialization include conversion of rural areas into attractive entertainments, a special market set of goods for sale, which starts to function as a "tourist attraction".

Marketization of rural resources in Poland has been included in the model of agricultural policy, realized as an element of the transformation process. So far, it has been a top-down rather than a grass-roots process. The main actor for change in the institution of agriculture was the state and its agencies. Before the accession to the EU, civic society was too weak to be able to take effective grass-roots actions. After the accession, the situation changed, as the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) promoted a model of sustainable development of rural areas, participation of local communities in its realization (LEADER Program), and the marketization of local resources and the mobilization of local social capital were treated as tools for the change. The gradual withdrawal of the state from the public sphere created a space for new social actors, such as private entrepreneurs, consumer organizations or country non-governmental organizations.

Food production has been subjected to wider and wider public control, which is realized by special institutions, e.g., five state agencies guard the safety of food in Poland. Consumer organizations represent the public interest in food quality control. The voice of farmers, who are charged with responsibility for the sub-standard food quality and marginalized, is hardly audible in the debate concerning the food issues. Farmers maintain a dialogue with the state, taking actions in the political sphere, rather than directly with the consumers.

What are the supports for the marketization process and what are the sources of barriers? Planned reforms of CAP are one factor supporting the marketization of rural resources, provided that they are realized as planned, where it is assumed that market regulations will be extended. The activities of the state and its agencies

acting in the spheres of management of rural and agricultural development are of a similar character in their promotion of better utilization of local resources using a participative model where the inhabitants and non-governmental organizations are participants. Another factor supporting the marketization are the controls in the production, processing industry, and food trade, which means a growth of the importance of consumer organizations that act for the extension of the scope of consumer choices.

One source of potential barriers to marketization is the preference given to other mechanisms of regulation by farmers organizations and state agencies. Agricultural organizations demand that the state take direct intervention measures that would help neutralize market failures, whereas state agencies pursue a policy of expanding market regulations.

Another source of limitations is the conflict of rules governing the production and consumption of food. Production of food is subject to a growing control of the market, which means global competition. Its objective is achievement of profits and accumulation of capital. It is subordinated to the requirements of technical and technological development and to the global standards of quality, health safety, etc. The consumption of food, on the other hand, is becoming more and more reflexive (debates on admissibility of GMO), it is regulated locally and regionally where traditions, consumer patterns, social and religious norms have a deciding role. It is subordinated to the consumer's individual satisfaction, and often serves as a manifestation of identity, realization of a lifestyle, e.g. vegetarian diet, consuming only the locally produced food.

PRACTICES AND ACTORS OF THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF RURAL SPACE

If the character of the rural space has changed, one should consider what social practices contemporarily contribute to its creation. Which groups of actors are the most important in the process? How much space is occupied among them by agricultural activity that has shaped rural areas for ages and still remains a leading practice in many regions of the world.

In the EU countries, the practices that are important for the shaping of rural space include CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) and policies regarding development of rural areas; the programmes and priorities of these policies determine the flow of financial streams and determine the success of many projects. Great importance can presently be attributed to the practice of natural

environment management, in which long-term interests are often considered to be of overriding importance compared to the current needs and objectives of the people inhabiting a given area. In order to achieve those goals, it is proposed to give preference to management and planning in the process of creation of rural space.

The marketization process gives a growing importance to marketing practices that determine what will be sold, to whom, how much and when. The final shape of rural life is now a result of marketing activities.

An increasingly important element is the role of architecture and spatial planning, as the key practices which organize the space, necessary both for creation of dwelling and recreational spaces that will keep growing in the countryside landscape.

What social practices lead to consumption the rural areas? One can mention here living in the country, tourism and recreation, so called "green consumerism" including events organized in the open air, such as picnics, marches, camping, cycling tourism, etc. Also, one should not forget about the marketing of food, where the countryside functions as a brand of food – "country sausage", "cottage cheese", "country eggs". Of equal important is the marketing of services, using the rural character as a brand of tourist products – "country landscape", "country air", "country customs".

As a result of those practices, the country functions as a market product, which entails a number of social and cultural consequences, such as:

– sale of elements of tradition, material culture and everyday life of the country to visitors from outside,

– idealization of the country landscape, which is being enhanced as it disappears,

– developing a cultural heritage "industry", offering all kinds of souvenirs and country products to consumers.

The result of these practices is a "country product of high quality, expressed through the market".

The concept of sustainable development of rural areas creates a new framework for public discussion about the development of rural areas, namely the "sustainability discourse", of which the participants, apart from the "ordinary" consumers of country resources, are state agencies, the European Union, local authorities, environmental organizations and business circles. This leads to new questions about the role of the hitherto existing producers and consumers of rural space resources, which include farmers and inhabitants of the rural space.

Because of the global character of environmental protection problems, the postulates include development of co-operation between various groups of actors, a dialogue, education and informing society. As Macnaghten and Urry (2005: 288) noted, the discourse is assuming an "optimistic model of a personal agency", that completely ignores the institutional context of activity of individuals who are responsible citizens and consumers. Relations with a state which pursues an environmentally friendly policy does not provoke problems, business provides "ecological" products, and people believe in scientific opinions and reduce their current consumption in order to preserve the resources for future generations. None of that gives rise to conflicts, requires a conciliation of contradictory interests or solutions to current problems of daily life. The reality is far from such an optimistic vision and requires compromises, agreements and negotiations.

SUMMARY

Michel Buravoy (2007) identified three waves of the marketization process, of which each was characterized by another range of impacts. The first wave embraced marketization of labour, marketization of agriculture in industrialized countries and marketization of the finance. It had a local range. It entailed movements that fought against marketization and development of an association life. Building a civil society from scratch was thought to constitute a social self-defense against the effects of marketization. The second wave embraced the marketization of money and trade and had a local or national range. The third wave which can be seen now, embraces the marketization of the natural and social environments along with public goods and has a global range.

Each of the waves evoked different activities, making it possible for societies to adapt to the consequences produced by each wave. Responses to the first wave were characterized by social adjustments and reactions on the local level, of which the aim was to defend labour and agriculture against the effects of market activities. They took the form of movements fighting the marketization or of establishing associations. The social self-defense in that stage was the building of foundations of a civil society. Responses to the second marketization wave were actions at the national/state level. Fascism and Stalinism are considered examples of attempts at defense of the economic autarchy against the tyranny of the international markets. Activities at the state level led to formulation of employee and social rights, which became an element of the welfare state policy. The state and the market collaborated in favour of and were controlled by civil

society. The reactions to the third marketization wave, which had a global reach, need a return to formulation of answers on a local scale. Marketization of the natural environment, commercialization of public goods, marketization of the human body, organs and products of the human brain requires a collaboration and defense against the effects of actions of supra-national political and economic institutions which tend to destroy employee rights and social benefits. The state is withdrawing from the public sphere as it yields to the market and supports market mechanisms. Civil society is left to carry out its defensive activities on its own.

Without having data that would allow for a full evaluation of the degree of advancement of the process of marketization of rural resources in Poland, or to determine the factors deciding its course, I can only conclude that the future situation of rural areas in Poland will be determined by local responses to those global impacts of the third marketization wave. Responses can be expected to be differentiated on the local and regional levels in order to utilize the whole variety of potentials of local environments. Their formulation requires a better mobilization of social and cultural resources that inhabitants of the country have at their disposal, including those who have nothing to do with agriculture. This formulation will not be possible without building effective social networks and co-operation of various groups of actors.

The contemporary rural economy is becoming a patchwork of differentiated local economies, and it can no longer be presented as a dichotomized model of a traditional or modern economy (Marini and Mooney 2006: 96). The possibilities of enlivening local economies depend on various local resources, including social resources that are useful to economic activity. Connections between the local economy and local social and cultural resources are used for formulation of differentiated strategies of local development, which constitute answers to the activity of the global market forces.

