PRZEGLĄD SOCJOLOGICZNY

SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Vol 65, No 4
2016

ŁÓDZKIE TOWARZYSTWO NAUKOWE

PRZEGLĄD SOCJOLOGICZNY

tom LXV/4
2016

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ŁÓDZKIE TOWARZYSTWO NAUKOWE
90-505 Łódź, ul. M. Skłodowskiej-Curie 11
tel. (42) 665-54-59; fax: (42) 665-54-64
Journal Customer Service: (42) 66-55-448, http://sklep.ltn.lodz.pl
http://www.ltn.lodz.pl e-mail: biuro@ltn.lodz.pl

Sociological Review (Przegląd Socjologiczny) is financed by the Ministry of Science
and Higher Education (grant no 703/P-DUN/2016 for public dissemination of science).
The print edition is financed by the Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Sociology, University of Lodz.

The Journal is indexed in CEJSH, CEEOL, EBSCOhost, Proquest ERIH Plus
as well as Copernicus and is itemized in the Ministry of Science
and Higher Education scientific journals ranking.
The contents are available online in: CEJSH, CEEOL, EBSCOhost, Proquest
as well as on ePNP and IBUK platforms.

ISSN 0033-2356; e-ISSN 2450-9351
First edition; original digital version
Cover design by: Hanna Stańska
Photocopying: „PERFECT" Marek Szychowski, tel. 42 215-83-46
Printed by: 2K, Łódź sp. z o.o., ul. Płocka 35/45, www.2k.com.pl, 2k@2k.com.pl
Print edition: 150 copies

CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

The common theme of the texts included in this issue of Sociological Review is a reflection on the pitfalls European societies are currently facing in view of the profound changes taking place.

The first two papers relate to European tensions and conflicts. Andreas Langenohl, following the considerations by Jürgen Habermas and Gayatri Spivak, reflects on the crisis of public criticism concerning European Union; and Katarzyna Waniek – on the basis of empirical research – shows the limitations, paradoxes and ambivalences of intercultural liaison based on her investigation into work performed by a young European volunteer and a professional helper. The next two texts relate to the problems of organizational and structural changes and the marketization of modern societies: Sebastian Giacovelli considers the concept of expected expectations as the phenomenon important for economic sociology; and Andrzej Boczkowski dwells on the transformations of the university and the modern educational system. The authors of the two last articles refer to biographical research focusing on the specificity of individuals who in a sense function outside the institutional structures of the state and business: Ina Alber studies the social activists of Polish non-governmental organizations; and Tomasz Ferenc analyses the issue of 'success' for Polish émigré artists.

As an addition to the papers we offer a review by Jerzy Stachowiak of Ulrich Bröckling's book *The entrepreneurial self. Fabricating a new type of subject* (2016), one of the most important publications in the field of *governmentality studies*.

ANDREAS LANGENOHL
Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen*

A CRISIS OF PUBLIC CRITICISM. THE ACTUALIZATION OF CENTER-PERIPHERY SEMANTICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Abstract

The paper approaches the current condition of the European Union as a crisis of public criticism from a theoretical perspective. This crisis consists of the clash between current peripheralist criticisms coming from national governments, opposition parties and quasi-social movements and often combining with exclusivist demands, and the EU's insistence on a continuation of its rationalist and modernist political project. The nature of this European project can be more closely analyzed if viewed as a political correlate to Jürgen Habermas' model of rational public political deliberation. This analysis is then confronted with an alternative view on public criticism as found in postcolonial theory. In particular, this discussion engages Gayatri Spivak's critique of peripheralist representations that deem themselves critical. On the basis of the theoretical juxtaposition between Habermas and Spivak, this paper distills a regulative idea for public political criticism that differs from Habermas' conception of communicative rationality – namely, the regulative idea of self-criticism. Self-criticism is conceptualized as a way to account for potentially problematic aspects that may accompany peripheralist criticisms, to understanding them as an expression of the metropolitan political public dynamic, and thus to assume responsibility for them. For the current crisis constellation, this would mean rephrasing peripheralist criticisms as part and parcel of a genuinely European public political dynamic, thus overcoming the chasm created by the reciprocal consolidation of peripheralist and centralist positions.

* Professor of Sociology with a Focus on General Comparative Studies, Institut für Soziologie; e-mail: andreas.langenohl@sowi.uni-giessen.de

Keywords: European Union; European integration; criticism; political public sphere; postcolonial theory

INTRODUCTION: YET ANOTHER CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

A series of major crises have recently shaken the institutional structure, but also the political imagination, of the European Union: the financial and sovereign debt crisis that continues to challenge the common currency of the Eurozone and implicit assumptions about solidarity among European national economies; the conflict between Ukraine and Russia that brought the specter of war in Europe back into the public imagination; the issue of (forced) migration into the EU, which has crystallized a wave of anti-Islamism and xenophobia throughout Europe; and, of course, 'Brexit', which has destroyed the idea of the EU's historical finality. These crises have inspired fundamental criticisms regarding the policies of European bodies such as the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the European Monetary Union. Throughout the EU, governments, political parties, organizations, and quasi-movements have blamed European institutions for dominating national governments and populations. These accusations – which have sometimes been mixed with collective, especially national essentializations – invoke the picture of an EU center that has driven nation-states into peripheral positions, and claim for themselves the right of the periphery to fight against subjugation by the center.

This politicized center-periphery semantics is not new. Reconstructions of the re-ordering of the world system since early modern times have argued that the most important characteristic of the modern system has always been an asymmetrical arrangement of centers and peripheries in terms of economic exploitation, political domination, and ideological hegemony [Wallerstein 2004; Buzan, Lawson 2015]. Moreover, center-periphery semantics have been shown to represent a powerful grammar according to which political identities, aspirations and claims have been organized in the accession process of new member states to the EU [Krossa 2005: 45–61, 123–134]. In the case of the current political dynamics within the EU, center-periphery semantics challenge European institutions and are often combined with exclusionist rhetoric such as demands to close the EU borders to refugees, anti-Muslim rallies, or manifestations of xenophobic nationalism. The periphery's claim to have the right to fight metropolitan domination is thus asserted independently of actual geographical, economic, or political peripherality: it has been staked by national governments in newer EU member states (as in Hungary

and Poland), significant opposition parties in historical EU core states (such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria and the U.K.), or quasi-movements on the extreme right (as in Germany and Greece). These claims have been publicly refuted by representatives of the EU as compromised by a relapse into nationalism, exclusivism, and xenophobia.

The European Union has always been a deliberately rationalist, and thus a *modernist*, political project. It has based its legitimacy on the ability to receive consensual agreement from both political elites and populations, to regulate conflicts on the basis of the consensus principle, and to engage its citizens in projects based on an understanding that European integration is something Europeans cannot *not* want. This understanding is fundamentally challenged by protests that combine a rejection of European integration as domination by a center with an essentialization of national collectives that transforms divisible conflicts over the allocation of rights and resources into non-divisible, identitarian ones [Hirschman 1995]. This leads to the emergence of a deadlock between criticisms that radically valorize peripheral positionalities, and the rejection of such criticisms by European institutions on the grounds that such criticisms are unacceptable due to their incompatibility with the political modernism of European integration. This constellation is as much a symptom as it is a trigger of yet another crisis in the EU: namely, an inability to find ways to start a dialog about what would constitute a viable way to critically address the EU's shortcomings. In this sense, critical political signification in the EU, is itself in crisis.

This article attempts to address this problem area by engaging with the academic and political current that has most ardently dealt with the dilemmas of criticisms from peripheral positionalities: postcolonial critique, which has often been seen as a possible source of criticism that is both locally effective and contextualized by considerations of global inequalities [cf. Buchowski 2006; Langenohl 2007; Kerner 2014; Biskamp 2016]. While many current accusations of the EU invoke postcolonial imagery (presenting themselves as peripheral criticisms of an imperial center), and have indeed often been framed in terms of postcolonial and decolonial theory,[1] this article specifically addresses the self-reflexive and self-critical capacities of postcolonial theory. The core of this theoretical discussion consists of a dialog between Jürgen Habermas' *Theory of Communicative Action* – a foundational model of the rational political deliberation so emphasized by EU institutions – and Gayatri Spivak's *Critique of Postcolonial*

[1] Cf. Michael-Matsas [2012] and Fouskas, Dimoulas [2012], critically discussing austerity politics in Greece.

Reason, which theorizes about the conditionalities of peripheralist criticisms. These two works address public political criticism in two different ways. While Habermas, with his social-theoretical model, places hopes in the auto-corrective forces of modernity to be realized through rational public deliberation, Spivak engages in a cultural-theoretical critique of peripheralist critical interventions as having side effects that undermine and compromise the criticism's cause. Habermas and Spivak can thus be seen as poles between which the current drama of criticism in the EU is unfolding. Habermas' social theory provides the theoretical foundation for a modernist and rationalist polity such as the EU[2] that has difficulties coping with criticism from peripheralist positionalities. Spivak analyzes the potentially problematic tendencies of criticisms that take peripheralist positions. So, while a precise analysis of the failings of Habermas' model might help us better understand the helplessness of a rationalist apparatus facing radically peripheralist criticisms, confronting his model with Spivak's enables us to capture the cultural framework within which those criticisms become major challenges to the European Union in the first place.

HABERMAS AND THE IMMANENT CRITICISM OF MODERNITY

Jürgen Habermas' conception of the public sphere and public political deliberation can still be regarded as the most influential position on an issue that has been discussed in a wide range of scientific disciplines, all the more so since the publication of the English translation of *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* [1962].[3] Not only is *Structural Transformation* regarded as a foundational text for, "the recovery and extension of a strong normative idea of publicness" [Calhoun 1992: 42], but it has also served to center and crystallize debates surrounding the public sphere by providing a model that could be critiqued from various points of view. Since the 1990s a number of papers and volumes have been published that point out shortcomings in Habermas' theory of the public sphere.[4] One main thrust of such criticism is that Habermas did not take the cultural dimension of the emergence of a bourgeois public sphere into account. This argument has been made from a historical perspective – showing how Habermas' early work is characterized by the, "remarkable absence of nationalism" [Calhoun 1991: 34;

[2] Habermas has regularly appeared as a theoretician of European integration and governance, and has referred to his theoretical considerations of deliberation [see, for instance, Habermas 2001].

[3] For a brief history of the reception to Habermas' work in Anglophone scholarship, cf. Eley [2002: 219–24].

[4] Cf. for a comprehensive summary of criticisms Crossley, Roberts [2004].

cf. Eley 1992; Baker 1992] – as well as in more conceptual contributions, which contend that Habermas underestimates the imaginary dimension of publicness and neglects the relevance of identity in the contemporary public sphere and symbolic politics [cf. Warner 1992; Dean 2001; Ku 1999]. Another area of criticism points out that his historical reconstructions and his speech act-theoretical elaborations systematically exclude certain groups from being considered as part of the public [e.g., women and workers], or that they downplay the relevance of alternative forms of lifeworld interaction, such as every day conversation, carnivalesque appropriations of rational arguments, or aesthetic performances [cf. Fraser 1992: 112–118; Benhabib 1992: 88–95: McCarthy 1992; Gilroy 1993: 40–59; Gardiner 2004; Hirshkop 2004; Roberts 2004]. Lastly, regarding new forms of publicity such as social media, some have argued that the public sphere in the singular is an outdated model that fails to integrate the multiplicity of medially formatted public practices [Haas 2004].

In illustrating the descriptive and analytical shortcomings of Habermas' theory of society, however, many criticisms fall short of demonstrating what they mean for his project of a *critical* theory of the public sphere. This theory can be understood as a form of immanent criticism of modernity grounded on social theory, that is, as an analysis of the basic functions of societal processes that reconstructs normative categories which can then be used to criticize empirical society itself. In this sense, Habermas' project is genealogically Marxist: instead of being 'philosophically' articulated and derived from transcendental principles, criticism must reflect the reproductive conditions and mechanisms of society. Unlike Marx, however, who depicted the foundations of the social in the conditions of material reproduction, Habermas places the symbolic aspects of the reproduction of the social at center stage.

Given this context, critiques of Habermas sometimes miss one of the main implications of his argument: namely, that the public sphere represents the structural location for modernity's own self-criticism. As an extension of the "lifeworld", the structures of the public sphere do not always empirically contribute to a rationalization of quarrels and arguments. Nonetheless, they do institutionalize the normative ambition (grounded in the speech act) that a voluntary agreement on social norms can be achieved, and they transfer this ambition into the self-image and self-ambition of modern societies.[5] The validity of self-criticism as a counterfactual norm is not situated at the same societal

[5] Habermas' political writings continuously provided examples for this understanding of the public sphere [cf. Habermas 1976, 1978a, 1978b].

level as the social closures that have empirically accompanied the emergence of the public sphere and that many critics have taken issue with. As a norm whose institutionalization has historically vacillated between rudimentary beginnings and advanced stages of decline, Habermas sees his point of departure not as a descriptive account, but as an *immanent criticism* of society that does not predefine critical norms but rather deciphers them from the symbolic foundation of social practices.

I intend to confront Habermas' approach with postcolonial positions on the public sphere and thus to add to the debate on the reformulation of critical theory.[6] Postcolonial theorizing represents one of the most radical contemporary criticisms of modernity, building its epistemology on a program of giving authority to peripheral representations in order to critically comment on the center's policies and epistemologies. In a recent contribution, Floris Biskamp [2016] has suggested a combination of Habermas' critical project and postcolonial criticism which capitalizes on the mutual complementarities of the two theoretical strands. He argues that Habermas' lack of any theory of signification, which is also the concern of the present paper, might be supplemented by postcolonial theory that specializes in signification. In the other direction, Biskamp also asserts that postcolonial theory's lack of a political theory can be supplemented by social-theoretical foundations as laid out by Habermas [Biskamp 2016: 203, 259]. In this article, however, I want to focus on a more specific discussion of forms of criticism within a conflict constellation structured by imaginations of the center-periphery asymmetry, as is the case in the contemporary EU.

POSTCOLONIAL THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF CRITICAL REPRESENTATION[7]

One of the aims of postcolonial criticism is the deconstruction of key analytical categories in western social-scientific, philosophical and literary thought. This intention is one part of postcolonial theory's more general program, namely to, "narrativize the constitution of the self-consolidating other," in the historical west [Spivak 1999: 409–410; cf. also Sakai 2001, 2009]. The main line of argument

[6] Feminist approaches must be mentioned here, cf. in particular the contributions by Benhabib [1992: 89–95], and by Fraser [1992: 118–37]. Furthermore, Nick Crossley [2004] has suggested that Habermas' project can be critically continued by turning to a Bourdieuian kind of analysis.

[7] Due to a lack of space, I cannot fully detail all of the relevant indications here, and must restrict myself to illustrations and examples of postcolonial theory's structure of articulation [for a reconstruction see: Langenohl 2007, 116–249].

is that most of the categories developed by European and (as its descendent) North American social and cultural theory implicitly rest upon a confrontation between western and non-western cultures, traditions, and ways of life. Cultural features ascribed to the non-west are regularly represented as being inferior to western ways and, thus, may be legitimately repressed and subordinated. This representation of the non-west – the discourse of "Orientalism", to use Edward Said's [1995 (1978)] famous term – thus serves to legitimize political, economic and cultural domination, and at the same time allows the west to consolidate its self-image by distinguishing itself from this constructed representation. In this context, the social sciences have been complicit with the project of western imperialism, which first (from the 16th century on) took shape in the economic exploitation and political colonization of the non-west and then, in the 20th century, transformed itself into the economic and political domination of former colonies by the states from the former imperial centers [Connell 2007; Bhambra 2008; Sakai 2001].[8] An instance of this complicity can be seen in the development of sociological modernization theory, of which Habermas' theory is a prominent example. Many influential versions of this theory operate with the categorical juxtaposition of 'traditional' and 'modern' societies and the idea of a universal path of societal development.[9] According to this paradigm, western societies reached the stage of modernity earlier than non-western ones, which, as a result represent a more primitive status and can therefore be legitimately subdued (even after formal political decolonization) through western developmental aid, policy counseling, secret service activities, and most recently military interventions [Prakash 2000: 164–167 and 171–179; Chatterjee 2000: 19; Spivak 2002: 60–61].

Postcolonial theory, as it has appeared since the 1990s, has assumed and institutionalized a distinctly self-critical form of academic debate. It can be traced back to discussions in English literary studies at the end of the 1980s that questioned the hegemony of the traditional Commonwealth literary canon and the dominance of analytical instruments developed in the historical context of the western literary classics.[10] Separately, the publication of Edward Saids's

[8] A radicalization of postcolonial critique, which calls for the decolonization of epistemologies in the humanities and the social sciences, terms itself 'decolonial criticism' [see Mignolo 2000; Quijano 2000].

[9] Jeffrey Alexander [1995: 71] traces this influential branch of U.S. American modernization theory, of which Talcott Parsons is the most distinguished representative, to the 1950s and 1960s and terms it "romantic liberalism".

[10] These discussions surface, for instance, in the following early volumes: Slemon, Tiffin [1989]; Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffin [1989]; Tiffin, Adams [1990].

Orientalism in 1978 gave impetus to a series of studies in what was to be called Colonial Discourse Analysis. These studies explored the self-affirmative construction of the non-west in western colonial discourse, be it literary, journalistic, diplomatic or academic [Bhabha 1994; Spivak 1987; Mudimbe 1988]. In the first half of the 1990s, these two branches of academic literary and epistemological criticism merged into "Postcolonial studies", a loose category covering not so much a specific disciplinary approach or a concrete pool of data, but rather an intellectual and scholarly style of conversation that was critical of the literary and theoretical discourses it analyzed, and self-critical with regards to its own possible collaboration with these discourses [Childs, Williams 1997: 218; Moore-Gilbert, Stanton, Maley 1997: 1–2]. The fierce debates in postcolonial criticism about whether it should attempt to critique representations of the west or that of the former colonies, or whether it is being written for a metropolitan or a peripheral public, are quarrels that are part and parcel of postcolonialism's self-criticism [Langenohl 2007: 155–212].

Postcolonial theory has thus established the *critique of critical representation* [Langenohl 2007: 164] as the norm for academic discourse: a sort of critique of the second order. In this respect – and despite the fact that postcolonial theory is eager to question and reject an unconsidered use of theoretical categories in the humanities as developed in the historical west – it can be seen as the empirical manifestation of a discourse-ethical approach to the public sphere in which the norms of critical statements are constantly being reflected upon as to their potential affirmative, hegemonic and exclusionary tendencies. An apt example of how postcolonial approaches constantly engage in the critique of critical representation is Gayatri Spivak's work. An early instance is her critical engagement with western feminism, which she accuses of taking a critical position toward patriarchal structures at the expense of non-western colonial female subjects, who are often represented in feminist criticism as being passive and subordinate to patriarchy [Spivak 1986]. Spivak's work also lends itself to challenging Habermas' assertion of the self-corrective forces of modernity, because her work sheds light on power effects while devoting attention to cultural dynamics and macro-societal and institutional structures alike (see, for instance, Spivak [2003], and Biskamp [2016: 167–204]). My analysis will focus on her book *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* as a work that, even in its title, expresses the self-criticism of postcolonial theory, and that addresses various instances of an (if unintended) self-subversion of public criticisms articulated from postcolonial positionalities within metropolitan societies. According to Spivak's analysis, these criticisms are infused with hegemonic power differentials, which causes marginalization

and the symbolic exclusion of groups located at the historical peripheries of the European empires that have no access to metropolitan resources. In this way, she critically confronts postcolonial criticism for its entanglement in the very power structures that it has sought to confront and criticize in the first place.

In *Critique of Postcolonial Reason*, Spivak handles the critique of the public sphere as a critique of representations or significations. Among others she uses the example of discourses on multiculturalism in western societies and most prominently in the U.S. Here, she identifies an acceptance by many postcolonial migrants of western culturalist discourse – especially within the frame of U.S. multiculturalism – that supports an interpretive pattern in western public opinion which attributes economic exploitation and political domination in the global system to 'cultural differences' between the west and the rest. Postcolonial migrants are complicit in establishing a discursive separation of western and non-western public spheres by implicitly agreeing to serve as proxies for non-western 'cultures' at the periphery. Americans of Indian origin, for instance, are made to represent 'national India', Asian Americans are made to stand in for 'Asia', etc. For Spivak, postcolonial migrants and their descendants thus have a special responsibility to undermine these representations:

> [T]he hyphenated Americans… might rethink themselves as *possible* agents of exploitation, not as victims; then the idea that the nation-state that they now call home gives "aid" to the nation-state that they still call culture, in order to consolidate the new unification for international capital, might lead to what I call "transnational literacy" [Spivak 1999: 357].

In the present context, the notion of "transnational literacy" can be recast as a rejection of the claim that national public spheres can be juxtaposed with each other and be reduced to container-like 'cultures'. Spivak has continued this critique in a more recent work, where she takes issue with reconstructions of transnational confrontations that put 'culture' at center stage while at the same time lacking the competency to capture complex cultural representations, like literature, in their capacity to subvert the container epistemology of 'culture'.[11] The normative orientation that gives shape to this critique comes from an appreciation of those voices that are regularly *not* heard in the public spheres – either within metropolises or on the peripheries – namely the repeatedly exploited and marginalized subalterns (for Spivak, one example includes "the poorest women

[11] Spivak [2003: 1–23]. Here, Spivak critiques Cultural Studies in particular for entertaining an over-simplified notion of culture unmoored in an intimate familiarity with non-metropolitan literacies and literatures. She instead calls for a re-ordered cultural anthropology that could in principle do justice to the cultural particularities of peripheral contexts.

of the South" [Spivak 1999: 416]). Spivak's earlier assertion, that despite attempts to theorize the subjective motivations of subaltern subjects they, "cannot be heard or read," and, "cannot speak" [Spivak 1988: 308], highlights the point of her critique as a theoretical project. Here, she confronts a Foucauldian understanding of the political intellectual who launches their criticism by speaking on behalf of subordinate individuals and groups. Theory thus cannot help but criticize other theoretical criticisms precisely because it cannot claim to speak on behalf of any subaltern subjects; it can merely outline the possibility that the subalterns might speak for themselves by criticizing theoretical attempts to speak for them – for instance, in critical multiculturalist discourse, culturalist theory unwittingly appropriates the voices of the subaltern at the periphery.

Given that postcolonial criticism is based on self-critical conversations among an academic-intellectual public critiquing representations that deem themselves already critical, it is interesting to take a closer look at the architecture of the concept of 'representation'. This concept also links Spivak's and Habermas' theoretical projects. Furthermore, the concept of 'representation' is shaped as part of a discussion about Marx, in both Spivak's and Habermas' writings. I will thus directly confront the different appropriations of Marx by Habermas and Spivak as they appear in connection with reasoning about representation in the public sphere.

REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFICATIONS: DIFFERENT READINGS OF MARX

At its core, Habermas' theory of society is based on an argument that the structural history of western European modernity allows for the reconstruction of an universal model of differentiation at a societal level. According to this model, the formation of territorial states and the establishment of a sphere of economic circulation in Western Europe are regarded as historical crystallizations of a general mechanism of societal evolution, namely the differentiation of two societal spheres that are functionally integrated: political administration and economy. These spheres are characterized by the fact that the actors' action orientations that constitute them are not directed toward the motives underlying other actors' actions, but solely toward the effects of their actions. Habermas argued with Mead and Durkheim that the prerequisite for this development is a certain degree of post-traditionalism in value-orientations and modes of communication within the lifeworld. Only if traditional norms, values and orientations have already been subjected to communicative rationalization (as happened first, Habermas argues, in European

bourgeois households at the end of the 18th century [Habermas 1989: 28–50]), can the integration of agency systems be decoupled from traditionally established normative judgments.

This process of decoupling action orientations from normative evaluations, and their crystallization into functionally integrated societal subsystems, opens lifeworld communication to the possibility of further communicative rationalization, until a point is reached where the validity claims of arguments can in principle be judged against the normative background of a potentially universal consensus. That this consensus can never be fully reached does not prevent it from structuring empirical conversations as a normative horizon. This model implies that communicative action holds the potential to put any topic on the agenda and to include any person because the empirical norm of argumentative rationality does not permit the exclusion of any topic or any person in itself [Habermas 1989: 36–37].[12] The evolutionary achievement of the public sphere is thus that it makes any issue subject to communicative rationality in a public deliberation that is (in principle) capable of the universal inclusion of all stakeholders. Modern public spheres are thus viewed by Habermas as arenas where the unfinished Enlightenment project is constantly driven forward through self-confrontation with its blind spots. Social movements, minority groups etc. successively put topics on the agenda that had until then been ignored by the general public, thus guaranteeing the continuation of a rationalization of public debate that is normatively grounded in the possibility of voluntary consensus.[13]

Still, the liberation of lifeworld communication from instrumental action motives, made possible by such motives' crystallization in the societal subsystems of the economy and political administration, comes at a price. According to Habermas, the fully fledged subsystems have the potential to impact the life world, and thus also the communicative potential underlying the public sphere. Because there can be, "no rational political will-formation unless it is supported by a rationalized lifeworld," [Habermas 1990: 208, author's translation],[14] any restrictions put on lifeworld structures and their potential to unleash the potential of communicative rationalization must be detrimental to public political culture.

[12] Although in more recent work, Habermas has argued that legal matters are confined to the public sphere and moral matters to private communication, Benhabib [1992: 89] notes that his own model of communicative rationalization undermines such categorization of issues.

[13] This emphasis on social movements was missing in the earlier work of the 1960s [cf. Calhoun 1992: 36–37].

[14] Original: "keine vernünftige politische Willensbildung ohne das Entgegenkommen einer rationalisierten Lebenswelt".

This diagnosis orients itself toward, yet at the same time takes issue with, Marx's analysis of commodification, namely that the *use value* of concrete labor is absorbed by the *exchange value* of abstract labor through its commodification in the labor market. In principle, this absorption of use value by exchange value can be rendered in Habermas' terms, as "colonization" (*Kolonialisierung*) of the lifeworld by systemic imperatives. The functional subsystems of political administration and economy, whose emergence was conditioned by a certain rationalization and de-traditionalization of the lifeworld, tend to expand their functional logic to societal contexts integrated by norms, and thus impact the lifeworld. This intrusion of self-sustaining functional logic into the lifeworld is not fully perceptible as such due to the process of the, "everyday consciousness… becom[ing] fragmented." From the perspective of the subjects, this means that, "the everyday knowledge appearing in totalized form remains diffuse, or at least never attains that level of articulation at which alone knowledge can be accepted as valid according to the standards of cultural modernity" [Habermas 1987c: 355]. This lack of articulation is a prerequisite for systemic colonization in the lifeworld. Still, in contrasting his model with Marx's theory of commodity, Habermas contends that the latter' theory detects only *one* of these colonizing relationships (that between capitalist economy and lifeworld) at the expense of the other (political administration – lifeworld). From the perspective of Habermas' lifeworld-system-differentiation, Marx misses the point that the danger of 'colonization' is not only typical for capitalist, but for modern societies in general [Habermas 1987c: 337–343].

This critique of Marx is coupled with a diagnosis of the crisis of social criticism in contemporary societies. According to Habermas, under the conditions of late-capitalist welfare states, the class conflict that Marx diagnosed loses its identificatory power because it no longer provides the categories for social identification (class identification). The class structure that separates different social classes in Marx's analysis – and thus different lifeworlds – from one another is transferred to the systemic sphere of society, for example in the conflict between entrepreneurial associations and unions moderated by state institutions. The class structure thus, "loses its historically palpable shape [*Gestalt*]" [Habermas 1987c: 348]. At stake is a social structure *past recognition*, the emergence of a public non-signifiability of the contradiction between different social classes. Although Habermas refers to the conditions of the late-capitalist welfare state in his diagnosis, it becomes clear that he recognizes the problem of signifying inequality (which is induced by systems logics] in Marx's work. Marx had tried

to address this problem with the transformation from the "class in itself" to the "class for itself", that is, through the transfiguration of a structural contradiction to an identificatory mobilization: a representation-through-self-signification, as it were. In Habermas' view, this concern with the signification of the class conflict, demonstrates Marx's blindness to the general tendency of modern societies to separate themselves into different lifeworld and systemic spheres [Habermas 1987c: 499–500], thus risking the creation of "fragmented consciousness" [Habermas 1987c: 355].

Because Marx's focus on the representation-through-self-signification of the working class was already mistaken, the signifiability of subalternity cannot be substituted by the alternative critical signification of a revolutionary collectivity. It is not the *signification* of an identity that must be rescued from the systemic logics of economy and political administration, but the possibility for participatory *political* representation. According to Habermas, the danger exists that participation will become nothing more than *rhetorical* representation, or the mere *signification* of representation ["mass loyalty", Habermas 1987c: 350], with the role of the active citizen to be replaced by the roles of client to the administration and consumer of the economic system.[15] This substitution is brought about by the aforementioned fragmentation of everyday consciousness: mass loyalty generated through symbolic politics is the significatory and identificatory substitute for real participation and representation in public deliberation. Habermas reconstructs Marx's class consciousness in terms of collected *individual* consciousnesses. Thus, ideology is not false *signification*, but rather false *consciousness* – which correlates with Habermas' suggestion that the threat to the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld through systemic colonization should be best understood as the fragmentation of consciousness in terms of distorted intersubjectivity.

