Kazimierz Piotrowski
Władysław Strzemiński Academy of Fine Arts in Łódź
kazimierz.piotrowski@neostrada.pl

METAPHYSICS IN THE SHACKLES OF ASTEIOLOGY

Abraham Hondius, *Dog fighting Heron*, 1667, oil on canvas, 135 x 115 [156 x 135] cm, National Museum in Warsaw, M. Ob. 446 MNW, Copyright by Piotr Ligier.
Abstract: Will the dog crush heron’s leg, or will the heron pluck out the dog’s eyes? – an array of possible decodings of this animalistic drama appears in the logical-ontological space of the image. However, an image does not participate in any of the worlds it implies. This visual asteism shows that the ontological participation is different from the metaphysical. Thus, the problem of metaphysical participation will not be solved by the logical-rhetorical trope of diaporesis that Abraham Hondius used to achieve almost an isocephaly in this struggle between what is high-flying and what is mundane or – perhaps – between metaphysics and asteiology. We find a paradigmatic display of this struggle in the Parmenides, where the One was wittily juxtaposed with idea of ... dust. Moreover, in the case of analogy of being, the diaporia is also an aporia, since analogia entis as analogy as such must be ultimately understood analogically (sic!), and thus asteiologically. And this is not a mistake of ignotum per ignotum but a good solution to our problem (an euporia), which is unlikely to satisfy ontology seeking an evidentialist truth. Such a conclusion would be potentially important for asteiology as the ingenium theory, which traces its subreptions also to metaphysics.

Keywords: analogy, asteiology, ingenium, metaphysics, participation of being, subreption

The term asteiology – used here1 – was dictated by the demands to reread the Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s project of aesthetics as a normative theory of wit2. At the present stage of studies, asteiology is understood contextually, according to different research objectives born out of reflection on ingenium. This new discipline is unmistakably becoming more important in the studies on asteiological themes (ingenia) in various fields of knowledge, art, and technology, including its logics and epistemes. The ingenium also is trying to capture discourse of metaphysics, what is particularly visible in the theory of being participation and related with it theory of analogy.

1 The phrase ἀστειολογία appeared in Rhetoric to Alexander (1434 a 33), currently attributed to Anaximenes of Lampsakos. It means ingenuity and refinement while speaking, following the recommendation ἀστεία λέγειν (22, 1434 a), also in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (3, 10–11). Asteiology occurs among Fabulae palliatae by Gnaeus Naevius, probably referring to The Art of Wit – cf. The Cambridge History of Classical Literature. II Latin Literature, E. J. Kenney and W. V. Clausen (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge USA 1996, p. 803. The term also functioned in Byzantium, according to the peripatetic tradition, collaterally with a virtue of tactful wit (εὐτραπελία), avoiding rusticity (ἀγρικα) and clownfish (βωμολοχία), as in the comments of Archbishop Aretas of Caesarea Mazaca in Cappadocia – see: A. Pizzzone, Toward a Byzantine Theory of Comic, in: Greek Laughter and Tears. Antiquity and After, M. Alexiou and D. Cairns (eds), Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2017, pp. 146-165, p. 160.

Analogy is a key tool of metaphysics. Analogy – as purportedly a more faithful one to abstract-clear-cut cognition – founds metaphysical discourse since it has been freed from the monistic simplifications of Ionian physicists of nature and the first attempts to reduce plenty of plural being to some abstract aspects of reality, what has been accomplished by the Eleatics, Pythagorean and finally atomistic philosophers. Analogy – as a achievement of Greek logical-mathematical culture, operating a possibility of predicating about some things in view of state of its multiplication, applied by Plato to the ideas theory in his mimetics, dialectics and mythology, perfected by Aristotle in the theory of being as analogy of attribution – constituted a leading modus intelligendi in the realistic current of mature scholastics. We are talking primarily about the crucial being analogy (analogia entis) of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Until today metaphysicians of this tradition protect their exceptional understanding of being analogy against a reduction of it to linguistic, logical or aesthetic issues. Analogy of being is a far greater problem than metaphor which performs only heuristic function or it is a tool of channeling emotions etc., especially in religious or artistic thinking. Analogizing is a crucial act, by which cognition of being complexity takes place – the cognition of necessary relations, first the internal – essential and existential – relations of being. This reference implies a problem of beings participation in the Being (Absolute). Being – in its contingent complexity – requires a consistent explanation of its existence as seeking real, non-contradictory arguments for the plurality of being: firstly by reference to the universum of things (esse per participationem), and finally to the Absolute as the Existence (esse per essentiam).