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VĚRA MAJEROVÁ
University of Life Sciences, Prague
majerova@pef.czu.cz

THE RURAL FAMILY: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT AND ITS CHANGES

Abstract

The meanings and roles of rural families are changing in connection with political, economic and social transition of society. Family roles were tied with the processes of collectivisation and after 1989 with reversal privatization and transformation of agriculture. Before 1989, theoretical concepts were shaped by the ideological intentions of socialistic rural and agricultural development. Since 1989, they have been drawn from the democratic principles of social development. The rural family has been influenced by the Czech economic situation since joining the EU until the present. This paper, based on statistical data and published sociological studies, reflects the stages of the development of the rural family.

Key words: Czech countryside, rural family, social and economic context

INTRODUCTION

The meanings and roles of rural families are changing according to the political, economic and social transformations of society. The metamorphoses of the rural family role within the context of Czechoslovak reality have been linked with the most important milestones of rural development, such as the impact of the agrarian crisis, establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic, land parcel reform, the world crisis that proceeded the Second World War, post-war collectivization of agriculture, and the regressive settlement of ownership rights through the privatisation and transformation of agricultural production after 1989. Before 1989, theoretical concepts had been shaped by the ideal associated with

the development of socialistic agriculture and the countryside. However, since 1989, they have been moving toward the democratic principles of society. Since becoming an EU member, concepts are affected by the economic situation of the Czech countryside.

Although the stability of marriages and families was partly eroded during the 20th the beginning of the 21st century, there is no doubt about the economic, social and emotional importance of the family. Currently there are 580 000 incomplete families in the Czech Republic (growth since 1961 shows 43 percent). Their number appears to be increasing parallel to the increasing ratio of unwed couples, who live together and bring up children. Despite this fact, ”marriage” and ”family” are often seen at the top of the value scale found in public opinion research or sociological investigations, even ahead of education, financial security, and religion (Hošek, 2010). Although rural life and the style of rural partners' cohabitation have rather more traditional features than their urban counterparts, the fundamental changes occurring in contemporary lifestyles also have a strong influence on rural families.

Theoretical concept and family significance in the private farm – the economic necessity of collaboration and coexistence1

Concepts including the importance of family collaboration and co-existence and their influences on the development of contemporary rural societies have been observed since the birth of rural Sociology. The life and survival of private farms at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century depended on the necessity of all family members cooperation. Their roles were determined by age, position inside the family, their potentiality and ability, size of the farm, the level of its facilities, traditional patterns of behaviour and dealings in community as well as other factors.

Descriptions of family life in the countryside as the pivotal economic and social unit appear in the majority of European and American textbooks and scientific publications independent of geographical authors´ localisation at the time (e.g. Thomas, Znaniecki, 1918; Bláha, 1925; Fenomenov, 1925; Gillete, 1928; Hodža, 1930; Hertl, 1931; Furdík, Takáč, 1933; Šmakalová, 1936; Galla, 1937, 1939; Landa, Pański, Strzelecki, 1939; Hájek, 1937; Laur, 1937; Štefánek,

[1] Pieces of knowledge introduced in this paper resulted from solution of research project Ministry of Local development WD-13-07-1 „Social capital as a factor influenting the regional disparities and regional development“.

1945; Gusti, 1968 and many others). It can be said that in the development of rural Sociology defined by the essential elements of economic and social functionality of rural space, the family has been considered the most important keystone of all activities. J. Chalasinski in 1928 wrote: *Sociology, ethnology as well as social history ....show not only the coexistence of technical and a certain forms of life in groups, but also existence of very strong stimuli to human activity, stimuli which result from the social relations... Impetus forcing the person to technic-economic activity is linked to the social role of individual. They provide this activity regardless on the subjective wishes of human* (In: Piotrowski, 1963, p. 170–202). The rural family made stability possible by earning and accumulating the substances of living such as farmland, real estate and current assets, and by using those substances to maintain themselves, either by buying, renting, selling or using them as a mortgage deposit. Family property was donated or inherited, either by one heir or was purposefully divided among more heirs. It meant social safety for the elderly and the ill through the institution of the "rent-charge"– obligation arising under the agreement of new farmer towards the previous one. The needs of the family were superior to wishes and needs of all its members. The family was not only a source of safety for them but also it authoritatively fixed their social status and role. The social status of rural families was determined especially by the extent of their property; social status could also be influenced by other family qualities, such as education, religion, ability of neighbourliness, etc., although they presumably resulted from their economic fruitfulness and by their social power.

Social stratification of the rural population reflected strictly segregated social ranks. Their relationships were specified by existing habits and coexistence manners, which were handed down across generations. Vertical advancement through social ranks was difficult. To penetrate into a higher level required successful business, profitable marriage or inheritance. Families (as economic units) controlled marriage very rigorously. The literature coming from this era was full of unhappy love stories of couples with inequality in their property. Also the heritability of farmland and property was subjected to diverse pragmatic approaches at different ages. Either the property was inherited by one of the descendants, mostly the oldest son or daughter, but if not, it was divided among male descendants. In the case of inheritance, the descendant had to settle the property through paying off his siblings in order not to weaken the farm. The division of farmland was always influenced by the need for all sons to farm to avoid military duty. Each European country set up rules of law and property settlement that guaranteed the stable state in different historical eras (the

importance of similar rules increased in times of war). Thanks to the amount of rural space, rural families and private farms held significant economic power.

CZECH COUNTRYSIDE AT THE END 19TH AND AT THE BEGINNING 20TH CENTURY

The Czech countryside evolved as a part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy at the end of the 19th century. Farm production was affected by the market and combined with growth of the population as a result of changes after the revolution of 1848. In the second half of the 19th century we can see the increasing importance of agricultural enlightment, which was based on notable technical and technological advances in farm production and growth of productivity (Kubačák, 1994). Agricultural organisations popularly known as "economic associations" and used for extending agricultural progress, played a special role in the development of farming and the countryside. The focus of these associations was production and economic issues, but the aim of their getting together was also perceived as economic defence. Hence cooperative farming was developed (Kubačák, 1994).

The second agrarian crisis, in the last quarter of the 19th century, revealed the dark side of the quickly growing farm production. The crisis was caused by overproduction, limited European agricultural markets and increased competitiveness of farm production from the USA. The Czech countries were also affected even though they were in the most industrial part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it affected the performance of agriculture. The crisis had the greatest impact on small farms with only few hectares. The continuing agrarian crisis evoked greater proprietary differentiation with the consequence of social stratification of the rural population. From data about the settlement of property, we can see that 37.6% of all land was owned by landowners which comprised a mostly "post-Bílá hora (catholic) nobility", who were a foreign, almost exclusively Catholic, nobility which only established itself in the country after the collapse of the Protestant uprising in 1620, called the "Bílá Hora rebellion". On the other hand, there were 594,033 small farms of up to 2 ha (68.4% of all farms) and they were farming only on 5.65% of all farmland (Vavřík, 1992).

TABLE 1. Number and structure of the farm in Czech in 1896.

Groups according area of land in ha	Number of the farms		Area of land in ha	
	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
0 – 2	594,033	68,4	286,351	5,7
2 – 5	109,544	12,6	364,794	6,9
5 – 10	62,963	7,2	454,136	8,9
10 – 20	61,346	7,1	874,668	17,3
20 – 50	36,119	4,2	1013,505	19,9
50 – 100	2,897	0,3	188,363	3,7
Over 100	1,548	0,2	1908,948	37,6
Total	808,402	100,0	5073,401	100,0

Source: Franěk Rudolf: Některé problémy sociálního postavení rolnictva v Čechách na konci 19. a počátkem 20. století, Praha l967.

In general, small farms were not able to support a family. Therefore, the incomes of family members were combined; farmland was cultivated by women and older children mostly whereas men looked for other ways to earn money, such as on other farms, in industry or building an industry such as hired labour for different jobs. The Czech word "kovorolník" (metal farmer) became a common idiom to represent this kind of economy. The uncertainty associated with their livelihood affected the family lives of peasants. The economic depression worsened social conditions in the overpopulated agricultural countryside leading to a consequential increase in the rate of migration and emigration. Internal immigration was mainly from Slovakia to the Czech countries, from economically undeveloped regions to the industrial ones and from the countryside to towns. Migration counter-balanced to a certain extent a faster population increase in Slovakia and other less developed areas (Slepička, Hošková, Ronnas, Sjöberg, 1989).