Spivak, by contrast, directly confronts what she sees as the dual meaning of 'representation' in Marx, that is, cultural signification (representation in the sense of *Darstellung*) on the one hand, and political representation (*Vertretung*) on the other. In doing so, she touches on a theme developed earlier in her essay *Can the Subaltern Speak?* There, she analyzed British and Hindu nationalist discourses surrounding a practice called *sati* in colonial India, a term used to signify the death of a wife on the occasion of her husband's death. British colonial officers portrayed the practice as forced burning and thus as murder, while nationalists portrayed it as spiritually motivated self-immolation. This

[15] "Legitimacy and mass loyalty form an alloy that is not analyzed by those involved and cannot be broken down into its critical components" [Habermas 1987c: 350].

discursive constellation, Spivak argues, was crucially based on the absence of the concerned women's voices, who figured either as passive victims that needed to be saved or as culturalized subjects who expressed their will only through their own death – a constellation that prevented the discursive positionality of women as 'speaking' and living subjects of their own lives from materializing. Moreover, with a critical view at attempts by contemporary Indian historians to rescue the 'voice' of subaltern subjects, she argues that it is impossible to speak fully on behalf of these women because their historical-discursive significance consisted precisely in their complete silencing [Spivak 1988: 308]. In other words, any critique of hegemonic imperial discourses has to proceed in a self-critical way, always reflecting on its own conditionality and possible complicity.

So, while Habermas critiques the fact that Marx privileged the question of signification at the expense of political participation, Spivak holds that Marx's use of the notion *Vertretung* is much more cautious and reflective of its own conditionality. Referring to *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* – in particular to a quote from that text in which Marx says about small peasant proprietors, a subordinated and exploited group, that they, "cannot represent themselves; they must be represented" [Marx as quoted in Spivak 1999: 259] – Spivak asserts that for Marx, political representation as a class does not follow from the immediate consciousness as a class. Rather, such, "strategic, artificial, and second-level 'consciousness'" [Spivak 1999: 262], always belongs to the realm of signification, which Marx aligns with the sphere of capitalist circulation: just as the exchange value of labor is the signifier of abstract and therefore objectified labor, so too is class consciousness a signifier of collective identity that threatens to objectify those in whose names it is articulated. Class signification must therefore be understood as being "discontinuous" with its carrier group's subjective identification and not an outflow of it: it is conditioned by the forced inclusion of this carrier group into a structure that, "is artificial to begin with – 'economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life'" [Spivak 1999: 261, quoting Marx], which thus undermines any claim to 'natural' signification, let alone political representation, of that group.

This interpretation of Marx – who in Spivak's view, "shows a cautious respect for the nascent critique of individual and collective subjective agency" [Spivak 1999: 261] – allows her to criticize the current identity politics in the United States' public sphere for signifying an essential collective identification as the point of departure in the struggle for public political representation. Such identity discourses do not emanate from a given collective's feeling of belonging, but are embedded into an economic order that is the historical successor to imperial

colonialism. Signification enters as a marginality producing factor of its own, and not (as in Habermas) as the heteronomous result of the invasion of the lifeworld by systemic logic. In Spivak's example, by participating in the critical multiculturalist discourse in the United States (as a neocolonial metropolis), and thereby achieving their acceptance as part of the different 'cultures' within the country, postcolonial migrants unwittingly help prolong the economic structures of subordination at the peripheries – that is, in the former colonies – by attributing inequality to 'culture' [Spivak 1999: 353–358]. By focusing on the power of signification and its discursive entanglement, Spivak's theoretical perspective, thus cautions against any 'empowerment' based on theoretical claims to represent subaltern groups as long as those claims do not include a gesture of self-criticism.

The lessons that Habermas and Spivak draw from Marx in their reflections on the public sphere are quite different from each other. To be sure, both have implications for a theory and diagnosis of the public sphere that regard themselves as *critical*, and thus must reflect the public criticism's conditions of existence. Both approaches discuss the relationship between signification and political representation in the public sphere, and both warn that theory must not commit certain fallacies when signifying this relationship. But this is where the similarities end; Habermas' and Spivak's elaborations on Marx formulate different impulses for the reformulation of a critical theory of the public sphere.

Habermas translates class conflict into a "colonizing" infiltration of the lifeworld by action orientations that constitute systemic social contexts. This means that the threatening potential of modernity takes empirical shape in distorted communication among lifeworld subjects. For a critical theory of the public sphere, this diagnosis implies an important norm of undistorted intersubjectivity sheltered from the direct influences of systemic logics. Because "colonization" does not produce a false, but rather a fragmented consciousness, it creates non-significations that cannot be challenged by any theorized ideology-critical signification. Habermas' model thus avoids a common semantic criticism of significations, because it considers them to be pathological in and of themselves ["mass loyalty", Habermas 1987c: 350]. The cure is found in immediate political representation within the public sphere, conditioned by an undistorted intersubjective consciousness that establishes the counterfactual norm of communicative rationality within the horizon of a potentially universal consensus.

For Spivak, who interprets Marx as cautioning against an identitarian-essentialist misunderstanding of the transformation of "class-in-itself" into "class-for-itself", the primary danger rests in the *domination of people's self-significations and self-representations* through cultural signification that is given

hegemonic weight; a phenomenon she identifies in colonial, postcolonial and neocolonial discourses alike. What stitches together colonial and neo-colonial discourses is not so much the persistence of certain public interpretive patterns or discourses of the "Orient" that vindicate its subordination under the west (as Edward Said would have it), but rather the interweaving of the West's self-asserting images of the cultural Orient with the culturalist self-image of colonial and postcolonial subjects who are inserted into macroeconomic and macro-political structures invisible to them. "Colonialism", then, refers to a condition in which a transnational hegemonic publicness of signification-taken-for-representation exists that does not allow for the differentiation between practices of signification and practices of political participation. In this way, the categories of the hegemonic discourse – and above all, the category of 'culture' – are attributed to those subjected to this discourse. The implicit critical-theoretical norm that this model derives from analysis is to support others in their own signification and representation [cf. Biskamp 2016: 198–199], while self-critically acknowledging that any such support might turn out to be a part of the hegemonic discourse it had intended to criticize.

COLONIZATION AND PUBLIC CRITICISM

Both postcolonial theory and the theory of communicative action proceed from the possibility of counterfactual norms that structure public debate. Yet, as we have seen, these two theoretical strands arrive at incongruous conclusions regarding the role of public criticism. The different invocations of the term 'colonization' highlight this difference. While Habermas introduces the term only in passing and as a label to refer to general paradoxes of societal modernization, postcolonial theory itself is based on the term in order to question the categories of modernity and modernization *grosso modo*. More importantly, the different uses of the term indicate different ways of routing criticism and self-criticism in contemporary societies, and in social and cultural theory. More specifically, the two different theoretical programs stand for alternative ways of accounting for peripheral positionalities and the potentials of self-criticism.

It is an odd coincidence that in order to develop his central critical statement about processes in historically western societies, Habermas chose the term 'colonization', while at the same time (the beginning of the 1980s), literary criticism had just begun to view colonization as a historical and epistemological perspective that made it impossible to think about the western metropolis without imperial colonization, that is, as separate from the peripheries it had

created. Habermas did not use the term *Kolonisierung*, in the original text, but rather *Kolonialisierung*. The English term 'colonization', which is the regular translation of Habermas' *Kolonialisierung* (instead of 'colonialization'), erases the morphological and semantic, if imprecise, difference between the two lexemes. The particular meaning of this latter word, which vaguely connotes a more thorough and lasting impact than its morphologically simpler alternative, can be derived from Habermas' own commentary on it:

> In place of "false consciousness" we today have a "fragmented consciousness" that blocks enlightenment by the mechanism of reification. It is only with this that the conditions for a colonization [*Kolonialisierung*] of the lifeworld are met. When stripped of their ideological veils, the imperatives of autonomous subsystems make their way into the lifeworld from the outside – like colonial masters coming into a tribal society – and force a process of assimilation upon it. The diffused perspectives of the local culture cannot be sufficiently coordinated to permit the play of the metropolis and the world market to be grasped from the periphery [Habermas 1987c: 355].

Kolonialisierung, as distinct from mere colonization, encompasses not only the physical invasion of a given territory, group or social sphere and their subsequent assimilation to the invaders, but also the emergence of a structure that steers these concrete processes yet remains undecipherable – non-signifiable – to the colonized subjects. *Kolonialisierung* thus reduces the lifeworld to a periphery of systemic processes that characterize modern society. Precisely because the 'invaders' abstain from setting up an ideology disguising their schemes and plans, this absent ideology cannot be revealed and replaced by a 'correct' signification coupled with a 'true' signification by the subalterns themselves. What critical theory must do, "[r]ather than hunting after the scattered traces of revolutionary consciousness… [is] to examine the conditions for recoupling a rationalized culture with an everyday communication dependent on vital tradition" [Habermas 1987c: 355–356]. The colonization of the lifeworld creates a *crisis of critical signification*. Accordingly, from the very beginning a critical theory of the public sphere must be self-limiting with regard to the critical significations it sets up – it cannot resort to a strategy of establishing a public counter-signification. With this signification-critical argument, Habermas approximates postcolonial theory.

At the same time, however, Habermas absolves *Kolonialisierung* of its own consequences as a term for the crisis of critical signification, by maintaining the possibility of a universal consensus regarding moral-practical affairs, if only as a regulative norm, vouched for by undistorted communication and a de-fragmented consciousness in the lifeworld. Habermas thus disregards critical signification based on the counterfactual-normative potential for immediate political representation

undisturbed by dynamics of significations. Habermas drives home this denial of the relevance of significations of marginality and exploitation within the public sphere by insisting on an undistorted, intersubjective and pre-signified consciousness as the prerequisite for rational communication. But in this argument, peripherality (for Habermas, the entirety of the lifeworld) is disregarded as a potential site of effective criticism because it merely serves as an example of the effects of colonization. The periphery is denied the capacity to even *identify* the problem of colonization, let alone criticize it. Because Habermas devalues the theoretical category of signification (that is, 'representation' in the sense of *Darstellung*) in general (which he demonstrates with the pejorative notion of "mass loyalty") he cannot include criticisms of such signification in his model of self-critical modernity.

The intervention of postcolonial theory, in this paper exemplified by Gayatri Spivak's work, rescues this critique of critical signification – which Habermas implicitly acknowledges in his *Kolonialisierung* thesis without being able to fully appreciate it – for an analysis of public criticism. Colonization points to a permanent crisis of critical signification in contemporary societies that cannot be undone by the counterfactual norm of communicative rationality as holding the potential for a universal consensus. Instead, this crisis of critical signification itself has to be included in this norm. Spivak's point that peripheralist criticism might play an active role in both prolonging as well as fighting colonization, calls for an approach to such criticism that neither valorizes nor dismisses it in a wholesale way. In conclusion, I want to suggest that the regulative idea of self-criticism, as an alternative to communicative rationality, may open up a way for the EU to approach peripheralist criticism (in all its problematic dimensions) as an expression of self-criticism – for which the EU must then claim responsibility.

CONCLUSION: THE CRISIS OF CRITICAL SIGNIFICATION IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE

This paper began with the observation that the current climate of public political deliberation in the EU is characterized by a confrontation of peripheralist positionalities that blame the EU for subjugating their legitimate causes, and a public reaction by EU institutions to this criticism that consists of rebukes of nationalist atavism, anti-progressivism, and exclusivism. This climate maintains and aggravates the juxtaposition of centralist, metropolitan positionalities that claim progress and modernity for themselves and peripheralist positionalities that see themselves dominated by such progressivism. I have called this constellation a crisis of critical signification because criticism and anti-criticism enter into

a self-propelling discursive confrontation that shrinks the leeway for political negotiation capable of addressing the EU's shortcomings in a nuanced and differentiated way. This crisis of critical signification is at the heart of the current impasse in the politics of European institutions. They find themselves exposed to a radical, exclusionary, often problematic criticism that successfully attains peripheralist positionalities, and that cannot be transformed by a rationalist model of public deliberation. What emerges is a vicious cycle of rationalist rejections of peripheralist criticism of the EU center that then further fuels such criticism's radicalist and exclusionary aspects.

I have argued that this constellation can be better understood if seen as a political-public analog to certain problems of Habermas' theory of rational political deliberation. By disregarding the significatory dimensions of public statements, this theory is only able to treat them within an analytical matrix that tends to short-circuit the peripheralist criticism's message with an allegedly limited worldview at the peripheries. The model thus implies an allegation that such criticism is a symptom of non-rationalized communicative structures at the peripheries, the so-called, "diffused perspective of the local culture" [Habermas 1987c: 355]. Today, it takes the form of accusations that peripheralist criticisms of the EU center are nationalistic and atavistic. In turn, this position can easily be interpreted by peripheralist positionalities as orientalism in Said's sense. The rejection of peripheralist criticisms on the grounds of a rationalist political modernism thus only deepens the divide that constitutes the centralist and peripheralist positionalities within the EU in the first place.

The question is how the theoretical elaborations presented in this article might be able to reframe and rephrase that confrontation. This pertains especially to Spivak's argument that peripheralist public criticism in metropolitan contexts is often inserted into discursive structures of domination that replicate the asymmetrical relation between center and periphery.

If, as Spivak argues, peripheralist public criticism in metropolitan contexts must be viewed as a part of hegemonic discursive structures – sometimes even utilizing categories whose effects it itself criticizes, such as center and periphery – it follows that we need to develop a regulative idea of public criticism that is different from the modernist idea(l) of rational political deliberation. This is because the modernist idea(l) presents a black-and-white picture of public criticism that is unable to differentiate between the hegemonic entanglement of criticism and its potentially productive impulses. I would argue that postcolonial thought has developed an alternative regulative idea of public criticism: namely the (self-)critique of critical representation. This norm holds the promise of allowing

for the differentiation between the critical capacity to work out the hegemonic entanglements of peripheralist public criticism and the critical capacity to rescue potentially productive strands and motifs of criticism from that entanglement. Only then is it possible to transform the deadlock between metropolitan and peripheral positionalities, which reinforce each other through the confrontation of radical anti-metropolitan criticism with its radical metropolitan and rationalist-modernist refutation, into a style of controversy where criticism can become the basis of association, as opposed to dissociation.

The contemporary EU, full of crises which are partially, if not mostly, homegrown, is in desperate need of this kind of criticism. It cannot allow itself a public-political self-affirmation that rejects peripheralist criticisms wholesale on the grounds of the atavism it attributes to them. A possible alternative would be to find ways to handle such criticisms, and all of the exclusionary aspects accompanying them, based on the regulative idea of self-criticism. This would involve viewing peripheralist criticism from within the EU, including all of its problematic aspects, as the *empirical expression* of public political deliberation within the EU – that is, to rephrase it as part of the EU's own self-criticism. This is a difficult task, because it requires the recognition of the radical exclusivism that often accompanies peripheralist criticism as part of the reality of the European Union – a perception which is at odds with the self-stylized understanding of the EU as a rationalist political project. Yet, this shift in understanding might create a normative basis from which exclusivist forces can be more effectively battled, as they move into sight as fields of genuinely European responsibility.

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Andreas Langenohl

KRYZYS PUBLICZNEJ KRYTYKI. URZECZYWISTNIANIE SEMANTYKI „CENTRUM-PERYFERIE" W UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

Streszczenie

W artykule podjęto teoretyczną refleksję nad stanem Unii Europejskiej w kategoriach kryzysu publicznej krytyki. Kryzys ten polega dzisiaj na zderzeniu krytycznych i połączonych często z żądaniami ekskluzywizmu opinii, pochodzących od rządów narodowych, partii opozycyjnych i ruchów quasi-społecznych z naciskami na kontynuowanie Unii Europejskiej jako racjonalistycznego i modernistycznego projektu politycznego. Charakter projektu europejskiego można rozpoznać bliżej, gdy potraktuje się go jako polityczny korelat sformułowanego przez Jürgena Habermasa modelu racjonalnej i publicznej deliberacji politycznej. Analiza ta jest skonfrontowana z alternatywnym spojrzeniem na krytykę publiczną, jakie znaleźć można w teorii postkolonialnej. W szczególności chodzi tu o dokonaną przez Gayatri Spivak krytykę reprezentacji peryferyjnych, które same siebie uważają za krytyczne. Z teoretycznego zestawienia stanowisk Habermasa and Spivak autor wyprowadza ideę publicznej krytyki politycznej, która różni się od Habermasowskiej koncepcji ra-

cjonalności komunikacyjnej, a mianowicie regulatywną ideę samokrytycyzmu. Samokrytycyzm jest tu pojmowany jako sposób, dzięki któremu możliwe byłoby: unikanie potencjalnie problematycznych aspektów, które mogą towarzyszyć krytyce peryferyjnej; zrozumienie ich jako wyrazu metropolitalnej dynamiki polityczno-publicznej; i – w związku z tym – przyjęcie za nie odpowiedzialności. W odniesieniu do aktualnej, kryzysowej konstelacji oznaczałoby to przeformułowanie peryferyjnych głosów krytycznych jako nieodłącznej części prawdziwie europejskiej, publicznej dynamiki politycznej, i tym samym, przezwyciężenie głębokiego podziału, jaki powstaje w rezultacie obustronnej konsolidacji stanowisk głoszonych przez peryferie i centrum.

Słowa kluczowe: Unia Europejska, integracja europejska, krytycyzm, polityczna sfera publiczna, teoria postkolonialna

KATARZYNA WANIEK
University of Lodz*

PARADOXES OF LIAISON WORK IN INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCES AND THEIR SOCIO-BIOGRAPHICAL IMPLICATIONS

Abstract

Recapitulated in autobiographical narrative interviews, the experiences of two Polish women: Magda and Ewa constitute the basis for this article on various types of liaison work (hegemonic and symmetrical). They are set within the framework of (*quasi*-) professional work aimed at helping Pakistani immigrant women in Italy and at supporting autistic children in Poland and Belgium, respectively. Thus, both narrators are forced to deal with considerably different cultural patterns rooted in an oriental and Islamic lifestyle, in the former case, and manifesting themselves in the therapies of children with disabilities in European countries, in the latter. An attempt is made to examine the social as well as biographical consequences of introducing a certain type of liaison work, when the recipients are persons afflicted with suffering. Moreover, the study discusses the tensions, ambivalences and paradoxes which appear in micro-situations, including conversations and professional activities, frequently framed by the neoliberal ideology promoted by the educational programs of the European Commission. It seems that they are rarely a subject of critical analysis which takes into consideration the biographical consequences experienced by both sides of the interaction and their social implications, particularly in the area of multiculturalism or intercultural dialogue.

Keywords: professional work, liaison work, mistakes at work, European educational mobility, intercultural communication, autobiographical narrative interview

* Dr., Faculty of Economics and Sociology, Institute of Sociology, Chair of Sociology of Culture; e-mail: k.m.waniek@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION

Two autobiographical narrative interviews[1] were carried out with Polish women who – in their (*quasi*-)professional work connected with educational mobility – were faced with the paradoxes and pitfalls of giving assistance to suffering others form the subject of this in-depth study. Firstly I examine the life history of 24-year-old Magda, who went to Italy under the European Voluntary Service and helped young Pakistani female immigrants. Secondly, I analyze the biographical experiences of nearly 50-year-old Ewa[2], who worked in an inclusive Kindergarten and – while visiting a similar institution in Belgium – compared various ways of dealing with autistic children, while restraining herself from judging which way is proper or more 'effective'. The objective of examining both autobiographical narrative interviews is to show a sequence of events leading to success or failure in carrying out professional tasks (connected with performing a hegemonic and symmetrical liaison work, respectively). The paradoxes, tensions and mistakes within the scope of the work are then subjected to critical reflections. It is vital to note that it is not primarily about placing one type of work above another, but to demonstrate that an inappropriate choice of work (e.g. ignoring the socio-cultural context and biographical circumstances of the interaction partners) when help is needed can wreck that work and end in fiasco. Much more attention is devoted to Magda's case, because the Pakistani women whom she helped interacted with her face-to-face, and their cultural pattern seemed to be definitely different. Therefore, she unknowingly made many mistakes, which presumably resulted in grave biographical and social consequences. It also seems interesting to determine the conditions of others' attitude to clients in her charge. Insofar as the case if Ewa is concerned, we deal with considerations from the point of view of the person who receives help and the recognition of various (although controversial) methods of treatment, while in the case of Magda we are able to observe a "missionary" attitude, relying on attempts to impose or make available specific cultural patterns to the women whom she helps, or, put differently, attempts to "mould" them for a specific European "image and likeness". This includes a presupposition – not

[1] This refers to autobiographical narrative interviews conducted and analyzed in accordance with the method proposed and developed by Fritz Schütze [see e.g. 1981, 1984, 2008; also: Prawda 1989; Kaźmierska 1996; 2012].

[2] Both interviews were carried out within the "EuroIdentities" project founded by the European Commission's 7th Working Programme (2007–2011). The age of the narrators refers to the time when the interviews were held.

always fully realized – regarding a definite hierarchy of actions, value systems, lifestyles, i.e. the preferred European versions versus those strange ones rooted in the Orient and in Islam. Such a simplified understanding of intercultural differences seems to offer schematic diagnoses of the problems of the young Pakistani women, whereas their origin could be elsewhere. The fact that Magda notices their suffering might suggest a need to introduce asymmetrical work – which is not so much focused on bringing together viewpoints and hierarchies of significance, but rather identifies and accepts cultural differences and tunes in to the overwhelming experiences of a marginal person [Stonequist 1961] that are seen, but unnoticed [Garfinkel 2002] by the narrator.

It should also be noted however, that the objective here is not to evaluate the conduct of either of the informants, but to describe the socio-biographical conditions under which their definitions of situations were constructed, to analyze their work, and to present its potential biographical and social consequences. One needs to realize that the kind of intercultural work done by both narrators is not an easy task, although it is seldom recognized and typically underappreciated. Nowadays, understanding the culturally different Other is usually based on a quick, schematic explanation, a superficial interpretation of gestures and symbols and a sketchy recognition of their values and rituals[3]. However his or her cultural patterns, resulting from "vivid historical traditions" [Schütz 1976a], hardly ever lend themselves to such quick and casual transpositions. Their comprehension requires intense work (including examining one's own interpretation schemes, reference systems, and mistakes in interaction) and does not always lead to overcoming the tensions which arise when juxtaposing one's own cultural patterns on somebody else's, even when it is brought to our attention or interest.

It is worth noticing that the famous announcement by Chancellor Angela Merkel that "multilateralism has failed"[4] has not led many European decision-makers or social analysts to look at that situation from the bottom-up perspective – viewed through personal experience of 'work at the grass roots' level, executed by many dedicated people (both professionals and volunteers), who – perhaps like Magda – were at least willing to 'face' diversity even if she suffered a defeat resulting in a biographical disappointment.

[3] One dominant way of understanding cultural differences in the field of intercultural management is e.g. the model postulated by Geert Hofstede [2001].

[4] This refers to her statement of 16 October 2010, which took place during a meeting with young members of the CDU.

PROFESSIONAL WORK AND LIAISON WORK – FRAMEWORK OF PROBLEMS

Professional work, and primarily liaison work, form the major analytical frameworks within which the cases related to giving help and support to people afflicted with suffering (immigrants and children with autism) are considered in this article. Therefore both these notions are outlined below.

Following chiefly the Chicago School of Sociology and its successors, professional work is understood here as a series of actions performed by an individual who has esoteric knowledge, a social mandate and licence (usually resulting from theoretical expertise and long-lasting practical experience) towards a person (client) in need of advice, help or support. Professional work can take the form of manual expertise, e.g. during an operation carried out by a surgeon, or it could be symbolic, e.g. when a priest absolves a sinner from his sins. On many occasions these forms occur together, blending with each other in various proportions. However, the classic professions such as doctors, lawyers or clergymen are not discussed here, but rather the focus is on the more "modest" profession [cf. Schütze 1992: 133] of a social worker (Magda) and a special needs teacher (Ewa). At the same time, I define Magda's work as *quasi*-professional[5] for two reasons: firstly, because she has no appropriate educational background, expert knowledge, or necessary qualifications or experience; and secondly due to the fact that there was no accountability for the results of her work to specific institutions or superiors. Furthermore, mistakes at work in Magda's case could not be discussed with senior or more experienced colleagues or supervisors, who might have provided reflections and guidance on her failures in the context of her identity and life history [cf. Granosik 2013: 241–242]. All the factors above do not eliminate dilemmas and predicaments typical for this type of work; actually, quite the opposite, they can augment them.

It should be re-emphasized that the reflections included in this article on work executed by both narrators are aimed at identifying dilemmas, antinomies, paradoxes, and pitfalls of professional work [Schütze 1992: 149–150; Riemann 2010; Granosik 2013], presenting thoughts on systematic errors which appear in it [Hughes 2009], and on recognizing potential weak points and 'dead ends' which are often not (or even cannot be) discerned *in actu*.

[5] This formula is not equivalent with such definitions of social work as half-professional or semi-professional work, as some authors have sometimes labeled social workers' actions [cf. Schütze 1992: 133]. It does not belittle the efforts by the narrator to build trust and cooperation with the immigrants.

At this point it is appropriate to stop for a little while and look at one of those mistakes, which usually translates into a paternalistic attitude to an individual afflicted with a problem and triggers hegemonic work. This is the result of deeply rooted rules of thumb and stereotypical views of an individual who is receiving help and of the motives for their conduct, which quite frequently direct the actions of social work practitioners, including even experienced professionals.

As regards social work practitioners, an interesting case is a certain German student of social work who participated in a seminar led by Gerhard Riemann. During the course he discussed, together with other participants, the field protocol concerning the case of Mr. Olschewski,[6] which he had encountered during his internship in a family counselling centre. While living in Germany, this Pole lost the right to custody of his daughter and was fighting to get it back before the German court. In his observations concerning this case, the German student commented as follows: "I think that the constellation with exclusively female office-holders [the case was presided over by a female judge – KW] is difficult for an eastern European male with regard to the acceptance of authority. The behaviour of Mr. Olschewski before the court (uncooperative and aggressive) becomes more understandable if you take this into account" [Riemann 2010: 81]. This stereotypical opinion, however, was subjected to critical reflections during discussion in the seminar group, to which I will return shortly.

As regards experienced professionals, it is worth examining the situation related by Catherine Delcroix[7] in a conversation with Lena Inowlocki [Delcroix, Inowlocki 2008]. Seasoned social workers, who could not cope with the rising unemployment and crime in Nantes, France among young immigrants from the Maghreb region, asked her for help and support. In the course of their joint work it turned out that they fixated on one interpretation of the causes underlying that state of things and believed that fathers were to blame because they were isolating themselves and had no authority, which was why they could not control their sons. This 'rigid', superficially obvious, diagnosis overshadowed any other prospective explanations [Delcroix, Inowlocki 2008], systematically deepening the pitfall and creating a sense of helplessness. Additionally, the schematic and dependent on

[6] Looking for the origins of overblown contrasts between a "barbarian" and "wayward" Eastern Europe and "civilized" Western Europe, Norman Davies points out that as the follow-up to the Cold War two full generations of people in the West grew up with hardly any acquaintance with the eastern part of Europe, and enjoying their newly acquired wealth were coming to believe that they are the only true Europeans [Davies 2005].

[7] Catherine Delcroix is not only a leading figure of the French school of biographical studies, but she is also extremely knowledgeable on Islam history and religion.

a culturally grounded stereotype Europe-centric view on the conduct of the Other (Muslim fathers) turned out to be such a persistent cognitive scheme that even in the course of collecting their life stories (which was proposed by Delcroix) the interviewers (social workers) did not acknowledge, or even pretended not to hear, the conversations when immigrants spoke about their friends or nets of relations with neighbours, because this was contrary to their expectations. It became quite clear from a thorough analysis of the conducted interviews that they consistently asked after their friends and their sense of loneliness (thereby presenting their understanding of the situation), even though the narrators had already spoken about those things [Delcroix, Inowlocki 2008].

That said, in both cases the social workers had opportunities to reflect on the triggered stereotypes.[8] In the first case it was a persistent image in Germany of a traditional and patriarchal Polish family and society, i.e. based on male dominance (being – in the student's view – very much distant from a civilizational model of equality between a woman and a man);[9] while in the second case it was a widespread interpretation of the history of colonization as a mission on the part of France to bring the noble ideas of the Enlightenment to other countries, which thereby resulted in almost automatic discrediting of immigrants from the post-colonial countries. As we observed, in both cases the students and/or social workers had opportunities to analyze their situations and recognize their own mistakes.

One paradox of social work resulting from knowledge gained and applied by professional assistants should be stressed here, as it is meaningful for our considerations. Mariusz Granosik defines it as follows: "The decidedly unequal division of power and knowledge between a worker and a client naturally introduces a hierarchy to the situation of a professional action. The client's expectations are quite different though – the client counts on full understanding, cooperation, and some preservation of equal footing. This conflict implies the need for special professional tasks aimed at minimizing the sense of subordination of the client – controlling the trajectory of suffering. Such intentional efforts facilitate a high efficiency of work, which is the foundation of its meaningfulness." [Granosik 2013: 116–117].

The second significant concept for this study is liaison work. Its origin is in the *liaison communication* introduced into sociology by Everett Hughes [Hughes

[8] They could analyze their own behavior and attitude during workshops, where all participants, i.e. students and mentors, speak on equal terms.

[9] Norman Davies is certainly right that – even in scientific papers on Poland – instead of fair comparisons it is very easy to find many false, exaggerated or unreasonable contrasts between the East and the West [cf. Davies 2005].

1972: 303 at al.]. He was observing the work of a bilingual secretary in Quebec, who relied not only on translating from English to French and vice versa, but also took into account the respective cultures (including the communication styles characteristic for both of them). This concept was further developed by Fritz Schütze to include the notion of *liaison work*, i.e. the work essential in intercultural communication which relies on converting differences in cultural codes (understood as resources of interpretation which facilitate defining and giving meaning to reality), and on defining and explaining the viewpoints of interaction partners [see: Czyżewski 2005: 348].