It seems that so far the classical metaphysics had not presented this bond satisfactorily. It could not – precisely because of the analogizing procedure. It raises an accusation that metaphysics is doing so intentionally (aequivoca a consilio), giving up other methods of cognition. Hence the post-classical or non-classical attempts of addendum or replacement of analogy by any unambiguously type of knowledge and more experiential (evidential) way of problem demonstrating, referring to Platonism, Neo-Platonism, Augustinism or Scotism, and inspired by the subject philosophy (German objective idealism) and its derivatives, as phenomenology developing theory of possible objects, that is the invention of ontology made by Jacob Lorhard in 1606.

This does not mean that the question of metaphysical analogy has been annulled by this subjectivist will to seeing. In particular, the Lublin Philosophical School defends the thomistic deposit from the 1950s, developing theory of being analogy. Analogy in the Polish Neo-Thomism is a basis for realism of co-

---

gnition, securing ontic pluralism which derives from common-sense intuitions hidden inside firstfruits of common parlance as a natural basis for the analogically understood transcendental quasi-concepts (the abbreviations of systems of various existential judgments) as being (ens), thing (res), unity (unum), individuality (aliquid), truth (verum), good (bonum), and beauty (pulchrum). The transcendentalia theory – developed in the centuries – remains imperturbable despite the competition from various philosophical schools that brought the modern and post-modern times including their participation theories. According to the participation theory of Father Mieczysław Albert Maria Krąpiec, composition of being – act and potency, substance and accidents, form and matter, essence and existence – is analogously proportional, that is, essence and existence are different in every being but the proportion of compound is preserved.

Father Krąpiec drew attention to the distinctiveness of analogous cognition in relation to other types of knowledge: *It happens that one does not differentiate between strictly analogical cognition and apparently analogical cognition - and, indeed, unambiguous cognition, where analogousness occurs only in the external structure - which is isomorphy or homomorphism [...]. In the case of isomorphy, it is recognized identical, usually quantifiable quantitative relations between correlates (for example 2 : 4 = 3 : 6); in the case of homomorphism, it is recognized a similarity itself, and therefore a pure convergence in qualities (for example wings of bird - wings of house). In analogy and analogical cognition existing relationships are not and can not be determined and unambiguously included, because they are not detached from being with all its specific contents*. In conclusion, analogy best demonstrates its cognitive qualities not in abstract-unambiguous cognition of logical-mathematical type, nor in the definitions of its variations, where the expression analogy gains some connotation and denotes or designates the specific acts of analogical cognition, but in metaphysical knowledge. Analogy is best understood in metaphysical experience, when we affirm in existential judgment the existential pluralism – in the one but analogically understood transcendental concept of being. In the methodology of metaphysics, it is recommended to use the term concept of being cautiously because it is not – basically – a question of concept but of concrete, existing being. Thus, analogy should not be definitively identified unambiguously with some object as a construct of abstract-unambiguous cognition. Therefore, the ratio analogiae is based on order of things, and not just on order of names (per prius that is on a priori denomination, and per posterius that is on predicating

---

of name based on experience of similarity between things or on recognition of some other relationship to first thing), as argued by the reductionists in their interpretation of the analogy concept of St. Thomas Aquinas\(^5\). This is why analogy guarantees autonomy of the so-called first philosophy (metaphysics), also in relation to evidentialism of ontology with its possible (non-contradict) worlds, and especially to unambiguous language of science, especially mathematics and natural sciences, unable to penetrate the structure of being. The metaphysical analogy - derived from the de facto existing being - is an intelligible order of being and at the same time a tool of mind thanks to which being is explained by the real non-contradictory arguments and not petrified.