TABLE 2. Average Annual Population Increase in Czechoslovakia in the Inter-war Period. Per thousands.

Country	1920–1924	1925–1929	1930–1934	1937
Czech Lands	8,5	6,0	4,3	1,5
Slovakia	15,9	13,1	11,3	8,6
Czechoslovakia	10,3	7,7	6,0	3,2

Source: Historická statistická ročenka CSSR. Prague, SNTL ALTA, 1985.

Foreign migration was aimed at the western European countries (coal-fields in Germany, France, Belgium) and mostly at the USA. Between 1922–23 alone, 100,000 people emigrated abroad, mainly from the poorest regions of Czechoslovakia. Emigration was by far heaviest from Slovakia, where 4.8% of the population left between 1922–23, as compared to 1.2% in Moravia and Silesia and 1.0% in Bohemia (Slepička, Hošková, Ronnas, Sjöberg 1989). We should remember from sociological literature the work of authors Thomas and Znaniecki on this phenomenon – the Polish farmer in Europe and America (Thomas, Znaniecki 1918).

Migration also proceeded from countryside to cities in Czechoslovakia. Slovakia, in comparison with Czech agrarian regions, has survived the most significant migrations of rural population towards cities where people found easier sources of livelihood.

TABLE 3. Urban and Rural Population in Inter-war Czechoslovakia by Regions. Percentages. Index 1921= 100.

Region	Urban		Rural		Index	
	1921	1930	1921	1930	Urban	Rural
Czech Lands	45,7	47,8	54,3	52,2	102	103
Slovakia	23,9	26,1	76,1	73,9	121	108
Czechoslovakia	40,7	42,6	59,3	57,4	104	113

Source: A. Boháč: Obyvatelstvo v Československé republice. Československá vlastivěda. Řada II. Národopis, Sfinx, 1936. In: Slepička, A., Hošková, E., Per Ronnas, Örjan Sjöberg: Rural Czechoslovakia: Patterns of Change under Socialism. Studies in Economics and Geography, Research Report No. 7, The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, ISSN 1100-1283, 1989.

The most serious consequence of the keen social differentiation was the massive debt borne by small farmers at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century. One impact of the depression was that the farming population became heavily indebted. In 1936, their total debt peaked at 36,000 million crowns, representing an annual interest of 105 million. There was a substantial increase in the number of farms that had to be put up for forced sale. In 1923–1926, 3,631 farms were sold in this way; in the 1930–35 period the number reached 129,843 (Choma, 1978).

The statistical data mentioned before enables one to picture the rural family lifestyle of the past. The workload depended mainly on the size of farm, mode of operation (production), intensity of farming, technical equipment and the

number of members of a family. *The smaller the farm, the higher quantity of work was expounded on 1 hectare of the farmland…. The working load was the most intensive in small-scale production because small peasant was trying to gain higher incomes through higher intensity of his work and also through higher number of work hours on insufficient small area of the farmland. Using of existing and new productive technique was made for him impossible because of the facts the machinery technique could not be operated on small and fragmented area and also of the fact of money shortage – as draught force could he use only cattle...* (Lom, 1979, p. 28).

The agrarian crisis intimidated farmers into extremely high work performance. The number of worked hours was 4000 per year in the smallholder farm families. But the women worked more hours than anyone else because they took care of the family and household. They worked from dark to dark; during Winter from 5 o'clock to the late evening; during Summer from 4 o'clock in the morning till 9–10 p. m. (Lom, 1979). Because big farmers could afford to buy technological farm machines and to employ staff, we can estimate their work load as about half in contrast to others. The working week was interrupted only by Sunday's rest, when visiting a house of worship allowed some religious and social life. The hours worked were structured in other ways during the winter. Farm animals required everyday care, but the Winter inactivity of crop production enabled household members to devote time to other activities such as repairing buildings and tools, working on handicrafts and also education in Winter farm-schools.

The wives of peasants were obviously very busy especially on the small farms. During their youth they helped their parents with farming, working in the household and also taking care of younger siblings and grandparents. After marriage they took care of their own children. Rather than being cared for, as they aged, they helped their children on the farm and in the household. Families were multigenerational; many children were born, but high child mortality constrained the size of families.

The households of peasants who owned farmland were different to those who did not own farmland. Only farmers with more than 10 ha could afford to employ outsiders rather than rely on family members. They either rented hired hands, for spring crop and autumn work, or they employed menials and hinds. Stable boys and girls were mostly young unmarried people from other small farms or from families that did not have land. They lived on the farms of their employers, ate together with the family and had rigorously-defined discretions and duties. The work filled the entire day and they had only one leisure day per week (more often only a half day). Menials were given clothing and shoes one or two times

a year – a monetary reward was the exception. Stable boys and girls were hired mainly for a year at the beginning of New Year till Christmas. Resignations and new contracts were fixed during Christmas days.

The status of menials in the farmer's family was different. In some places, they were treated as a member of the family and relationships with the family were good. But in other places they had an uncertain status and farmers didn't abide by the contract conditions – their treatment was very hard and cruel (other members of the farmer's family could also be cruel). This treatment of labour resulted from the social structure of the village in this era. These practices were established in that time because of the demand for labour coming from villages and near surroundings, but also, poor families had to find a livelihood for their members who would not inherit and work on the farm. Before girls got married, they had left either for employment on other bigger farms, in the cities (as domestic help); learning a handcraft (as a trainee) or they had joined a monastery. Until they had taken the monastic vow, they could leave the monastery and return to their family or get married. They shared in running the monastery and its activities (for instance nursing and caring services) during their stay in the monastery. The partial descriptions in literature and remembrances of witnesses have resulted in explicit information about economic conditions in families. Members of the family helped each other out and confined their personal life to the needs of family (care about orphan children, old and ill members of the family and so on).

"Hinds" refers to a social group, and they were employed only by big farmers. They lived in hind-flats (mainly belonging to owner of farm), which were a component of the estate or were situated in its narrow surrounding. They got a part of their salary as money and the rest as gratuity. The men worked as coachmen, fodderers or sometimes they had a more important position such as, for example, granger while the women worked in animal and crop production, helped in the household, etc. Their social status was high, but their economic dependency was obvious because if they lost their employment (the reason did matter), they also lost their living. In contrast to menials, they were not considered a part of the farmer's family.

Male members left their homes and migrated or emigrated for jobs. This left women and older children responsible for both the farm and the household. Many men fought in the Austrian army during the First World War, with an accompanying huge waste of life . Those who survived went back home with poor health. Their absence during the war was covered by women; women cultivated farmland, harvested crops, took care of the family and the household. Except for

a few special cases, there are no descriptions of the lives of these families in the sociological literature. They appear only in the remembrances of witnesses.

The economic impact on the countryside had begun to take effect after the great political changes which took place with the founding of the independent Czech Republic in 1918. The complicated situation of the rural population continued during the early years of the new republic.

Although people were expecting to get rid of privation ...the reality showed to be another because country was threatens by starvation without its blame. The war got through all reserves of foods, raw materials and products, destroyed and got weak all produce machinery. The farmlands during the war were bad cultivated and the insufficient crop was almost consumed in autumn. Austrian government exported supply of food into the countries more symphatic for it. There were a long winter and spring between present and futures moment of new crop on the farmland... Satisfaction of National people's committee from gaining liberty was disturbed by fear of starvation. They didn't underestimate the fact of coming up against dangerous. They were afraid of wildness evoking by hungry and its removal from homes towards the streets. (Peroutka, 1933, p. 241).