In addition, Marek Czyżewski's three types of liaison work formulated with reference to the public discourse [Czyżewski 205: 356–385; 2006: 130–132] are characterized and transferred to the area of experiences of face-to-face contact with the Other, [10] as outlined below.

1) **Hegemonic liaison work** is based on a schematic way of thinking about the Other, it does not include the rule of reciprocity of perspectives, and therefore it is associated with attempts to dominate the interaction. It can take two forms, by either: a) ignoring the points of view of the partner in a communication process, or b) paternalistically treating the partner's outlook on the world, which is predefined as incorrect or distorted. More importantly, the persons who perform this work are typically well-intentioned and truly believe they are acting for the good of the Other. As a result, any failure which results in breaking the relationship can lead to social and biographical consequences.

2) **Symmetrical liaison work** assumes equal terms for both sides of the argument and both viewpoints, wherein asymmetrical conditions stemming from a sense of injustice or humiliation do not occur. It has a modern-rational variant (a), relying on reciprocity of perspectives, i.e. considering and recognizing the standpoint of the interaction partner and assigning basically equal significance to his or her schemes of interpretation and values [Czyżewski 2014: 398–399; cf. also Schütz 1976b]. It is also related to an assumption that in wishing to settle some controversy "one should use primary and unvarying criteria of rationality of arguments and aim for a valid synthesis of an opinion" [Czyżewski 2006: 131]. It also has a post-modern-relativistic variant (b), which rejects the assumption above and recognizes the validity of all opinions in efforts to reach consensus.

[10] Following Everett Hughes and Fritz Schütze, Marek Czyżewski speaks about three contexts where potential misunderstandings in intercultural communication occur. It can happen on institutional grounds, in situations of private face-to-face interaction, and in the public discourse (including the political discourse) [Czyżewski 2005: 348]. The last area is not discussed in this paper.

Juggling various, frequently dispersed and inconsistent discourses, becomes an objective as such and a cultural value [cf. Czyżewski 2014: 399].

3) **Asymmetrical liaison work** is related to thoroughly problematic and primarily asymmetrical experiences of violence, suffering, and humiliation. It requires – as Czyżewski points out with reference to Levinas's ethics – to learn 'instructions', subordination to the Other, giving voice to them (without negotiations or attempts to reach common ground), listening to their story, and respecting their (harmed) dignity in a face-to-face situation [Czyżewski 2005: 364]. Put differently, this type of work is aimed mainly at persons experiencing a trajectory of suffering [Riemann, Schütze 1991], i.e. those who are disoriented and feel increasing chaos in their lives, have lost trust in the world and themselves, suffer from disorders, and are convinced of an inevitable, terrifying fate. It must be stressed that yielding to the dynamics of the trajectory makes one essentially unpredictable both for oneself, one's significant others, as well as professional assistants. It happens that a person afflicted with suffering seems unbalanced, brusque, argumentative or arrogant, which deepens the interaction anomy and discourages people who bring help, exactly when their help is desperately needed. It requires extreme patience and understanding from their interaction partners, but also entrance into their biographical experiences, which could bring about a "discovery" of enormous significance for their own life and outlook on the world [cf. Czyżewski 2012: 491].

In the text below – based on the experiences of Magda and Ewa – an attempt is made to show the socio-biographical determinants for the choice of a particular type of liaison work, to indicate some crucial points (overlooked or ignored) in its course, and to discuss the consequences of introducing hegemonic and symmetrical liaison work respectively. Asymmetrical liaison work, although it is not considered here as a biographical experience, is presented as an alternative and, in Magda's case, a recommended way to proceed in the situation of rising tension between diverse cultural patterns. It should be also stressed that this type of liaison work described below can be seen in Delcroix's suggestion that social workers in Nantes rely on carefully listening to immigrants' life stories; or for example in the work initiated by Dan Bar-On in a dialogue between the descendants of the Nazi oppressors and the children of those saved from the Holocaust, in which experiences of seemingly indescribable and indisputable suffering are shared [Bar-On 2000].

HEGEMONIC LIAISON WORK – THE CASE OF MAGDA AND PAKISTANI IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN ITALY

The case of Magda, who tried and failed in her attempt to integrate Pakistani women with the local environment[11] during her work within the scope of the European Voluntary Service, represents a contribution to the discussion on professional work and liaison work in its hegemonic form. The reconstruction of the narrator's efforts and her system of orientation is attempt to account for the causes of her failure, which brought about significant biographical and social consequences.

The interview with Magda was conducted in 2008. She was then 24 and was studying at the university in a big Polish academic centre, where she moved from a middle-size town. Having been prodded by the interviewer and narrative constraints [e.g. Schütze 1984] she started her story with memories of her family, which were still very difficult for her due to her parents' recent divorce.[12] At the same time they were of major significance in Magda's reasoning about the role of women and in her feminist orientation. She underlined that she had always enjoyed gaining knowledge and had been continually engaged in social matters, which she described as follows: *I have always been keen on reading, engaged, and I have always been a leader of something or other.* This scheme of action produced specific results: at the young age of 13 Magda won an English language competition and as a result received a journey to Italy. As she claims, she was delighted by this 'fortuitously' visited country and it became an object of her great affection. Another trip the next year and subsequent travels to many other European towns – due to her engagement in numerous intercultural cooperation programs for children and youth and within the European Voluntary Service – were her conscious choices and are presented in the narration as a biographical action scheme.[13]

[11] An up-to-date description of the program can be found, for example at: http://www.eurodesk.pl/granty/erasmus-mlodziez-wolontariat-europejski.

[12] After receiving the question aimed at stimulating the narration, the narrator suggests that the memories from her childhood are not meaningful for her life story and wants to go on to her university time. At that point the interviewer subtly asked her to go back to her childhood time. Magda concluded these issues are too painful for her, but elaborates on them thanks to the narrative constraints.

[13] 'Biographical action scheme' is one of four (besides institutional expectation patterns, trajectory of suffering, and metamorphosis) biographical structural processes that refer to one's own autonomic plans and the intentional mode of relating to one's life [see: Schütze 1981].

Before proceeding to analyze the history of interaction processes related to Magda's cooperation with Pakistani women immigrants, it is worthwhile to look at her mental space [cf. Schütze, Schröder-Wildhagen 2012], which influenced her definitions of situations. It should be recalled that the horizon of mental space of an individual is determined by his or her biographical experiences, which profile a unique stock of knowledge at hand [Schütz 1976c: 281], systems of significance shaped in the process of education, public debates concerning issues important to the individual, or tested methods of coping with external expectations (e.g. requirements of the European Union expressed in the rules of youth programs). Put differently, in trying to answer the question why narrator applied a certain type of liaison work, we should take into consideration what could determine her understanding of the situation in which she found herself back then. In Magda's biographical account we can indicate two main viewpoints which organize her reasoning and system of relevance and, thus, configure her mental space and life attitude. They are: feminism and neoliberalism. It should be pointed out that while the narrator consciously refers to the former 'ideology',[14] the latter is taken for granted as a model of organizing everyday reality and is not subject to her critical reflection.

At this point it's worthwhile to ponder the experiences which Magda associates with her feminist attitude. Paradoxically she traces the origins of her young fascination with *gender* issues back to her days in a senior boy-scout crew, which she joined so she could face specific challenges on equal terms with the other members. Unfortunately, she quickly realized that even there the division of tasks was strictly related to gender – it was assumed that as a girl she would take care of cooking while the male members of the crew would willingly carry her rucksack. The narrator recognizes this form of external expectations of the role of the woman as a pressure which she refuses to accept. It is unclear to what extent this definition of her world is impacted by the relations between the narrator's parents – nonetheless, it ought to be taken into account in further considerations. At the beginning of the interview we learned that her parents were recently divorced. In Magda's opinion, this event was of an emancipatory character for her mother – only after escaping her husband's dominance could she continue her professional career. Moreover, when reconstructing Magda's descriptions, we can trace the beginnings of her attitudes, values, desires and orientations invoked

[14] It needs to be distinctly stressed that I am not concerned here with sociological interpretations of either of these 'ideologies', but with 'how' the narrator 'knows' and 'defines' them, bearing in mind that the system of one's knowledge is – as described by Alfred Schütz – "incoherent, inconsistent and only partially clear" [Schütz 1976a: 93–95].

and promoted by youth programs (e.g. the European Voluntary Service). Let's look closely at two excerpts where she relates what young people can learn there (e.g. in the course of trips or camps) and what lessons she herself learnt from these meetings:

> Then the camp in Denmark… […] school in Copenhagen […][15] (2). The camp was for young people aged 18 years old and I went too early of course ((laughing)), I was 16 years old and I didn't fit in well there because of my age, but I found my feet soon. And it was a camp for... for people from all over the world, there were Asians and people from South America there, the whole world really. Hmm. The camp was organized in such a way that the participants had to work on its programme, the structure of the whole camp err everyday agenda, organized cooking, cleaning and all that. We were supposed to govern the school for three weeks and well… it was our good will if we did something or not… The camp was fantastic, actually full of… stories, getting to know people, sort of voluntary things, so this was// this was the best idea for a camp, just let us act… hmm wonderful thing. […] It was just a nice camp, good camp, hmm, with interesting people, from whom I learned a lot, that's it! Not in the sense of competences, but I learned from them, hmm, some ideas for life… As a teenager I needed such... sparks.

Next, in response to the interviewer's query how she actually finds out about the possibilities to go to European camps or youth meetings, Magda explains what their participants can learn:

> Well, apart from a set of social and other competencies which one […] acquires there, I think that they also get convinced that they can do something, that if they want they can do something for others… and I… probably thanks to these experiences **I became convinced that, generally I believe in it, that we are the masters of our own destiny**[16] and hmm// and maybe I am, I don't know, so much contaminated or marked with this sort of thinking, but I believe… hmm that we think about our life in terms of some sort of plans short and long-term [plans], and I just schedule every next year, I've got…// It's very embarrassing, but well, I've got a plan for every single year to be carried out, one-year plans…

It should be noted that the informant describes a way of 'formatting' a model of a 'useful' citizen, needed for Europe[17] – an individual who has specific features and competences. She talks about self-organization, self-discipline, facing challenges, reaching for her personal potential, rational and creative time management,

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[15] Transcription notation system used here is adopted from Gail Jefferson [see Atkinson and Heritage, 1984, ix-xvi]. I: Interviewer; N: narrator; … short pause; (2) longer pause, lasting 2 minutes; // cut off of prior word or utterance, difficult stressed word or utterance; ((laughing)) nonverbal of preverbal behaviours; [] additional explanations of the researcher or transcriber, […] avoided parts.

[16] Author's emphasis.

[17] The watchword of the European Voluntary Service is: "Improve your skills and society". See: http://ec.europa.eu/youth/index_en.htm.

adaptation to various situations, responsibility for oneself and others, and skilful management of cultural differences. All this should ultimately contribute to a harmonic coexistence and optimal cooperation in the spirit of personal freedom and independence. However, the narrator does not realize that her way of presenting experiences is essentially the characterization of a person who is an 'entrepreneur of himself' [cf. Foucault 2008: 226, Stachowiak 2013: 141–161], which is aptly captured by her own words: *I became convinced that generally I believe that we are the masters of our own destiny*. At the same time Magda was not aware that her autonomy was merely superficial and that she was overcome with mediated and disguised – characteristic for 'governmentality' – methods of wielding power [cf. Czyżewski 2009: 87]. This 'neoliberal variant of the art of government' – as Jerzy Stachowiak explains following Nicolas Rose – "aims at (…) 'governing through freedom' – managing actions of subjects convinced of their own autonomy, independence, and self-determination" [Stachowiak 2013: 144]. Analyzing the informant's excerpts above, it can be assumed that while working with Pakistani women immigrants she was driven by a particular image of what qualities an individual should have to 'fit in' with the Italian society and become a legitimate citizen of Europe. In other words, features such as independence, agency, openness, individuality or equality seemed vital to her, and these were all traits which – according to a common stereotypical view – a traditional Muslim community does not have and which those young women (oppressed by a patriarchal family, in her view) needed to be shown. That's why her support relied mostly on encouraging them to defy their own religion and culture, which – paradoxically – she hardly knows.

Let's now proceed to the part crucial for our considerations, the part of the interview in which Magda talks about her one-year stay in Bergamo, Italy, under the European Voluntary Service (her stay took place two years before the interview was held). We will closely examine the sequences of her interactions with young Pakistani women and pay attention to the way both parties to this process defined each other, bearing in mind that negotiating and maintaining own identities (establishing who is who in a given situation) is a fundamental issue for this process and also defines the further direction of the actions of both sides [cf. Czyżewski 1985: 36].

I: And what does one do during the European Voluntary Service?

N: Hmm, many different things […] many different things because there're// there are different fields, hmm, in which you can run projects ranging from ecological to youth policy, and for instance the organization of events on their grounds… The Italian commune helps elderly people and works with children etc. And I was supposed to work with children in my

project, but I think I am not fit for it ((laughing)) and that's what I discovered while in this project. I was able to convince my coordinator quickly to change my job schedule… and I could . . . I could act in a little bit in a different field, I mean I could organize something for// for a little bit older people, for the youth. But hmm (2) well damn! That was the whole year of my life. Very intense, beautiful, well, well, amazing, I think, it has changed me a lot, because… hmm of course, right, one thing is that I got to know Italy and the Italian culture, this is actually obvious, but hmm, I met **my beloved immigrants** errr . . . from from Pakistan there, too. Because… the cheapest house to rent, mhm, in the surroundings was in the heart of the immigrants' district […] and Italians have a very strange policy, at least these Ital// at least Northern Italy has a policy of hmm, facilitating immigrants' life. I mean they secure flats for them, hmm, ration out life necessities, but it my opinion it results in segregation, because these people are clustered round one area and they have their Gypsy houses, Pakistanis too, Lebanese and this looks totally like, I don't know, maybe a ghetto, at least for me it looked like this. And that was the place where the centre in which I worked with children was situated, so I could see my **beautiful Pakistani women** every day bri// just bringing their children, and then taking them home, well, and their role… was over in fact, they could not go farther, they were very restricted in terms of physical [surroundings], they couldn't get out of this park which separated their houses and our centre, so they crossed the park, took their children and returned// came back home [I :uhm] well, hmmm, it was a difficult experience for me, because I actually discovered that one may, hmm. such hmm, so strong// that women can have their hands tied tightly and can be so strongly tied to their homes. It's, hmm, because […] I am talking about girls who were born in Italy and until then//girls, women, hmm, who until then were going to school with Italian children and then because of an arbitrary decision of their families: actually their uncles, fathers, elder brothers at some moment these girls are withdrawn from the schools and well… placed at home. They are supposed to marry quickly, which means that this husband is a find for them, and they are supposed to deliver children and they should bring these children to our centre, that's all... But it is, well, something terrible, because for some time they are under the illusion that they also can learn. Mmm, can study, they can be like other girls. For a moment they are allowed to put on these// western style [clothes] go out in the same fashion as, for instance// as Italian children and then they have to wear these… robes. So we became close, because I was// I was smuggling my mobile and they could call their friends, mmm, luckily, mmm, no men found about this, none of these families, because I would be in trouble, I guess. So for instance, they could not talk to their childhood friends with men because at a certain age, mmm, talking to men is unworthy of a woman. Even though he was their friend in childhood. I know for instance, that these are things one can read about and so on, but… to see it, to see suffering in this woman's eyes it'ssss, it's a different matter… and I with my compassion, with this sensitivity to feminism it was// I felt sorry for them, especially because they couldn't be honest, they could// and it took us a long time to reach them and have some sort of opening up and building trust. Eventually they started to talk about their suffering, that they do not feel well// in spite of the fact that// that they were born in Italy and for some time they could live like other children and then… their hands are tied, so well… it's a strange thing. And, of course, I didn't solve this puzzle, I don't know how it was, I didn't know what kinds of processes take place in these families, but hmm, well, I really felt sorry for these girls and, hmm, they actually disappear from that place. This means that when I came back to Trento, after some time, I came to this place in order to visit them after half a year… yes it was some half a year after my Voluntary Service

there, it turned out that they don't live there anymore, so they were sent to// to Pakistan...so I don't know what happened… I'll never solve this puzzle.

Magda describes her interaction partners/clients as: *my beloved immigrants from Pakistan*, or later *my beautiful Pakistani women*. Their ethnic identity takes the forefront – therefore we are dealing with ethnicization [Czyżewski 2009: 8–9; Nowicka 2014: 249–253], while their characterization is reduced to physical appearance. This collective description of women, as well as the narrator's analysis of their behaviour, tends to significantly generalize – there are no references to individual, separate cases or mentions of singular life stories. Moreover, in speaking about Pakistani women Magda says: *my* or *my beloved*, which indicates a paternalistic relation, sanctioning their subordination. All these ways of linguistic description are markers of a stereotypical (and extremely simplified) image of the Other.

It is important, however, that her interaction partners came from another ethnic group and another civilization zone, which created distinct communicative problems resulting from differences in cultures,[18] incomparably greater than those which can be encountered between people coming from various European countries. This is not the place for an in-depth discussion of historical, cultural and social frameworks determining the attitude of Europe to the Orient, which was thoroughly described by Edward Said, among others. He claims that it still creates the deepest and most recurring images of the Other in the European culture [see: Said 1979: xxvi]. The perception of this region is frequently based on the dogma repeated by orientalists, who presume that there "is an absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, and inferior" [Said 1979: 291]. It is similarly defined by Norman Davies, who argues that in the context of the history of Europe, Islam is traditionally treated as the giant 'Other', *le grand Contraire* – the opposite, and definition of what our continent is *not*. Frequently Europe and Islam are juxtaposed as the West and the East, indicating Europe as the opposite of Asia, and Christianity as the opposite of the great Islam religion zone [cf. Davies 2005].

Taking into consideration Magda's individual experiences and the general socio-cultural framework, is can be presumed that in the case of dealing with Pakistani women we face a higher risk of an interaction misunderstandings and

[18] This is also related to the substantial limitation on possibilities of applying a basic rule of commonsense thinking, namely reciprocity of perspectives, which is highlighted by Marek Czyżewski [2014: 402] in his considerations on symmetrical liaison work.

a failure in professional work. The problem is that nobody had prepared the (young and voluntary) narrator for her task,[19] and nobody made her realize that contrary to what the European programs required in terms of accomplishing specific objectives – her actions do not have to produce substantial results. In consequence, she was left alone to deal with the nagging mystery that 'something went awry'.

It is interesting to speculate on how Magda might have been perceived by the Pakistani women. This task is difficult as long as the only source of information about this topic are utterances from the informer herself who, while interpreting action processes of her interaction partners, makes inferences about the role that was imputed to her, and on this basis she positively evaluates both the communication process and the joint actions [cf. McCall and Simmons 1966: 143]. Nevertheless, we are interested here in her subjective impressions and definitions of situations. The narrator emphasizes that she succeeded in building trust and felt she became someone significant for her clients. It could also be inferred from Magda's utterances that she was primarily (if not exclusively) defined as a 'European', and the fact of her being Polish did not carry substantial weight. This is important because, firstly, she could have been perceived (and it apparently happened) as a representative of the West, which forces its civilizational superiority on others, and secondly – at least hypothetically – the emphasis could have been shifted to a shared fate, resulting from the fact of her also being a guest in another culture. In this context it seems interesting that Magda's actions fit into the role of a European patronizing instructor. She not only proposes some (European) lifestyles to her clients and promotes a specific cultural pattern that is supposed to liberate young Asian women from the ties to their own culture and religion, but also forces a specific model of intercultural communication, i.e. she determines what rules it should be based on and what objectives it should aspire to. This conduct clearly shows the narrator's disapproval of their cultural otherness.

Now we turn to reviewing how Magda attempted to solve the 'puzzle' of her Pakistani clients' disappearance from Bergamo. She thinks that they had been sent back to their homeland and returned to their (oppressive) families. In her understanding this was caused by the force of culture and religion on Pakistani women, which 'sucked them back' after they had been enabled to get a taste of another life and had given an illusory and short-term sense of freedom. This

[19] This situation is undoubtedly more complex than presented here. It seems intriguing, however, that the work aimed at creating a social order relying on multiculturalism is delegated to young people who are not indigenous members of the culture to which immigrants are to be 'included'.

event is a source of the narrator's chagrin – she was hoping that with her help her women immigrant clients would emancipate themselves, and become self-determined, self-sufficient, independent, and responsible. We may reckon it was at this point that her feminism and neoliberal ideology (acquired in European programs for youths) started to impact her interpretation of her surrounding everyday reality, and her role as a European volunteer in particular. However, for Magda this failed attempt to 'Europeanize' Pakistani women immigrants (which could obviously be interpreted as an attempt to 'civilize' them) is a significant and fateful biographical experience, which damages her defined preconceptions of the world and 'suspends' her faith in grass-roots work.

It is thought-provoking that the narrator's vision of the world and the common rules of its functioning managed to overshadow other interpretations of the existing situation and triggered a hegemonic-paternalistic modality of liaison work. Undoubtedly Magda recognized the suffering of her clients (she says, e.g.: *to see […] suffering in the eyes of that woman, this, it is another thing obviously,* or later: *finally, they started to tell me they were suffering*) and she is most sympathetic to them, and this should rather initiate an asymmetrical liaison work. It does not happen though. We can point to several reasons for this state of affairs. First of all, in her theoretical commentary Magda explains the causes of the suffering of the young women immigrants exclusively by the rigidity of the Islamic culture, noting however, that they *suffer, because they were born in Italy and for some time they were able to live like other children and then… their hands are tied*. Yet she does not recognize the real impact of the gap between these two cultures on their lives. However, as might be inferred from the quote above and the following excerpt: *for some time they live under the illusion that they can also learn, err, can study, can be like other girls. For a while they can even dress (…) in a western style (…), and then they have to wear those (...) robes* – the source of their painful experience (unnoticed by Magda) could be their marginal position in the dominant society, that is, experiencing a conflict between groups as their own fault, a sense of inferiority [cf. Stonequist 1961: 122–125], and discovering a stigma related to their race and ethnicity [Goffman 1990].

The informant ignores the tensions which are usually evoked in marginal men by attempts to reconcile competing cultural paradigms, which those people could experience in their lives – raising their sense of dissonance and harmony, repelling and attracting them at the same time [cf. Stonequist 1961: 9]. She does not notice the thing described by Georg Simmel in his considerations on 'the stranger', that is, a person who arrives today and stays tomorrow and does not leave, does not completely resign from their freedom of coming and going

[Simmel 1908: 204]. It is interesting that although she criticizes the Italian policy towards immigrants,[20] she fails to recognize that young Pakistani women as well as their parents aspire to the group (Italian society) continually manifesting their lack of interest, keeping them at bay and preventing them from building trust. Analyzing the situation of Pakistani women described by Magda, two additional things ought to be taken into account: the fact that they are the second generation of immigrants (they were born in Italy) and are most likely entering an early phase of adulthood, which could trigger or exacerbate a conflict between their own biographical plans, expectations of the family, and the requirements of Italian society, creating a special biographical configuration at that point. It can be said that they are highly likely to experience a trajectory of suffering [Riemann, Schütze 1991], which – stressing it ones more – does not have to result exclusively (nor even primarily) from their native country culture, but from their particular position as a 'marginal man'.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that Magda's relationship with Pakistani women was inevitably headed for a failure because it seems that her sentimental work and most of all trust work was not sufficient [Strauss et al.1985: 135–136]. Probably this was leading to a sense of disappointment on both sides of the interaction and to a cessation of efforts to work out an agreement between diverse cultures, based on a conviction that reaching such a joint standpoint is impossible. Moreover, it might be presumed that their mutual perception of each other could result in strengthening or even creating negative stereotypes (e.g. attributing to immigrants a reluctance to integrate or assimilate) and prejudices (e.g. due to a conviction of barbarian acts or terrorist tendencies on the part of Muslims). These are very serious social consequences, which could be physically and symbolically strengthened and create entrenched borders between an immigrant *ghetto* and an immigrant-receiving society (as it happened, e.g., in Brussels in its Molenbeek district).

[20] Criticized by Magda, the Italian strategy of dealing with multiculturalism is similar to the 'sanctioned ethnic pluralism' described by Kazimierz Krzysztofek. It "ensures a substantial range of freedoms, but does not generally promote social integration; quite the contrary, it often leads ethnic communities to exclusion from the civic society or even to their ghettoization, bantustan status, subclass (…)" [Krzysztofek 2003: 80]. This attitude contains the conviction that one's civilization is superior. The narrator seems to be attracted by another model – that respecting the 'right to be different' [Krzysztofek 2003: 81] and positive tolerance. She does not take into consideration, however, the uneven status and different situation of her interaction partners.

SYMMETRICAL LIAISON WORK – THE CASE OF PRESCHOOL TEACHER EWA AND THE CONTROVERSY AROUND AUTISTIC CHILDREN

Now we proceed to the life history of Ewa[21] – a preschool teacher in an inclusive kindergarten, born in 1961 in a large town in Poland. Although when she was merely 2 years old her father started a new family, he always kept up a relationship with his daughters (Ewa and her sister) and together with his new wife took care of them when their mother was in the hospital with a serious heart condition. That fact played a significant role when the narrator was choosing her profession; she wanted to become a paediatric ward nurse, but her mother decidedly dissuaded her from it. In consequence, Ewa became a preschool teacher, although she started her professional education in gardening and took a three-year break (she was working in a dental lab then) related to the closing down of many educational institutions. But she always felt that care of and work with children were her calling. The fact that she did not go on to study pedagogy at the university (the subject she graduated from nearly 15 years later) was related to *the most important priorities to me,* as she says. When in high school she got pregnant and got married.[22] Unfortunately she lost the baby in the seventh month of pregnancy and for many years thereafter she was trying to have a baby again. When she finally gave birth to Marcin, he became the most important part of her life. It is interesting that it was from him that she learned how to use a computer and surf the Internet,[23] which enabled her to look for possibilities of cooperation with foreign kindergartens. She initiates contacts abroad and finds them in an institutional framework (within the *Commenius* program of the European Commission), and she has become a pioneer of such actions in her institution, attracting others to them and actively creating an international arena of cooperation, thanks to which teachers from many European countries can exchange their experiences during

[21] A methodological comment: interviews with Ewa were conducted twice, with a two-year gap in between them, although a return interview with the informant had not been initially planned. The first interview: "Ewa (1)" was conducted during her several-hours breaks at work, which could prevent her from describing some aspects of her life with due diligence, but the interviewer did not have enough time to ask additional questions. Her life history turned out to be particularly interesting to both (Polish and German) teams cooperating in the "EuroIdentities" project and, after analyzing the first interview and outlining specific suppositions, it was decided to ask the narrator about some more issues in-depth. The second interview: "Ewa (2)"corroborated the correctness of the previously formulated suppositions.

[22] Ewa married to a man with whom she still remains in a harmonious relationship.

[23] This is 'prefigurative culture', as defined by Margaret Mead [1970].

joint meetings and children can stay in touch with each other via the Internet (e.g. jointly composing and then performing songs), and even thanks to snail mail (e.g. sending drawings to each other).

To start with, the formal features which differentiate the work of both narrators, and their socio-biographical conditioning, which could have impacted interpretation schemes and Ewa's actions are shown.

As for formal issues, it should be borne in mind that insofar as Magda's case is concerned, the misunderstanding occurred between her and the addressees of her (*quasi*-)professional work (between a professional and clients), while in Ewa's case we face a controversy within a specific social world [Clarke 1991, Strauss 1982]. It concerns the way she helps clients (in her case, autistic children). Put differently, there are professionals on both sides of the dispute, and the subject of the dispute is the way of dealing with persons in need.

Secondly, a seemingly obvious explanation for Ewa's successful work and Magda's failure suggests itself – the difference is related to the degree of otherness of cultural patterns which both narrators had to deal with. Simplifying somewhat, it can be argued that Magda faced the remote and strange culture of the Orient, whereas Ewa dealt with the Other, but still within the European methods of conduct (although this does not negate the eastern and western European variants). Nonetheless, it should be noticed that Ewa's successful actions did not simply result from a smaller gap between cultures and action patterns, but mainly from the implementation of suitable liaison work, adjusted to the situation and free from schematic references to the West. It is important to note here that, on one hand, educational and scientific programs of the European Commission promote such constellations of the member states as consortiums on a certain project, whereby the ex-communist states are still supposed to 'learn' from the West (which carries an implicit presumption of intellectual and organizational backwardness of the former), while at the same time Poles feel a sense of moral superiority on one hand, but also a civilizational retardation in relation to the West on the other [Piotrowski 2005: 334]. It seems however that neither of these frameworks determined the actions of the narrator.

Let's begin by examining the passage wherein Ewa speaks about her stay in Belgium within the framework of the Comenius program, where teachers who work with children with autism visit each others' places of work, observe their actions, and share their experiences:

> EWA (1)
> In these school centres there are stimulating trainings, special programmes for autistic children. We entered the room and the first impression was that we saw children fixed to chairs with braces and for us it was very strange… Here [in Poland] parents would never ever

allow something like that. And there [in Belgium]/ you know, an autistic child just jumps very often. And if from the age of being little kids they are prepared that for some time they will be fixed and must sit at a table… There are signs on the wall -hmm- for example// there were such pictures of what each child is to do now, for example, "now a jigsaw" and a jigsaw puzzle was drawn and the child knew and took a box with jigsaws […] and the child was composing the jigsaw. When it was finished the teacher hung up "now we will draw following bands"… so the child knew and took a piece of paper. Everything was taught according to some scheme and it's the best way of work with autistic children because it gets them used to something… I haven't come across such an attitude here.