This existential modernization of Thomism, cleansing it from the essentialist being conception of Duns Scotus and other influences, was an important bastion of metaphysics, especially in Poland during the post-war domination of aggressive state Marxism or cultural Neo-Marxism, and now used as an alternative to postmodernism, inspires respect for unique possibility of dealing with the living tradition of the classical philosophy of being.

The *ingenium* as an analogon rationis

Ever since the rhetorical concept of *ingenium* has been introduced to the discourse of philosophy by Marcus Tullius Cicero, it began to bring as much benefit as damage. Thanks to its translation into modern languages, since the Renaissance, thanks to this Latin relic, it has been possible to understand identity of thing (*identitas*) and similarity (*similitudo*) between things despite their diversity (*diversitas*). There was obvious competition for such concepts as intuition (Greek: *epibole*, Latin: *intuitia*, *intitus*) or reason (*nous, intellectus primorum principiorum*). The modern translation of *ingenium* referred to the source of *wit* and *der Witz*, derived from Old German *wizzi* (know) and initially understood as a spiritual cleverness or an ability of fast, understanding seeing, a fruit of which is practical knowledge or wisdom (*Klugheit*). Therefore, *wit* or *der Witz* - as an innate talent (*Mutterwitz*) - originally defined the limits of human adaption to the requirements of life\(^6\). Nevertheless, *ingenium* was recognized as dangerous in its original acts because of their irreducible, achrematic absurdity, as evidenced by the criticism of wit activity. Critics demanded control of wit by

---


power of judgment (Latin: *iudicium*), warning that wit – run wild – turns out to a *kind of madness*. It was confirmed, however, that an instance must appear, which could soften this agon or convert wit into a *good fancy*. As a result, the *ingenium* was opposed to the *acumen*, understood as a sharpness (*Scharfsinn*). The concept of wit in the strict sense was distinguished (*ingenium strictius dictum*), defined as an ability to perceive identity of thing (*habitus identitatem rerum observandi*). Wit is able to capture things in the aspect of their identity, that is, similarities, compatibility, equality, rational proportions – despite their multiplicity, diversity, and heterogeneity. And vice versa, the *acumen* performs a different work as an ability to detect in things what distinguishes them from one another (*habitus diversitates rerum observandi*). The *ingenium* recognizes similarity in diversity and the *acumen* discovers diversity in similarity. These faculties of mind were tried to combine as an *acutum ingenium*, reintegrating the earlier understanding of the *ingenium* as a perfect view of things in their material plenitude (*ubertas materiae*) to separate reliable sensory cognition from fictitious invention, that is from the activity of wit itself, including its all games (*ingenii (fetus) lusus*), including errors, illusions or even subtle scams and vain arguments (*falsae subtillitates inanes argutationes*). Although in their invention sharpness is involved, but it does not speak in its own name (*aesthetica mythica*). On the contrary, the combination of these abilities in soul in the form of *acutum ingenium* makes it to think deeply, perspicaciously (*perspicacia*): both sensually, because something like a *sensory thinking* exists, and – of course – intellectually. Soul is capable not only of a skilful insight into identity and similarity of things, but also of a subtle – knowing differences – insight. The *ingenium* and *acumen* – located in the domain of sensuality as an *ingenium sensitivum* and *acumen sensitivum* – co-create (together with the *memoria sensitiva*, *facultas fingendi*, *facultas diiudicandi*, that is the *iudicium sensitivum*, expectatio casuum similium and *facultas characteristica sensitiva*, what makes the complex together as an *analogon rationis*) the basic theoretical ability as a sensual ability to witty and at the same time as a smart insight – imagination and presumption. Furthermore, wit was also considered not only in the context of sensual thinking as an *analogon rationis*, but also as a *habitus* of reason (*ratio*) as an *ingenium intellectuale* next to the *acumen intellectuale*, *memoria intellectualis* (*personalitas*), *iudicium intellectuale*, *praesagito intellectualis* (*providentia*), and *facultas characteristica intellectualis*. The *ingenium* was therefore extremely appreciated. Hence is this superposition – the *ingenium sensitivum* and *ingenium intellectuale*. If logic would take care of the cuteness (the *acumen intellectuale* would be the first in the series of abilities founding the *ratio*) as an art of strict reasoning