Securing a food-supply for the population was the most important need during the post-war months. As the situation appeared to be very similar to the "domination of producers over consumers". it was not possible for Czechoslovaks to develop any policy other than defending consumers through this extended and difficult system. (Peroutka, 1933).

Families had to stay together in order to earn a living. They became essential economic and social units. The hopes of small farmers combined with land reform beginning in 1919 were fulfilled only partly. About one third of the farmland was owned by the aristocracy (mostly post-Bílá hora nobility) and churches. Social strain was also accented by racial problems. The land reform was very radical because the law allowed one to possess farmland from 150 ha and any kind of land over 250 ha. It allowed the appropriation of up to 500 ha of farmland to "public welfare". However, in the regions where was a high interest in land, could be confiscated farmland over 50 hectares. The estates were taken over financial compensation.

The farmland parcel reform had been continued almost until 1936. At that time, the hardships of the appropriation laws began to soften and, in practice, were starting to make exceptions for larger farmers.

TABLE 4. Results of land parcel reform in Czech till the end of the year 1936.

	Expropriation of farmland			
	Whole land		Farmland	
	In ha	Percentage	In ha	Percentage
Whole land used for parcel reform	1614810	100,0	546,212	100,0
New owners	746,192	46,2	390,746	71,5
Giving back to old owners	797,217	49,4	150,891	27,6
Useable land for reform	71,401	4,4	4,575	0,9

Source: Statistická ročenka 1938, p. 55.

Approximately 49.4% of appropriated land was given back to previous owners. Of the land that could have been used for reform, 4.4% of whole land and 0.9% of farmland was not.

TABLE 5. New owners after land parcel reform in Czech till the end of year 1936.

	Rationed land			
	Whole land		Farmland	
	In ha	Percentage	In ha	Percentage
Total	746 192	100,0	390 746	100,0
Rationed till 30 ha	319 642	42,8	279 953	71,6
Remaining farms	114 100	15,3	99 443	25,5
Other bigger objects	312 450	41,9	11 350	2,9

Source: Statistická ročenka 1938, p. 56.

Despite the real balance of land parcel reform and recognizing that original laws are different, the configuration of Czech and Slovak villages changed. Small farms were increased up to 5 hectare and there was an increased ratio of agricultural small-scale production to Czechoslovak's agriculture. The significance of agriculture was considerable in the First Republic, because it had become an important part of the domestic economy. The promising era of the development of the Czech countryside and farming was interrupted by the beginning of fascism and the Second World War, which brought great economic waste and too much human suffering once again.

If we were to describe this era according to the viewpoint of the rural family, then we would see that their economic self-sufficiency was based on surviving

during difficult periods. The family had to solve the problem of temporary and long-term absence of its members, mostly men, who migrated for jobs. The family had to ensure livelihood in this era of war and to make their peace with death or permanent handicaps of men who had been drafted into the army. The family took over their work during their absence and made the best of it during the upbringing of children. It helped men with re-entry into their lives when they returned from the First World War. The family carried debts in periods of crises. Duties towards members of the family were compensated by certainty of mutual help. The tasks of rural families were very similar during the II. World war and their cohesion helped them survive these times.

COLLECTIVIZATION AND ITS ROLE IN THE DESTRUCTION OF THE FAMILY

The beginning of the post-war period was affected by two political decisions resulting from the power of victory and from another evolving problem of the Czechoslovak government at this time: (a) the inclusion of the Czechoslovak republic into the block of socialist countries, although at first this was not perceived negatively because the political, economic, and social implications were not clear, and (b) the withdrawal of about 3 million Germans from the Czech border regions combined with confiscation of their property. This affected all mixed marriages and Czech or German families who had lived and worked together here for centuries. Repopulation of these border areas was dramatic. Uninhabited farms and farmlands were rationed to Czech and Slovak citizens and to repatriates from other countries. The ration of farmland was limited to up to 13 ha, which was enough to nourish the average family at this time. Coming to the border region and gaining the confiscated property meant a significant social rise for many families. Between 1945–1948 almost all menials, farm workers and hinds vanished. Either they became private middle farmers or they left to work in industry. Primarily because of these property changes, another parcelling of farmland occurred. The number of the small nonmarket farms with an area of up to 1 ha was increased. Some who had been small farmers became middle-sized farmers. Middle-sized farmers became economically and socially the strongest social group of the countryside – they owned more than 51% of the farmland at this time (Vavřík, 1992).

Consequently, the socialist orientation of the Czechoslovak republic and the pressure of the Communist party were largely toward nationalization of private

and cooperative property. Cooperative farming had begun to appear in Czech countries at the end of the 19th century. It significantly helped recovery during the agrarian crises and also the worldwide crisis in the thirties. In the period of the Second World War, cooperative farmers were sharing their food-supply especially with the German population, but also with that part of the Czech population in the occupied protectorate. Good economic performance and strong encouragement of the rural population both had a long tradition in the Czechoslovak republic

At the beginning of 1946, instructions were established at the VIII. Congress of Communistic Party concerning the general cooperative economy and particularly, cooperative farming (Protokol VIII. sjezdu KSČ).

After February of 1948, the era of building the "socialistic economy" in Czechoslovakia began. Ninety-five percent of all industry, all banking, foreign trade and practically all domestic wholesale, on which the cooperative economy depended, were nationalized. Part of the retail network and part of farm production, ensuring estates, municipal and public good, belonged to the Socialist sector. Transport was also partially nationalized. However private small-scale production and the farms of big farmers and landowners persisted in the countryside, and private factories and larger businesses dominated in the cities.

Because of the political and economic situation, expropriation was not practically possible. The displacement of Germans along with waves of emigration and migration of the rural population to the cities led to the beginning of a labour shortage. Such an extreme step would mean a decline of market production and a threat to the food-supply.

Overall, efforts to propagandize didn't evoke interest in cooperative farming in the countryside. Small peasants and lacklands, gaining land after land parcel reform or in the post-war period, didn't want to limit their independence or to revoke it for the benefit of collective forms of farming. Hence, another way was chosen – constraint and repression of the larger farms in the countryside through increased supply and taxes, price disadvantages, reductions of rations and so forth. It was supposed that property could easily be taken from peasants because the would not be able to fulfil all of their duties:

We have to enforce filling of all national and public liabilities of capitalistic layers in the cities and also in the countryside. In case of treasonous and unlawful activities of these elements is necessary to penalize them through property fines. (Gottwald, 1949, p. 287).

Liquidation of agricultural farms meant, above all, the destruction of rural families. Methods applied in the Soviet Union became a good model for the intensification of class struggle. Owners of farms with an area over 20 ha were

classified as rural richmen – this limit was lowered to 15 ha later. And at the same time specialists were to find "other criteria different from area of land in order to define capitalistic fiends" (Kaplan, 1993). The category of rural richmen could be defined by anybody and thus was opened the way of unlawfulness, crimes and settlement of personal hostility. By 1948 and 1949, many peasants were not able to obtain supplies they had ordered. Rural families were almost decimated by wide scales of penalizations. Thanks to access to the archives, it is possible to more exactly determine, such details as the numbers of executed farmers, the number who died in prison or died a short time after release because of the inquisition and imprisonment, the range of expropriation of property and the number of violently displaced and chased families.

Hundreds of thousands of farmers and their families were persecuted. Penalties meant not only economic sanctions such as fines or blocking of bills, but also interruptions in the supply of energy, loss of vouchers for buying soft goods or shoes, forced thresh-out and buy-out, banned slaughter of pigs for self-consumption, banned hunting, forced buy-out of agricultural machines, forced tenancy, forced barter of land, banned employment of a strong labour force, expropriation of property and many more. The peasant very often became a casualty of provocations ; they were accused of such crimes as purposefully spreading animal and plant diseases, sabotage and robberies of their (own) property. Farmers who were convicted lost their civil rights and almost all their property was confiscated. Furthermore, members of their families were punished – they were thrown out of work, children could not attend schools above elementary level, they were criticized and humiliated, and the majority of these families were moved to places far from their previous residences. Peasants who were released from prison could not go back to their villages (or they risked imprisonment again) and they were required to work far away from their families. Imprisoned farmers also had to sign a statement about how well they were treated during their stay in prison, and, of course, they could not talk to anybody about their experience there.