EWA (2)
I: and there is a short, short story about autistic children, how they are treated in Belgium
N: uh-huh
I: Could you tell me… what's your personal attitude towards this therapy, towards [this kind of] help, towards, towards work with such children?
N: Well that's, I know that for sure it was a great sho// great shock when we entered this place and saw autistic children who were… erm chairs are fixed to the floor and children are fixed with braces… to those chairs. So for us, in Poland we don't have this at all… erm, and it was a very big shock, thaaat// well we couldn't imagine that one can (treat) a child in such a way. Erm, and then… observing these relations, being twice, I guess I was three times in Belgium, … erm, and we see that, well, that still there is some progress with these children… mm, I think that here there is a lack of as such work… with those autistic children as they stress it there… So well, these opinions are mixed. I mean I don't have one opinion cause, erm, on the one hand each year I have an autistic child… This year I've got a teacher who supports me, so Mary is more educated in this direction, and she supports me and, erm, well and at this moment I cannot imagine that I would for instance fix… Tomek to the chair to (make) him work while being fixed, when he must, well, he exudes his great joy, he must move, jump, errr, shout a little bit just for himself… mm, and I think I probably couldn't (fix him)… […]
I: If I got it right, you saw that nevertheless… that at the beginning this fixing seemed so inhuman, but the development of those children//
N: erm, is bigger
I: is bigger.
N: Well, mm, if there is a method which perhaps doesn't look nice… mm, not so much sympathetic but it gives big result, so I think that perhaps it's worth (doing)… cause nevertheless it helps children (3) well that's like that.

These two interesting descriptions of situations of a different and 'shocking' way of dealing with autistic children in a Belgian kindergarten, together with accompanying commentary and arguments, show the incredible work the narrator had to do to face and consider these diverse points of view. She does not resort to a banal statement such as 'we can do it better, more humanely', or non-cognitive attempts (i.e. overlooking a specific socio-cultural context) aimed to implement seemingly 'better' models from the West, but she stops to reflect and consider a different approach. The practices observed by the narrator are not fundamentally rejected or disqualified, but she refers to them, which is crucial in professional

work, by adjusting them to a specific child (client). This is excellently captured when Ewa says: *at this moment I cannot imagine that I will for instance fix Tomek to the chair to make him work being fixed, when he must, well, he exudes his great joy, he must move, jump, errr shout a little bit just for himself... mm erm and I think I probably couldn't fix him.* Accordingly, it seems that Ewa recognizes and accepts another point of view and other ways of action, thereby creating space for effective multicultural communication – setting the stage for a discussion wherein varied perspectives are considered and compared, but there is no need to work out unequivocal conclusions. At this point the words of Marek Czyżewski come to mind, whose definition of symmetrical liaison work in its rationalistic variant basically overlaps with Ewa's attitude: "It assumes the equal status of both sides of the debate and calls for a dialogue between them" [Czyżewski 2014: 398].

In closing, it is worth considering one more issue, which played a significant role in understanding Magda's failure in her work with women immigrants – namely a vision of reality and a "paradigm of the subject useful for the society" [Stachowiak 2013: 144], as promoted by the European Union programs. Although both informants refer to experiences which occurred quite a long time ago (before the economic crisis) and concerned participation in two different educational programs of the European Commission (currently included within the framework of Erasmus Plus), it seems nonetheless that their ideological foundations have not substantially changed. The programs still aim at developing knowledge about cultural variety and/or learning foreign languages, mainly by means of contact with the other culture, shaping specific skills and competences necessary for personal development, as well as active European citizenship, promoting mobility or creating innovative ways of learning etc. Moreover, they deal with the socio-economic, cultural and ecological challenges faced by Europe, aimed at facilitating social and professional inclusion, promoting self-realization, social cohesion, and citizen activity, and awakening the spirit of entrepreneurship. They will be favoured by "key skills and attitudes (…) such as creativity, initiative, resilience, team work, risk comprehension and a sense of responsibility".[24] It seems legitimate to ask why Ewa does not approach these promoted contents as enthusiastically as Magda? Perhaps the explanation – which I put forward for consideration rather than present as an indisputable opinion – can be found in the

[24] Here are up-to-date websites of both Erasmus Plus programs:
http://www.comenius.org.pl/menu-glowne/o-programie;
http://erasmusplus.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/odnowione_ramy_wsp%C3%B3%C5%82pracy.pdf

fact that Ewa is an active, resourceful person full of energy and initiative, whereas Magda's problem could result from the fact that a paradigm of the man of agency and entrepreneurship – typical for the neoliberal order – is an imperceptible way for her to take control over chaos in her life.[25] Returning to Ewa, we need to take note of her special education process, system of values 'filtered' most probably by her own experience, which includes a trajectory of suffering and the specificity of the 'modest' profession she exercises while working with children with autism. We may assume that all of the above does not allow her to fall into the trap of schematic attitudes to other persons or follow the same pattern of action.

CONCLUSIONS

It may be posited that the problems discussed in this article are outdated or invalid, particularly in the light of the European immigration crisis, whose origins date back to 2011 (the breakout of the civil war in Syria). However, an analytical reflection on the failure of Magda's work can be a contribution to considerations on systematic mistakes committed in professional work related to the provision of help to immigrants and refugees arriving in Europe from Africa and Asia, and particularly from countries defined as Muslim ones. It seems that this problem is especially relevant today and is related, on one hand, to the enormous wave of people seeking asylum in Europe (applicable for the most part to Syrians) and, on the other hand, to the threat associated with the Islamic State.

It seems that there is little regard for the bottom-up perspective and that work at the grass roots is ignored, while thinking of Europe exclusively in macro-structural and economic terms does not allow for reaching the heart of the matter. In fact, it contributes to thorough misunderstandings and diagnostic absurdities (e.g. in mistakenly attributed motives and the strengthening of stereotypes). At the same time, it is obvious that resorting to the level of microanalysis does not provide the quick, straightforward and effective solutions sought for shaping European policies. But it may potentially enable the identification of and critical reflection on the paradoxes, pitfalls and mistakes in professional work (even when it is of kind of 'amateur' character).

Ewa's case, on the other hand, shows that opening a space for debate on sticking points, a space which is free from stereotypical thinking about interaction partners (Belgian preschool teachers) and their clients (autistic children) creates an opportunity for understanding and effective international cooperation.

[25] This concerns an incomplete process of working through the relations with parents.

In closing, it should be stressed that communication failures in multicultural interactions, particularly when we are dealing with suffering and humiliation, result from dynamic interactions between differences in the knowledge at hand and systems of significance (especially when very 'remote' cultures are at play), as well as the type of liaison work applied. In addition, we should bear in mind that multicultural misunderstandings are seldom shortcomings which can be easily and seamlessly amended. Volunteer workers in the European programs are usually unaware of that fact, and for them an inability to reach successful communication can result in a serious biographical disappointment and, in consequence, build a reserve to the challenges of multiculturalism, thus depriving the society of the needed professionals who do liaison work on its behalf.

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Katarzyna Waniek

PARADOKSY PRACY POŚREDNICZĄCEJ W INDYWIDUALNYM DOŚWIADCZANIU ORAZ ICH SPOŁECZNE I BIOGRAFICZNE IMPLIKACJE

Streszczenie

Podstawę podjętych w tym artykule rozważań nad różnymi typami pracy pośredniczącej (hegemonialnej i symetrycznej) stanowią zrelacjonowane w autobiograficznych wywiadach narracyjnych doświadczenia dwóch Polek: Magdy i Ewy. Doświadczenia te osadzone są w ramie pracy (*quasi*-)profesjonalnej polegającej, w pierwszym przypadku, na pomocy młodym imigrantkom z Pakistanu oraz, w drugim przypadku, na opiece nad dziećmi autystycznymi w Polsce i w Belgii. Wymaga to od obu narratorek odniesienia się do znacząco odmiennych wzorów kulturowych, zakorzenionych w kulturze Orientu i islamu oraz związanych z terapią dzieci niepełnosprawnych w różnych krajach Europy. Szczególna uwaga jest tutaj poświęcona społecznym i biograficznym konsekwencjom wprowadzenia określonego typu pracy pośredniczącej w sytuacji, gdy jej adre-

satami są osoby dotknięte cierpieniem. Analiza podjęta w tym artykule obejmuje zatem błędy, napięcia, ambiwalencje i paradoksy pojawiające się w mikro-sytuacjach rozmowy i działaniach profesjonalnych często ramowanych przez neoliberalną ideologię obecną w edukacyjnych programach Komisji Europejskiej. Rzadko, jak się wydaje, stanowią one przedmiot krytycznej analizy uwzględniającej biograficzne konsekwencje ponoszone przez obie strony interakcji i społeczne implikacje przede wszystkim w obszarze wielokulturowości czy dialogu międzykulturowego.

Słowa kluczowe: praca profesjonalna, praca pośrednicząca, błędy przy pracy, europejska mobilność edukacyjna, komunikacja międzykulturowa, autobiograficzny wywiad narracyjny

ANDRZEJ BOCZKOWSKI
University of Opole*

TRANSFORMATION OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION. FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF REASON TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE MARKET

Abstract

Some ideological trends in higher education global discourse, and practical changes in higher education institutions that occur in countries participating in Bologna process, are leading to decreasing the quality of teaching and learning in many fields of university studies. In this paper an attempt is made to characterize the quality of higher education as a subjective or inter-subjective construct referring to the effectiveness and usefulness of the educational process. Also, some aspects of the marketisation of universities (in particular some of its underlying reasons and consequences) are discussed in the last part of the paper.

Keywords: idea of university, entrepreneurial university, quality of higher education, marketisation of universities

THE CHANGING IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY

The idea of the university has been evolving from its very beginnings in the Middle Ages, but in the last two-three decades it has become subject to radical changes. This is taking place on a global scale, although of course not everywhere at the same rate and in the same form. It is mostly visible in European Union (and associated) countries, which are realizing programmes and activities established on the international regional level (known as the Bologna process), aimed at

* Associate professor, Theoretical Basis of Sociology Unit, Institute of Sociology, Faculty of Social Sciences; e-mail: aboczkowski@uni.opole.pl

formally organizing and ideologically justifying the quantitative and qualitative changes taking places in universities. In particular, these changes consist in positioning universities as only one of many higher education institutions (HEIs) – the educational activity of universities is at present dissolving in the sea of HEIs' activities aiming at satisfy the increasing (allegedly) economic demands for highly qualified specialists and, connected therewith, the increasing educational needs in modern societies. As a result, the changing social role of the university is accompanied by an ideological justification based on projected economic growth and comprehensive social and cultural progress. Different definitions of such a new social role of the university may be reduced to the concept of the "entrepreneurial university" – a kind of empirical model defining the direction of changes in two basic parts of university functioning: educating and conducting scientific research. This paper is critically focused on the former element.

The concept of an entrepreneurial university glides over the important problem of the sham nature and superfluousness of mass education on the higher level, which is leading to a decrease in the quality of education in many fields of study. One of reasons for this is the difficulty in defining the quality of teaching and learning in the new environment, in contradiction not only to the old idea of a university but also to some of the basic social functions of higher education.

Ronald Barnett claims in his latest book that the idea of the university has been limited ideologically, spatially and ethically. Ideologically, because the contemporary university is officially encouraged to realize only its narrow economic and financial interests (in the service of the "knowledge economy"). In the spatial dimension the university is forced to be engaged in its direct environment, in particular to have relations with industrial or business organizations, and its students are increasingly "local". The university has also become hermetically closed ethically, because is concentrated mainly on its own interests. Unprofitable faculties, such as linguistics, philosophy, chemistry or physics, are closed down because their closure serves the university's interests. The public (social) interest is either re-defined to suit this context or passed over altogether. Barnett suggests that all these trends are connected with the concept of the "entrepreneurial university",[1] one of the main directions in the development

[1] The core characteristics of developing mechanisms of the entrepreneurial university concept can be found in the book by Kamila Biały: "Przemiany współczesnego uniwersytetu – od idei von Humboldta do modelu uczelni przedsiębiorczej" ("Transformations of the contemporary university – from the von Humboldt idea to the model of an entrepreneurial higher school") [Biały 2011: 30–40].

of the contemporary idea of an university, which has been forming for some time and now has become dominant [Barnett 2013: 2–3].

At one time the idea of the university was associated with a specific structure of values, including some axioms. Barnett notes that:

> A university offered a social space for rigorous and disinterested inquiry, for a collective search for truth (however that might be understood and successively redefined), for an insistence that those inquiries be conducted according to publicly attested standards, and a sense that such a collective inquiry was personally and socially edifying, assisting personal development and the growth of public reason and understanding in society. Such a set of assumptions was accompanied with a belief in the value both of institutional autonomy and academic freedom, as concomitants of and as a safeguard of this idea of the university. And it is just this 'value background' [...] that has come under severe pressure over the past three decades or so, and around the world [Barnett 2013: 53].

This pressure has been generalized and expressed in the concept of the 'entrepreneurial' university, which contains some particular elements; such as being of an innovative character, the generation of income, and the taking of some risks. Such a university becomes a market institution striving to identify and project services and products suitable for its 'clients' on different markets, and not only within the educational sphere. In the contemporary educational ideology it has become an accepted norm that:

> such a university might try to develop a niche for itself in the provision of short courses, in the leisure and hospitality industry (even establishing quasi-hotels on campus), in consultancy services or in the exploitation of its research work, and in the setting up of so-called 'spin-out' companies [Barnett 2013: 78–79].

Barnett suggests that the idea of the entrepreneurial university should be treated as pernicious for three reasons, which correspond to the three ontological levels of social existence according to the model proposed by Roy Bhaskar [Bhaskar 2011].

Firstly, at the empirical, directly observable level, this idea manifests itself in the 'busyness or super-activity' that is demanded by the university from itself. All material and human resources should be perceived as being efficient, effective, and ready and able to provide the potential client with the demanded or expected services. Thus:

> The entrepreneurial university has no spaces for rest, for contemplation, for quiet reading and introspection. [...] is a calculative machine, continually scrutinizing its units, its activities and its staff to ensure – in each of its devolved 'cost centres' – that they are fully 'productive', generating income for the university [Barnett 2013: 82].

Secondly, at the level of perceiving the actual conditions of their functioning, universities accept a competitive attitude as a dominant characteristic.

> Far from understanding themselves to constitute a national or even a worldwide collective of universities, each university seeks to gain competitive advantage, a stance aided by the increasing number of worldwide league tables of universities [Barnett 2013: 82–83].

Thirdly, at the deepest level of their institutional existence, the acceptance of these characteristics and of being an 'entrepreneurial university' bring about a kind of "seismic displacement". From its medieval beginnings the university was constituted on the principle of reason (in its philosophical view), but at present it has become constituted on the principle of impact. This principle is construed quite narrowly: the university's impact on beauty in the world, civilization progress, empathy, culture or individual and social well-being is no longer part of the equation, nor are the possible transformations of students' internal lives and minds taken into account. The principle of 'impact' has a purely economic basis and is linked with other new principles of universities' functioning, all of them focusing on the university's concern for the impact of its performance on its own economic well-being.

The idea of the university thus moves away, little by little and step by step, from the interest in reason, in critical dialogue and in understanding without economic benefits.

> Universities are not to be judged by the extent to which they open communicative spaces for reflection and debate, as a space of reason in their own right, nor by the ways in which they might open intellectual spaces for asking and pursuing fundamental and penetrating issues of humanity. This is not to say that these activities cannot be found; but it is to point to the dominant ethos at work. With its linkages to reward structures – material and financial – this ethos, in which considerations of space, beauty, empathy and liberty become otiose, subtly and powerfully comes to re-position universities [Barnett 2013: 83].

According to this general approach it seems that tertiary (higher) education should realize the following social functions: (1) transmission of culture, the creation of cultural capital; (2) transmission of knowledge from defined scientific fields; (3) positioning in the social structure (stratification function); (4) training and distributive function; (5) developing innovation abilities; (6) introduction to an occupational career of a given kind; (7) preparing to enter and function on the labour market; and (8) implementing basic and applied scientific research findings.

In Europe, including also in Poland, in recent years the discourse related to reforming higher education and to its future in general have manifestly brought two functions from the above list to the fore: the function of preparing students

to enter and operate on the labour market; and the function of implementing those scientific research findings useful for the economic sphere of social life. Other functions are treated mostly as ancillary or subordinated to these two. This phenomenon is accompanied by the rapid disappearance of the autotelic motivation for studying, which may be treated as an effect of the narrow perception of higher education tasks, i.e., limiting educational discourse to the applied and ancillary perspective of HEIs' functioning.

The above-mentioned ideological trends and practical changes in HEIs' (including universities) way of functioning have occurred mainly within European (and thus Polish) HEIs, under the influence of the understanding of the Bologna process as an institutionalized and formalized reform in the area of higher education, as well as an ideology justifying such activity. However, analysis of relations within the economic (especially financial) reality of universities, their functioning in the scientific and teaching/learning spheres, and their ideological superstructure decidedly goes beyond the scope of this paper.

THE QUALITY OF HIGHER EDUCATION AS AN IDEOLOGICALLY–CONDITIONED THEORETICAL CONCEPT

In this paper, almost all the problems related to the situation and functioning of HEIs in general, and of universities in particular, are focused on the concept and the implementation of quality in education. An attempt is made to conceptualize the quality of education from an operational perspective, as resulting from subjective construction processes relating to education's effectiveness and usefulness. 'Effectiveness' is understood as the level of attainment of educational objectives related to the social functions of education; and 'usefulness' is defined as the benefits of realization of these functions to individuals and groups [Boczkowski 2009]. Effectiveness and usefulness, when treated as aspects of the quality of education, are placed in an evaluative context consisting of: the objectives of higher education; social actors interested in higher education and their expectations; the normative sphere (with respect to problems associated with higher education); as well as the areas, directions and methods of assessment.

Quality, and therefore the quality of education, can be understood in different ways and this is reflected in the literature of the subject [see Frazer 1992; Skrzypek 1999; Hornowska 2004; Boczkowski 2011; Strategia rozwoju 2009]. The abundance of definitions and approaches to quality reflects the relativisation of this concept with respect to the persons or social subjects (actors) employing

it. This relativity of the notion of quality is reflected in the interesting definition of Anna Krajewska:

> Quality is defined by the amount of features characterizing an object, product, or activity which are significant in reference to the values approved by the user of the term [Krajewska 2004: 26].

Thus the quality of education is a complex, multidimensional construct: the construction of a skeleton or general scheme, and then filling it in with content within the field of social interactions, being the subject of educational discourse. Different social actors participate in this process through the realisation of their own interests, defined with reference to an educational ideology.[2] In connection with these assumptions the following theses might be formulated.

1. The quality of education is produced and reproduced by different interested subjects.
2. There is no quality of education existing independently on its subjective or inter-subjective interpretations. It is always the product of these interpretations, a construct based on them.
3. Such a construct is not produced in a free method, but on the basis of or with the active participation of educational ideologies – presented, suggested, implemented or imposed in educational discourse.

In order to operationalize the possibilities, including the possibilities of ameliorating activity and empirical research, the most important issues in the quality of education are, firstly, the extent to which the educational activity meets its objectives; and secondly, the extent to which it realizes the expectations of actors interested in education (i.e. brings benefits to them).

The approach to the quality of education proposed here is therefore focused on two aspects of its quality: effectiveness and usefulness. These two aspects constitute the denotative core of the concept, and other aspects of quality are auxiliary or concomitant in relation to the dominant two, and constitute the connotative field of the notion of quality of education.

Constructing and reconstructing the quality of education by the social actors within the context of evaluation of the effectiveness and usefulness of education can be presented in a schematic way to more clearly show the specificity of the process. Three spheres influence the process of producing/constructing the quality of education:

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[2] Educational ideology is understood here as a relatively fixed set of ideas (views, impressions, symbols, norms etc.) concerning the educational sphere of social life, being a justification for activities undertaken by a given social group or category to realize its interests.

- declared and realised educational objectives;
- characteristics of evaluating subjects – focused around the expectations addressed to the educational institution or educational cycle, with the crucial role played by the evaluative criteria accepted by the subject,
- social spheres as the context of evaluation (assessment).

The quality of education can be interpreted as its effectiveness, i.e. the extent to which the educational objectives of a training facility, previously formulated on the basis of the needs and expectations of actors interested in education, are achieved. Most frequently there is also the question of whether certain professional skills are transferred, developed, modified and refreshed in a way that maximizes the satisfaction of particular actors. As satisfaction is a function of the benefits attained, perceived in relation to specific educational experiences, we are dealing here with another aspect of the quality of education – its usefulness. It is particularly important to keep in mind that these two aspects of education quality are mutually interrelated.

The assessment of the education quality conceived in such a way can be carried out in three complementary dimensions, or aspects. Firstly, by checking how much the consciousness of the participants in a learning process has been subjected to desirable (i.e. consistent with the objectives of education and/or expectations of the actors involved) changes as a result of this process. Secondly, through analysis of the positive and negative aspects of the professional careers of graduates, being results of an educational cycle completed by a given person, or are at least indirectly related to that cycle. Thirdly, the assessment of the effectiveness of education can be performed using evaluations, feelings, and opinions of graduates after the completion of their educational cycle. The first of these evaluations concerns the effectiveness of education, the second – its usefulness, while the third examines both the effectiveness and usefulness of education.

Educational objectives are generally indicated by an institution offering education or by a wider educational system, taking into account cultural patterns, the interests of the state, and the social expectations (expectations of social actors – including direct participants in the educational process and their families, expectations of groups of people pursuing the interests of the educational system, and the interests of academics, employers, etc). Usually one of these aspects (usually the expectations of the social actors) is dominant, while others are subordinate (or subordinated) using a more or less unique background or reference systems. One can also imagine a dynamic, varying hierarchy of interests and related expectations.

Social actors interested in education always expect benefits, which differ between different actors and are often conflicting or even mutually exclusive. The qualification of events or states as a benefit or non-benefit may be different in the context of perceived education effectiveness. What is a benefit for one social actor – independently of its level of effectiveness – for another may be an effective but useless realization of an educational objective.

The value may be, on one hand, the achievement of specific educational objective(s), and on the other the meeting of certain individual or collective expectations. In this context one can suggest a category of universal educational objectives, which should always be carried out regardless of the content and details of the educational process. These are changes (defined structurally, not generically) in the consciousness of the educated actor. If these changes were implemented sufficiently, the training could be regarded as effective, regardless of the generic characterization of the acquired knowledge and practical skills. An argument could be made that achievement of the universal educational objectives would make the educational process useful as well, in a similar universal dimension. Assessment of the effectiveness of an education should be performed in this context as well.

Both the goals and expectations may be formulated in terms of benefits. Moreover, regardless of its objectives (whether verbalized or not), education may bring some benefits, so the utility value of education should be taken into account regardless of whether it brings about, or doesn't bring out, the benefits of defined characteristics (expected or unexpected, foreseen or unforeseen, predicted or unpredicted). In order to determine the above, an assessment of an education's usefulness is made. Here, a category of the relative utility of education should be considered: some benefits (even those that are not seen as such in connection with the specific perceptual conditions of the interested actor) arise or may arise from the participation in the educational process itself. Training may therefore be perceived as useless, despite its established effectiveness and independently of the usefulness perceived by another actor according to other criteria.

An assessment of an education's effectiveness and usefulness is associated with "customer satisfaction", i.e. the degree or the scope of positive assessment of learning outcomes by particular interested actors. This assessment also concerns meeting the actors' expectations connected with the learning process, educational institution etc., generally formulated in terms of benefits. This assessment is made by taking into account the degree to which expectations are included in the declared goals of an educational institution (before selecting its kind or specific type of training), as well as the extent to which these goals are achieved (meeting

those expectations) during the educational cycle and as a result thereof. The issue of assessing the usefulness of an education comes into play as the main component of the satisfaction of an actor interested in education, if the issue of meeting expectations arises. Education is (was) useful if it brings (brought) benefits, that is, if events or states of things occurred as its result, and are (or were) perceived/ experienced as benefits. Of course, this also entails benefits unrelated to the formal (official) education program.

THE QUALITY OF EDUCATION AS SATISFACTION FROM STUDYING

A particular point of view on what constitutes the essence of the quality of an education is frequently adopted: the satisfaction of the (subject) actor interested in education.

The satisfaction of a particular client is a quite sufficient criterion of quality in the case of manufacturing products or the provision of typical services, but this is not the case with respect to educational services. In this case the criteria of quality (understood as the degree or level of the actor(s)'satisfaction) may be different because of the need to meet the expectations of different actors interested in education. The "parameters" of these expectations would have to be determined *via* an arduous analyses, taking into account many social circumstances – cultural, administrative, political, economic, etc. Indeed, any social actor interested in education formulates – directly or indirectly – a set of expectations, and therefore certain requirements to be met by the educational system (or educational cycle). The expectations of various actors may be common and coincide, but they often differ greatly. Many of these expectations coincide in a more or less conscious manner, which accumulate and undergo some modification in the minds of the people directly involved in the educational process, and also secondarily affect other interested actors and thus are reflected in the expectations formulated by them towards training institutions.

However, one should bear in mind that the educational system (in particular, the system of tertiary education) gradually withdraws from shaping its participants' abilities to create, understand, or agree on the meanings connected with scientific and technological discoveries, new social theories, or ideas underlying them. Expectations and activities relating to the traditional idea of education – intellectual and personality shaping – are today disappearing, and even are being systematically removed from educational practice (for instance in the process of installing a National Qualification Framework in a higher education

area). Different social subjects (actors) participate in this practice – candidates and students, educational policy institutions and higher schools' authorities. This is reflected in a segment of a press interview with a member of the management of one of the Polish state universities:

> In the traditional approach the 'quality' is the high level of knowledge. If a graduate has a large amount of knowledge in a given field this is alleged to constitute a high level [of quality]. Meanwhile the philosophy of the new Higher Education Act emphasizes not knowledge, but skills and competences. [...] The student's level of knowledge has become a side issue. His/her satisfaction is the most important thing. That is what the university should guarantee for each student. Strictly speaking, there is a question about the satisfaction of university graduates, and obtaining and keeping up a satisfying job is the source of it. [...] I am explaining [in this way] the meaning of the notion of 'quality' according to the new Higher Education Act and according to the Bologna process. [...] This quality does not mean advanced knowledge. The quality is the graduate's satisfaction. The quality is to be happy. Of course, the university cannot be transformed into a factory of satisfied people, but first of all we must think about students in the same way a car factory thinks about its clients: upon leaving the car dealer they cannot regret their purchase (*Jakość to bycie szczęśliwym* 2012: 7).

THE MARKETISED UNIVERSITY

As one of the main social institutions, the economy comprises the whole set of social roles connected with production and distribution of goods and services and the fulfilment of human needs. From its very inception economics has sought to discover and to rationally elaborate the rules or laws governing the economy. But in reality the production and distribution of almost all goods and services are subordinated to market mechanisms, which are rational only from the point of view of producers and distributors, as is visible in the expanding field of creating consumers' needs. This subordination – more and more frequently called "marketisation" – currently affects all spheres of social life, including the system of education, and particularly higher education institutions.

It's obvious that producing and disseminating knowledge/skills/competences always has had, or may have, an economic aspect: academic research requires money, its results may or may not bring financial benefits. Maintaining an academic staff, material infrastructure, and equipment generate costs, and HEIs have incomes and expenses, and so on and so forth. The problem is whether and to what extent HEIs are market-independent producers and distributors of knowledge and skills/competencies; and also whether and to what extent their activity can

be reduced to "educational services", with all the consequences resulting from the dominant role of the client (consumer) on the "educational market".[3]

Another problem is that, in principle, the higher (tertiary) education is a part of a national educational system – the highest level of education after its primary and secondary levels – but in fact it is treated, i.e. governed, administered, and managed, as an autonomous societal system with its own mission, ideology, and policy. This autonomy is bringing about a separation from any coherent educational perspective which, in view of the weakness of (or the absence of) a national education policy and in view of the increasing demand for diplomas, has enabled an overwhelming and aggressive marketisation of HEIs, and in consequence is contributing to the total collapse of the idea of a university higher education.

The most visible collective symptom of this collapse arise from the indisputable facts of the massification of almost all types of higher education,[4] and imparting them with mainly an instrumental character. Furthermore, the social fact is that collective consciousness and public discourse are shaped by the claims emerging on the basis of a mythologized educational ideology within the area of relations between the educational system and the situation of graduates on the labour market. At the same time, the symptoms of a labour market saturation as concerns relatively young people with tertiary education diplomas is becoming ever more clear, and employers are clearly articulating their needs for employees' skills which, in general, have no cause-and-effect relationship with a higher education. The graduates are thus having difficulties with obtaining a job corresponding to their expectations, which by the way are shaped by an educational ideology.

Today every tenth graduate of Polish HEIs does not have a job [Drozdowicz-Bieć 2014], and even if a job has been found and already accepted – usually after an intensive job-search – very often it does not correspond with the formal qualifications and/or expectations of the graduates. Such a phenomenon, observed in other European countries as well, coexists with three important macro-social processes.

[3] The problems surround the correctness of application of the client/consumer concept in the context of different education areas has been discussed in another place [Boczkowski 2011: 101–108].

[4] Although the inflow of candidates to study in HEIs (particularly in non-stationary, tuiton-based fields of study) has been declining in Poland in the last few years.

1. The popularization and mass scale of studying[5] or, more precisely, of striving for diplomas. This is accompanied by an overwhelming, non-substantive, and passive instrumentalization of higher education: in the majority of cases students undertake study programmes not for their content nor even out of any interest in a particular field of knowledge, but with the aim of finding a satisfactory job after finishing their higher education cycle and setting themselves up well in life. Two paths aimed at achieving this aim seem to be most frequent: (a) gliding through the studies without doing any serious work, probably expending less intellectual effort, with the goal of obtaining a diploma which, *per se*, is supposed to be a pass to a satisfying career; and (b) demanding to be effectively taught some skills and competences (in fact it does not matter which ones, and better be taught in a practical way which does not require excessive mental effort), that can provide such a career.