---

7 K. Piotrowski, *Acutum ingenium*, op. cit.
based on logical division, and thus guided by the real truth, esthetics as an *ars analogi rationis* and *ars pulcre cogitandi* (where beauty is an *analogon veritatis*) would educate wit, because the *ingenium sensitivum* occupies the prime place in the sensuality complex of the *analogon rationis*. Aesthetics – *per analogiam* – would extend the acquired by logic clarity of cognition to a sensual thinking. Hence the implantation of a twig from the trunk of *acumen* in the *ingenium*. Wit gains the support, which allows it to grow as a *perspicacia* straight into beauty. The *pulchritudo* as a *consensus phenomenon* is the metaphysical ground of aesthetics, where the *acutum ingenium* is transformed into a mature form as an *ingenium venustum*.

It also pointed at the important function of the *ingenium latius dictum*, that is wit in the wider sense as a compositional ability, determining the desired proportion not only between products of cognition, but also between faculties of soul. In this composing wit organizes both the objective diversity – objects, materials, as well as the subjective diversity of spirit and person. The extensive plentitude of human cognition or spirit (*ubertas ingeni*) is captured by the *ingenium latius dictum*, constituting the logical horizon – the field of reason and intellect, and the aesthetic horizon – the field analogous to reason, illuminated by its light, or the horizon shaped by the *acutum ingenium*. Depending on proportions created by wit, this composed complex is either refreshing (*vegetum*) or slow (*tardum*), whereby wit can transform both mind states in one or other direction by excitation or its weakening. The ideal is invention of a harmonious state that excludes state of permanent agitation or sloth. A proper pattern is beauty here, that not only appeals to soul (*vis appetitiva*) but also stimulates contemplation. It is an obviousness grounded in the natural ability of whole soul to beautiful thinking (*dispositio naturalis animae totius ad pulcre cogitandum*). The *ingenium latius dictum* expresses itself in the harmoniously shaped disciplines: *ingenia empirica, historica, poetica, divinatoria, critica, philosophica, mathematica, mechanica, musica* etc., that man could complete with his works the most perfect state of the world (*mundus perfectissimus*), participating in the pre-established harmony (*systema harmoniae praestabilitae*). Undoubtedly, also from these ingenious aesthetic and regulatory acts flows the diversity of metaphysical experiences and the multiplicity of incommensurable metaphysical systems in which truth does not appear unambiguously, but just analogically, because in it to some extent these systems participate.

**The subreption of analogy (and *ingenium*)**

Nevertheless, such highly appreciated analogy, both in the classical metaphysics and in the rationalist trend of the German philosophy of subject, which preferred ontology as a theory of possible (non-contradictory) objects and has
generated aesthetics as an asteiology, raises many questions. Undoubtedly, analogy is a fascinating tool of cognition and it touches on the core of the problem of participation. Analogy – defined as a *dissimilar similarity* – considered in the logical supposition seems to have a disjunctive form, because it is neither a recognition of identity nor a statement of difference between things. On the other hand, in analogy is important its inclusive power, which is used by metaphysics, because analogy indicates the relative, complex unity of being. Analogy thus combines the refutative and confirmative functions of predicating. It is also claimed that analogy – despite its variations – must be ultimately understood in the same way – analogously (sic!): *However, analogy itself is analogous*\(^8\). This surprising thesis of Fr. Krapiec produces the performative aporia. Because if analogy in the logical supposition has a disjunctive form, and in the epistemological supposition is a diaporia, this approach to analogical thinking will also not give a positive result, but another doubt.

