Metaphysics in the shackles of asteiology
Will the dog crush heron’s leg, or will the heron pluck out the dog’s eyes? – an array of possible decodings of this animalistic drama appears in the logical-ontological space of the image. However, an image does not participate in any of the worlds it implies. This visual asteism shows that the ontological participation is different from the metaphysical. Thus, the problem of metaphysical participation will not be solved by the logical-rhetorical trope of diaporesis that Abraham Hondius used to achieve almost an isocephaly in this struggle between what is high-flying and what is mundane or – perhaps – between metaphysics and asteiology. We find a paradigmatic display of this struggle in the Parmenides, where the One was wittily juxtaposed with idea of ... dust. Moreover, in the case of analogy of being, the diaporia is also an aporia, since analogia entis as analogy as such must be ultimately understood analogically (sic!), and thus asteiologically. And this is not a mistake of ignotum per ignotum but a good solution to our problem (an euporia), which is unlikely to satisfy ontology seeking an evidentialist truth. Such a conclusion would be potentially important for asteiology as the ingenium theory, which traces its subreptions also to metaphysics.