2. In some countries there is a decreasing demand for the younger specialists with higher education and an increasing demand for the older employees with occupational/professional experience, and not always with an HEI diploma.[6] This is probably the effect of limitations in the quantitative and structural absorption capacity of the labour market.

3. The economic and financial crisis, which started in 2008, quickly transformed, particularly in Europe, into a kind of civilization crisis. It must be underlined here that the global crisis has overlapped with the processes mentioned above, and has most probably created favourable conditions for their intensification.

The evolution of HEIs in the recent decades, and their present form, seems to reflect an attempt to react rationally to the instrumental motivations and expectations of those persons interested in a higher education. However, at the same time both the expectations addressed to the HEIs and their reactions are weakly connected with economic and labour market reality. This disconnect does not consist in their "lack of adaptation to needs or demands of the economy and

[5] In the English language literature relating to tertiary education this phenomenon is sometimes referred to as "massification". It seems that this notion has certain negative connotations related to unintended consequences of the sudden increase of the number of students at the tertiary level of the educational system [Teichler 1998; Guri-Rosenblit et al. 2007].

[6] According to the data contained in the OECD report from 2009, Poland was in second place (after Sweden) among the countries in which such a trend was the strongest in the years 1998–2006. During this period the number of specialist jobs for younger people (24–35) having a tertiary education decreased in Poland by 11% [Education at a Glance, 2009: 31–35]. There are signs that this trend is still preesent in the Polish labour market.

labour market", as is frequently stated in public debates, but in the impossibility for HEIs, in particular at universities, to fulfil the great part of the needs/demands expressed by the employers. As is sometimes asserted in the deepening sociological research, such needs/demands or expectations can be classified in four groups, as being related to: (1) personality or character traits, not to be acquired at an HEI; (2) obvious matters, such as knowledge or skills in a given field; (3) the arte-factual items formulated by social science theorists and popularized by the mass media in very simplified forms (creativity, soft skills); and (4) the structural and economic characteristics of the labour market (expectations or even demands for professional experience in a given field).

The main individual aim within the sphere of non-obligatory education, in particular at the tertiary level, is financial security in the future (i.e. in adult life), and only to a very small extent the realization of autotelic aspirations connected with functioning in the defined occupation. The graduate's satisfaction, as was mentioned above in the interview with a university managing authority, is mainly of a financial nature. Only at farthest end of the pole does one find the mention of satisfaction related to the sphere of prestige or to autotelic participation in occupational space. This relatively small proportion of candidates, students and graduates having some autotelic motivations (and predispositions to learn at a higher level) is melting in face of the mass of individuals having only instrumental motivations, without appropriate intellectual preparation for studying. Poland's quantitative educational success – over 1.4 million students with a net enrolment rate of about 40% – was possible only as a result of severe decreases of the demands on candidates and students. In fact, these quickly progressing negative processes, attributed in the everyday public discourse as symptoms of the decrease in the quality of higher education, have resulted, firstly, from the commercialization and mass participation in HEls over and above any rational limits of academic staff efficiency, and secondly from the unsatisfactory functioning of the preceding levels of the educational system.

The general, collective aim, intended by both the European and Polish educational authorities, until recently was fulfilling the needs of a developing economy and labour market, which has always been one of the main premises of the Bologna process, but unfortunately only based on ideological reasons, without relation to the actual situation on the Polish and European labour markets. One can formulate a quite likely true hypothesis that the structural changes in the system of higher education also had, *inter alia*, an important political aim: to manage, with the help of HEIs, the mass of young people with previously aroused consumerist

ambitions, to move or spread over time their entrance to the unprepared labour market, despite the fact that other countries' experiences with the massification of tertiary education clearly showed the threats connected with this approach.

The situation within the sphere of higher education quality, which has many aspects, has been shaped multi-dimensionally and in a very complex way. As it seems, the quality of teaching and, in particular, of learning is declining as an effect of the massification of studying, especially at the social and humanist faculties which – being perceived as easier and less demanding than others – constituted a majority of the mass enrolment during the last two decades.[7] As a matter of fact, even within that group of faculties one can observe a leaning towards those faculties having the reputation of being most easy to pass. One can say that for a considerable majority of candidates and students the quality, referring to scientific disciplines defining the contents of studies, does not constitute a criterion for choosing and continuing studies. The quality of education, understood as effectiveness and usefulness and referring only to aims and expectations connected with entering and functioning on the labour market, is however such a criterion.

However, it is difficult to attain a high quality of education, referring both to scientific disciplines and to functioning on the labour market, in the greater part of social sciences or humanist faculties. But what still remains is the quality of education understood as the satisfaction obtained through the secondary characteristics of studying. An informal aim of studying – although sometimes expressly put into words in HEIs' promotion materials – is the participation in student life, broadly understood as a sphere of entertainment, cultural expression, and emotional experiences. The satisfaction of this aim during studies (independently of even passive participation in the teaching/learning process) and the usefulness of this aspect of the studying period – in the sense of living up to expectations – might contribute to producing the students' perception of the quality of their education, understood quite uniquely but in accordance with theoretical assumptions. However, it must be noted that even within such a meaning, sustaining the high quality of education (or of studying) is more and more difficult to achieve. It seems that this is connected with the disappearance of the student subculture due to the commercialization, marketization and massification of tertiary education and with the ever more frequent engagement of students in part-time or even full-time jobs, even during full-time stationary

[7] Over 50% of students in Poland study at faculties of social sciences, economics, law, pedagogy, humanities and art [Szkolnictwo wyższe w Polsce, 2013; Informacja o wynikach rekrutacji..., 2014].

studies. This suggests that in many cases studying or continuing studies is of an inert character, realizing the stereotype of the importance of higher education "just in case", because this is universally accepted and "everybody is doing it" – according to the ideologically-saturated promotion of higher education as it appears in popular educational discourse.

The dominant educational ideology also influences the perception of the general objectives of higher education. In educational discourse some modifications and changes appear, initiating the process of moving from effectiveness and usefulness, understood and evaluated in the context of testing knowledge and skills in relation to the study discipline(s), toward evaluating the education almost solely in the context of "life practice" – in particular of financial success, which is less and less connected with intellectual, cultural, or occupational development. We have to deal with the educational pattern of the "(wo)man of the labour market", subordinated ideologically to some utopian vision of a completely shaped, perfectly flexible worker/employee of an enterprise or an institution oriented to maximize profits and benefits. The main ideological premise here is the internalization of the supposed expectations of the employer. Educational attainments in this area should allegedly guarantee to the student/graduate satisfaction connected with his or her success on the labour market, and to the higher education institution/the educational system – maintenance of the *status quo* or even progress in the organizational and/or financial sense. This is a strongly ideological vision, clearly oriented towards the interests of the uniquely profiled "corporate" employer, as well as towards the interests of higher education institutions.

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Andrzej Boczkowski

TRANSFORMACJA KSZTAŁCENIA UNIWERSYTECKIEGO. OD ZASADY ROZUMU DO ZASADY RYNKU

Streszczenie

Niektóre tendencje ideologiczne w globalnym dyskursie edukacyjnym oraz faktyczne zmiany w szkolnictwie wyższym dokonujące się w krajach uczestniczących w procesie bolońskim prowadzą w szczególności do obniżania się jakości nauczania i uczenia się na licznych kierunkach studiów uniwersyteckich. W artykule podjęto próbę scharakteryzowania jakości kształcenia na poziomie wyższym jako zsubiektywizowanego konstruktu odnoszącego się do skuteczności i użyteczności procesu kształcenia. W ostatniej części artykułu omówione zostały niektóre aspekty urynkowienia uniwersytetów (w tym niektóre jego przyczyny i konsekwencje).

Słowa kluczowe: idea uniwersytetu, uniwersytet przedsiębiorczy, jakość kształcenia na poziomie wyższym, urynkowienie wyższych uczelni

SEBASTIAN GIACOVELLI
Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen*

CHANGING MARKETS, EXPECTED EXPECTATIONS AND POPITZ'S OBJECTION

Abstract

Based on the fact that the concept of expectation is marginalized in economic sociology, where action and communication theories dominate, this paper reflects on the potential of expectations or, more precisely, expected expectations. In pursuing this objective the author works out the characteristics of expected expectations as the foundation of social structure in general and market structure in particular, with a special focus on social change. Considering the assumption that expectations shape action and communication on the one hand, and given theoretical compatibility on the other, there is, therefore, every indication that an appropriate expectation theory should be elaborated – with the exception of Popitz's objection. Heinrich Popitz argues against highlighting expectations in theory because of the methodological problem that one cannot prove whether one specific expectation leads to a specific behaviour. The author counterposes two arguments against Popitz's position: First, expected expectations are made observable, hence they can be expected. Whilst we are focusing on second-order expectations there is no methodological issue. And secondly, the clou of this paper is that expected expectations finally reveal their social power on the basis of an 'as-if' logic: actors can legitimately be treated as if they orientate themselves towards expected expectations, e.g. on the basis of formal or informal rules, and this guarantees (temporary) stability.

Keywords: expected expectations, markets, social change, economic sociology, methodology

* Dr., Institute of Sociology; e-mail: sebastian.giacovelli@sowi.uni-giessen.de

INTRODUCTION

In 2007, Richard Swedberg identified a missing understanding about what markets really are and how they operate [2007: 12]. An answer seems yet to be found, despite the wealth of theoretical approaches and empirical studies conducted under the aegis of new economic sociology. The contribution presented takes Swedberg's discontent seriously, by starting from general sociology and calling on the concept of expectations or, more exactly, bringing expected expectations into play.

While action and communication theories dominate economic sociology, various studies show that action and communication in markets are driven by expectations; for example, financial markets and some theoretical concepts highlight, or at least consider, the role of expectational structures, which could be a key concept for a better understanding of social structures in general and markets in particular.

The concept of expectations is especially suitable for studying changing social structures for four reasons: First, expectations, which are anticipated on a micro level, shape both communication and action, and thereby reduce uncertainty [cf. Galtung 1959; Beckert 2014]. Secondly, the concept of expectations automatically brings the temporal dimension into play: changing market structures are interpreted as a change in expectational structures.[1] Thirdly, expectations only take effect socio-structurally if they assume the shape of expected expectations [Luhmann 1995; cf. Mead 1934/1967]. Only if actors orientate themselves towards expected expectations a market gains (temporary) stability.[2] And fourthly, certain expectations are established, while others are not, and take effect socio-structurally in the shape of expected expectations. In other words, the term expected expectations implies power aspects, at least in competitive contexts.[3] Hence it should be pointed out that expectations will be interpreted as a sociological and

[1] For instance, Andreas Langenohl argues that the concept of expectations is eminently suitable for explaining social dynamics in financial markets [Langenohl 2010: 18].

[2] Concerning stability (and change) it should be pointed out that the debate about rational expectations as a point of orientation would go beyond the scope of this paper; particularly as there are issues with principles such as profit maximization or cost minimization transferring into sociological argumentation [e.g. Luhmann 1996; Engels, Knoll 2012].

[3] The compatibility of Neil Fligstein's 'concepts of control' and the idea suggested herein of dominating/dominated expected expectations will be elaborated later on [see part II; see also Giacovelli 2017].

not a psychological phenomenon, although quite a few sociological definitions prompt a psychological interpretation of the term.[4]

Consequently, the initial question is: If communication and action are prestructured by expectations, why should not markets, and especially changing markets, be analysed with a focus on expectations and, more precisely, on expected expectations? And my main assumption is that market structures *are* expectational structures, and in this understanding a change of market should be understood as a change in expected expectations.

I'll discuss the importance of expectational structures for analysing markets in three subsequent steps: In a first step I'd like to comment on basic characteristics of expectations, and expected expectations – concerning their relation to time, uncertainty and change (Part I). And secondly, I turn to the role of expectational structures within prominent concepts of economic sociology and show that different approaches recognize but not extend to the idea of expectational structures (Part II). Thirdly, I react to the objection of Heinrich Popitz, who criticises the missing observability of expectations and, therefore, the lack of empirical evidence for any correlation between expectations and concrete behaviour. But this point only has validity insofar as second-order expectations and a so-called 'as if-logic' are ignored (Part III).

PART I: FUNDAMENTAL GRASP – EXPECTED EXPECTATIONS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Expectations: Following Erich Witte's concise definition, expectations express 'a perception of future events or actions' [Witte 2002: 115]. But, expectations underlie a more or less marked uncertainty. And with the addition that expectations are 'fictional', Jens Beckert emphasizes that an expectation is not a reliable 'preview of a future present'. From his point of view, expectations should, in general, be understood as fictional expectations, because they are about the perceptions actors build with respect to future states and, in doing so, they shape

[4] But several definitions suggest that expectations have to be understood psychologically: 'Expectations will be conceived of as standards of evaluation, located in the mind of one individual and used to evaluate attributes and actions of oneself and other individuals' [Galtung 1959: 214]. Also, Blumer points out that expectations are not *per se* a sociological subject, but rather a psychological one [Blumer 1953]. Even within modern economic sociology, suspicions arise that terms like Jens Beckert's 'cognitions' or 'cognitive frames' lead to a psychologisation of sociology [Beckert 2010; Roth 2010: 49].

their decisions in the present although the outcome is still uncertain [Beckert 2014: 9].[5]

In a condition of uncertainty, expectations cannot be secure predictions of future states or events. They are perceptions or imaginations 'upon which actors base their behaviour *as if* these expectations actually did describe future states and causal relations' [Beckert 2013]. Also, Niklas Luhmann points out that expectational structures 'extend through time only in the temporal horizon of the present, integrating the present's future with the present's past' [1995: 293], shape our communication and actions and in this way the social structure in the present. Expectations 'are the temporal form in which structures develop' [1995: 303].

Expected expectations: Already at this point, it is obvious that the concept of expectations is inconceivable without time and uncertainty. The future is open and uncertain. The term 'double contingency' expresses precisely this: 'Something is contingent insofar as it is neither necessary nor impossible; it is just what it is (or was – or will be), though it could also be otherwise' [1995: 103]. Hence, expectations can only be understood as a structure of social systems if they are in turn expected and, with regard to Herbert Mead, if reflexivity concerning others and oneself is considered [cf. Mead 1934/1967]. Johan Galtung calls this reflexivity 2nd order expectation [Galtung 1959: 220]. And only by taking account of expectations about expectations are the concepts of expectation and double contingency combinable [Galtung 1959: 228; Luhmann 1995: 303]. Concerning the importance of expectations in social theory, Niklas Luhmann goes one step further. His key assumption is 'that the structures of social systems consist of expectations, that they are structures of expectation, and that there are no other structural possibilities for social systems' [1995: 293].

Change of expected expectations and power: If we assume that all social structures are expectational structures, the question arises: How do these structures change? Heinrich Popitz states that for all types of human action the ability to change is constitutive [Popitz 1992: 22]. And carrying forward previous thoughts, it is just a question of whose expectations become prevalent. This means that social structures are the result of establishing certain expectations – and from this, it is a matter of power. This obviously implies that expectations of Ego

[5] The explanatory approaches could not be more different: Whereas sociologists understand in the present events occurring as results of the past (past → present), economists explain todays decisions on the basis of the current value 'of expected future rewards'; in this sense, working backwards from the future, as Beckert points out (present ← future) [Beckert 2014: 7; cf. Abbott 2005: 406]. Moreover, these thoughts make clear that an analysis of economic theory has to recognize the concept of expectations [Frydman, Phelps 2013; Giacovelli, Langenohl 2016; Priddat 2016].

and Alter can diverge. And expectations of both can change and be replaced by other expectations over time. Ego and Alter can freely modify their expectations, be profoundly wrong or aim to trick the other [Baraldi 1998: 46–47]. All these variations threaten the stability of social structures, because only if everyone can expect from another what he expects from him, in other words if each one's selectivity is taken over in its own orientation, is stability realized [Baraldi 1998: 47]. Regarding differences between expectations and observations, e.g. if an event does not correspond with the expectation, actors have the choice between two expectational modes: either dropping or changing own expectations, we call this learning, or clinging to an expectation, for instance if an actor feels they are in the right. The first mode is conceptualised by the term 'cognitive expectation' and the second by 'normative expectation' [Galtung 1959: 216 ff.; Luhmann 1995: 320; Baraldi 1998: 48–49]. However, concerning this analytical differentiation, we have to consider that cognitive expectations may change into normative expectations: 'expectations may start out as purely cognitive, but over time gradually take on a normative character' [Galtung 1959: 227; cf. Parsons, Shils 1951: 153; Luhmann 1995: 321 ff.]. Therefore, expected expectations allow a reciprocal orientation over time [cf. Parsons et al. 1951: 15]. And, as Niklas Luhmann points out, 'expectations provide structures with a content that can be revised'. Indeed, expectations obligate, if they are expressed irreversibly through communication. But, 'this is only a kind of preliminary commitment, which can still be revised up until the expected event' [1995: 305].

Especially in situations of higher complexity, the expectational orientation towards something uncertain, with a chance of disappointment, is relatively high. This applies, in particular, if expectations are directed towards organisations or markets. The crucial idea is that 2nd order expectations can be seen as a source of conflict: participants are highly motivated to stop or supress expectations they expect not to be fulfilled [1995: 307]. As a consequence, participants put themselves into strategic favourable positions [ibid.]. Nevertheless, expectational conflicts should not be judged critically: They are the basis for a change or restructuring of expectational structures [Galtung 1959: 223; Luhmann 1995: 304].

These preliminary considerations of expected expectations, cognitive and normative expectations, strategic bringing-into-position or conflicts of expectations as the foundation for structural changes are carried forward on the level of markets.

PART II: LIMITED IMPACT ON RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY

Now, we turn the attention to three prominent lines of research in new economic sociology and the relevance of expectational structures to various market concepts. Three typical lines of research are: Markets as Networks, Institutional View of Markets and Performativity/ Cognition. What all three of these briefly outlined lines of research in economic sociology have in common is that markets are understood as socially constructed structures and are culturally, cognitively and politically embedded [Granovetter 1985; White 1981a, 1981b, 2002]. To these three approaches a fourth one is added from systems theory, because this theory implies a more detailed analysis of expectational structures.

Markets as Networks: The core idea of the 'Markets-as-Networks' perspective is that market structures do not result from a rational and optimizing calculus but from network agreements as, for example, Mark Granovetter und Patrick McGuire illustrate with their empirical study of the development of the US-American electricity industry. Crucial are 'friendships, similar experiences, common dependencies, corporate interlocks, and active creation of new social relations' [Granovetter, McGuire 1998: 167]. And as Harrison White highlights, market structures do not correspond with a neoclassical paradigm, instead they are shaped by interrelations, by the reciprocal orientations of producers. In a way, producers appear as collaborators who try to avoid open competition by observing each other, searching for identities and niches and trying to occupy those niches [White, Godart 2007: 201–202, 208]. This network-theoretical concept has an action-theoretical design. Markets are shaped by interaction. And these market interactions, a crucial point, are pre-structured by reciprocal observations.

This network-based, reciprocal orientation, the interplay of signalling and observing each other, leads to a reduction in uncertainty. In their article 'Networks and Meaning: Styles and Switchings', Harrison White and others discuss Niklas Luhmann's systems theory from a sociological network analysis perspective. In this paper they put this reduction in uncertainty down to 'configurations of expectations' and 'expectational structures', which are continuously stabilised [White et al. 2007: 545, 549]. Keeping expectations and identities stable over a long time period is distinctive of networks. In this sense, the term 'netdoms' points with 'net' to network structures and, likewise, with 'dom' to the domain of 'stories, symbols and expectations' [ibid.]. Markets, as Patrik Aspers concludes, referring to White, are considered to be 'ordered' if actions, offers or prices are to some degree expectable, so that actors are enabled to overcome uncertainty

[Aspers 2009: 8]. Referring to this specific network analysis in economic sociology, greatly influenced by Harrison White, the term 'expectation' is *not* part of the linguistic core repertoire, rather it is considered to describe fundamental social mechanisms, in particular if the stabilisation of social structures is addressed.

Institutional View of Markets: Let us now turn to expectational aspects of the institutional view of markets. Neil Fligstein regards property rights, governance structures, concepts of control und rules of exchange as requirements for competing, and also for cooperation between market participants [Fligstein 1996: 658 ff.]. Concerning his focus on production markets and the network concept, Fligstein's criticism is that this research still has no answer to the question of what the 'embedding of markets' really means [2011: 80–81]. Instead he puts emphasis on the concept of markets as fields. Fields are cultural constructions. And on the basis of these fields, dominant actors share perceptions about what makes a group of organisations dominant. And these dominant actors aim to reproduce their advantages. Dominated organisations have two options: challenging dominating actors or accepting their market role [Fligstein 2011: 80]. This perspective, and especially the 'concept of control', emphasizes the role of power in the relationship between market participants.

The aspect of dominance, in the sense of shared perceptions about dominated and dominating organisations, although not explicitly formulated, is strongly linked to the concept of expectations, because establishing and anticipating specific concepts of control is equivalent to the logic of expected expectations: *Just as dominating concepts of control offer orientations for market participants, they shape communication and action and become structurally operative.* In this understanding, the concept of control becomes compatible with thoughts about expected expectations. The institutional approach takes, as Peter Walgenbach and Renate Meyer [2008] point out, 'institutional expectational structures' into account – even if the term 'expectation' is rarely given prominence.

These outlined institutional and network views on markets have in common that expectations are usually mentioned only as an afterthought. Furthermore, both approaches criticise that neoclassical economics conceives empirical reality inadequately [Aspers, Beckert 2008: 240].

Performativity and Cognition: Whereas proponents of the performativity thesis highlight the creativeness of economic theory, as Michel Callon points out: 'economics in the broad sense of the term, performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather than observing how it functions' [Callon 1998: 2]. So, the question of how economic theory shapes markets is foregrounded [MacKenzie, Millo 2003; MacKenzie 2006].

Especially, social studies of finance focus not only on the formative impact of economic knowledge, but also on the rudimentary role of expectations and expected expectations [e.g. Kalthoff 2004]. Andreas Langenohl remarks that the sociology of finance has thus far no decided interest in expectations, and he puts expectations at the heart of his contribution [2010]. He understands expectations, respectively, as so-called 'meaning-devices', as a mode of social meaning and social attribution in financial markets. He is not interested in analysing how financial markets are shaped by expectations but the question of 'why market observers prefer to see expectations in these markets and ascribe them to other market participants' [Langenohl 2010: 24].

Langenohl highlights four characteristics of expectations and expected expectations in the context of financial markets: First, 'the interpretation that something happens according to expectations introduces an accomplished future state as a defining reference point of interpretation'. Second, expectations are concrete and specific. Interpretations, which rely on expectations, screen the possible future for concrete and specific events that might happen. Third, expectations not only orient action but also provoke decisions – in his words: 'the meaning structure of an expectation does not permit inactivity'. And fourth, expectations presuppose expected expectations. In particular, in financial markets, because of their (in comparison to face-to-face interactions) limited possibilities of observation, the consequences of anticipated decisions and actions are ascribed to the expectations of market participants, because 'it is only expectations that can be expected to invariably lead to action'. In fact, it is not surprising that market events are ascribed to specific expectations and consequential actions.

At this point it is advisable to add some thoughts from Niklas Luhmann's systems theory, because this offers a valuable insight into a concept that takes expectational structures in markets quite seriously:

Systems Theory's View on Markets: first of all, systems theory sees 'expectation' as a core concept: Expectational structures shape market structures. Expectations give orientation and reduce the range of possible actions via preselection. By doing this, action is released from selection pressure.

Concerning markets, such prestructuring is for example ensured by the predictability of price-building. Markets are socially constructed by their observers and on the basis of observable prices. Market participants assess their possibilities of participation. And they do this, following Harrison Whites 'mirror metaphor', reciprocally and without interaction [Luhmann 1996: 94 ff., 101 ff.]. In other words, participants build expectations based on prices and other market data, which in turn guide their communication and action. And based on these

anticipated, in the form of observable prices, expectations, others are able to build their expectations, too. Thus, according to Dirk Baecker, speculating on the expectations of others could be more profitable than betting on price trends in consumer markets [Baecker 1999: 296; cf. Giacovelli 2014: 180–185, 255–272]. With this, Baecker aims at expectation formation on the basis of the expectations of others, which are in particular observable in financial markets, as, for instance, Elena Esposito shows with a focus on speculative operations on the basis of invest-orientated trade [Esposito 2010: 110 ff.].

Interim conclusion: With the exception of the last-mentioned, expectations only play a minor role in the outlined concepts. However, I assume that expectational structures are not only an important, additional analytical requisite, but that markets can only be understood as expectational structures. Along these lines, expected expectations describe the structure of markets, by making anticipated future events expectable and, by doing this, they prestructure communication and action in the present. And focusing on competing market participants' competition revolves around pushing one's own expectations through. And, to highlight the aspect of power in communicated expectations, we can label them, referring to Neil Fligstein, as dominating (and dominated) expectations. And if expectations are successfully established in the form of expected expectations (they have already become the basis of market observations, communication and action), they are equatable with the market structure: *Who shapes expectations, shapes communication and action in the present, and gains interpretational sovereignty about an anticipated future state* and sets a development in the direction of this specific future state (among other possible future states) in motion! And, being more precise and descriptive: such expectations could (in a market context) contain specific prices or price developments, products, modes of exchange and competition, and also, generally speaking, market relationships and market rules.

PART III: CLEARING A HURDLE – POPITZ'S OBJECTION AND A REPLY[6]

But, before going into further detail and refining the terminological repertoire, it seems necessary to reply to a solid objection raised by Heinrich Popitz. Popitz focuses neither on markets nor on changing markets, but on social change and (changes to) social norms. Against the line of argumentation presented in this

[6] I would particularly like to thank Andreas Langenohl for his pointer to Popitz's argumentation.

paper and with a main focus on social norms, Popitz opposes a sociological perspective, which highlights expectations.[7] Taking up his point proves to be very useful for clarifying the significance of expected expectations as a basic concept of (economic) sociological thinking and the progress research has made thus far.

At first, expectations do play an important role in Popitz's thinking. Behaviour, as Popitz mentions, orientates itself not only towards facts, towards visible evidence, but also towards the expected behaviour of others [1961/2006: 76]. Always, when Popitz deals with orientations of behaviour, actors' expectations matter. Even in his definition of social norms, expectations are mentioned. Social norms are based on behaviour, which may have the following four characteristics: it can be expected, show regularity, be desirable and be tied to a risk of sanctions in the case of deviant behaviour [1961/2006: 85]. And it is the case of divergent behaviour which raises a question about how reliable the concept of expectations is.

At the start, Popitz distinguishes between various norm-theoretical social roles: The 'norm addressee' (orig.: 'Normadressat') is bound to behaviour patterns, from which he cannot deviate without consequences. As for the 'norm beneficiary' (orig.: 'Normbenefiziar'), everyone else is bound by sanctioned behaviour. The so-called 'subject of sanction' (orig.: 'Sanktionssubjekt') represents a decision-making and executive body. And, finally, 'norm senders' (orig.: 'Normsender') preserve the legitimacy of norms [Popitz 1961/2006: 136]. The crucial point concerning his distinction from that of Ralf Dahrendorf [1958/1977] and the assumption that social structures are grounded on expectational structures is that, according to Popitz, norms are based on behaviour: Neither desired, nor bindingly thought nor *subjectively expected*, only 'actually proceeding behaviour' should be the foundation of behavioural norms [1961/2006: 135]:

> With this, essential terms are not related to behavioural orientation and behavioural expectation; they do not assume knowledge and assumptions […] We don't assume that a norm addressee orientates himself towards demands and expectations of his beneficiary. Not to mention stable internalisation, a norm addressee acts to conform to roles, if he orientates himself towards out-groups, imaginary heroes, role models of all kinds, which have nothing to do with the structure of addressee – beneficiary – subject of sanction [Popitz 1961/2006: 136–137].

The key issue concerns norm-conform behaviour, which is noticeable, even if actors do not orientate themselves towards claims or expectations, even less reflecting on these. Presuming this, Popitz concludes that neither expectations

[7] His critics in particular refer to Ralf Dahrendorf's contributions to role expectations and to distinguishing between 'can', 'are to' and 'must' expectations [orig.: 'kann-/soll-/muss-Erwartungen', Popitz 1961/2006; Dahrendorf 1958/1977].

nor communication or action per se, but solely norms should be understood as a social-base element and changing norms as the nucleus of social change [Popitz 1961/2006, 1980].

Therefore, the norm-related shaping of behaviour by expectational structure seems to lack a basis, because psychologized, subjective expectations are technically not observable, even if behaviour is in line with norms [1961/2006: 137]. This is why Popitz takes the view that putting the term role on a level with terms like behaviour, expectation, demand or orientation is misleading [ibid.]. After all, Popitz does not disagree with the view that expectations prestructure communication and action. Concerning a concrete behavioural norm we, according to him, cannot empirically observe that a specific expectation provokes a specific behaviour or if it is just caused by adaptive behaviour or an accidental coincidence of behaviour and behavioural norm beyond any reflexivity. His objection is provoking, because it is easily applicable to a general sociology view of societal, organisational and interactional contexts.[8]

To start with, it has to be mentioned that, from a historical point of view, Popitz's suggestions have to be dated to an early phase of sociological discussion, when the question about expectations as a psychological or sociological phenomenon had not been finally answered [cf. Blumer 1953; Galtung 1959; Luhmann 1995].