However, in this conclusion there is nothing shocking from the point of view of logical semantics, to refer to the famous distinction in the *Über Sinn und Bedeutung* (1892) of Gottlob Frege\(^9\). It can be argued that analogy is included in the set of names that have sense, but they do not have reference, because the enumeration of particular variations of analogy can not be considered as its reference. Analogy has such status in the logical semantics as propositional functions that are grammatically well-constructed, and they have sense, but ultimately expressions used in them mean nothing. Frege demonstrated it on the example of the mathematical expression a *slowest convergent series*. This expression makes sense, but it can be proved that it has not reference, because we can always use the new indexing to construct a new function that will generate an *even slower convergent series*, and so on forever. Thus, we can enumerate varieties of analogy (its sense): 1. the analogy of being (internal-ontic, that is, in being itself, and inter-ontic, between beings); 2. the analogy of cognition (of metaphor, assignment – attribution, general and transcendental proportionality); 3. the analogy of predicating; 4. the analogy of inference (heuresis). But there is no reference of analogy, because it must be understood analogously. The sense of potential establishing of meaning along with its postponement – and therefore its actual absence – is inherent in analogy, which leads to the aporia.

The asteiological tradition points to this dimension of the subreption of analogy, which manifests itself when we oppose the productive wit of the well-established knowledge that knows the justification for its principles of thin-
king. The *ingenium* – in its comparative function, motivated by pure pleasure from finding similarities between heterogeneous things, creating material for further production of strict concepts of abstract-unambiguous or metaphysical cognition – produces in this disinterested play the resistance of wit to this type of regulated knowledge, because not all material is suitable for use in unambiguous or analogous cognition guided by the various interests of power of judgment (*iudicium*). These unproductive residues of productive wit – that is proposals that can not be transformed into well-established views – are to be used in accordance with the program of sensuality apologia, what wit is doing in its argumentative function (*ingenium argutans*), that is, using rules to extend the applicability of achrematic material through pragmatization of remnants of comparative wit, but without knowing a justification for these principles\(^{10}\). Thus, the activity of the *ingenium argutans* is a kind of resonance, because it is based on a robbery, using in its pragmatic argumentation various principles that do not belong to its domain. Pragmatization – using clever theft – broadens the scope of freedom of thinking about the dimension of argumentative or resonant thinking. The ability to pragmatize becomes a test for the mind aspiring to be acute (*perspicax*). Thereby, wit becomes the unique power, which has not every person, because it is different from the cognition belonging to domain of power of judgment or reason. The essence of argumentative-resonant thinking of the *ingenium argutans* is a subreption and a lack of grounding, caused eventually by this that in the case of *ingenium* activity we are dealing with a game without grounds. Analogy has the same form as a punch line defined as a *consistent inconsistency* or an *inconsistent consistency*, related to concepitive activity of wit.

This juxtaposition of participation of being with the aesteiological reflection on *ingenium* shows that they are connected by the problem of analogy. The question then arises, whether the classical metaphysics with its elevation of analogy serves as foundation for the *ingenium* theory, but because of the analogical – diapoeretic and aporetic – understanding of analogy, metaphysics duplicates the activity of *ingenium argutans*, and thus is itself part of aesteiology? Is metaphysics a participative exploration of the thaumaturgic power of *ingenium* rather than of the classical understood theoretical reason (*nous theoretikos*)?

If the confirmative-refutational relation in the act affirming identity and diversity of things is to appear in analogy, then it must itself be an establishment of some regulative idea (such as *unity* or *being*) in which these opposites of identity and difference, or similarity and dissimilarity, must be reconciled momentarily, at the same time disappearing completely as opposites appearing as relative in *dissimilar similarity*. Thanks to this annihilation of opposites, it is possible to present such an idea not only in analogized things, but also in

---

analogy itself. In this sense, the idea of analogy is something negative because in it, as in a rallying point, opposites become weakened and somehow lost, and this tendency is called *ingenium*. That is why asteiology suggested that wit should be combined with overviewing – with an aesthetic, figurative or symbolic dimension of thinking and understood as something artistic, which is born of an artistic mood\(^\text{11}\). Neither above mentioned view is merely symbolic, nor wit is only allegorical one, because in each of them there is a point in which acts of symbolization and allegoresis unite. Wit finds an idea only after the abolition of opposites and it motivates itself to the consciousness of idea. Opposites in this witty approach no longer have objective status, but they are regarded as opposites in human consciousness in which idea is generated. Opposites can not be sharp here, because the acts of symbolization and allegoresis do not come out of extreme positions, but from the center of reason which is fantasy. In this center, idea is a unity and an equivalence of concept and phenomenon, a generality and a detail. This is the dialectics of artisticism, which ultimately must participate in the analogously understood being, however the metaphysical analogy – as inherently necessary – is opposed to the unnecessary analogy, including artistic one\(^\text{12}\).