Terror towards the chosen farmers grew in intensity and the rural population was scared; however, many of them tried to help wanted peasants and farmers. Those involved in the class-struggle were often disabled workers and handicraftsmen or others looking for political advantages or specific power positions. Peasants, who stayed on farms and had made a living through hard and intensive farm work, resented waste, disorder and theft of property. These were usually subjected to persecution and subsequent confiscation of property.

There is little empirical data from this time. Persecution was interpreted by the official press as deserved revenge on the enemies of building socialist agriculture. The phraseology of journalists became more and more aggressive and churlish. "Rural richmen" and "enemies of folk" were subsequently labelled "terrorist clique", "traitors", "agents", "saboteurs", "perverts frenzied by moneymaking", "bloodsuckers", "hamsters", "the Green international sprouts", "disruptive elements", "leeches", "cosh-boys" or "murderers". There was neither an independent press nor any empirical research. Nowadays information comes from police protocols, inquiry protocols and from witness accounts (Jech, Majerová, 1999).

Attacks were focused on families that had a natural authority in the village connected with their social status. They were often long-term residents. *My parents were the 7th generation on the land. Wedding announcements and obituary notices said: peasants. (HZ)*

Although rich farmers were mentioned, it did not mostly succeed in evoking hatred from less wealthy peasants against them. Villages were relatively coherent. *If I remember our earlier village, we had there all sort of things, there we had exercised almost all villagers, there the amateur's darmatized, fire brigade there was, and it was so lovely village. That time was not television, only a few people owned a radio, people came together to the ceilidh. If anybody slays a pig, the neighbour or other one obtained the sausage; the life was such, after which I miss today(JD).*

Political pressure was graded and it was being emphasized systematically to people that the farmers who were exploiting and profiting from their work were responsible for their lower level of living. Of course *In every village, there was a certain group of people, who understood and wanted to understand the Communist Party ideology. (ZT)*

That propaganda was doubtlessly efficient and the idea of the displacement of rich farmers by some layers of the rural population met with certain understanding. *They all imagined – that they would move over to those farms and would become lords. (HZ)*

Sanctions towards persecuted families were severe hardship with drastic impacts. *We were turned out and daddy was sentenced to the forfeiture of all property. Also, he was banned for life to return to the village and also sentenced for 20 months and I do not know precisely, but he was also fined for about 20,000. Even if they had taken everything from him, still there was that penalty. (AK)*

"Again, there was the legal court with the terrible judge. The barrister estimated the sentence at least at five years. During the proceedings, at the midday break,

I tried to persuade two judges from the people at the lunch in a pub. I explained to them, how everything happened. My husband was sentenced for a year and a half together with confiscation of all property including clothing. He was devoid of civil rights and was forbidden the stay in the village forever. My property was not confiscated. They made the women sign that they gave up property. Stalin died then and they had obviously forgotten me in the confusion. (MM)

My husband said – let them take all, only our lives they gave us. Let them leave us together. But they did not leave us. They locked him up. It was said that they would also lock up me – in 1949 our daughter was born. They didn't lock me up. (MF)

Imprisonment of parents, displacement of residence, confiscation of property, exclusion from work and from education – all these facts made rural families on one hand more coherent, especially in cases of widespread fear among them, but on the other, it meant trauma and life long consequences.

My parents lived together 55 years, but we were like the children from divorced marriage. Throughout our youth, our dad was not at home. He was in Litoměřice prison, we were there once, than there rode only mom... Dad was too uncommunicative, he never talked about prison, I don't know, I didn't know him inwards. We talked with mum about it, mum was frightened always and forever she is afraid (HZ).

The dominant fear was for children. They were exposed to hardship, lack of safety and poor living conditions , regardless of their age. *The worst moment of those years was one Sunday, when a group of women was waiting in front of the prison for visits. A lady came and said that she knew something terrible, that they were going to take away our children and would re-educate them. Then, I was trembling and felt a terrible fear. After a while, during the visit, I had to keep it secret and carry it alone, so that my husband did not feel still worse there. (MM (number of Page- it is quotation of non-published interviews* – Karel Jech, Věra Majerová: The Liquidation of the Czech and Slovak Class of Private Farmers in the Context of the So-called Collectivisation of Agriculture. Group Research Support Scheme Grant No. 1649/233/1998. Part of Qualitative Sociological Research – Věra Majerová, Praha 1999).

The persecutions have tailed off since the mid fifties. During the IX. Congress of the Communist party, directions were issued for finishing the socialist reconstruction of villages. The beginning of the sixties brought political modulation with a more moderate political approach in the Soviet Union. Resistance to cooperative farming was broken and private farming was substituted throughout cooperative farms and state farms.

TABLE 6. Structure of the Agricultural Labour Force in ČSSR in 1948 and 1980 (%).

Sector	1948	1980
Private sector	94,5	1,7
Co-operative sector	3,4	70,4
State sector	2,1	26,5
Affiliated agricultural enterprises	-	1,4
Total	100,0	100,0
Total in absolute numbers	2 221 691	897 567

Source: Slepička, A.: Některé teoretické problémy přetváření venkovského prostoru. Územní plán ování a urbanismus, 1987:4. In: In: Slepička, A., Hošková, E., Per Ronnas, Örjan Sjöberg: Rural Czechoslovakia: Patterns of Change under Socialism. Studies in Economics and Geography, Research Report No. 7, The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, ISSN 1100–1283, 1989.

In the continuing years, there was partial removal among sectors, but the number of persons in agriculture remained unchanged. Only 0.49% was private farmers in 1989 because with age, farmers eventually left farming. Collectivization was the basis for intensification and specialisation of farm production. But the typical farm-family, combined with private farming through living and entire sense of its life, practically ceased to exist. A return to the previous way of life was not possible.

CHANGE OF RELATIONSHIP IN SOCIALISTIC AGRICULTURE

Violently collectivized cooperative farms didn't record good economic performance. The level of a cooperative farmer's living was low, indebtedness of cooperative farms grew and incomes stayed below subsistence level. In order to survive, cooperative farm families were allowed a certain area of farmland for private farming – "private plot"(mostly 0.5–0.6 ha). On this private plot, plants for self-consumption and feed for self-farmed animals were grown. This arrangement was supposed to be only temporary, but because of continuous shortages in the food supply for the population, it persisted until 1989. During the establishment of state farms, a model for the functioning of socialist agricultural production was defined. Thanks to collectivization and variations of co-operative agriculture production, state farms served as a tool for solving some problems. They filled a compensatory function on the economic and the social level by such means as taking over farmland with no production, cultivation of confiscated big farms

and taking over economically poor farmers' co-operatives with no ability to farm. This was all enabled through considerable state subsidy. This kind of help to state farms typically losing and therefore they returned back to the intended function of innovation (Suchý, Vrba, 1958; Burian, 1970).

Although the beginnings of socialist farming were very difficult, successive consolidated farms and rural families finally adapted to the new reality. Socialist large-scale production created a change in the position of rural families and their members. The creation of a socialist form of agriculture and a socialist lifestyle in the rural population was based on "industrialisation" and "growing together of cities and countryside". Farm work was to become comparable with industrial work – for example delimited hours of labour, equipment, techniques and new technologies, use of labour forces, improvement of the working environment and other parameters. Members of rural families were employed in agriculture composed by co-operators or farmers in state farms. The careers of men and women evolved both interdependently and separately. The position of women was changing: *While on one hand is given basic supposition of successful large-scale production due to defragmentation of farmland and combination of productive instruments, on the other side it is stayed prompt need to improve age and expertise of workers in agriculture It was no small role that farm-women played in this process. They composed 53% of all workers in this branch. The content of their occupation was changed: distinctively separated household and job. Wide all-encompassing activity of farm-women in the past became superfluous. Requirements for expertise now had rather vertical than horizontal character: universality was superseded by specialisation* (Burian, 1970).