Furthermore, concerning his reasoning, Popitz disagrees with expectational approaches in two different ways. He suggests that expectations have to be interpreted as a subjective phenomenon [e.g. Popitz 1961/2006: 137]. Inevitably, we encounter a methodological problem: What should be proven by field observation, whereby actors orientate themselves? My counterargument is that, if expected expectations are the stuff that society is made of, then we are not talking about expectations as a psychological, not empirically observable, phenomenon. In fact, expectations are to be regarded as relevant to social structure *only if they appear in the form of expected expectations*. That is to say that they become observable. We are talking about quite another matter than the one Popitz takes into account. To put it another way, the moment will come when a deviation from a norm reveals the missing reflexivity of an actor und forces him to deal with expected expectations, possibly by sanction. At that very moment, we, in our

[8] Against this, Niklas Luhmann presents a concept in organisational sociology, which is built on an expectation-theoretical basis, that derives from expectations to expected expectations, to decisions and decided decisions and finally to decidable and not decidable premises of decisions [Luhmann 2000].

highly structured, by an interactional, organisational and societal socialisation formatting environment, are confronted with the fact that someone else can treat us as if, he can, e.g. legally, expect us to reflect others' expected expectations and act according to this maxim.

Remembering the fact that actors base their behaviour on expectations, *as if* these expectations actually do describe future states [cf. Beckert 2013], one recognizes that dealing with expected expectations operates on this 'as-if' logic: In daily life, observable expected expectations are treated as if they are guiding principles. And this is even better observable when speaking about dominating expected expectations (see part II). One is forced to adopt a position: obedient or divergent. And expectational structures have their sociological legitimacy when they are made explicit. Precisely, this presupposes the sociality of expectations in the form of expected expectations! We are not talking about behaviour that can be expected, but about *expressed expectations that can be expected*, therefore, about *second-order expectations*.[9]

CONCLUSION

The objective of this contribution has been to highlight the potential that the concept of expected expectation offers to (economic) sociology, especially in empirical case studies of market change, but from a more theoretical point of view. To this end, I have presented the essential characteristics of expectations and expected expectations, followed by an outline of the role expectational structures play in prominent concepts of economic sociology. As Neil Fligstein points out regarding the idea of dominating concepts of control and interpreting changes in markets in terms of establishing dominating concepts of control, changing markets can alternatively be described as establishing dominating expected expectations, which also considers aspects of power. Establishing dominating expected expectations is a communicative process triggered by powerful actors, which leads to new options for orientation towards action and reduction in uncertainty, and it puts obsolete expectations to the test. And if expected expectations shape communication and action it seems necessary, as a consequence, to start analysis not on the level of expectations, but on the level of second-order expectations.

It is crucial for the understanding of sociologically relevant expectational structures that, concerning the discussion of Popitz's objection, expectations

[9] That is why norms were unproblematically understood as expected expectations, nowadays [cf. Schneider 2002; Preyer 2012].

are not only treated *as if* they actually describe future events, but also that every interactional, organisational or societal socialised 'ritual insider' can be treated *as if* expected expectations are guiding principles. Obviously, it could be advantageous to reflect others' expressed expectations, but this is not the crucial issue. Whereas, it is of vital importance that one can treat someone else as if expected expectations are guiding principles, e.g. at least with a reference to formal and informal rules that have relevance in a specific context.

The same applies especially to the expectational structures of markets. Actors cannot afford to ignore expected expectations in the long term. At the very least, concerning formal and informal market rules, terms of membership, provisions and business culture make the prestructuring power of expected expectations become clear. Expected expectations form the framework for communication and action, from which substantial variance rarely goes without consequences. But even the possibility that the application of sanctions is quite likely provides an expectational structure with social power.[10] Questioning if actors practise daily routines instead of following expectations is not crucial for explaining the stability or instability of markets in particular, or social structures in general, even if a reflexive population is more pleasant than a routinized mass. Rather, much more decisive is the fact that actors can – and concerning responsibility issues have to – be treated as if they orientate themselves towards expected expectations and as if they, at least principally, are also able to shape expected expectations themselves.

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[10] Obviously, there is still a lot of work to do. For example, we have to clarify the interrelation between different types of market change (e.g. changes caused by disruptive or incremental innovations) and expectational structures – plus a further elaboration of the contents of expectations is needed.

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Sebastian Giacovelli

PRZEMIANY RYNKÓW, OCZEKIWANE OCZEKIWANIA I ZASTRZEŻENIE POPITZA

Streszczenie

Odwołując się do faktu, iż pojęcie oczekiwania jest marginalizowane w socjologii ekonomicznej (zdominowanej przez teorie działania i komunikacji), autor tekstu rozważa potencjał tego pojęcia, a dokładniej pojęcia oczekiwanych oczekiwań. Autor przedstawia charakterystykę oczekiwanych oczekiwań jako – w sensie ogólnym – podstawy struktury społecznej, a w szczególności struktury rynku, koncentrując przy tym swoją uwagę na zmianie społecznej. Zakładając, że oczekiwania z jednej strony kształtują działania i proces komunikacji, z drugiej zaś podążając za wymogiem teoretycznej zgodności, wykazać zatem można potrzebę wypracowania stosownej teorii oczekiwań – z wyłączeniem zastrzeżenia Popitza. Heinrich Popitz sprzeciwia się bowiem podnoszeniu teoretycznego znaczenia oczekiwań z powodu problemu metodologicznego – według tego autora nie jest możliwe udowodnienie, że określone oczekiwanie prowadzi do takiego, a nie innego działania. Autor tekstu formułuje dwa kontrargumenty wobec zastrzeżenia Popitza: po pierwsze, oczekiwane oczekiwania stają się obserwowalne, zatem mogą być oczekiwane. Kwestia metodologiczna znika więc, jeśli koncentrujemy się na oczekiwaniach drugiego rzędu. Po drugie, sednem tekstu jest twierdzenie, iż oczekiwane oczekiwania ujawniają swoją społeczną moc na podstawie logiki „tak, jakby": aktorów społecznych można w sposób uprawniony rozpatrywać tak, jakby orientowali się oni według oczekiwanych oczekiwań, na przykład na podstawie reguł formalnych lub nieformalnych, co zapewnia (tymczasową) stabilizację działań.

Słowa kluczowe: oczekiwane oczekiwania, rynek, zmiana społeczna, socjologia ekonomiczna, metodologia

INA ALBER
University of Göttingen*

DOING CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-SOCIALIST POLAND. TRIANGULATION OF BIOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Abstract

This paper focuses on the intersection of actors and discourses in "doing civil society"[1] in everyday life. It takes into account the diversified discourse about civil society in the socio-historical context of Poland. Interviews with human rights and democracy activists in post-socialist Poland provided the empirical basis for the qualitative study. Methodologically, a triangulation of biographical analysis and discourse analysis was used in order to approach the social phenomenon from different perspectives. Using the framework of Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM), two interpretative types were reconstructed on the level of action patterns and interpretative schemes: the qualification and the empowerment type. The article introduces the methodological framework, the discursive construction of civil society and the two interpretative types, illustrated by case studies.

Keywords: biographical research, discourse analysis, triangulation, empowerment, democracy promotion, sociology of knowledge

INTRODUCTION

Civil society is a powerful, yet vague theoretical concept and everyday practice. Whenever members of international organisations refer to democracy promotion or consolidation, local politicians talk about prosperity and welfare in their town

* Dr., Institute of Sociology; e-mail: ina.alber@sowi.uni-goettingen.de

[1] This refers to the concept of "doing gender" introduced by West, Zimmerman [1987].

or any non-governmental organisation (NGO) writes a grant application, civil society, as a sphere between the state, the market and the family, is referenced. The functions ascribed to civil society are rooted in the history of political philosophy and thinking. They range from protection from state power to control over state power, the critique of "un-democratic behaviour", the articulation of opinions, especially those of minorities, to mediation, education, skill enhancement and social inclusion. The action patterns known as civic engagement or social activism are closely related to civil society. They are commonly defined as forms of acting which are non-violent, oriented towards compromise, self-organised, voluntary, pluralistic, public, co-operative, non-profit-making and serving the "common good". Empirically, civil society refers to associations, non-governmental and non-profit organisations (NPOs), trade unions, foundations or citizens' action groups as well as to a vague, but positively attributed project[2] [cf. Klein 2001; Kocka 2004: 32–34; Adloff 2005; Alber 2016a].

As a researcher in the tradition of the sociology of knowledge, I understand civil society as a discursive construction which frames the everyday actions of humans relating to civil society and which is simultaneously re-constructed (and transformed) by these social actors. Civil society engagement is thus neither a totally free decision, nor a totally determined path. It must be analysed empirically in its specific socio-historical context. Displaying theoretical sensitivity to the scientific discourse about the "resurrection of civil society" through East Central European oppositional movements [Cohen, Arato 1995: 15], I looked at human rights and democracy activism in post-socialist Poland in my PhD study. I used a methodological and data triangulation [cf. Denzin 1970] of biographical analysis and discourse analysis in order to reconstruct the social phenomenon of "doing civil society" in Poland after 1989, when the legacy of the Solidarity movement was undergoing profound changes.

In the second part of my paper I outline the methodological framework and the triangulation in the tradition of sociology of knowledge used to analyse the phenomenon of civil society. The third part deals with the diversified discourse about civil society in Poland. The fourth part discusses the two contrasting interpretative types of civic engagement using two case studies. Finally, I will draw conclusions about "doing civil society" in the field of human rights activism in Poland at the level of action patterns and interpretative schemes.

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[2] Jürgen Kocka [2004: 32–34] introduced the analytical model with three dimensions for civil society: 1) space/sphere, 2) action patterns, 3) utopia.

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The sociology of knowledge approach [cf. Berger, Luckmann 1967; Schütz, Luckmann 1973] forms the epistemological background to my study, constituting the research question and objectives. This approach presumes that human beings are born and socialised into an intersubjective cultural world. In order to reduce complexity and make this world pragmatically approachable, they use typifications, which depend on relevance systems developed during their life courses. These typifications are "recipes" that help to make sense of the social world, while at the same time constantly (re-)constructing it. On higher levels of aggregation, they become objectified and socially construct human reality [Nathanson 1970; Schütz, Luckmann 1973]. They appear as collectively shared action patterns (recipes for how to do something) and interpretative schemes (recipes for how to interpret something). Typifications, patterns and schemes are sedimented in biographically individual stocks of knowledge and yet at the same time collectively shared [Schütz, Luckmann 1973; Alber 2016a: 54–63]. These proto-sociological thoughts create the framework for interpretative biographical research and for the sociology of knowledge approach to discourse analysis (SKAD), which were triangulated in my analysis of "doing civil society".

Biographical analysis

Biographical research in the tradition of the sociology of knowledge concentrates on biographically sedimented experiences, memories and narrations as well as on the interdependency of collective and individual stocks of knowledge. In my research, I built on the biographical methodology introduced by German sociologist Gabriele Rosenthal [2004, 2006]. Key to this approach is the reconstruction of the biography and the case-based analysis. My data was collected through biographical narrative interviews using the framework developed by Fritz Schütze [1976, 1983] and Gabriele Rosenthal [2004]. Here, the interview starts with an open question to the interviewee to tell their life story. During the main narration the interviewer only takes notes and does not intervene. Only in the second part of the narrative questioning is the interviewee further encouraged to talk about the situations, people and experiences mentioned during the first main narration. The third part of the interview may touch on previously undeveloped topics. During the narrative questioning no how-, why- or what-questions are posed. Biographical narrative interviewing allows us to reconstruct social events from the perspectives of the actors and to pay attention to their relevance systems. According to Fritz Schütze [1976], story-telling is an everyday competence of

ordinary people that does not require specific education and can therefore be used in various fields. A narration works through self-generating schemes: we must select details, impose limits and bring it to a conclusion in order for it to make sense to us. At the same time, evoking narrations also stimulates memories.

> Because the interlocutors are first encouraged to tell a longer narration about self-lived experiences, they can structure the narration according to the criteria they themselves find relevant; the memory process is supported [Rosenthal 2003: 92].

In contrast to semi-structured interviews, narrative interviewing often brings out new topics and further information that the researchers had not thought about in advance [Schütze 1976, 1983; Rosenthal 2003; Alber 2016a: 94–99].

Most of the interviews in my PhD study lasted for three to five hours. I met some interviewees twice (n = 13). The sampling of my interviews was based on GTM and on minimal/maximal case contrasting [Glaser, Strauss 1967/2006]. Each interview was firstly analysed in a memo, the first stage in theoretical sampling. Central to Gabriele Rosenthal's biographical case reconstruction process is the analytical division between the lived life history (the chronology of experiences) and the narrated life story (the chronology of narration) [Rosenthal 2004]. This was already done in the memo, in which objective biographical data and narrated life story were analytically separated, enabling attention to be paid to the interdependency of experience, memory and narration.

The first step in a biographical case reconstruction is the biographical data analysis. It builds on the objective hermeneutics approach pioneered by Ulrich Oevermann et al. [1979] and focusses on the objective data of the experienced life history. At this stage one abstains from interpretation or considering the way in which certain life events were narrated during the interview. The result is the reconstruction of the genesis and structure of action patterns. The second step of the analysis is the text and thematic field analysis which reconstructs the gestalt of the narration and the self-presentation of the person. At this stage the interpretative schemes and the way in which biographical experiences and interpretations are narrated are reconstructed. The third and culminating stage of the biographical case reconstruction is the contrasting and bringing together of these two levels of analysis [Rosenthal 2004; Alber 2016a: 94–99].

The aim of the sociological reconstruction of biographies is thus not to collect the memories of a specific historical person (of interest), but to understand the triad of experience, memory and narration from a phenomenological point

of view[3] as a dialectical relation between the individual and collective action patterns and interpretative schemes [Schütz, Luckmann 1973; Rosenthal 2006]. The appropriate sociological conclusions and theoretical generalisations may be drawn from a detailed case reconstruction which takes into consideration not only the biographical narrative interview text, but also other sources such as archive material, newspaper articles, history text books and scientific literature [Rosenthal 2004]. In my study, the biographical case reconstructions already involved a data triangulation. However, I also applied a further, methodological, triangulation when the interview texts were used for discourse analysis. I will first explain the SKAD before saying more about triangulation.

Sociology of knowledge approach to discourse analysis

The original writings by Schütz, Luckmann and Berger have been criticised for not taking into account power relations and assuming a social world of equality. However, their ideas are proto-sociological and can be further developed. The German sociologist Reiner Keller [2012, 2013] merged social constructivism with the discourse theory of French philosopher Michel Foucault to create the sociology of knowledge approach to discourse analysis (German: *wissenssoziologische Diskursanalyse*). SKAD is not a method *per se*, but a research programme and perspective on social phenomena. In SKAD, discourses are treated not only as ways of speaking and communication. They are understood,

> as historically situated real social practices, not representing external objects, but constituting them. This implies looking at concrete data – oral and written texts, articles, books, discussions, institutions, disciplines – in order to analyze "bottom up" how discourses are structured and how they are structuring knowledge domains and claims [Keller 2012: 53].

Discourses are also closely linked with social actors, who re-create them through their everyday action. In the case of my study, activists re-create civil society through taking part in demonstrations, joining organisations, writing letters on behalf of Amnesty International (AI) or blogging about human rights on the internet. Scientists like myself, in writing and talking about civil society, also reproduce, transform and create it as a historically situated real social

[3] This involves the application of Edmund Husserl's idea that there is only a *noema* of memory, not a static, single and eternal pattern. Memories appear as different phenomena depending on the *noesis* of the person remembering, i.e. how someone approaches the phenomenon. The context of the present day situation of narrating therefore structures the way in which the experience is remembered and told. The aim of biographical research is therefore to understand the genesis of today's *noesis* [Rosenthal 2006].

practice. In order to systematically analyse source materials as well as the interview texts, I used GTM and its sampling strategy of contrasting cases and writing memos. I also conducted sequential hermeneutical micro analyses of text fragments, some of them in interpretation groups together with other scholars. Starting from the biographical cases, I analysed the interview texts and other sources relating to civic engagement in Poland after 1989, for example scientific literature about civil society (in Poland), bulletins from NGOs and governments, websites and blogs of activists as well as media contributions about civil society [Alber 2016a: 99–103]. Data and results from both discourse and biographical analysis were systematically triangulated to produce an understanding of the social phenomenon of "doing civil society" from the perspectives of discourses and actors.

Triangulation

"Triangulation" refers to the concept as systematised by Norman Denzin [1970]. In his work about "The Research Act" he states:

> The four basic types of triangulation are *data*, with these types; (1) time, (2) space, (3) person, and these levels (1) aggregate (person), (2) interactive (person), (3) collectivity (person); *investigator* (multiple vs. single observers of same object); *theory* (multiple vs. single perspectives in relation to the same set of objects); and *methodological* (within-method triangulation and between-method triangulation) [Denzin 1970: 301, emphasis added].

The aim of triangulation is to link different perspectives on a certain social phenomenon in order to grasp its complexity. In scientific debates triangulation has been understood as a means to validate "subjective methods" in qualitative research [cf. Flick 2004], but Norman Denzin has [2012] recently insisted that this was not his intention. Triangulation should rather be seen as a way of approaching social complexity from different perspectives in order not to analytically flatten a multidimensional phenomenon [cf. Fielding, Fielding 1986; Knoblauch 2010]. Triangulation could be compared to a kaleidoscope showing various aspects of social phenomena [Köckeis-Stangl 1980: 363]. The approach can be theoretically justified and integrated into research *designs* at their inception. This was the case with my research design, in which civil society as both a vague and powerful discursive construction was viewed as just such a complex phenomenon to be approached both through biographical and discourse analysis. However, triangulation may also be needed during the research *process* when planned methods do not produce data material or a new perspective seems required to understand a social phenomenon. Additionally, an important question to be asked

and answered relates to the level at which the data, methods or theories will be combined when triangulating them.

Often, as qualitative researchers, we apply data triangulation during the collection process. We are exploring life worlds. When conducting biographical narrative interviews in the offices of civil society activists I also wrote field notes about their organisation's premises and collected information brochures or books from them. But when I moved on to the analysis of the data, I began by applying SKAD separately from biographical case reconstruction. Only in the process of analysis did I start to focus more on action patterns and interpretative schemes. I understand interpretative schemes as typifications that are closely linked to action problems and action patterns [Oevermann 2001; Soeffner 2004: 23–24]. These problems of everyday life have been solved by our ancestors and the interpretation of the problem is sedimented in interpretative schemes. They are connected to action patterns that offer the solution to these problems in an abstract way. Discourses only become relevant in everyday life through interpretative schemes [Schetsche, Schmied-Knittel 2013: 25]. The biographical approach allows the reconstruction of the genesis of the individual sedimentation of the collectively shared action patterns and interpretative schemes. At this "process" stage, the methodological triangulation of action patterns and interpretative schemes in relation to "doing civil society" enabled me to connect the perspective on discourses and actors with their specific biographical background [Alber 2016a]. The results of the analysis were generalised into two interpretative types of civic engagement – the qualification and the empowerment type. Before discussing the types I will elaborate on the diversified discourse about civil society in Poland as this is the stock of knowledge available to civil society activists entering the discourse.

DIVERSIFIED DISCOURSE ABOUT CIVIL SOCIETY

The discourse on civil society is closely linked to other powerful, yet vague discourses on democracy, power, public and private sphere, society and community. Especially in historical perspective, the discourse revolves around war and peace, violence and civic virtues, empires and national sovereignty. Such interpretative schemes constitute the framework within which civil society activists in Poland perform their engagement. To briefly summarise the scientific discourse about civil society: in Western political thought bourgeois citizens are the main actors in promoting civil society. Developments in the 18th and 19th century brought forth the bourgeois division of society into separate spheres:

state, market, family and civil society as the linkage between private and public life [cf. Cohen, Arato 1995; Keane 1988; Kocka 2004]. In East Central Europe, however, the politics of empires hindered the development of a bourgeoisie and thus also of a civil society as a sphere between state, market and private life. The state was equal to the empire and Polish concepts of the relations between state and society were dichotomously organised into *us*, the people/society, against *them*, the occupiers. The interpretative scheme of civil society was neither powerful nor well-known. However, the idea of society as a dichotomy was discursively established due to the action problem of perceived occupation [Alber 2016a: 112–122; cf. Słodkowska 2006].

After the First World War, the establishment of sovereign nation states throughout East Central Europe led to the introduction of democratic rule. Organisations which had often operated as underground oppositional movements, for example, the Scouts, emerged openly into the public sphere to form a vibrant civil society. The action problem of perceived occupation led to the establishment of a civil society and a democratic culture. The action patterns and interpretative schemes ranged from the old "us against them" to more compromise-oriented actions. With the beginning of the Second World War these structures were destroyed and civil society as well as all democratic structures ceased to exist publicly under Nazi German and Soviet occupation. In Poland, many organisations moved their activities to the underground and many activists lost their lives [Słodkowska 2006: 39ff; Borodziej 2010: 102ff]. The pattern of "us against them" was (once again) framed as a battle for national sovereignty. Civic engagement not only involved peaceful and compromise oriented actions, but also militant action including the use of armed force.

In the late 1940s civil society was discursively overruled by the establishment of the Polish People's Republic (PPR) and the imposition of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Many organisations existed that displayed some of the characteristics of civil society, such as socially integrating people, working for the common good and socialising young people politically. But PPR civil society lacked the aspects of voluntariness – most people were forced to participate – and pluralistic order. Even though there were many different organisations, they all promoted the same political opinion. Organisational involvement and "voluntary work" as they existed in this historical period remain a pejorative reference in the discourse about civil society. Other organisations (still) worked underground and in opposition. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, civil society was used as a concept drawn from Western discourses in order to promote the notion of society against the state [cf. Arndt 2013]. It was now "us, the people" against "them, not the occupiers but

the Communist Party and its members". Instead of weapons, peaceful strikes and grassroots participation were to be used. The scientific analysis of these events offers a variety of interpretations: the idea of a resurrection of civil society in theory and practice is suggested by Cohen, Arato [1995] while other researchers doubt that the Solidarity intellectuals really drew on this Western political thought framework [cf. Załęski 2013]. Both the scientific and the everyday discourse contain these interpretative schemes, which shape the framework within which civil society activists still position themselves today.

But it is not only intellectuals and scientists who produce and re-produce the civil society discourse. In the early 1990s many international democracy promoters started working in Poland. US-American, mostly private, foundations, of which George Soros' Open Society Foundations and the Stefan Batory Foundation were the most prominent, sent their democracy promoters to Poland to give trainings. These actions were often limited in time and focussed on infrastructural aid. That is, they offered training on how to create an NGO or trade union, how to set up a board and statutes and how to manage finances and work democratically. They also gave and still give grants to project-based organisations [Kubik, Ekiert 2000; Quigley 2000; Freise 2004]. By the late 1990s most of these US-American democracy promoters had moved on from Poland, heading further East. However, they had brought their interpretative schemes and action patterns of civil society with them and knowledge transfer happened in terms not only of management skills, but also of interpretations of civil society. These interpretative schemes relate mainly to liberal models of civil society as the sphere protected from state influence and allowing citizens to strive for their private happiness – in cooperation with others [cf. Alber 2016a]. These schemes are closely linked to liberal market economy ideas and some scholars have accused democracy promoters of using their mission to support neoliberal market policies [cf. Wedel 1998].

The German political party foundations are another main actor in democracy promotion in Poland. They have settled more permanently, with all the big political parties setting up offices in Warsaw. They promote democracy as conceived in the ideology of the parties they are affiliated with. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, for instance, had already worked together with trade unions and workers in the 1980s and could build on its support for social democracy and workers' rights. The Heinrich Böll Foundation, linked to the Green Party in Germany, promotes both gender democracy and ecology. The party foundations bring a pluralistic variety of interpretative schemes and action patterns to civil society. They cooperate closely with local partners, but also promote future political and economic elites, for example by offering scholarships. However, it should be stressed that

democracy promotion does not work through the hypodermic needle. It can only promote actors who negotiate about interpretative schemes and action patterns and thereby (re-)create structures of their own [cf. Alber 2015].

The vigorous growth of civil society organisations both in terms of numbers and the range of their interests after 1989 in Poland led to a diversification of the civil society discourse. In 1989 there were 277 foundations [Gliński 2002: 60]. In 2004 a report by Klon/Jawor, itself a civil society organisation, counted 45,891 associations and 7,210 foundations. However, many of the registered organisations were no longer active [Klon/Jawor 2004]. For the year 2015 Klon/Jawor [2015] reported 86,000 associations and 17,000 foundations. About 70,000 people were involved. The fields of operation of these organisations were: sports and leisure time (34%), education (15%), culture and art (13%). Other areas of activity included: social services and charity as well as local development. Many organisations had a rather small budget and relied mainly on volunteers, with only a few employed members of staff [Klon/Jawor 2015].

With institutionalisation, civil society in Poland gradually disappeared from the scientific and political agenda. After the EU accession of post-socialist countries like Poland, Hungary and the Baltic States, issues such as integration into the union, economic developments and free market access dominated both the scientific and media debates. However, in November 2015 the Committee for the Defence of Democracy (Polish: *Komitet Obrony Demokracji* – KOD) emerged in Poland to fight as an extra-parliamentary opposition against the government and policies of the Law and Justice Party (Polish: *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* – PiS). They are perceived nationally and internationally as the powerful Polish civil society appearing on the streets again. KOD's name refers directly to the legacy of the Committee for the Defence of Workers (Polish: *Komitet Obrony Robotników – KOR*) of the 1970s. The subject of defence is the democratic order, for instance in the shape of the Supreme Court, whose independence has been endangered by PiS-introduced laws [Deutsche Welle 2015]. The empirical data for my study was collected and analysed before PiS came to power and KOD emerged. Yet the current actions of civil society activists reflect its results quite well; indeed, one of my 2010 interviewees is now an active member of KOD. But this is just one aspect of the civil society discourse in Poland. In the next paragraph, I will illustrate how the interdependence of discourse and actors can be theoretically generalised in the form of a typology.

TWO INTERPRETATIVE TYPES OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

Although the civil society discourse offers a variety of interpretative schemes and action patterns due to a long history and different influences, the combination of biographical and discourse analyses has revealed only two major interpretative types: the empowerment and the qualification type.

The empowerment type

The first type can be characterised as the empowerment type. The representatives of this type perceive their civic engagement as a form of emancipation and empowerment. Emancipation refers to a concept on the macro-level which is connected to the struggle against social inequality and for participation for excluded social groups [cf. Quesel 1994]. On the micro-level, empowerment relates to individual abilities and is found in the discourses of social work and psychology. Within the civil society discourse, empowerment links both the micro- and macro aspects and suggests positive democratic qualities. The notion of civic engagement serving as empowerment and a form of participation by and on behalf of minorities can also be found in democracy promotion efforts by NGOs or through UN programmes [Craig, Mayo 1995; UN Women – Headquarters 2016]. The representatives of the empowerment type reproduce this interpretative scheme and transform it (gradually) at the same time.

I will illustrate this type using the case of Edyta Truszkowska.[4] Edyta was born in Upper Silesia in 1962. Her parents had been sent to this part of Poland on work assignment (Polish: *nakaz pracy*) in the 1950s. The social structure of Edyta's home town as well as the surrounding region were undergoing radical change. The former German/Prussian parts of post-war Poland were being industrialised and "Polish culture" encouraged. Many people were sent to these towns to work in newly established factories and in mining. A lot of effort was also put into educating young people from the working class and peasantry [cf. Irgang 1995]. Edyta's mother took her chance, attending university classes in the evening and achieving a management position in her firm. Edyta's father, however, did not manage to adapt to the post-war working conditions. According to Edyta, he never felt at home in the place he was sent to and suffered from alcoholism. She talks about bad experiences as a child because of her father. She experienced

[4] The name and some personal information of the interviewees have been changed for the purpose of data protection.

discrimination and social exclusion because of her father's behaviour. However, her mother got a divorce when Edyta was eight years old and thereafter they lived together with her stepfather. Edyta considers this to have been very positive for her and that she now had a tranquil time and life at home.

Edyta had a "normal" childhood, going to school, joining the Scout movement and getting good grades. She talked vividly about the emergence of Solidarity in summer 1980 when the grey everyday life suddenly become colourful and when the public sphere became pluralistic [cf. Alber 2016b]. She also remembers a teacher who was arrested. However, nobody in her family or herself were active opposition members during the first Solidarity period. She continued along a normal career path, studying Polish and becoming a secondary school teacher. While at the university she got to know her husband. In her final year of studies Edyta became pregnant. The couple got married before the first child arrived. Their second was born two years later. During the time of transition, 1989–1991, Edyta was busy with her two small children and her job as a teacher. However, soon afterwards she used her social network to get a summer job in the West, finding work on a farm in the UK. Having worked there for one summer, her husband joined her the following year while the grandmother took care of the children. With the money they earned they bought a flat in their home town. Only after Edyta had secured "a good life" and the same quiet and safe home she had herself enjoyed with her stepfather did she start getting civically involved in the mid-1990s, when she became interested in human rights issues and joined AI. She says about her engagement:

> It was so, well, very important for me because of my daughter. Something can always happen to anyone. But you should do something about it. You can't leave it, you can't put your head in the sand and agree, right, you need to go protest and change [Interview Edyta Truszkowska 2010, p.30; translation from Polish into English I.A.].

The topics that Edyta addresses in her civil society activities are closely related to this idea of being able to speak out and change things. Even though she is a member of an international organisation, AI, she prefers to focus on the local level. She writes letters not only to call attention to international cases as AI does, but also to point out inequalities and injustice in her home town. Pupils of hers that have problems with unwanted pregnancies, abortions or homosexuality trust Edyta as a teacher. She not only listens to them, but also discusses rather private problems (anonymously) as public issues within a broader interpretative realm. In her case the interdependency of emancipation and empowerment and the private/micro and public/macro spheres can be reconstructed in her civic engagement.