*Therefore, metaphysics has an asteiological dimension, just as asteiology has a metaphysical domain. Metaphysics raises the question of the ontic sense of analogy, which implies the issue of subreption of *ingenium* as a basis of analogue thinking. According to the classical theory of participation, which indicates participation of somethin imperfect (complex, conditioned, contingent) in the perfect (henological, unconditioned, absolute) one, the *ingenium* participates in the higher faculties of the mind (power of judgment or reason). But even in some declared representatives of realism, who cut themselves off from the modern tradition of ontology and asteiology, the *ingenium* sometimes binds their mind. I once heard in 1985 or 1986 at the Father Krąpiec’s lecture on metaphysics that the world is crystallization of God’s thought. Such implicatio – in the mouth of this enemy of idealism – seemed to me a curiosity. Perhaps, it was only the expression of the difficulties that Thomists have with their theory of participation – still at the development stage?\(^\text{13}\).

Even one might risk putting forward the thesis that the classical metaphysics along with its theory of being participation has been tied by a quasi-sopi-

---


\(^{12}\) Ibidem, pp. 224-225.

stic asteism. Those who are satisfied with theory of analogy do not go beyond what is said in the first question that was asked by Socrates in the Platonic Parmenides: What is your meaning, Zeno? Do you maintain that if being is many, it must be both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like – is that your position? This game with similarity and dissimilarity implies the issue of analogy and ingenium in its comparative function. What is a difference here between Krąpiec, who acknowledged that analogy permeates the whole structure of being, and for example ... Friedrich Schlegel? According to him: Alles ist Witz und überall ist Witz. Paraphrasing the formula of Saint Thomas: multa habent proportionem ad unum, it may be said: multa habent proportionem ad ingenium. The ingenium is both in the things and it allows to capture their specific identity and transcendental unity. Because of this unique position of analogy in metaphysics, should it not be based on asteiology as an ingenium theory? Of course, such a metaphysical theory of ingenium should only be created. For it is not enough to say that analogy in a colloquial sense has heuristic and ordering qualities. We have seen that analogy as a dissimilar similarity and understood analogically is devoid of reference, but it makes sense as the One in Parmenides’ henology: And thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either in relation to itself or other? [...] Neither will the one be like anything or unlike itself or other. The problem of participation as a theory of what is conditioned in being, implies in the Parmenides the problem of what is unconditioned, that as the One does not participate in anything – neither in the same (tauton) nor in the other (thateron). The traces of this concept can even be found in the Thomistic theory of participation based also on the reductio ad unum, whereby the disjunctive (refutational) formula of analogy changed into the confirmative one. The One is here understood in two ways depending on modi essendi of concrete being – esse per participationem (analytical and conditioned one of contingent beings) and esse per suam essentiam (absolute, unconditioned One).

Also in art, ingenium creates visual concepts that reveal what is unconditioned in what is conditioned. To visualize this problem, let us use the special