In fact, the living and work conditions of women were more complicated than those of men. Housework needed a considerable expenditure of time, because the quality of services needed for households was insufficient in the countryside. The majority of work had to be done by hand. A private plot and farm required everyday care. Women had less expertise than men; therefore they did manual work more often. According to the research mentioned above, between 1966–1970, women worked an average of 48.2 hours a week in agriculture and, at the same time, spent 47.1 hours a week in the household or private plot. This means that women worked an average of 13.6 hours daily (including Sundays and feasts). From this research, we can also see that 71% of women in this period did not take paid holidays and two thirds of 29% of women who had a holiday stayed at home – working at home. In fact, the difference seems only to be that peasants could organize their own work in private farms, but it was combined with all the risks and responsibilities for bad decisions. However, on the state

side, the mistaken decisions of socialist leaders were paid through the national budget in the socialist conditions of agriculture[2].

Bringing the city and countryside closer together resulted in an introduction of city patterns such as household facilities, dressing, kind of entertainment and spending of leisure time into rural life. There is no doubt that the life of farmers and the rural population was being improved. The needs of society were changing and the differences among cooperative farms and state farms were being reduced. The socio-demographic structure of workers in state farms was being created in a different way than it had been in cooperative farms. The majority of staff in state farms gained from the acquisition of remuneration. Therefore employees came from other regions and they were not linked to the village where they lived as strongly as the others. The staff of state farms were not a solid labour force. Although they had a higher socio-demographic status than co-operators, the productivity of state farms was lower (Krůček at al, 1977).

Deficiencies in the economy of the socialistic mass-production companies, difficulties with the supply of food for inhabitants or insufficient services were not considered as failure; instead, they were interpreted as partially removable dysfunctions on the way towards socialism in a temporary era. Soviet examples were often given as suggestions of exemplary solutions (Jankovová, 1975; Procňuk, Šepelova,1975).

The rural family was a part of the labour force in rural areas, and its independence and meaning was moved from the economic to the private sphere. The recommendation concerning rural families was connected with improving the work conditions of occupied women and with enabling them to harmonise their work and motherhood roles. *...women's employment in agriculture is not only important economic phenomenon (necessary to ensure farm production), but also there are social phenomena which are interfering in family life, level of living conditions, quantity of leisure time, care of children, relationships in family and the personal development of working women... to ensure implementation of social policies pose large requirements for state investments. For instance: investments in children's pre-school institutions, in school meals, in development of transportation, in health service..., ...arrangements of population policy comprise prolongation of maternity leave, extension of labour-law security of*

[2] Pieces of knowledge introduced in this paper resulted from solution of an institutional research intention MSM 6046070906 "Economics of resources of Czech agriculture and their efficient use in frame of multifunctional agri-food systems".

women-mothers, financial contributions and other fundamental arrangements for all of society (Krůček, 1977).

The state has taken over families, that is, the state controls both the work and private life of families. *All suggestions, concerning extra-work life of women, are intended to change the structure of women's activities in the household (which has to be done after work). It doesn't mean only reduction of work and extension of leisure time, but also these changes are combined with the creation of conditions for women's self-realisation and coherent development of their personalities. Due to this process, women are not so isolated by their devotion to the family; they can now also share public and social life* (Krůček, 1977, p. 102).

The majority of recommendations were well-intended suggestions concerning working women and the improvement of their living conditions, but they were made at a time of economic troubles in the socialist economy. Gender inequalities persisted in work, in the traditional division of labour in household and in the role of women in the family. Despite this, education of the rural population was increased and each subsequent generation of women was more qualified and more emancipated.

Of course, the nature of mutual cooperation among partners in the family was changing. The way of life of the socialist rural family required a heavy work load on private, economically-significant, family farms . But also, for many people, it meant a means of self-fulfilment and presented the possibilities for independent decisions. The limited possibilities concerned with enterprise, education and travel promoted activities that could satisfy the intellectual and creative potential of rural families: improvement of the family house and flat, care of garden and plants, breeding farm animals, and activities in hobby organisations and clubs. Such rural families were also characterized by reciprocal help among relatives and generations in the family, lower divorce rate, and greater significance of the division of labour in the family and household.

THE CONTEMPORARY RURAL FAMILY

The improvement in life conditions had economic limits in the countryside in the seventies and eighties. At the end of the eighties, it was apparent that the development of the socialist system had surpassed its zenith. There were increasing economic problems of companies and state, natural resources were used up and the ecological conditions of life deteriorated, the system of redistribution of means was complicated and not clear, and corruption, protectionism and nepotism

had increased. It was made worse by the state of health of the population and by poor moral aspects concerning attitudes towards work (Majerová, 2000). Czechoslovakia had belonged to countries with the widest levelling of incomes and egalitarianism in rewarding qualification and performance in Europe until the end of the eighties. Society was homogenized in accordance with "constringency of socio-economic position and life way" towards the average. (Machonin, Tuček, 1996)

The year 1989 brought fundamental political, economic and social change. There was talk about returning property and farmland, about redressing grievances, and about the possibility of private entrepreneurship and other life opportunities that had been brought about by the transformation of business and the revival of the countryside. Hopefulness was blended with uneasiness; there was great uncertainty about what the changes meant for individuals and for families. It was assumed by the previous government and the mass media that there would be a return to private farming in agriculture beginning in 1990. But reality was different. The character of the rural family and its way of life had changed. Minimally, there were two generations with no experience with private enterprise. Privatisation was late, property restored to families was in bad condition, and existing laws concerning enterprise hampered instead of encouraged business. People did not have financial resources for investment, supplier-customer relations and entrepreneurial experience. The rural population mostly preferred the establishment of some kind of agricultural companies. The bewildered approach of farmers to a private economy was confirmed through the work of researchers working independently of each another (Hudečková, 1991).

Private farming was supposed to change the way of life in families, but the generation of young people thought differently. There were positively-evaluated changes concerning new possibilities for voluntary decisions, the democratic development of society, travel abroad and education. But there were also anxieties concerning the everyday life of individuals and families, growing prices, eventual lowering of the level of living, social shakeouts and unemployment (Majerová, 1990). Loss of employment in agriculture was a serious problem – mostly in regions with agriculture as the main or prevailing resource of livelihood. Those who were not limited to a particular segment of the economy, such as drivers, tractor drivers, repairmen and administrative staff, had the best positions in the labour market, because they could find jobs more easily both in and outside of agriculture (Majerová, 1992). Transformation accelerated the horizontal and vertical mobility of the rural population and helped to extend the self-supply

behaviour strategies of agricultural families in the nineties (Horská, Spěšná, 1994).

Rural families adapted, but differences in Czechoslovakia, and later in Czech society, were growing. Research into vertical social differentiation concerning the perception of social status by groups in the years 1984 and 1993 (Machonin, Tuček, 1996, p. 221) gives a number of facts such as *while basic and only one axis of differentiation is position in employment in 1984... and society is agreed with kind of profession, then the situation is different in 1993. Besides employment position is it possible to survey other axes of society settlement: property (rich / poor), moral (honest / dishonest), politically in sense of use ante-November position (communist / the others) and idea of national perception by several groups. It certainly occurred distinct shifting towards class or at least dichotomy view on society*. Although in 1984, agriculture, an important component of the rural population, was placed within one of the better off sectors of society, for many reasons, by 1993, it was found to be among those least well off (Machonin, Tuček, 1996, p. 222).

The situation of rural households (also families) was different from households in the cities[3]. *More members (2.49 at average) in rural families and fewer economically active members are typical for rural households in contrast of city households (2.18 at average). They achieve substantially lower incomes than people in big cities (86.2% of gross incomes and 87.2% of net incomes). The lower rate of income among entrepreneurs is distinctive in terms of the composition of their income ...contrary to the higher rate of social incomes that contained, primarily, higher rations of national social support. People living in rural areas also draw lower pensions lower. It is combinated then with totally lower total amount of social income in rural families in terms of absolute value* (Spěšná, at al., 2009, p. 47*)*.