Edyta's overall action pattern is to secure her own position first and then get involved. Her interpretative scheme for problematic social situations is to understand them as something that she and others can change. She "does civil society" through local activities with AI which also become important globally. Her activities usually transfer social problems which are often perceived as private ones into the public sphere in order to discuss them and effect change. Her action pattern might be influenced by the experiences of the first Solidarity and the temporarily pluralistic public sphere in 1980/81.[5] Certainly in her own evaluation of her life course she stresses the importance of experiencing Solidarity with its symbols and colours.

In November 2015, almost five years after I had conducted the biographical narrative interview with Edyta, I happened to find a long media article about her work with KOD in her home town. She organises demonstrations, writes open letters and posts online "in defence of democracy". Given her experience of the Solidarity movement in her youth, her idea of being able to change one's situation and her previous civil society activities, her involvement with KOD fits very well with her action patterns and interpretative schemes.

To summarise the empowerment type: "Doing civil society" empowers the activists as well as others, for instance, women, the LGBT movement or ethnic minorities. The empowerment of individuals and smaller groups contributes to collective emancipation. Civic engagement functions as a powerful resource for doing biographical work and overcoming bad past experiences. The memories of being an outsiders and suffering discrimination are re-interpreted when fighting for inclusion, participation and resources for others. The individual negative experiences are negotiated at a public political level of human rights and ideals of tolerance and democracy. The civic engagement is mostly organised informally with friends and private network partners on an *ad hoc* basis. Posting and blogging on the internet are powerful instruments in promoting idea(l)s and political messages. Striving to become politically influential is part of the engagement as well, but unlike the representatives of the qualification type the "empowermentalists" do not aim to achieve high political positions but to fight against discrimination and for solidarity with minorities. They experience social inclusion through their local civic engagement, mainly within private networks, but they also refer to global movements like AI. "Think global, act local" could serve as a motto for this type [Alber 2016a: 264–266].

[5] Writing open letters was also a means of oppositional activities in pre-1989 Poland. Perhaps Edyta also relates to this action pattern [cf. Stegmann 2016].

The qualification type

The second interpretative type is the qualification type. Representatives of this type interpret themselves as experts in a newly established social phenomenon: civic engagement in a democratic society. They relate to the post-socialist discourse about civil society according to which Polish people lack a sense of "civilizational competence" [Sztompka 1993] resulting in a weak civil society [Howard 2002]. In scientific and political discourse this is also linked to some of the positive ascriptions to civil society. It serves as a sphere in which individuals get socially included and learn important (soft) skills which can also be useful in the job market [Herbst 2011; Alber 2016a: 198].

My empirical example, that of Wojtek Wejda, has similar socio-structural characteristics to that of Edyta Truszkowska. Both were born and socialised in the 1960s in Silesia in Poland, became school teachers in the PPR in the 1980s and after 1989 were local leaders of civil society organisations. Yet, their actions in and reasons for "doing civil society" are different. The biographical method of case reconstruction allows us to analysis the genesis of the relevant action patterns and interpretative schemes and to explain why Wojtek Wejda is a representative of the qualification type and Edyta Truszkowska of the empowerment type.

Analysing his experienced life history, the first important biographical date is 1962: Wojtek Wejda was born as the second child into an average Polish family. It is important for his family history that his ancestors – having lived in the same town in Silesia for more than three generations – experienced many regime and border changes. The family seems to have adapted rather well to changing historical circumstances. Both female and male family members worked at the factory of a Prussian industrialist. They were able to maintain their working-class life despite the sweeping political changes of the first half of the 20th century. Wojtek was socialised in the PPR. The whole family accepted the political system and Wojtek made his career within it. In the 1980s, he became a secondary school chemistry teacher. Only after civil society organisations had been legalised in 1989 did Wojtek get involved with the Solidarity trade union at his school. Some other teachers had formed a local Solidarity group and Wojtek was asked to join them. After a few months, he became a local leader. First he attended training courses by external democracy promoters, mainly from the United States, before going on to organise and lead them himself. He made a typical career as a multiplier. From his work for the teachers' trade union he gradually evolved into one of the leaders of a democracy-promotion NGO in Warsaw. He gave democracy-education courses and training sessions not only in Poland, but also

in Ukraine or Belarus. In the second meeting of our interview I asked Wojtek to tell me more about the time he got the offer to work part-time in the democracy promotion organisation in the 1990s. He elaborated on the conditions and background of his decision and said:

> Non-governmental organisations in Poland were a rather young creation well, really, there is such a fear. For example, in my family they didn't have any idea, well, there was no social awareness about what is that – non-governmental organisations? Well, people they talk but they don't know. And my uncle who is a person of higher education, well, when I told him and explained what a foundation is, he asked me: 'But is this not a sect?' ((interviewee and interviewer laugh)). Well, because the term 'sect' had already started to work in society. People were afraid and they had already heard about it in the media and that people could get caught into these sects. And I told my uncle: 'Listen, that ain't no sect! Well, I think it's not, I've been working with them for almost ten years and they didn't force me into anything or ask me for money. Well, we do provide trainings! We sow the idea of democracy and it seems that this is right and necessary' [Interview 2 with Wojtek Wejda, 2008, p. 3f.; translation from Polish into English I.A.].

In this fragment from the interview, Wojtek refers to the discourse mentioned above according to which NGOs are almost unknown in Poland and civil society is weak. But Wojtek also stresses the qualifications that he himself got from "doing civil society" and which at the same time qualify him to do it again. He also links democracy and civil society. In his own interpretation of his life story he stresses how much he owed to the initial workshops: social acceptance and inclusion as well as new techniques and methods for adapting to the new liberal job market and pluralistic democracy, i.e. the public sphere. Taking into consideration Wojtek's family history, in which adapting to changing circumstances has been an action pattern passed on down the generations, his positive experiences with democracy promotion can be seen as continuing and transforming the pattern. In the 2000s he got involved with the European Union accession process and organised trainings and workshops. As a qualified expert in the field he found many jobs, got connected with local and regional political and economic elites and experienced social inclusion on a more power-related level. It is not the "us against them" pattern, but rather "us together with them" [Alber 2015, 2016]. Today he is still a democracy promoter for an NGO in Warsaw, but also a freelancer in the field of civil society and democracy promotion.

To summarise the qualification type: The representatives of the type do civil society because of and as a special qualification. They see their expertise as the key to their successful career within the civil society sector. Their civic engagement started – before or directly after 1989 – with voluntary work, for instance, in the Scouts or with Western democracy promoters. The skills acquired

in voluntary work (management skills etc.) were useful for institutionalising NGOs and foundations and the actors moved from voluntary to paid work. The civic engagement of this type is usually highly professionalised and formalised. Civic engagement as a qualification serves as a solution to the new social problem of democratic transition and unemployment. The representatives of this type perceive themselves as experts qualified to educate others on democracy, human rights and the liberal job market. The reconstruction of the biographical genesis of this pattern shows that civic engagement functions as a means of social inclusion in terms of political and societal power. Within certain elite networks in major towns, civil society activists can reach highly influential political positions. In many cases the subjects continued their family tradition of adapting quickly to new political frameworks and of keeping or achieving high social positions [Alber 2016a: 222–224].

CONCLUSION

Using the biographical and discourse analytical approach to civil society, I focussed on the intersubjective life world, in which, through everyday actions, this vague, yet powerful social phenomenon is constantly being re-constructed and transformed. Triangulation of biographical analysis and discourse analysis proved very fruitful for the analysis of "doing civil society" in Poland after 1989 from different perspectives. Through SKAD, the stock of knowledge, interpretative schemes and action patterns organised in discourses could be reconstructed. Although the discourse on civil society in post-socialist Poland can be characterised as diversified due to historical developments, only two interpretative types of civic engagement were found within the sample of democracy and human rights activists: qualification and empowerment. The theoretical generalisation in terms of GTM applies only to these types of activists. Further research on different fields of civil society like charity, sports or cultural organisations would therefore be valuable.

Within the field of democracy and human rights activism, the biographical geneses of action patterns and interpretative schemes show that civic engagement functions as a means for social inclusion at different levels for both the qualification and empowerment types. The reconstruction of the biographical cases illustrates that abstract terms like peace, democracy or national sovereignty are not the main incentives for involvement. The biographical functions of engagement are: to become socially included, do biographical work or gain influence. The "high ideals" serve more as an interpretative scheme which activists

can refer to when presenting their activities, for instance, to a young German female researcher in an interview. Through various offline and online activities like organising workshops and demonstrations, blogging or writing open letters civil society activists reproduce and transform the civil society discourse, which simultaneously structures their civic engagement within "knowledge domains and claims" [Keller 2012: 53]. They "are doing civil society" on several levels, but within certain discursive limits. And, of course, my own study also contributes to the reproduction of the powerful, yet unclear discourse of civil society – but hopefully to its transformation at certain points as well.

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Ina Alber

DOING CIVIL SOCIETY (PRAKTYKOWANIE SPOŁECZEŃSTWA OBYWATELSKIEGO) W POSTSOCJALISTYCZNEJ POLSCE. TRIANGULACJA ANALIZY BIOGRAFICZNEJ I ANALIZY DYSKURSU

Streszczenie

Artykuł ten traktuje o wzajemnym wpływie dyskursów oraz aktorów społecznych w ramach „praktykowania społeczeństwa obywatelskiego" (*doing civil society*) w codziennym życiu. Autorka koncentruje się na zróżnicowanym dyskursie społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Polsce, uwzględniając kontekst społeczno-historyczny tego zjawiska. Empiryczną podstawę prezentowanych w tekście badań jakościowych stanowią wywiady z działaczami na rzecz demokracji i praw człowieka. By ukazać analizowane zjawisko społeczne z różnych perspektyw, w ramach metodologii teorii ugruntowanej zastosowana została triangulacja analizy dyskursu i analizy biograficznej. Na poziomie wzorów działania oraz schematów interpretacyjnych zrekonstruowano dwa typy działających aktorów – typ zaangażowania opartego na kompetencjach i typ zaangażowania opartego na upełnomocnieniu. W artykule przedstawione zostały kolejno ramy metodologiczne, uwagi dotyczące konstrukcji społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w dyskursie oraz – tytułem ilustracji – dwa studia przypadków odnoszące się do wspomnianych, modelowych kategorii działaczy społeczeństwa obywatelskiego.

Słowa kluczowe: badania biograficzne, analiza dyskursu, triangulacja, upełnomocnienie, promocja demokracji, socjologia wiedzy

TOMASZ FERENC
University of Łódź*

THE AMBIGUITY OF "SUCCESS" IN BIOGRAPHICAL STORIES OF POLISH ÉMIGRÉ ARTISTS

Abstract

What factors determine artistic success? How do the artists themselves interpret this issue? How is this issue viewed by émigré artists? This article is an attempt to answer to these questions. By examining biographical research conducted among Polish émigré artists living in Berlin, London, New York, and Paris I try to show the ambiguity of the term "success". This concept is variously interpreted by the different narrators and in each instance requires contextual concretization in relation to the biography of the particular artist. This article distinguishes between the objective and subjective dimensions of experiencing success. When taking into consideration the subjective understandings and individual expectations, the category of success changes its meaning depending on the fate of the individual artists. It cannot be narrowed down to only the artistic dimension, because many other aspects of the life of émigré artists are strongly intertwined with it. The fate of those who have succeeded may be understood only if we compare their stories with the stories of artists who remain on the periphery of the art world.

Keywords: success, émigré artists, life satisfaction, biography, art creation

INTRODUCTION

In comparing the number of people living in the Poland with the number of Poles living abroad, the Polish diaspora is one of the largest in the world [Chodubski 2003: 55]. For many generations of Poles emigration has been a major biographical

* Associate professor, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, Institute of Sociology, Chair of Sociology of Art; e-mail: tomasz.ferenc@wp.pl

experience. This process has also had a great impact on the micro-, mezzo- and macro-structures of Polish society. The thought of either a permanent or temporary abandonment of the 'homeland' is an ever-present element of the Polish identity. Writer Jerzy Pilch aptly describes this state of mind in the following dialogue:

> The normal Pole is thinking of emigration at least once in a lifetime.
>
> The normal Pole, sir, is thinking of emigration at least once a week. In my opinion, entertaining frequent thoughts about emigration is a sign of both normality and Polishness [Pilch 2008:120].

Taking into account Poland's recent history, the scale of artists' emigration is indeed significant. In proposing a methodological and theoretical perspective of a biographically-oriented sociology of art, I would like to formulate some questions and point out some problems. Among others, to what extent does the fate of émigré artists have typical characteristics, common for this social group, and to what extent is each artist's experience exceptional and unique? Artistic mythologies lead us to believe in the uniqueness of each author – not only their works, but also their lives [Golka 2008: 81]. Is it then possible to look for common biographical patterns for such a diverse social group? I also try to show how moving to another country affects the output of the artists, their identity and feeling of strangeness. But above all I focus my attention on the issue of 'success' viewed from various émigré artists'perspectives.

In seeking answers to these questions this article refers to the biographical research I conducted in the years 2008–2012 among Polish artists who settled in London, Berlin, New York and Paris. In carrying out this research I drew on the theoretical inspiration and methodological instructions of several prominent scientists, among whom I should mention Fritz Schütze [1997], Kaja Kaźmierska [2004], and Alicja Rokuszewska-Pawełek [2002]. The participants in the study come from different artistic fields, such as photography, graphic design, painting, film, literature, poetry, dance, sculpture, video art and multimedia. Among the 60+ artists I was able to interview, some are well known and live among the cosmopolitan elites of the artistic world and are able to fully devote themselves to their artistic careers, while others have a limited audience for their work and have been often forced to look for "non-artistic" jobs to survive. My choice of the biographical interview method was an intentional research strategy, stemming from the belief that getting to know the social worlds of émigré artists would only be possible by collecting the stories of people with different career paths. It should be noted that the persons chosen for study started their émigré lives and careers at different points in time, from the 1970s to the first decade of the

21st century. Clearly the time frame affects the circumstances of their emigration, their expectations, and further consequences stemming from their decisions.

The biographical interview method used in this research requires the anonymization of the narrators; therefore fragments of biographical stories that appear in the article are labelled only by artistic genre and the name of the city in which the given artist resides. This study of Polish émigré artists included 40 men and 21 women. The process of finding respondents was based on the method of snowball sampling, which is nothing more than a system of choosing subsequent participants based on information received by previous respondents. The ratio of males to females was largely a matter of chance in this case, which does not mean that there were a lot of important questions to be asked linked to gender. We know that the art world favors male careers, which has resulted in a disproportion in terms of power, prestige, income, as well as the scale of professional success. Taking into account the women artists who participated in this research, one of the recurring topics was the need to care for their children, which often rested entirely on the women's shoulders. Therefore single mothers who decided to emigrate had to solve this problem above all. Among the passages from interviews cited in the article, only two are from women, but this doesn't mean that they have not succeeded. Despite the lack of such stories, conclusions, or codas in the analyzed material, many of the women artists have achieved a stable position in the art world, some even at the international level.

STUDY OF POLISH ÉMIGRÉ ARTISTS – A FEW INITIAL REMARKS

Studying émigré artists is both fascinating and complicated. Both as a social group and as individuals, artists are very versatile and elusive. Over time, the meaning and range of the notion *artist* has been constantly changing, which makes the artistic profession difficult to characterize. While exactly the same problems are faced with respect to the definition of art, nonetheless for the purposes of this research I had to accept one definition. In 1980 UNESCO formulated a definition of the status of an artist, as follows:

> Artist' is taken to mean any person who creates or gives creative expression to, or re-creates works of art, who considers his artistic creation to be an essential part of his life, who contributes in this way to the development of art and culture and who is or asks to be recognized as an artist, whether or not he is bound by any relations of employment or association [UNESCO 1980].

There are many criteria which are not taken into consideration in this definition, such as education, social esteem, presence in artistic environments, talent, income, and many others. Yet although this definition seems to be very broad, it might be a good starting point, with a basic sociological assumption that "being an artist" is a matter of social recognition. As mentioned above, over 60 artists took part in the entire study (among them 40 men and 21 women artists). All biographical interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed.

Explaining the reasons for migration was usually the starting point in each narration. In analyzing each individual story I tried to identify three main elements of biography: *milieu* (social environment, local perspective); historic factors (macro-historical dimension); and personal factors (individual aspects of the decision to emigrate) [Czyżewski 1996: 46]. These three elements appeared, with different intensity, in the majority of the collected narrations. This made it possible to distinguish the main migration drivers, predominant factors, and attendant conditions accompanying them. In accordance with Everett S. Lee's theory [Lee 1966: 47–57], a group/set of 'push' and 'pull' factors were identified. This set of reasons and explanations changed across decades with respect to incoming social cohorts. Among the dominant migration drivers (push factors) in Poland during 1970s and 1980s, the most important were: political repressions and surveillance; censorship; lack of the possibility of free artistic expression; limitations on contact with the outside world (for example a very restricted passport policy); the introduction of martial law in 1981; and of course the general economic decline of the country. The dominant pull factors included: a close relationship with a person living abroad; psychological predispositions toward emigration; curiosity about the external world (breaking out of the Iron Curtain); and the will and ambition to pursue further artistic education abroad.

As seen above, one of the most important drivers leading to the thought of leaving Poland was having relatives abroad. This was not a matter of participating in a 'chain migration', but rather a psychological factor that facilitated the decision to leave. Another reason was the desire to test one's capabilities in other art markets, in a different artistic environment surrounded by different people. Another factor which was emphasised in many of the stories was a specific cosmopolitan atmosphere in the family home. Social capital and inherited *habitus* proved to be important factors in the psychological preparation to leave the homeland. A cosmopolitan attitude which favours readiness to emigrate is very often associated with the process of early socialization. None of the respondents mentioned economic issues as the most important factor in their emigration. Some of them had a relatively stable professional position in communist Poland. The

financial issue was referred to in several biographical stories, however, mainly by artists who have achieved a certain success at this level. Generally a dominant factor pushing for emigration is the desire to improve the material conditions of one's existence, but in the case of artists we must specify a number of other, equally if not more important, motives. Often political and economic factors intertwined to create a strong impetus inducing them to think about emigration and pushing them out of Poland. It should also be noted that settling down abroad is not always the result of a deliberately implemented biographical plan. Sometimes it is the result of a spontaneous decision, the consequence of suddenly emerging opportunities or an action that was initially treated as merely temporary.

The collapse of the communist system in 1989 ended the period of political emigration, opening a new chapter in the history of Polish emigration. Therefore, the nature of emigration changed, as well as the configuration of push and pull factors. While following Poland's accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004 the mobility of Poles within the EU countries significantly increased [Świętochowska 2007: 127], the process of leaving the country at will started already at the time of the political transformation in 1989. One of the most popular directions of migration was London,[1] especially for the younger generation of Polish artists. For them, leaving their homeland was no longer the same dramatic personal uprooting as for the older Polish migrants, who refused to live under communism. Still, like their predecessors, representatives of the new transnational migration did not leave for economic reasons only, although this sphere remained (and still remains) important. Equally significant was (and is) the openness to new experiences, the search for an optimal place to live life, not only in their own country but also away from it. Young artists, like all immigrants, have to think about acquiring the resources needed to support themselves in their new land, but they also make an effort to attain a lifestyle that is not determined only by economic objectives. This makes them different to some extent if we compare their fates with those of the predominantly economic migrants. In their biographical plans creativity and art remain important values, even if they are not always their main or sole occupation.

Several themes emerge from the data collected, the most significant of which are problems of alienation, issues of assimilation, identity processes, and issues

[1] The Polish Diaspora in London consists of several social worlds coexisting together that occasionally contact one another, while remaining substantially separated. The various generations of migrants, and the subsequent incoming compatriots from Poland each time constitute a different social world, based on different principles, ethos, and other purposes.

concerning the different social worlds in which the artists find themselves living. An immigrant artist in a new country often has to contend with the stigmatic burden of 'otherness'. On one hand, this strangeness can create a great artistic power, provide an opportunity for new insights and imbue the artist with an air of mystery, all of which combine as factors conducive to the development of creativity. However, it may also represent a major barrier against adopting the new culture, traditions, mentality, or language, which under certain circumstances can develop into an experience of isolation. Thus émigré artists are a particularly interesting social group for this kind of research because of the dichotomy of their otherness, which originates not only from their coming from a foreign country but also from their creative inclinations. The term "alien" commonly refers to an individual who comes from a different cultural and social background or does not belong to a group, and often conveys a pejorative meaning which raises strong emotions. The concept of "other" on the other hand, commonly means an individual different in some way from social norms, but not subject to such strong evaluative judgments and emotional reactions as "aliens".

The biographies compiled in my research reveal not only a complexity and diversity in the fate of Polish émigré artists, but also the unique nature of each case, the individuality of which escapes typology and precludes any attempts to create a comprehensive model fully explaining the phenomenon of artists living in exile. An institutional theory of art is not sufficient to reflect the complexity of the world of an artist, because it describes only one of its aspects. The World of Art cannot be separated from the other worlds in which such artists exist, since these overlap in a variety of complex ways and on many levels. Perhaps investigating these interdependencies may over time become a central task in any biographically-oriented sociology of art. These narrations show an account of events that cannot be described in determinist terms, but instead point to the use of probable categories or even require us to consider the phenomenon of coincidence; a set of circumstances, an intervention by others, a random event, or an accidental meeting which changes the life of the narrator. All of these remain atheoretical and very often unpredictable.

Each city where the research was undertaken also creates different conditions that affect the plans of the artists and reveal, in various configurations, the cultural and historical contexts specific to their setting. The tales of artists living in Paris made it possible to reconstruct the social world of each emigrant artist from a professional, artistic angle. Referring to the institutional theory of art, I have tried to identify the circumstances that affect the successful development of their artistic careers. The tales from London show a chronological shift in the Polish

Diaspora and its multi-generational character, and subsequent generations of émigrés refer differently to the problems of maintaining Polish traditions. For a long time post-war migration was of a national and political nature, and the London narratives reflect this change, while at the same time revealing something more. One can see, *inter alia*, that the relationship with the country of settlement and the country of origin goes beyond the traditional separation – assimilation paradigm, and that instead we have to deal with a complex range of relationships. The biographies also reveal how changes in the recent history of Poland have contributed to the migration process.

In the post-EU era, Polish émigrés have enjoyed a full freedom of movement. This does not mean, however, that they do not experience identity problems, exclusion, and social/professional degradation. Emigration contributes to social and cultural fragmentation, which has become one of the principal elements of modern man's existential experience. It also suggests the existence of a specific model of identity (inspired by the works of Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner), defined as 'liminal identity'. It describes a sense of life constantly in "suspension" or "being in between", at the intersection of different worlds [Ferenc 2012: 172–183]. Those finding themselves in such situations do not identify with a new culture or society, and cannot or do not want to change. Manifestations of such identities appear in statements such as: "we are neither here nor there", "we are in between". "Being in between" may become a kind of creative strategy, a source of inspiration, a theme for artistic implementation, but at the same time may also be a constant source of mental discomfort, prompting thoughts of further migration or a return to Poland.

Artists living in Berlin drew attention to the historical-political specificities of the emigration of Poles to Germany. The proximity of West Berlin attracted emigrants from the People's Republic of Poland because it was the closest bridgehead of the Western world [Baumgartner 2010: 73]. This "island" city became an important centre of independent art in Europe, a place where Polish artists found freedom and opportunities to have contact with other artists, while at the same time remaining close to Poland. Emigration to Germany was particularly difficult for Polish people of Jewish origin, as one narration shows. The stories from Berlin also depict one more issue connected with the history of recent migration, namely the departure of young children and teenagers, forced to resettle as a result of their parents' decision to move there.

The 20+ interviews collected in New York made it possible to discover how artistic systems function, and give a clearer view of the consequences of transcontinental emigration. This material highlights the stories of artists'

successes, wanderings, trajectories, and suspensions of careers, all of which leads to the proposal of a typology of narrative tales [Ferenc 2012: 385].

The use of narrative interviews is an attempt to overcome the limitations of the sociology of art as traditionally understood. The purpose of this research was not to negate existing theories, but to attempt to enrich them with new elements. Sociology of art should not focus solely on art, defined as the production, circulation, and reception of objects defined as art. Sociology of art may be understood also as the sociology of an actively functioning person, as a science seeking to understand the social nature of a creative person. Narrative interviews make it possible to better understand the phenomenon of being an artist and provide greater insights into their social worlds. They also show the ambiguity of basic categories, such as career, assimilation, otherness, and success.

WHAT FACTORS DETERMINE ARTISTIC SUCCESS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE?

At the outset it should be stressed that it is impossible to list and name all the factors determining artistic success. As was said earlier, success in this field of symbolical production is unpredictable and atheoretical, and in most cases arises from a combination of various elements. But at the same time the question of determinants of artistic success is interesting and contemporary. What conditions must an artist fulfil to achieve success and to be able to continue his/her career? Before we answer these questions, we have to establish which elements comprise a successful artistic career. According to Marian Golka, these elements are: self-esteem, including satisfaction with success as well as a sense of existential security; resources of social prestige; popularity and public resonance; autonomy in making choices (as well as the importance of such choices, i.e. their scope of power in social micro- and macro-structures); personal income level (manifested in the lifestyle and character of consumer behaviour); and the range and social performance of the work of a particular artist [Golka 2103: 109]. For example, where does a given artist display his or her works of art and how prestigious are these venues for safeguarding the future circulation of the artworks? Similarly, Natalie Heinich stresses that nowadays a successful, professional artistic life is manifested not only in the ability to sell one's art, but also in being identified and recognized as an artist. The peak of such a career is the presence of an artist's art in important and prestigious art institutions: museums, galleries, academies, official competitions and jury awards. Of course Heinich is aware that even such achievements might be questioned and do not translate into stable, solid,

unshakeable and indisputable position. This is why a successful artistic career means presenting future generations with a real model, in which both the artist and his/her works are equally important [2010: 112].

In the case of émigré artists everything seems to be much more complicated and uncertain. Hence the question arises: What circumstances are conducive to the development of careers for such artists? Firstly, an important factor for achieving success is a professional artistic education acquired in the country of origin. If it is supplanted by further education in artistic academies abroad after immigration, the chances for a successful career are usually higher. The knowledge and skills acquired in the country of origin provide a solid basis for further artistic work, while continuing education abroad allows one to hone these skills, acquire cultural competence, and create a local network of contacts. Put simply, it helps to 'plug in' to the local artistic environment, which might be crucial for the émigré-artist. This is also an important process conducive to assimilation. Another essential factor that facilitates a new start in a foreign country is knowledge of the language. People who are able to communicate in a foreign tongue usually start their lives abroad from a better and safer social and professional level. Another element facilitating, though of course not guaranteeing, success is a relationship with a person from the country of migration. Living with a native, i.e. someone from the host society, usually helps to normalize one's life abroad and to gain the status of a resident or citizenship (which was very important before Poland entered the EU). Such a relationship also helps to learn some rules of the new social environment and to gain cultural competence. In this case the migrant might feel more protected and guided in the new world. Stories about the 'significant others' in migrants' lives popped up several times in the narratives. Such a person is able to influence the biography of an artist by helping, advising, and intervening in difficult situations. Gaining artistic success is usually the result of a complex and multivariate chain of events. Alongside social factors, equally important are mental aptitude, talent, determination, ability to cope with failures, and finally something that can be described as 'coincidence'. This last element is crucial in many stories, for example in the narrative of an artist who lives and works in Paris:

> After nine months, I met the director of the Théâtre Nacional de la Colline-Jorge Lavell, who was a friend of Witold Gombrowicz and who introduced him as a writer to France. He was in love with Polish culture. He offered me a job in the public theatre; designing newspapers, seasonal brochures, posters etc. So since then, in 1994, I started my career as a poster designer. And that's when all the knowledge about posters acquired in Poland and the whole poster story began to take shape in my projects [Interview 4, Painter, art editor, poster designer, Paris].

The point in time when an artist settles in a new place is another important factor. For example, an artist from Paris mentioned several times a brief but strong expansion of sympathy and support for Polish émigrés in early 1980s, after martial law was introduced in communist Poland on December 13, 1981. The time context evokes other significant issues, for instance what kind of artistic competence is required at a given time, what are the dominant fashions and trends, and how strong is the art market and economy of the country in question. All of these factors significantly affect one's career course. One of the artists mentioned this in his biographical story, as follows:

> I came in such a good moment for the American illustration, which was flourishing at that time, that I didn't have any difficult times financially, contrary to everyone else's experiences. Immediately I began to earn good money and I never had a moment that would make me take just any available job because of a lack of food. I was doing what I did in Poland, only in a much higher league, extra world-class, and not the fifth league in Poland. That was the difference [Interview 1. Painter, poster designer, New York].

However, early successes are hardly predictors of further career development. Only their long-term strengthening can create a more stable position for the artist. At the same time, lack of success does not have to denote the interruption of creative, artistic work, or weaken its intensity. Many artists experience something that could be called a "suspension of career". These artists usually manage to live on the periphery of the artistic world; they organize exhibitions or publish, but their work remains outside of the mainstream. This "suspension" has nothing to do with any artistic qualities, but refers primarily to the biographies of the artists, reconstructed on the basis of interviews. It should be emphasized that the "suspension" could be a temporary state, but may also become a kind of artistic/biographical strategy and turn into a permanent state. "Suspension" may have different reasons, not always clear even to the narrators themselves. This is illustrated in the following excerpt from a narration:

> For 10 years every day I've kept thinking I could handle this, but I haven't. I had my artistic works in the Drawing Centre, and they liked them very much, and I had my portfolio in the gallery, an important institution. But every year you must renew the portfolio and I haven't shown my face there for 10 years. I could even have had my drawings hung in a museum, but I stopped going there. I have no idea why [Interview 11. Painter, New York].