17 The Dialogues of Plato, op. cit., p. 63.
case of concept art – Dog fighting Heron (1667) of Abraham Hondius. Will dog crush paw of heron, or heron will pluck out its eyes? – this is the question and an agon at its isostenic moment, that is, unable to unity with any of the possible chains of consequences. A series of possible decodings of this animalistic drama appears in the logical-ontological space of picture. But an image does not participate in any of the worlds that it implies. No settling of this fight is more or less likely. Something that is going to happen in the concretizing (phenomenological) imagination is similar and at the same time dissimilar to what actually de facto exists in the presented episode. This visual asteism shows that the ontological participation is different from the metaphysical one, which in the classical version does not abolish the logical principle of excluded middle. Metaphysics does not consider as existing what is only possible (noncontradictory), so it is possible to think. So the problem of metaphysical participation will not be solved by the logical-rhetorical trope of diaporesis that Abraham Hondius used to achieve almost isocephaly in this struggle between what is high-flying (for example Platonic, etc.) and what is mundane (Cynic etc.). We find the paradigmatic display of this struggle between metaphysics and asteiology in the Parmenides, where the One was juxtaposed with the idea of ... dust. Moreover, in the case of analogy of being, diaporia is also an aporia, since the analogia entis as analogy as such must be ultimately understood analogically, and thus asteiologically. And this is not a mistake of ignotum per ignotum, but a good solution to our problem, which rather will not satisfy ontology seeking an evidentialist truth. Such a conclusion would be potentially important for asteiology as the ingenium theory, which tracks its subreptions also in metaphysics.

Analogy – like being or ingenium – undoubtedly belongs to those fundamental words like this, something, aliquid or mana, which – as Claude Lévi-Strauss claimed – can accept any sense, remaining with a zero symbolic value, designating the fourth dimension as an unconscious category of collective thinking. These words do not always have explanatory value, but they perform an important thaumaturgical function both in the primary thinking (science du concret) and in the metaphysical explanation – also focused on being that is actually existing. Although Father Krąpiec fought structuralism, analogy in his view – ultimately understood asteiologically – confirms its manic, absolute power of something multiplication. But this is its sense – an empty promise of its reference in the enumeration of the types of analogical cognition. Thus, subreption is the inherent aspect of analogy. Its source has been indicated for

---

centuries by asteiology as the *ingenium* theory. Metaphysics – which usually ignores subreption of *ingenium* – is a resonance and a victim of wit as a more or less stable architectonica (one of the terms of metaphysics given by A. G. Baumgarten). Thus – let us repeat, encouraged by Fr. Krąpiec – although the subreption of analogy implies diaporia, then aporia based on it turns out to be in the metaphysical knowledge a *neutrum* invalidating monism as well as radical, diffusive pluralism, so it is an euporia – a good solution to the metaphysical problem of participation. But thereby metaphysics has shackled itself to an asteiology.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


Frege, Gotlob (1952) *On Sense and Reference*, in: Geach, Peter; Black, Max, eds (1952) *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gotlob Frege*, Oxford: Blackwel, pp. 56-78 (this text translated by M. Black).


METAFIZYKA W WIĘZACH ASTEIOLOGII
(streszczenie)

Czy pies zgruchocze łapę czapli, czy czapla wydłubie mu oczy? – ustawia się w przestrzeni logiczno-ontologicznej malowidła szereg możliwych rozstrzygnięć zwierzęcego dramatu. Lecz obraz nie partycypuje w żadnym ze światów, które implikuje. Ten wizualny asteizm ukazuje, że partycypacja ontologiczna różni się od partycypacji metafizycznej. Problemu partycypacji metafizycznej nie wyczerpie więc trop diaporezy, jakim posłużył się Abraham Hondius, by osiągnąć prawie izokefalię w tej walce pomiędzy tym, co górnolotne, i tym, co przyziemne, czy – być może – metafizyczne i asteiologiczne, a czego paradygmatyczny popis mamy w Parmenidesie, gdzie Jedno zestawiono z ideą … kurzu. Co więcej, w przypadku analogii bytu diaporia jest zarazem aporią, skoro analogia entis musi być ostatecznie rozumiana analogicznie (sic!), a więc asteiologicznie. I nie jest to błąd ignotum per ignotum, lecz dobre rozwiązanie naszego problemu (euporia), które ontologii poszukującej eвидencjalistycznej prawdy raczej nie zadowoli. Taka konkluzja jest potencjalnie doniosła dla asteiologii jako teorii ingenium, która tropi jego subrepcję także w metafizyce.

Słowa kluczowe: analogia, asteiologia, ingenium, metafizyka, partycypacja bytu, subrepcja