There are still socio-demographic differences between contemporary rural and city populations, but they are not that great . The rate of abortion is lower in the countryside than in the cities (22% of all rural women; the rural population is about a quarter of all the Czech population). The same number of children are born in the countryside as in the cities; the divorce rate is higher in the cities: about 79% in the cities with rate on 3 quarters of all population in Czech and 21% in countryside).

[3] Family means a group of persons in relative association. Houshold means a group of persons mostly relative which lives and housekeep together.

Within social groups in the rural population there are economic and social differences, modified to some extent by gender stereotypes. The traditionally high employment rate of women has made some women feel more independent. The social group "women in household" has practically become extinct. This group is represented now only by women on post-maternity leave; that is, by women who stay at home and take care of young children and, occasionally, to care for ill or old members of their family. They combine this care with partial work activities in the personal economy or in temporary or part-time jobs. Men and women build their professional careers separately; mutuality appears more significant only when they work together as entrepreneurs. A new trend in contemporary Czech society is the substitutability of both parents during the upbringing of small children. Paternity leaves are not used very often now, but families (incl. rural families) are beginning to calculate which income is most important for the family. Requirements for the equalisation of women in all aspects of life, including work, are shaped through the economic environment more distinctly than through trying to affect public opinion for their benefit.

The Czech countryside is developing similar to Czech society, and Czech society follows with little delay after European and world trends. The contemporary Czech rural family involves elements that are perceived as indicators of the "crisis of family", including the increased rate of non-married couples and the number of extramarital children. Also, the divorce rate has grown extremely high. We cannot deny that, as a social and economic institution, the family is still at the top of value ladder accepted by society. However, it is no longer clear for the contemporary generation how they will build and maintain the family. Evelyne Sullerotová, perhaps a little belletrist but very concisely, specifies the different phases of development of European families:

The marriage boom of the forties and fifties in the 20th century,

The subsequent shift of partnering to younger ages,

The economic troubles of young families,

The increasing divorce rate,

Democratization inside the family and individualization of children in the sixties resulting in the flower revolution,

Generations refusing a "commune" as an alternative to the family,

The economic and social weakness of independent families due to state paternalism,

The decline of the birth rate and the marriage rate,

The increasing age of primiparas,

Looking for models of social coexistence outside official institutions,

The growing rate of extramarital children and children moving back in with parents after having lived independently (Sullerotová, 1998).

The current situation of rural families after accession to the EU is a continuation of this trend. Czech society emerged into a broader economic and social space through EU accession. An important factor is the possibility of EU funding, which helps to improve the living condition of rural population. Aside from the economic asset, however, there is also the creation and stabilization of cooperation among social development actors, including rural families.

The closeness of rural community has vanished; however, the extent of frankness regarding non-rural factors is still a subject for discussion. The material aspect of local specifics maintenance is the subject of particular proceedings within the EU Rural Development Program. However, the social aspects do not have similar simple solutions.

CONCLUSIONS

Until now, it has been typical for the rural household to have more members (2.49) than their urban counterparts (2.23), however, their share of economically active persons is lower. Rural inhabitants earn considerably lower incomes than urban inhabitants (91.4% gross and 92.3% net incomes). During 2009, the effects of the economic crisis became evident on the Czech labour market. The average registered annual rate of unemployment reached 8.0%, whereas the previous year, it came to 5.4%. (Zpráva o stavu zemědělství za rok 2009, MZe ČR, 2010, p. 66). The situation of rural households, and then also the rural families, deteriorated. Not only does The the significantly lower educational level of the rural population limits their employment but there are also not enough qualified jobs in rural space (Zpráva o stavu zemědělství za rok 2009, MZe ČR, 2010, p. 68–69). Social inequalities persist also in the pensions. Rural inhabitants have lower pensions; which also means a lower volume of social incomes in rural areas. Although the cost of living is perhaps not so high, transport costs to school, shops and work are growing. The economic crisis concerns the rural areas to a deeper extent.

Contemporary families are shaped by both traditional and modern features. There is no doubt that the family represents an indicator of societal development. It is shaped through the economic situation of the state, existing legislature, the range of state social support and faddish trends. It is not out of the question that all the economic pressure will tend again to reinforce the significance of the family.

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BOOK REVIEW

Karl Bruckmeier and Hilary Tovey (eds), 2008, **"Rural Sustainable Developmentin the Knowledge Society"**, Ashgate.

In this review I discuss the book entitled: „Rural Sustainable Development in the Knowledge Society" edited by Karl Bruckmeier and Hilary Tovey. In the first part I focus on its goals, assumptions, and organization. I also describe the most interesting parts of it and some of the results. In the second part I shall be claiming that the weak point of this publication is the lack of information about methodological and theoretical background.

The book is based on the EU-funded 'Cognitive approach to Rural Sustainable Development' research project (CORASON). It seeks to problematise the concept of sustainable development. According to Bruckmeier and Tovey this idea has been identified in the mainstream notion of a balance between social, economic and ecological spheres. They called this version of sustainable development *wishfull thinking*, because it assumes: '[...] *an aspiration to capture and integrate all the problems of development that have never before been capable of integrated resolution in modern societies*.' [2008a:7]. Bruckmeier and Tovey remarked, that the interpretations of the idea of sustainable development were dominated by expert forms of knowledge (scientific and technological). In comparison, the knowledge of local actors was neglected [2008a: 3–4]. Moreover, scientific concepts of sustainable development '*tend to be rather general, lacking cultural, social and historical specification.*' [2008a: 8] These points raise questions about the types of knowledge that relate to the concept of sustainable development. The context for the interest in knowledge dynamics within rural societies was the idea of a knowledge society. Sustainable development was defined as a knowledge-based set of practices [Bruckmeier, Tovey 2008a: 3].

CORASON research aimed to: '*identify and explain the dynamics and variety of knowledge forms used in rural project*' and '*encompass the main interpretations of sustainable development held by different actors in rural development – both governmental (national, regional, EU administrations) and non – governmental (community groups, local networks, civil society associations, NGOs)*.' [Bruckmeier, Tovey 2008a: 2,5]. Within this thematic priority, the authors have identified questions such as: what knowledge is used and how is it used by rural

actors in the rural development process to specify the concept of rural sustainable development. The authors of the book paid particular attention to differentiation among three forms of knowledge:

– expert or scientific knowledge – *[...] which is characterized by the logics of abstraction, generalization and universalistic thinking* […] *subsequently simplified and pruned of its contextual references so that it can be made to apply in standard ways across all local settings*,

– managerial or organizational knowledge – *the knowledge of public administrations and governmental bureaucracies, but it also exists outside such institutions*,*'*

– local or lay knowledge – *[...] it include[s] traditional skills and practices* […], *indigenous cultural understandings of natural and social processes, experimental knowledges built on experiment and observation and even re-localized expert knowledges where standardized knowledge are adapted to the specific features and conditions of a particular local setting* [Bruckmeier, Tovey 2008b: 268, 269].

The book brings together and compares a series of case studies into rural and sustainable development processes in twelve European countries. It consists of three main parts. The title of the first part is: 'Diversification and innovation in rural development'. Case studies are presented in six chapters from such countries as:

– The United Kingdom ('Sustainable Livelihoods on the Island of Skye')

– Sweden ('The Non – Agriculture Rural Economy as a Component of Rural Sustainable Development'),

– Poland ('Diversification and Different Contexts of Knowledge. The Case of Polish Rural Areas'),

– Czech Republic ('Regional Disparities and Their Influence on Sustainable Rural Development – A Comparisons of Two Different Regions'),

– Hungary ('Nature and Culture – Resource Management and Knowledge Use in a Hungarian Micro-Region'),

– Italy ('Practical Knowledge and Institutional Mediation in a Controversial Case of Clam Farming).