Another artist undergoing a period of "suspension" might continue his or her creative activity, but has to combine it with another line of work. However, art remains crucial for him/her; (s)he considers it a must to remain an artist and to develop his/her artistic path. Creative work thus becomes a kind of biographical

necessity, and the narrator strives for this continuation, in spite of life's trials and tribulations.

> I paint, actually for myself. I cannot imagine forgoing art; that would be a total disaster [Interview 13. Painter, New York].

A "suspension" might have many causes and many different variants. The reasons and course of this biographical process notwithstanding, it is always connected to a subjective sense of life satisfaction and individual self-esteem. Many émigré-artists didn't manage to repeat the successful artistic lives they enjoyed in Poland. For them, from an artistic point of view, emigration meant also disappointment. But as will be shown below, life satisfaction and the understanding of success are much more ambiguous than they seem.

LIFE SATISFACTION AND THE SUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING OF SUCCESS

Émigré-artists' life satisfaction is not simply a consequence of their professional success. Development of creative potency and an artistic career aside, it is also important to pursue other social roles – as a spouse, partner, parent, and so on. Next to art, what is very important in the ultimate life balance of many artists is the family and upbringing of children:

> It is also important to be fulfilled as a human being, to have children and a wife. It was important to me. It is my greatest happiness that I have a son and I shall have a daughter and perhaps another son. Somehow I am fulfilled as a human being who has a family. A child is like a memorial stone. Then you can do something more, but this is the base [Interview 9. Photographer, Paris].

Another artist understands success differently. As a writer who lives in Paris, success in life means mainly independence, manifested in having free time and achieving a stable level of financial security.

> I know what I want to do and I try to do it. Of course, I am filled with guilt and remorse that I'm doing it poorly and that I should do a lot more, but I worked out one tremendous thing, and I think many people can envy me this: I have time. I believe that this is the greatest treasure that can be achieved. This is independence. I don't complain about lack of money. I have a little – not too much, but enough for me. I hope it will be like this till the end of my life (...) [Interview 2. Writer, scientist, Paris].

This sense of independence is an extremely important issue which surfaces in many of the biographical stories recorded. However, in contrast to the passage above it is described more often as a goal than as something already achieved.

In fact, the ability to survive abroad is very often considered a success in itself. It was heavily stressed in the biographical stories of artists who emigrated from Poland in the 1970s and 1980s. For instance, the move from communist Poland to England in the early 1980s brought with it highly stressful systemic and cultural changes. A process of serious social and psychological transformation was required. A successful adaptation could thus become a source of satisfaction, considered by the narrators as a huge biographical success:

> When crossing from one system to another, because when I was leaving [Poland – T.F.] the system was still very Eastern there, and here it is very Western. It was so confusing that a person had to set his priorities again, and it takes an awfully long time, almost like being born and growing up again. So that is a success to me [Interview 2. Sculptor, London].

The metaphor of 'growing up' appeared several times, in different stories from different cities. In the initial stages of emigration, apart from administrative complications there is an entire set of other problems that need to be solved. This first period is typically fraught with difficulties and full of activities that are supposed to ease the emigrant's life; but all of this takes place under conditions that are unknown to the emigrant, who has to face an alien environment that he/she does not understand. All of which adds to his/her confusion.

Making it through this period of long and intense biographical work is emphasized in the stories as an extremely important achievement, a key experience in constructing a new identity of an immigrant. For young artists, migration becomes an important biographical experience of living in international, metropolitan surroundings. It is also a major life test, which may lead to a mental boost. Huge effort aside (which was repeatedly mentioned by artists in their narratives), they also described various biographical benefits of leaving their home country.

> I learned a lot and certainly I wouldn't have learned it in Poland. I'm more confident and probably stronger. Artistically I have more freedom. Here I have more opportunities; I'm able to relate to different parts of the world. I simply know more, and not only from books but from people [Interview 13. Poet, London].

Emigration is often described by young émigré artists as a process of biographical strengthening, conducive to self-discovery:

> I really got to know myself in London. For that I'm thankful to the city. I really got to know myself here [Interview 11. Photographer, London].

Representatives of the younger generation of Polish immigrants are able to move about more freely in a globalizing world, adjusting their life strategies to current conditions. Most of them have to work for a living and therefore they

cannot be full-time artists, but every one of the narrators makes an effort to find time and resources to keep his/her artistic work alive:

> Now is good. I have the comfort of stability. We go to work, come back, do not worry about money. We can afford to do what we do. After-hours, if we are not tired, we paint, for example [Interview 10. Painter, London].

An individual sense of failure and success is usually ambivalent and hard to clearly qualify. Objective signs of success, such as publications, exhibitions, positive reviews, sales of works, or an active presence in the field of artistic production are not necessary for an artist to feel a subjective satisfaction with the course of his/her career. However, the exactly opposite situation is also possible. Some artists who have achieved objective success depreciate their achievements to some degree. What at some stage of their careers was regarded as significant, over time becomes only a part of the stories of the past and no longer contributes in any significant way to the present. Thus, an objectively measurable success, even in the form of prestigious awards, publications in important opinion-forming journals, exhibitions in well-known galleries, etc., may bring with it ambiguous feelings as well. Such a thread was revealed in the story of an artist who, taking into account objective categories, achieved a considerable success, artistic and commercial alike.

> I developed a taste for the fact that I started to make money, the fact that I was doing important, visible things for *Newsweek*, the *New York Times*. You think you're on top of the world. Then it turns out that as you have another cover, no one really looks at it. You are part of the media machine, and you think that it is important [Interview 1. Painter, poster designer, New York].

In observing the careers of émigré artists we can distinguish several potential scenarios of building a successful career. Of course, these scenarios take different forms in individual cases, but we can indicate common elements that make it possible to speak about different degrees of artistic and professional success and several types of careers, and even more broadly about some biographical models. On one hand there are artists who have managed to seamlessly continue their professional and artistic careers, begun in Poland, and quite quickly settle into their new reality. On the other side of the spectrum, there are artists who have already completed a full professional education in Poland and then began their artistic career only after the migration, building it up gradually.

An artistic success is undoubtedly a consequence of talent, the work put into it, and originality of ideas; but talent and determination notwithstanding, an adequate confluence of events is also needed. Artists must encounter people (agents of the symbolic field, as Pierre Bourdieu would put it) who have an impact on what

happens in a given period in the fields of artistic production. Therefore, what is often mentioned in the narratives as an important factor for success is luck**,** which we can understand as a fortunate combination of all the factors mentioned above.

> Consistency, hard work – in being an artist this is 98 percent, the rest is luck [Interview 19. Painter, Paris].

An artist has to be seen at the hub of things and at the same time work intently, build a network of contacts, and be patient, waiting for the right favourable configuration of these factors. Although this does not guarantee success, it can at least provide an opportunity to present oneself and one's skills. This work on presentation opportunities was described in one of the stories. The key is to enter a suitable environment and try to be as close as possible to the field of artistic production in which the artist would like to participate.

> You have to be able to maximize the situation at the right moment. Know with whom it is worth it, and with whom it is not. And do what you can. Show what you have without being intrusive. In my dossier were my pictures from Poland, then I started taking pictures here. People liked them. At that time, still a boy, I had some talent, and I was aware of it. There was something in these pictures, and it helped me a lot. Not just my personality, but I had something on paper, as they say. Something that was not Polish, and it was not American – it was mine [Interview 3. Photographer, New York].

An artist must therefore gain an excellent understanding of the social world in which (s)he wants to participate, must know the distinguished artists, curators, art critics, collectors, and gallery owners who may at some point may become 'significant others'. An artist has to be recognized as original and worthy of being promoted by institutions of art. Success requires professionalism and mastery of technique, but apart from that social support is equally important. Finally, and what is probably key to success, he/she has to offer something expressly individual – an original aesthetic proposal.

In almost every single narrative success is defined differently. Sometimes artists in their biographical stories mention its objective dimensions, such as publications in prestigious journals, important exhibitions, selling or showing their works in important collections of art, or good reception of his or her works by the public. In other cases, success is defined as achieving independence and a strong position in the Art World, or achieving financial security (which is not always the same thing). An important, and in some cases a key aspect for the narrators is continuing their intellectual and artistic development.

> My success lies in the fact that I am who I am. I did not give up in the face of all this stress, failures. I'm only doing what I like; I make documentaries like I want to, not the way someone

> wants me to. I come up with them, or someone comes up with an idea and then I work on it. This is precisely success – and not the rewards, when someone happens to like a given idea at a given point in time [Interview 16. Director of documentary films, New York].

Another artist defines success similarly. In this case the primary determinant and sign of success is the ability to be completely focused on one's creative work:

> Success boils down to the fact that I do what I want. I have a strong feeling that everything is consistent, one thing comes from the other and vice versa [Interview 18. Graphic designer, New York].

One of the most important determinants of an artist's success is the ability to shape his/her future. This means, among other things, to have financial independence and, concomitantly, the possibility to choose one's place of residence. The ability to move freely, not only in the country of settlement but throughout the entire globe, is also crucial. Zygmunt Bauman calls it the freedom to choose one's routes in life. This means that "the main and decisive factor of stratification is nowadays freedom of choice" [Bauman 2000: 125]. This applies of course also to artists, maybe even to a greater extent than to other people.

CONCLUSIONS

The narrators revealed several strategies for developing their artistic careers. One of the crucial decisions that most of the artists had to concern themselves with was their relationship with the local Polish community and institutions of art. What was frequently repeated in their stories was the idea of separation from the Polish community, in both the social and artistic dimensions. Such declarations appeared in the narratives of artists living in each of the four cities. They emphasized that only an attempt to enter the local artistic environment could open up opportunities to move about in wider circles of reception. This applies especially to the artists dealing with the visual arts. The situation is different in the case of writers, although even in this situation exceptions might be observed. This is why we may distinguish artists who, despite remaining outside Poland, have oriented their artistic work to audiences in their country of origin (i.e. Poland), as well as those who focused on building their career in their new country of settlement. The latter path may also lead to the development of a global career and entry into the supranational system of cosmopolitan elites. Émigré artists have thus been able to develop three kinds of careers: oriented toward their country of origin (Poland); oriented toward their country of residence; and cosmopolitan-oriented. These three levels are not mutually exclusive, and we

may note their diachrony and synchrony. We have to keep in mind that for many Poles, the Polish community constitutes an important support structure, without which it would be extremely difficult for them to operate in their new country of settlement. This also applies to those artists who find their customers, potential buyers of their artistic works, and get all kinds of institutional support from the Polish émigré, ethnic community. For many artists this is the only chance of entry into the circulation system of institutions of art, even if its range may be limited to a narrow ethnic circle.

According to Nathalie Heinich, nowadays success in the arts is not only the ability to monetize one's work, but also being identified as a recognized artist. The peak of an artistic career is one's presence in major art institutions: museums, elite collections, or art academies. But a truly successful career, according Heinich, "is not expressed only in the possibility of imposing certain aesthetic solutions as mandatory on other artists, but also proposing to the future generations a real model in which both the individual artist and his work play an important role" [Heinich 2007: 112].

A subjective sense of success does not necessarily translate into objective manifestations (such as a position in the field of artistic production, a specific number of exhibitions, publications, etc.). On the other hand, objective signs of success do not necessarily mean an equal subjective feeling or considering it as an important achievement. Moreover, success is a concept that we cannot narrow down only to its professional or artistic dimension. Individual narrators define the concept of success differently, stressing different aspects and mixing its subjective and objective dimensions. The fate of those who have 'succeeded' may be understood only if we compare their stories with the stories of artists who remain on the periphery of the art world. Each of these cases is individual and escapes easy categorization or attempts to create a typology. This problem also applies to attempts to understand the category of success, which will change its meaning depending on the fate of individual artists. The ambiguity of this category, in the context of the biographical stories of artists, seems to be inevitable. This is mostly because this concept is so open to interpretation that it remains largely out of focus; each time requiring a more precise definition and concretization in relation to the biography and the circumstances of a given artist.

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Tomasz Ferenc

NIEJEDNOZNACZNOŚĆ „SUKCESU" NA PRZYKŁADZIE BIOGRAFICZNYCH OPOWIEŚCI POLSKICH ARTYSTÓW EMIGRANTÓW

Streszczenie

Jakie czynniki wpływają na artystyczny sukces? Jak interpretują go sami twórcy? W jaki sposób odnosi się to do artystów emigrantów? W artykule podjęta została próba odpowiedzi na te pytania. Odnosząc się do wyników badań biograficznych przeprowadzonych wśród polskich artystów emigrantów mieszkających w Berlinie, Nowym Jorku, Londynie i Paryżu ukazano wieloznaczność

terminu „sukces”. Ponieważ kategoria ta jest różnorodnie interpretowana przez narratorów za każdym razem musi być odnoszona do szerszego kontekstu biograficznego. W tekście wyodrębnione zostały obiektywne i subiektywne aspekty doświadczania sukcesu. Biorąc pod uwagę subiektywne odczucia, kategoria ta zmienia swoje znaczenie w zależności od losów indywidualnych twórców. Nie może także być zredukowana jedynie do wymiaru artystycznego, ponieważ inne aspekty życia artysty emigranta silnie z nią interferują. Wychodząc z założenia, że los tych którzy odnieśli sukces może zostać zrozumiany jedynie w kontekście losów tych, którzy pozostali na peryferiach świata sztuki w artykule przytoczone zostały wypowiedzi jednych i drugich twórców.

Słowa kluczowe: sukces, artyści emigranci, satysfakcja życiowa, biografia, działalność artystyczna

REVIEW

JERZY STACHOWIAK
University of Lodz*

Ulrich Bröckling, *The entrepreneurial self. Fabricating a new type of subject*, Sage Publications, London 2016, pp. 256

Is it possible for a sociologist to devote a book to something that does not exist? It is, and *The entrepreneurial self. Fabricating a new type of subject* falls exactly into that category. Ulrich Bröckling openly announces that the "entrepreneurial self" is a fiction, and for good reason.

The entrepreneurial self is the English-language edition of *Das unternehmerische Selbst*, Bröckling's German habilitation thesis, originally published in 2007. It is a highly interesting book, not only for sociologists, but also for researchers from many other scientific disciplines. In this thematically comprehensive and analytically complex work, Bröckling outlines the intellectual origins of contemporary neo-liberalism and its organizational, cultural and discursive manifestations. Some of the themes covered in the book have been developed by Bröckling on his own, while others borrow significantly from the oeuvre of Michel Foucault and his followers.

Bröckling's work emerges from the so-called 'governmentality studies'. This is a complex research perspective focused on modern forms of power over human populations. This approach avoids treating power as a means of control and as pressure from state institutions. Instead, it involves looking for ways in which power is realized through the practice of self-regulation and self-control undertaken by formally free people [Rose 2004; Czyżewski 2009; Bröckling,

* Research assistant, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, Institute of Sociology, Department of Research on Social Communication; e-mail: jerzy.stachowiak@uni.lodz.pl

Krasmann, Lemke 2011; Ostrowicka 2012]. The title/theme of "entrepreneurial self" is central to this approach and is derived from what Michel Foucault has called "the entrepreneur of himself" in *The birth of biopolitics* [2008].

Bröckling's contribution to the development of governmentality studies, and at the same time to the central theme of *The entrepreneurial self,* can be briefly expressed as follows. The "entrepreneurial self" is an interpellation to act, in all spheres of life, like an entrepreneur in business. The concept of interpellation is used here in the specific sense proposed by Louis Althusser [1971]. In simple terms, Bröckling says that representatives of numerous private and public institutions, authorities and consultants within various specialties promote and emphasize the value of the entrepreneurial mind-set as a general model attitude to life. This attitude is supposed to help people understand who they are, who they should be, and therefore how they should change to meet expectations. Contrary to its name, but in accordance with the direction of global social changes, this entrepreneurial self does not apply only in the world of business, although it does encourage cultivating its virtues. At a time when advocates of neo-liberalism succeeded in convincing others that a decent society is one that is organized like a company, modeling one's own actions to mirror those of an entrepreneur has become the quickest way to attain social recognition. Who is valued in a company if not the entrepreneur himself?

Contrary to appearances, the entrepreneurial self is not a state that can ever be fully achieved. The only thing possible is to maximize entrepreneurial qualities. Therefore, the interpellation discussed by Bröckling means, to put it briefly, admonishing and urging one to act as an entrepreneur. One should be constantly excited and ready for action, for calculating profits and losses, be highly creative, approach others as clients, always be willing to solve problems, make tireless and renewed attempts to achieve success, and remain resilient to adversity.

Bröckling presents a comprehensive outline of the eponymous entrepreneurial self in ten chapters. In the first one, *Genealogy of subjectification*, he refers to one of the key representatives of governmentality studies – Nikolas Rose – in order to exemplify his own research problem. *The entrepreneurial self* is meant to analyze the historical process of the formation, use, and legitimization of control over the behavior of individuals, ranging from institutional methods for leading people, the influence of "engineers of the soul" (personal trainers, counselors, therapists), to people's ways of defining who and what they are.

In the second chapter, *Tracing the contours of the entrepreneurial self*, Bröckling discusses in detail the entrepreneurial self as interpellation. He outlines

the socio-economic context of the significant dissemination of the discourse of entrepreneurship outside the sphere of economic activity. He also demonstrates discursive and non-discursive conditions that, over the years of erosion of the social-democratic welfare state and as a result of the formation of the so-called 'new economy', have been reinforcing the tendency to blur the differences between expectations for businesses, institutions, and individual subjects.

In the third chapter, Bröckling presents the post-Foucauldian view on the idea of neoliberalism. In the first section he explicates Foucault's interpretation of German ordoliberalism and the American human capital theory. In the latter section of the chapter, Bröckling presents his own discussion of the work of selected representatives of neoliberalism. He focuses on those whose ideas have had the most significant impact on the formation of the "entrepreneurial self". Thus he omits trends such as monetarism, public choice theory, or anarchocapitalism, even despite the fact that they also imply the need for subordination of society to market principles.

The fourth chapter presents the figure of the entrepreneur in typological terms. The scope of types Bröckling examines – speculator, innovator, risk bearer, and coordinator – partly overlap. This applies both to the source texts by economists (including Joseph Schumpeter, Ludwig von Mises, Israel M. Kirzner and Frank H. Knight), as well as their interpretation by Bröckling. Each of these types is, however, founded on what Bröckling calls a neo-liberal version of Kant's definition of Enlightenment. The author quotes Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons, educational scientists inspired by Foucault: "Unproductivity is the inability to make use of one's own capital without direction from another; this unproductivity is self-incurred when its cause lies not in the lack of human capital but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. *'Have courage to self-mobilise! Have the courage to use your own capital!'* is therefore the motto of entrepreneurship" [Bröckling 2016: 75].

The fifth chapter is a detailed presentation of the principle of contract: from market transactions and educational life, to its philosophical justifications. According to Bröckling, the regime of contract corresponds with interpellation to act like an entrepreneur, if only in the sense that being an entrepreneur is considered as being constantly active and rationally calculating one's own success in contacts with others.

At the beginning of the sixth chapter, *Creativity*, Bröckling notes that: "Faith in the creative potential of the individual is the secular religion of the entrepreneurial self." Bröckling derives that religion from sociological and anthropological, as well as – mutually corresponding – psychological and economic concepts of

creativity. Psychology makes it possible to apply the category of creativity to micro- and macroeconomic issues. Economics, on the other hand, teaches about measurable benefits of investing in the so-called creative potential. Bröckling demonstrates how the contemporary market is a system of criteria separating "useful creativity" – that serves business productivity – from "useless creativity" – that goes against the grain of economic requirements.

In the seventh chapter, entitled *Empowerment*, Bröckling traces the origins, political orientation and transformations of the idea of empowerment. Its modern capacity is characterized by a series of paradoxical properties. Firstly, on one hand it is omnipresent; but on the other – it presupposes the existence of a significant deficiency, the need to fill a major gap. Secondly, contrary to the unequivocally positive connotations of the notion, empowerment is a form of directing control over someone else's behavior. Today, empowering people almost always involves making them follow the rules of productivity and business profitability.

Bröckling opens chapter eight, *Quality*, with the remark that entrepreneurship is primarily so-called 'quality management'. Quality, of course, in the dual sense of the word: relating to the characteristics of people and things, and at the same time to their specifically understood values. Bröckling focuses on discussing two techniques meant to define quality in such diverse varieties of its existence – as the quality of processes, results, interpersonal relationships, or the appearance of products. The first is the Total Quality Management (TQM); and the second is 360-degree feedback. Bröckling sees 360-degree feedback as a democratic panopticon and thus as a good object for a study on contemporary forms of power. This is because 360-degree feedback focuses on all four aspects of what Foucault called "moral conduct", a conduct that conforms to cultural codes and expectations, i.e.: (a) which aspects of the person is the object of work on self; (b) in what way people are made to recognize the obligation to conduct themselves in a certain manner; (c) which techniques are used to do so; and (d) what purpose it should serve [Bröckling 2016: 163].

In the ninth chapter, entitled *Projects*, Bröckling presents a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of "project." The contemporary, yet very general meaning of the term, generally evokes an association with work outside the rigors of a typical power hierarchy. "Project" work used to be also understood as attractive in the sense that it weakens the boundary between work and private life. These characteristics of "project" work lead Bröckling towards references to the notion of the "new spirit of capitalism." To some extent, *The Entrepreneurial Self* is a post-Foucauldian approach to a problem similar to that which Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello covered in *The New Spirit of Capitalism* [2007].

Both these sociological works address, *inter alia*, a new cultural pattern of the expected subject and were conceived as a representation of local (German in one case, French in the other) manifestations of trends disseminated globally. Bröckling emphasizes the profound relationship between the ideal of constant activity, analyzed by Boltanski and Chiapello, and the "entrepreneurial self." The chapter ends with remarks on "Project Me" self and "Me Inc.", which are terms meant to characterize people for whom every activity in their lives, from work, rest, health, to contacts with others, has become a "project" to be implemented.

Against the background of the contemporary popularity of governmentality studies, the tenth chapter stands out the most. To a large extent, it is precisely because of this concluding chapter that *The entrepreneurial self* is particularly worthy of special attention. It includes not only a summary of the previous (critical) sections of the book, but also a handful of prospective remarks, rarely formulated by post-Foucauldian scholars. Bröckling considers the possibility of breaking free of the regime of the "entrepreneurial self," a variant of an escape from its rigors. To this end, he formulates the idea of "the art of being different differently." Although the German-language original of the book was published nearly ten years ago, this very interesting theoretical proposal has been almost entirely overlooked by representatives of governmentality studies. This omission cannot be explained by the propaedeutic nature of the discussion of Bröckling's idea. In Bröckling's view, the specificity of the entrepreneurial self causes actions undertaken to counterbalance this form of power to be possible only temporarily. This, in turn, means that their description can only be very general in nature. To recall the definition of Michel de Certeau, the program of liberating from the entrepreneurial self can only take the form of a tactic, not a strategy.

What makes Bröckling's book stand out among other works on governmentality studies is the scope of its theoretical ambition. It goes far beyond the more or less effectual demystification of what is generally regarded as an indisputable civilization achievement of Western culture. Bröckling attempts something more: he tries to define a certain attitude, which would be a positive response to the ubiquity of the "entrepreneurial self." Given the scope of the cultural legitimacy of entrepreneurial attitudes and "project work", this task is particularly difficult. How is one to become free from neoliberal forms of power which refer to the need to restrict government? Is it possible, while looking for ways to break out of the regime of the "entrepreneurial self" to rely on the same idea of freedom that the regime uses for its own sake? Bröckling posits that in searching for answers to these questions one needs to consider "the art of being different differently." The whole final chapter of the book is devoted to the consideration of various aspects

and potential opportunities resulting from this attitude, as well as the conditions necessary for its actual adoption.

The entrepreneurial self is thought-provoking – it is an extensive and important commentary on the ubiquitous incentives and admonishments to live one's life the way an entrepreneur acts in business. But Bröckling's book also raises critical questions of a meta-methodological nature, and it might be worthwhile to look at them in the context of *The entrepreneurial self*. There are at least two themes that can be addressed.

The first is that the "entrepreneurial self" is treated as an interpellation. Such an interpretation has one major advantage: it allows Bröckling to develop his argument in a way that does not make the subject of his examination a static entity (e.g. the state of things, a form of work organization, social status), lending it instead a historical and processual quality. It is a valuable incentive to tackle the problem of the so-called 'real fictions' which, according to Bröckling, should be examined within the framework of the strategy he defines as speculative empiricism. Readers who can overcome the daunting first impression that these seeming oxymorons make will see them in time as a chance to go beyond such dichotomies, organizing typical sociological thinking as structure-process or agency-determinism.

At the same time, however, these supposed advantages entail some problems. Approaching the "entrepreneurial self" as interpellation (in the sense discussed above) indicates that the reader is faced with a dilemma, the solution of which should have been proposed by Bröckling himself. Such a reader will need to choose between two options. The first would require him/her to assume that interpellation belongs to the field of communication acts. Therefore, its properties should be analyzed exclusively in the field of discourse. At the core of the second option is the assumption that the concept of interpellation is a stylistic ellipse. Thus, one would have to conclude that such an ellipse conceals the implicit link of Bröckling's interests in discursive and non-discursive phenomena.

Both options, however, lead to a dead end. Following the first, one would have to treat unfairly both the means of coordinating a collective work, such as Total Quality Management, and the writings of neoliberalism classics as qualitatively equivalent interpellations. Opting for the second variant, one might mistakenly conclude that the overall methodologies of governance and strategies of power associated with the entrepreneurial self can be reduced to an ellipse, defined by Bröckling as "interpellation."

Another important meta-methodological theme can be called a 'post-Foucauldian paradox'. Drawing on Foucault's methods of work requires taking into

account the fact that over time he changed his own theoretical ideas, reformulating them and abandoning some subjects for new ones. Except for his conviction that power is (literally) everywhere, that is, the idea that – interestingly – achieved the status of a universally applicable axiom in his historicizing perspective, Foucault was not particularly attached to most of his ideas. In this context, governmentality studies (gaining more and more popularity) stand out in an intriguing contrast to the amount of attention Foucault himself devoted to governmentality. Foucault studied governmentality for two years in his lectures, and later moved on to other issues. His interest in neoliberalism was even more short-lived. At the same time, Foucault did not provide guidance about which subjects should be dropped and when to tackle new ones. Attempts at being a post-Foucauldian scholar should include this issue.

And if so, some crucial questions arise, namely: Does being a post-Foucauldian scholar require dealing with different research problems than Foucault? To what extent can one aspire to become a post-Foucauldian scholar and model oneself on Foucault at one and the same time? To put it bluntly: When trying to follow in the footsteps of Foucault, who studied forms of knowledge and subordination to discourses of authorities, do his followers unexpectedly submit to the irresistible authority of their teacher?

The entrepreneurial self provides arguments both for those who would see it as an important study, expanding the scope of interest of sociology, and those who would rather accuse Bröckling of being blinded by Foucault. After all, Bröckling starts his inquiry from the Foucauldian problem of the 'entrepreneur of himself' and translates it into the notion of the 'entrepreneurial self'. Having accomplished an extensive and multi-faceted examination of this problem, he formulates the answer in the form of the so-called "art of being different differently."

It must be mentioned that Bröckling offers plenty of valuable insights on this occasion. Among them is his comment that the entrepreneurial self is a special peculiarity of our time. On one hand, it is a collection of opposites of clinical depression, while on the other – a short path leading to it. Referring to the French sociologist Alain Erhrenberg [2010], Bröckling indicates that the negative of the entrepreneurial self is to evoke an overwhelming sense of overload, fatigue, helplessness and fear of failure. This prompts the association with a theme Erich Fromm [2011] addressed in the mid-twentieth century. He noted that our civilization is heading in a direction where to be considered "normal" one needs to exhibit psychological traits that are essentially pathological. Fromm would be likely to say that the Janus face of the "entrepreneurial self" is the pathology of normalcy of the turn of the century.

Moreover, Bröckling argues that while depression (in addition to dependency and addictions) is indeed the dark side of the regime of the "entrepreneurial self," at the same time it is an effective, albeit destructive for the individual, form of weakening it. Another weapon against interpellation is ironic distance. This allows one to reduce the principles of the business world to the absurd, and thus deprive them of their earlier seriousness. The third way to escape the "entrepreneurial self" is passive resistance, as discussed by Bröckling using the example of experimental social practices of the Berlin activist group, The Happy Unemployed.

It is certainly worthwhile to follow Bröckling's lead and attempt to formulate answers to the social consequences of the entrepreneurial self. Bröckling notes himself, however, that even the three options of resistance he listed do not guarantee success. Depression destroys one mentally, irony does not change the object of derision, and the principle of idleness got commodified over time [Bröckling 2016: 204]. As a result it looks like opponents of the entrepreneurial self cannot count on virtually any promising tactics of resistance. For these reasons, it is worthwhile to take a step back and return to the premises of what Bröckling calls "the art of being different differently." This leads, of course, to Foucault and the so-called "art of not being governed like that, not by that, in the name of those principles" described by him in *What is critique?* [1997]. From this perspective, we can say that Bröckling starts with Foucauldian premises and, after a long time (about 230 pages of the book), arrives at Foucauldian conclusions. The final result in fact reflects a need for further exploration of ways to critically disobey the entrepreneurial self. Therefore, when compared to Foucault's general normative guidelines, Bröckling seems to be "different but not that differently."

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