The second part is entitled: 'Environment and sustainability in rural development'. It consists of research from:

– Ireland ('Ecologizing Rural Ireland? Conflicts and Contradictions Regarding Knowledge for Sustainable Development'),

– Norway ('Interpretation of Sustainability Related to Designated Areas'),

– Germany (' Nature Conservation and Bio-Diversity in the Northeast'),

– Poland (‘Designing Nature and Resource Management Strategies’),
– Portugal (‘Natural Resources, Sustainability and Rural Development’),
– Greece (‘ Knowledge Forms and Sustainable Development’).

The title of the last part is: ‘Comparison and synthesis of CORASON case studies’.

Each was carried out under one of four themes: 1) non-agricultural rural economy; 2) innovative economic development, 3) protection of nature and bio-diversity maintenance, and 4) sustainable resource management [Bruckmeier, Tovey 2008b:243]. A unifying topic across all case studies was sustainable resource management. Some chapters illustrate the problems of sustainable rural development by focusing on one core issue, for example renewable energy sources or the protection of nature. Some investigated the performance of sustainable development by enterprises, illustrated a special relation between the agricultural and non-agricultural economies, the protection of nature and bio-diversity management, and innovative rural development [Bruckmeier, Tovey 2008a: 2, 17]. In most of the case studies, demographic, statistical data provided useful background for understanding important social issues presented in cases.

In my opinion, one of the most interesting chapters is the Italian one. It presents a case from the delta of the Po River that is famous for its unique environment, made up of lagoons and small islands. The problems encountered in this case are interdependence among experts, cooperative and public bodies. The authors described the influence of an unexpected environmental crisis, caused by gaps in local knowledge, to debate about rural development. A loss of oxygen in the lagoon evoked a collapse of clam farming. When that happened, relationships between producers and scientists became stronger. As can be seen from this case ‘[…] a different kind of knowledge mix was able to impose in a short time a non-agricultural activity in a rural areas’; it became very important to find a way to transfer scientific knowledge about sustainable development for everyday issues. It turned out that a man who worked at the university and lived in the area: ‘ […] *was able to understand the potential of clam farming* […] *to convince a local community where entrepreneurship and trust were very scare resources to join a common project*’; thus he was able to support sustainable development [Osti, Silvestri:112–124].

The Polish chapter is also very interesting. It is entitled: ‘Designing Nature and Resource Management Strategies. Governance, Knowledge and Sustainability: Tree Related Dimensions in Two Exploratory Cases.’ The authors explore the relations among three basic issues: governance, knowledge and sustainable

development in two projects. The first one was called 'The Preservation of Genetic Resources of the Polish Red Cow'. This project caused important changes in all three dimensions of sustainability, that is: 1) environmental (suiting the cow breed to natural conditions), 2) economic (increasing cow breeding), and 3) social (cooperation of various actors in order to strengthen the position of the whole community). The second project called 'Integrated Fruit Production' is an example of ecological fruit production. The project also produced sustainable development in three dimensions: social (cooperation of different actors), economic (some of the farmers created a group that started to sell fruits to one of the markets) and ecological. From this material, the authors suggested that: '[...] only in the case of collaboration between different types of knowledges used by cooperating actors could sustainable development occur'. Moreover, they remarked that these projects can be treated: ' [...] as an example of a situation where a global retail chain has positively influenced both the local ecology and a local economy, as a part of a governance network containing external expert, local authorities, members of local association, some NGO experts and local fruit growers.' [Gorlach, Adamski, Klekotko 2008: 187–197].

I would like to point out that the editors recognized (and the case studies let them readers understand): '[...] how an emergent knowledge society is being constructed and formed within rural areas in Europe as an emerging multi – faced and regionally differentiated social reality' [Bruckmeier, Tovey 2008a:6]. Synthesizing across the findings enabled the editors to develop some general conclusions. One of them is that the initial typology of the three knowledge forms was too simple and produced the need to create a new distinction between tacit and codified knowledge. Most important for practice seems to be key findings related to the success of the project for rural sustainable development. Namely, projects should bring together and combine expert and lay knowledge [Bruckmeier, Tovey 2008b: 279]. According to Bruckmeier and Tovey, one of the most significant lessons from CORASON research was that a participatory form of development is needed to open up dialogue between lay and expert knowledge on equal terms [2008b: 281]. The chapters of the book show that the sustainable development idea is unfinished. From the United Kingdom case study it can be seen that: 'For some people, sustainable development is still about conserving ecology, others would expect the environment to take precedence over the economy and society in the three-dimensional definition, and a further group would expect the three aspects to be threatened equally' [Talbot, Dargan, Shucksmith 2008:34]. Another important conclusion is that: 'Local actors need

time, opportunity and a reason to absorb these into their own pre-existing ways of understanding, to test them out and see how they work and whether they are relevant to their own concerns' [Tovey 2008: 147].

The CORASON research presents a variety of approaches and methods, including both quantitative and qualitative. It is worth pointing out, that integration between the research themes was achieved through a multidisciplinary and collaborative approach to research. In the book some cases are based on such methods as: interpreting statistical data, documentary analysis, interviews, some also on focus groups interview. However, readers will not find much information about the methodology. There are not any detailed empirical descriptions of the processes of interpreting and shaping rural development. What can be found is a short note that methodological information can be found in the initial country reports under the different thematic work packages (accessible at www.corason.hu) [Bruckmeier, Tovey 2008a: 17]. The perspective presented here limits the possibility of a critical analysis of the case results. The exception is the Norway chapter. In this chapter, more information about the methodology is included. For example, the information that the case study was based on relevant written documentation or interviews was included. The authors characterized this material more precisely than others [Daugstad 2008: 154].

The book does not follow the most popular scientific publication scheme: the theory analysis, then the exemplification of numerous variables (dependent and independent) and hypotheses, and finally the part related to verification. What seems to be the weak point of this publication, is the lack of information about the different meanings and the history of the sustainable development ideas that could be very useful for those readers who are not familiar with the topic. It is worth mentioning that the concept of sustainable development appeared in science in the late sixties [Sadowski 2007: 64]; however, it was at first defined as environmental protection. Most contemporary definitions refer to the approach adopted by the G. Brundtland report in which sustainable development: [...] *meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs* [WCED 1987, Żylicz 2007: 109]. This idea has gained popularity since the United Nations Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. As S. Kozłowski remarked, the Global Program of Actions Agenda 21 contains basic documents including the premises of sustainable development [Kozłowski 2007:237]. In literature we can find numerous different definitions [for example: Pezzy 1989, Daly 1990, Van den Bergh 1991, Paszkowski 2001, Dresner 2002, Tainter 2003, Piątek 2007, Papuziński 2007, Sadowski 2007]. The most popular

is: sustainable development meets economic, social, cultural and ecological goals for the present and the future [C. Musters, H. Graaf 1998:127]. At the moment, it is impossible to create any development strategy without obligatory reference to the concept [Żylicz 2007: 109], especially in Europe which is: [...] *the only continent that seriously and consistently aims at realization of sustainable development* [Kozłowski 2007: 237]. This information strengthens the need of conducting such projects as CORASON.

It would be really useful to have a short description of the knowledge society idea, which is also the theoretical framework for the CORASON research project. The authors do not use the basic concepts of the sociology of knowledge, what means that they do not focus on the conditions of each knowledge type. In my opinion, identification of these concepts would be very interesting and important not only for rural sociology, but also for the sociology of knowledge.

To sum up, rural areas are the key to the social transition to sustainable development. The book shows not only the issues like sustainable development of rural areas, but also presents a broad view of conditions of development in contemporary society. The authors have succeeded in contributing thought-provoking insights on the subject area. 'Rural Sustainable Development in the Knowledge Society' edited by Karl Bruckmeier and Hilary Tovey provides in-depth, thoughtful analysis that integrates relevant research and enables readers to develop understanding at different levels. It combines good writing with a thorough treatment of the subject.

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Reviewed by Katarzyna Zajda
University of Łodz, Lodz
socwim@uni.lodz.pl

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